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ABSTRACT The transnationalisation of economic relations and the 
emergence of supranational sites of policy-making and governance have 
been of concern both to “affected publics” subject to the remote decision-
making that such developments entail (and who have mobilised extensively 
to demonstrate their opposition to these bodies), and scholars keen to locate 
the possibilities for a democratic politics in the context of the state’s 
subsequent diminishment (O’Brien et al., 2000; Scholte, 2001; Patomäki and 
Teivainen, 2004; Rittberger et al., 2008). One such group of scholars are 
public sphere theorists, who, taking up an ongoing concern with the 
conditions for, and criteria of, effective democratic participation in politically 
authoritative policy debates, and responding to these new dynamics, have 
begun to define a new research agenda in search of “transnational public 
spheres” (Habermas, 1989; Fraser, 1991; Fraser 2007). That is, they have 
begun to look to the transnational for sites in which those affected by the 
exercise (or, indeed, absence) of political authority at this level strive to 
engage that authority in policy debate. In this thesis, I argue for the existence 
of one such transnational public sphere, which, being both provoked and 
constituted by the transnational peasant and small farmers social movement 
La Via Campesina, promises to be institutionally realised by the recently 
reformed United Nations Committee on World Food Security (CFS). 
Identifying and exploring key dynamics relevant to the CFS’s aspirations for 
political centrality, inclusivity, and policy debate, moreover, I lay bare the 
challenges that confront the attainment of this promise. 
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Chapter One – Introduction 
1. Crisis and Rural Mobilisation 
 
Crisis. Rural crisis. However way we look at it, a number of statistics 
communicate the sense of a rural crisis that is global in its pervasiveness. In 
2000 a WorldWatch article observed somewhat despairingly, for instance, 
that, “Since 1950, the number of people involved in agriculture has 
plummeted in all industrial nations, in some regions by more than 80 
percent.” (Haliwell, 2000: 16). Breaking these statistics down, the article 
captured how, “In the past 50 years, the number of farmers has declined by 
86% in Germany, 85% in France, 85% in Japan, 64% in the U.S., 59% in 
South Korea, and 59% in the UK.” (Haliwell, 2000: 20). Similar trends are 
observable in the developing world. In Brazil, for instance, “over five million 
peasants have been driven off the land since the 1970s.” (Wittman, 2011: 
810, referencing: Dimitri et al., 2005). And in Sub-Saharan Africa, Bryceson 
records the presence of, during the last three decades, an “exceptionally 
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strong urbanization trend” - the result of a “push from a declining rural 
peasant sector rather than from the pull of rising urban productivity.” 
(Bryceson, 2011: 77). For those that have remained in the countryside, 
moreover, the picture seems bleak. In 2011 the International Fund for 
Agricultural Development’s (IFAD) Rural Poverty Report observed that, “At 
least 70% of the world’s 1.4 billion very poor people are rural” (IFAD, 2011: 
3). Moreover, of the 925 million hungry people in the world in 2011, three 
quarters of them live in rural areas (WFP, 2011).  
 
The parlous existence faced by many rural dwellers captured in the statistics 
above can and have been attributed to a combination of “inappropriate” 
policies and political neglect. Trends in agricultural investment are illustrative. 
Clapp and Cohen, for example, referencing the research of the World Bank, 
observed that: 
 
 Agricultural investment in 2007 was only 4 percent of public spending 
in sub-Saharan Africa, while the share of agriculture in official development 
assistance declined from 18 percent in 1979 to just 3.5 percent in 2004 
(World Bank 2007, 40-42). The World Bank’s lending for agriculture dropped 
even more sharply, from 30 percent of its loans in 1980 to just 3 percent in 
recent years (World Bank, 2008). Donor support for public agricultural 
research has barely kept pace with inflation. 
  (Clapp and Cohen, 2009: 5).  
 
Certainly the World Bank’s 2007 World Development Report cited by Clapp 
and Cohen - its first to focus explicitly on agriculture for thirty years - 
acknowledged the insufficient attention that had been given by political elites 
to rural peoples, speaking of “years of policy neglect and […] 
underinvestment and misinvestment in agriculture”, which reflected “a 
political economy in which urban interests have the upper hand.” (World 
Bank, 2007: 2, 7). Food aid trends - considered by the World Food 
Programme as a useful way of “assessing the fight against hunger” confirm 
the impression of neglect, having reached in the early 2000s in fact a twenty 
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year low (Webb 2003; Maxwell, 2006; WFP, 2011).1 And in its own 
assessment of the causal determinants of rural decline, IFAD’s 2011 Rural 
Poverty Report identified, as important, “Low levels of investment in 
agriculture, inappropriate policies, thin and uncompetitive markets, weak 
rural infrastructure, inadequate production and financial services, and a 
deteriorating natural resource base” (IFAD, 2011: 1).  
 
However, at the same time as rural peoples have been subject to political 
neglect and inappropriate policies, the possibility of their seeking to remedy 
these developments with a direct appeal to sites of decision-making authority 
- with the transfer upwards of such sites to the transnational level - has 
receded. In response to the debt crisis of the 1970s and the subsequent 
bailouts that many developing countries required of them, IFIs (International 
Financial Institutions) such as the World Bank and the IMF, for instance, 
gained direct influence over the economic policies of a great many 
developing countries (Patomäki and Teivainen, 2004:55).2 This has taken the 
form of loan conditionality - administered through such vehicles as 
“Structural Adjustment Programmes” – through which states have had to 
reorient their economies in accordance with the neoliberal principles 
advocated by these institutions.3 The affects of these interventions, however, 
upon the poor and rural communities are regarded as being severe, with 
small farmers – as a result of the dismantling of state support infrastructure – 
being particularly affected (Pinstrup-Andersen, 1989: 90; SAPRIN: 2004). 
Indeed, World Bank/IMF interventions are associated both with declining 
                                            
1  “[G]lobal food aid supplies climbed steadily from less than 10 million tons in the first years 
of the 1980s to more than 17 million tons in 1993. This was followed by a precipitous fall to 
less than half that peak by 1996, the year of the World Food Summit in Rome. Two years 
later, global food aid flows again reached almost 14 million tons, only to collapse once more 
in the early 2000s, to 11 million tons—the level attained 20 years before (FAO 2000).” 
(Webb, P.  (2003)  “Food as Aid: Trends, Needs and Challenges in the 21st Century”, World 
Food Programme Occasional Papers No.14.  
http://www.wfp.org/content/occasional-paper-14-food-aid-trends-needs-and-challenges-
 21st-century-patrick-webb (15.3.2011).  
2 In 2000 O’Brien et al., noted that “by 1998 eighty-four states had borrowed from the Fund 
for at least ten years” (O’Brien et al., 2000: 162). 
3 The core components of the Bank and IMF’s “structural adjustment programmes” have 
been well documented, and include: the deregulation of domestic markets (to allow a greater 
role for the private sector); the dismantling or removal of state support and services 
(including subsidies); the elimination of government controls on trade; and the privatisation 
of state enterprises (UNCATD, 2000; SAPRI, 2004). 
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numbers of smallholder producers, and hundreds of “serious political 
upheavals” around the world as a result of a deterioration in living standards 
for large swathes of the societies where structural adjustment programmes 
have been imposed (Khan, 1999; Patomäki and Teivainen, 2004). Though 
it’s concrete impacts are considered less relevant (Hathaway and Merlinda, 
1996; Ingco and Croome, 2004; FAO, 2006), the establishment of the WTO 
in 1995 and the coming into force of its Agreement on Agriculture 
established the prospect of a more enduring subordination of sites of 
domestic policy-making to the transnational, by binding its member states to 
an ongoing commitment to liberalise agricultural trade - thus limiting the 
future consideration of alternate policy instruments (Weis, 2007) – and 
further insulating, therefore, sites of food and agriculturally relevant decision-
making from those who were affected by the decisions taken therein. 
 
Indeed, in the creation narratives that chart its emergence, the establishment 
of the WTO is regarded as constituting a – if not the - major reference point 
for the mobilisation of peasant and small family farmers into the global social 
movement La Via Campesina, established in 1993 (Desmarais, 2007; 
Martìnéz and Rosset, 2010; Wittman et al., 2010). The promulgation of 
various regional agreements of significance to food and agriculture, such as 
NAFTA, the FTAA, and the CAP, had already cultivated a sense of collective 
plight, and collective identity, in the farmers’ organisations that banded 
together to resist and seek voice within them, and, as the negotiations of the 
latest round of multilateral trade negotiations – the Uruguay Round – drew to 
a close, they anticipated that the organization that this round would establish 
- the WTO - “would fundamentally alter the relationship between farmers’ 
organizations and the state”, and so a decision was taken to mobilise at the 
transnational level to provide the voice for peasant and small-family farmers 
that was needed to contest both the destructive policies and political 
marginalisation that – in the eyes of its members – this institution symbolised 
(Desmarais, 2007: 74).  
 
The concern of peasant and small-family farmers seeking voice in 
transnational food and agricultural policy and governance processes is 
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paralleled by the concern of scholars keen to locate the possibilities for a 
democratic politics in the context of the state’s subsequent diminishment 
(O’Brien et al., 2000; Scholte, 2001; Patomäki and Teivainen, 2004; 
Rittberger et al., 2008). One such group of scholars are public sphere 
theorists, who have long been concerned with the conditions for, and criteria 
of, effective democratic participation in politically authoritative policy debates 
(Habermas, 1989; Fraser, 1991; Calhoun et al., 2002). Recently, in the 
context of the transnationalisation of economic relations and sites of 
decision-making, public sphere theorist Nancy Fraser has – seeing the 
Westphalian state no longer as the satisfactory locus of the public sphere – 
insisted upon the necessity of interrogating this level in search of “new 
transnational public powers, which can be made accountable to new 
democratic transnational circuits of public opinion.” (Fraser, 2007: 24). This 
thesis can be regarded as having taken up the research agenda defined by 
Nancy Fraser. 
 
2. The Central Focus of This Thesis  
 
In this thesis, I am doing three fundamental things. Firstly, on the basis of a 
political ethnography undertaken by conducting research for this movement, 
I am arguing that La Via Campesina can in fact be read as seeking to 
provoke and constitute a transnational public sphere in food and agriculture. 
This argument derives support from three dynamics of La Via’s articulation at 
the transnational level: The movement’s strategic pursuit of a single political 
space for transnational food and agricultural decision-making; its 
contestation of food policy both - though interrelatedly - through the 
development of its “food sovereignty” framework and attempts to gain voice 
within politically meaningful discursive arenas; and the creation of the 
movement’s own autonomous discursive arenas. On the basis of these three 
dynamics, therefore, I am arguing within this thesis that the global social 
movement La Via Campesina can be read as both seeking to provoke and 
constitute a transnational public sphere. 
 
Chapter One 
Introduction 
 6 
The second fundamental thing that I am doing is arguing that, following its 
reform in 2009 as the international community sought to transform the 
international food security institutional architecture in the wake of the food 
price crisis 2007-2008, the UN Committee on World Food Security promises 
to institutionalise the transnational public sphere that is anticipated by La Via 
Campesina. This argument is again premised upon the presence of three 
fundamental aspirations within the document that provides the blueprint for 
the CFS’s reform: Firstly, its aspirations for political centrality; secondly, its 
aspirations for inclusivity, and; thirdly, its aspirations towards becoming a site 
of policy debate.  
 
And the third fundamental thing that I am doing in this thesis is identifying 
and interrogating dynamics relevant to both the CFS’s attainment of, and La 
Via’s participation within, this nascent transnational public sphere. These 
three core undertakings can be formulated as the following three overarching 
questions:  
 
1. To what extent can La Via Campesina be read as seeking to provoke and 
constitute a transnational public sphere in food and agriculture? 
 
2. To what extent can the Committee on World Food Security be read as 
promising to institutionalise the public sphere that is being provoked and 
constituted by La Via Campesina? 
 
3. What dynamics are relevant to the CFS’s realisation of a transnational 
public sphere (with La Via fulfilling its inclusivity criteria by participating within 
it)?  
 
How do I approach this? 
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 3. Chapter Overview  
 
In Chapter Two, which follows this introduction, I describe the way in which 
the research process upon which this thesis is based proceeded. The central 
vehicle for this was a research project conducted for La Via Campesina, the 
explicit objective of which was to provide the movement with information 
about the dynamics of UN food and agricultural institutions – refined over the 
course of the research to one institution in particular, the FAO (Food and 
Agricultural Organization of the United Nations) – in the midst of a period of 
particular dynamism and uncertainty following the “food price crisis 2007-
2008”. Situating this research project in the context of a broader “political 
ethnography” I describe how it provided me with a number of insights that in 
time coalesced with public sphere theory to define the focus and conceptual 
and theoretical framework for this thesis. I also reflect more generally upon 
the dynamics of conducting participatory observation with La Via Campesina 
– and its allies – and the principles that guided me during this process.  
 
In Chapter Three, I establish the theoretical and conceptual framework for 
the subsequent analysis of the thesis. Beginning my discussion with 
Habermas’s The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, I then move 
to a consideration of critical responses and revisions to this classic text to 
arrive at the definition of a public sphere – as “the site in which affected 
publics communicate and contest (symbolically and rationally) with (political) 
authority in the context of policy and governance debate” - that provides the 
anchor point for my discussion in the following pages. I also introduce a 
conceptual tool – interlocutionary subjecthood – that I believe, through an 
attentiveness to the impacts of the implicitly dynamic interplay between the 
capacities possessed by aspirant interlocutors, the extent to which their right 
to speak is recognised by other interlocutors in the discursive arena, and the 
mode of communication within the discursive arena (and other requisites of 
participation) is of methodological utility in interrogating dynamics of voice 
and power in public spheres. Within this chapter, after having addressed 
Nancy Fraser’s concerns on the need to think through the public sphere in 
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the transnational frame, I define the different conceptual “planes” of the 
transnational public sphere. Here, for example, taking up the “all affected” 
principle as defining the basic principle of inclusion, I illustrate how ambiguity 
in the ways in which we understand being “affected”, amongst others, 
captures a central dynamic of the public sphere: boundary contestation.  
 
In Chapter Four I introduce the field of transnational food policy contestation 
that provides the context for the public sphere being argued for within this 
thesis. Capturing both long term and more recent developments, I establish 
the growing importance of discursive contestation within this field of 
relations. I also identify how positions in policy debate are implicitly informed 
by background norms on the ends of agri-food systems, and the rights to be 
enjoyed and responsibilities owed by different agri-food system actors. The 
development of agricultural technology, traced in this chapter, illustrates, at 
least from an abstract level, that policy-makers are now confronted with huge 
potential variability in the scales, technologies, and instruments of food and 
agricultural production, distribution and consumption. Moreover, as these 
choices have increased, so has the number of both structurally embedded 
and interested actors trying to participate within and influence food and 
agricultural governance and policy-making. At the close of this chapter I 
bring over the conceptual framework established in Chapter Three to provide 
a broad conceptual map of the different elements of the public sphere being 
argued for within this thesis, and how they are related.   
 
In Chapter Five, in light of their importance both to La Via Campesina and to 
the viability of the public sphere, as stressed by Fraser, I identify key 
dynamics of political authority. Beginning by deducing some of the properties 
of a political authority capable of fulfilling the political efficacy component of a 
public sphere: being authoritative, being open (to debate), and being 
receptive to multiple inputs, I then move the analysis through a series of 
horizontal and vertical perspectives to capture dynamics relevant to the 
attainment of these properties. At the global level, these dynamics consist of 
a complex and fragmented institutional architecture, in which a wide range of 
different entities address different aspects of food and agricultural policy-
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making and governance with varying degrees of authority and influence. 
They also include, however, the presence of non-state actors – TNCs – the 
nature of whose relationship to states seems somewhat ambiguous. At the 
global level, moreover, are to be found the inter-state dynamics of the FAO, 
the recent history of which alerts us to the fundamental importance of 
attention to this site of relations and its relevance to both the possibility of 
political authority exercise, and – because of the impossibility of maintaining 
“dialogue” when each state seeks only to attain its own interest – of policy 
debate. Continuing the focus on policy debate, I also identify the possible 
trade offs between meaningful connections between national level authorities 
and global decision-making, on the one hand, and openness, on the other. 
The possibility of meaningful articulation with national level authorities, 
however, might be diminished by – focusing in this chapter upon inter-
ministerial dynamics – the lack of effective coordination that exists between 
the different institutional sites relevant to food and agricultural in national 
governments, and beyond.  
 
In Chapter Six I turn to La Via Campesina. This chapter is divided into two 
main sections. In the first section – part 2 – I establish the foundations of my 
argument that La Via Campesina can be read as seeking to provoke and 
constitute a transnational public sphere in food and agriculture. As stated 
above, there are three central components to this argument – firstly, La Via’s 
strategic pursuit of a single politically authoritative space for food and 
agriculture at the transnational level; secondly, the movement’s contestation 
of food and agricultural policy through the articulation of their “food 
sovereignty” framework and their attempts to gain voice in politically 
meaningful discursive arenas; and thirdly, through its constitution of 
autonomous discursive arenas – the movement itself being one. In the 
second section – part 3 – and using interlocutionary subjecthood so as to 
provide the analytical framework, I move to identify dynamics relevant to the 
attainment of La Via Campesina’s participation within a public sphere.  
 
In Chapter Seven I focus upon the body the existence of which I believe 
promises to instituionalise the public sphere that is being both provoked and 
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constituted by La Via Campesina. This body is the recently reformed UN 
Committee on World Food Security (CFS). I begin the chapter by discussing 
the context that gave rise to the process to reform this body - the “food price 
crisis 2007-2008”. I then establish exactly why I see this body as promising 
to institutionalise the transnational public sphere in food and agriculture, 
focusing upon its mandate, vision, roles and membership, as outlined in the 
reform blueprint that provides its template. Again, consistent with the 
definition of a public sphere offered in Chapter Three, and the argument that 
La Via Campesina can be read as seeking to provoke and constitute a public 
sphere developed in Chapter Six, I identify three fundamental attributes of 
the reformed CFS as fundamentally relevant – its aspirations for political 
centrality; its aspirations for inclusivity; and its aspirations to facilitate policy 
debate. Drawing from data captured during the post-reform implementation 
period, however, I lay bare some of challenges of operationalsing these 
aspirations.  
 
In Chapter Eight, the conclusion to this thesis, I situate the dynamics 
captured in Chapter Seven in the context of the discussion conducted in the 
previous pages. Invoking the three questions formulated above, I 
demonstrate how I’ve approached these questions, evaluate the extent to 
which I’ve been able to answer them, and identify both important omissions, 
and future research questions and possible “real world” interventions 
suggested by the data. In keeping with the analytical trajectory of the thesis, 
this chapter is divided into three main sections. In section 1, I address the 
range of dynamics that can be captured under the heading “policy debate”. 
In section two, I turn to “inclusivity”. And in the third section the focus will be 
on “authority”. In the conclusion I address everything else that can’t be 
subsumed under these headings.  
 
4. Conclusion 
 
This thesis stands at the intersection of two sets of distinct though 
converging concerns. On the one hand, there are the “real world” concerns 
of an “affected public” – the global social movement La Via Campesina, 
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whose members are fighting for voice in transnational food and agricultural 
policy and governance processes. The other sets of concerns – let’s say, 
more “academic” - are best captured by the research agenda established by 
Nancy Fraser, within which this thesis can be squarely situated, and which 
can be defined as the search for the conditions for, and criteria of, effective 
democratic participation in the context of the transnationalisation of 
economic relations and policy and governance processes. Thus, serving two 
masters as it were, as suggested above, in both the research process 
(captured in Chapter Two) and the Conclusion – though recognising that 
whilst in their extremes these two spheres of activity can be separated the 
distinction is otherwise a fuzzy one - I have striven to be attentive to both the 
academic and real world implications of the dynamics captured within this 
thesis.  
 
On the whole, though I have not by any degree satisfied the research 
agenda that is mapped out within this thesis, I feel that I have successfully 
met the objective that I defined for myself at the commencement of this 
research project (defined in the following chapter as “to understand and 
contribute to a grass roots struggle for subjecthood”). Amongst the positive 
achievements of this thesis I would include, in no particular order:  
 
Firstly, the development of a conceptual tool in the form of interlocutionary 
subjecthood, the methodological utility of which - when seeking to interrogate 
the dynamics of power and voice that structure inclusion and exclusion within 
discursive arenas – extends I believe beyond this thesis.  
 
Secondly, demonstrating the purchase that can be obtained between the 
research agenda defined by Nancy Fraser – the search for transnational 
public spheres – and the specific, though very expansive, field of relations 
that is transnational agri-food policy contestation. This includes 
demonstrating the applicability and analytical value of public sphere theory 
for this field of relations, and for the our understandings of the dynamics and 
meaning of La Via Campesina’s struggle for voice within this context.  
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And thirdly, capturing fundamentally important dynamics of food policy 
contestation relevant to the challenges of operationalsing that within an 
inclusive, politically efficacious discursive arena.  
 
At the moment these are three positive achievements of this thesis that 
impress themselves upon my consciousness. In Chapter Eight, the 
Conclusion to this thesis, I have striven to as clearly as possible identify the 
areas where more could, should and needs to be done.  
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Chapter Two - From La Via Campesina To Public 
Sphere via Political Ethnography 
 
1. Overview 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to describe how the research conducted for 
this thesis proceeded. There are four main sections to this chapter. Section 2 
provides a brief description of how the research got started. Section 3 
discusses the research project that I conducted for La Via Campesina. 
Section 4 describes how I arrived at public sphere theory. And in Section 5 I 
argue why the methodology that I use for this thesis can be identified as a 
political ethnography.  
 
2. Getting Started…  
 
It would be a lie of some degree of magnitude if I claimed that the research 
conducted for this thesis followed faithfully some carefully pre-structured plan 
or design. It did not. That, in the end, I was able to achieve a strong 
coherence between my original research objectives (defined, almost 
unconsciously, at the start of the research as to “understand and contribute 
to a grass roots struggle for subjecthood”) and field-work was a result either 
of intuition and luck, or divine intervention, depending upon one’s 
metaphysical proclivities. My original research proposal outlined a project to 
examine La Via Campesina’s relationship with the WTO. This was 
acceptable enough to get me admitted on to the PhD programme and, 
indeed, to secure a scholarship to conduct the research. It was not, however, 
agreeable to the movement itself, who, when I finally submitted my proposal 
before their International Coordinating Committee (ICC) after a fairly clumsy 
and naïve attempt at making contact with them, expressed their enthusiasm 
for my plan in fairly unambiguous terms, by rejecting it. This, in the first six 
months of my PhD, felt like a major blow. It was, however, an experience that 
taught me a lesson the truth of which I have come to inscribe upon my heart: 
Feeling comfortable and being where you need to be are not the same thing. 
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Following the rejection by La Via of my original proposal (the start of 2007) I 
reflected for a period (whilst progressing through the research training 
component of my PhD), before deciding that my commitment to working with 
La Via Campesina was non-negotiable. I also reflected on the embarrassing 
irony that my research was supposedly an attempt to understand – and 
assist in – a grassroots struggle for subjecthood, and yet I had failed to 
recognise the subjecthood of La Via when formulating the research 
proposal.4 However, shortly after, I experienced the first of the many bits of 
luck that would positively shape the research trajectory of this thesis. My 
supervisor was asked to write a review of a book on La Via Campesina 
written by Canadian ex-grain farmer and La Via activist now turned 
academic, but continuing Technical Support to the movement, Annette 
Desmarais, who, coincidentally, was broadly responsible for facilitating 
researcher-movement engagement and had been the channel for my 
dealings with them. Mindful of my situation and keen to facilitate my 
engagement with both the literature and the movement, he insightfully 
suggested I write it in his place. Forwarding the published review to Annette 
with a statement of my commitment to conducting research that was of 
benefit to La Via, she helped me to launch a process of dialogue with the 
movement that eventually resulted in the mutual formulation of a research 
project that would not only allow me to be true to my initial research 
objectives, but would also end up situating me (spatially and temporally) 
within the field of relations that constituted the object of my research at a 
critical location in its history: Rome – the centre of UN food and agricultural 
                                            
4 In this chapter the definition of methodology that I use and that informs the discussion is 
“The links between research objectives and research outcomes”. Whilst, I acknowledge that 
in social scientific research there are approaches that seek to provoke or produce positive 
social transformation, and my own basic motivation was along these lines, most of the time 
methodology is understood as the “how” of producing knowledge – how do we know? 
Though, in this chapter, I refer to my desire to affect some sort of positive improvement in La 
Via’s position in the field of relations in which they are active, in this discussion I bracket out 
those concerns and treat methodology in the more mainstream sense, as in the “how” of 
producing knowledge. Thus, the methodological “concerns”, of this research included 
conceptual issues like how I define “subjecthood”, but also pragmatic ones, like how I 
secured access to the field of relations, or how I “knew” this field of relations more generally.  
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activity - during the period of heightened activity following 2007-2008 food 
price crisis.5 
 
3. Conducting Research for La Via 
 
The objective of the research project that I agreed I would conduct on behalf 
of La Via Campesina was very much related to their being an actor – or 
group, or site of actors – with an interest in intervening within international 
food and agricultural policy debates. The leadership of the movement 
understood that this field of relations – particularly its institutions - was in 
something of a state of flux, and they wanted to understand better what this 
implied.6 As I discuss in Chapter Six, La Via have a particular interest in UN 
institutions, and the goal of the research was defined as seeking to 
understand the dynamics of reform across the UN system.7 From the launch 
of this project, in May 2008, the fieldwork began. Having clarified the goals of 
the project – in another research proposal (Jun 2008) – the first step was 
then for me to establish that I understood what I called “La Via Campesina’s 
positions”. To facilitate this my counterpart in the movement – Technical 
Support to the International Operational Secretariat of La Via Campesina, 
Nico Verhagen – forwarded me 12 documents, predominantly declarations, 
statements and press releases, which defined the movement’s positions on a 
number of issues. In the analysis of the UN that La Via Campesina wanted, a 
particular focus was to be placed upon 5 key themes. These were: land 
tenure and water; market and price policies; research; seeds and GMOs; 
and TNC agribusiness regulation.  
 
                                            
5 The period of time from when I first sent La Via my (rejected) proposal to when our 
research project was finally approved by the ICC was 17 months.  
6 Two briefing papers produced by La Via Campesina allies Pat Mooney from the ETC 
Group and Nora McKeon – formerly responsible for FAO’s relations with civil society, and 
currently lecturer, author and activist on rural peoples’ organizations, food issues and global 
governance – were important in framing the movement’s understanding in this regard. 
These two papers were amongst the first documents sent to me by La Via Campesina when 
I was formulating – in response to their expression of interest in researching UN reform – the 
research proposal that would eventually establish the basis of our collaborative project.  
7 As outlined in a two-page research proposal that I produced for them.  
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After having reviewed the 12 documents forwarded me by Nico and 
synthesizing their content – structured along the 5 key themes defined above 
– into a document that I sent to La Via (Aug 2008), the next step was to start 
engaging with UN reform processes, particular the institutional innovations 
and developments that were being provoked by the food price crisis of 2007-
2008 (discussed in Chapter Seven). This process resulted fairly quickly in the 
first report that I produced for the movement (October 2008, amended Feb 
2009): an analysis of the policy document produced by the UN Secretary-
General’s High Level Task Force on the Global Food Security Crisis, the 
Comprehensive Framework for Action (see Table 1 for full list of the 
documents produced during this research). Shortly after this, also October 
2008, I attended La Via Campesina’s Vth International Conference, just 
outside of Maputo, Mozambique. This was a critical moment in the research 
process because it was where I first met face-to-face many of the people 
who had already been, and would go on to become, very important to my 
research, such as Nico Verhagen, Annette Desmarais, Beatriz Gasco from 
the IPC, and Sofia Monsalve from FIAN.8 Indeed, after discussing my 
research with Beatriz, she suggested I attend the meeting of FAO’s 
Conference (the institution’s highest governing body) the following month, 
November 2008, my invitation being facilitated by the IPC. This event 
provided my first introduction to this institution and my first opportunity to 
conduct some interviews. These interviews – with long term FAO-watchers 
Pat Mooney from the ETC group, Antonio Onorati, IPC International Focal 
Point, and Flavio Valente from FIAN, augmented with an interview with the 
FAO official responsible for FAO-CSO relations, Thomas Price – confirmed 
to me that the breadth of the research project as conceived was impossible 
to deliver, and so following discussion with Nico Verhagen the focus of the 
                                            
8 Annette and I had already talked on the telephone several times and we had developed a 
good relationship, so it was a pleasure to meet her face to face. She also greatly aided my 
introductions to other key La Via allies and sympathetic experts by literally walking me 
around the busy conference and introducing me personally to anybody she thought I ought 
to speak to. As my counterpart in the movement – Nico Verhagen – was totally consumed 
with the exigencies of running a 5-600 people conference, and therefore had, 
understandably, virtually no time to give to me, I was of course extremely grateful for her 
intercedence.  
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project was narrowed to the Rome-based UN institutions – FAO, IFAD, and 
WFP – with the accent upon FAO. 
 
In January of 2009 I attended my first meeting of the international civil 
society network that, as I discuss in Chapter Six, has played a historically 
important role in facilitating La Via’s engagement with UN/FAO policy 
processes: the International Planning Committee for Food Sovereignty (IPC). 
My participation was again facilitated by Beatriz Gasco, a core member of 
the IPC’s Secretariat and whom I profile in Chapter Six, upon the condition 
that I would serve as rapporteur for the three-day meeting. This was of 
course acceptable to me – I had already served as rapporteur for a meeting 
at La Via’s Vth international conference, and in the course of the research 
would serve as rapporteur for four meetings in total (see Table 2 for a list of 
the meetings I attended during the course of this research and the roles 
performed at each). Following this meeting I took an institutionally enforced 
hiatus from the data collection to fulfill the requirement of my MPhil-PhD 
transfer, but even this proved to be fortuitous because it meant that the bulk 
of my data collection - interviews conducted and meetings attended over four 
months in Rome - was moved back to fortuitously coincide with the 
successful resolution of the process to produce a blueprint for CFS reform 
(discussed in Chapter Seven) in October 2009, and the People’s Food 
Sovereignty Forum organised to run parallel to the FAO Summit, in 
November of the same year.  
 
In July 2009 I moved to Rome for a four-month period, where I conducted 
interviews and attended several significant meetings. Again, early interviews 
in this period revealed that even after having already narrowed the focus of 
the research project once, it was still too broad. Again, following discussions 
with my counterpart in the movement, Nico Verhagen, with whom I was in 
constant contact throughout the course of the research (Box One outlines 
some of the principles that guided my relationship with La Via), the research 
project was finally narrowed to five key questions, or aspirations, which 
would be used to structure the ongoing research: 
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1. La Via Campesina want to understand the disconnects between FAO 
headquarters and regional and country offices;  
 
2. La Via Campesina want a single space for UN food and agricultural 
policy-making and governance; 
 
3. La Via Campesina want the FAO to return to its mandate and to 
respond to La Via Campesina’s agenda; 
 
4. La Via Campesina want to know more about the ICARRD follow-up 
process;  
 
5. La Via Campesina want to know the plans of the Treaty Secretariat 
following the Tunis meeting. 
 
In October 2009 I was ready to write up my findings for La Via in a report, 
and in December I returned to the UK where I commenced the writing up of 
the thesis in earnest. In 2010, however, I returned to Rome twice, to be the 
rapporteur once again for the IPC meeting in March, and to participate in a 
training session for La Via Campesina European leaders, in June, at FAO. 
This last event more or less signaled the conclusion of my project with La 
Via. However, in August of the same year I was commissioned by the IPC to 
write a Briefing Paper for Civil Society (the food sovereignty movement) on 
the Committee on World Food Security (CFS), the promise of which for 
global food and agricultural policy-making and governance – following the 
recent elaboration of a blueprint for its reform – needed to be communicated 
amongst the wider networks, whose participation was – and will continue to 
be - essential in fact to the realisation of that promise. My final visit to Rome 
was in October 2011, to attend the second annual session of the reformed 
CFS, it’s 37th annual plenary session since its founding. 
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BOX ONE Principles that guided my relationship with La Via Campesina  
 
Both during and after the period of time in which I enjoyed a working 
relationship with La Via (from May 2008 to the presentation of my research 
findings at a training session for La Via leaders in June 2010) I recognised 
that certain interrelated principles – following the education provided by their 
rejection of my proposal - were guiding my conduct with the movement:  
 
Recognising interests – Obviously, prior to La Via’s rejection of my 
proposal I had not really recognised them as an autonomous group of actors 
with their own interests and agenda. This changed as soon as they declined 
my request for the movement to participate in my research, and I understood 
very clearly that La Via were more than simply data for me to mine in the 
construction of my thesis. The failure to recognise this, I would say, seems to 
be quite widespread. I have been contacted a few times over the course of 
my research by fellow PhD students seeking to include La Via in their data 
collection plans, and none of them – just like me - had factored in La Via’s 
interests in their proposals. That is, they had assumed that La Via’s leaders 
and the movement would make themselves available to participate in their 
interviews or contribute to whatever theoretical or conceptual concerns they 
were pursuing. 
 
It seems to me, however, that the recognition of interests goes beyond the 
researcher-researched relationship and extends to the wider field of relations 
in which the movement operates. This includes a wide range of economically 
and politically powerful actors with commercial and strategic interests, such 
as agribusiness TNCs, and states. Thus far La Via Campesina, as a 
movement seeking radical change in the agri-food system and attempting to 
contest, head on, neoliberalism, its advocates and beneficiaries, does not 
appear to have been the target of an overt campaign of delegitimation 
(though many of its member organisations at the national and sub-national 
levels face hostile political and security contexts). If this were to be the case, 
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however, researchers might have to think carefully about the different ways 
in which their research findings could be taken up and used by those seeking 
to diminish the movement’s potential influence. However, irrespective of 
whether or not La Via is the target of a campaign of overt delegitimation, the 
movement does have a fundamental interest in appearing strong, both to its 
members, who, politically and economically marginalised in many instances, 
appreciate movement “victories” at the global level (Interview, Paul 
Nicholson, founder member of La Via Campesina, and two-term member of 
its ICC, 19.8.2011), and to the other actors in its field of relations. The 
implications of this for movement-oriented research, I think, need to be 
thought through.  
 
Establishing clarity - As a researcher, irrespective of my values and 
political aspirations, I was aware that I had interests – to obtain good data, to 
explore theoretical concerns that were not an immediate concern of La Via 
Campesina, and so forth – that gave my attitude to La Via a certain 
instrumental complexion. At the same time, maintaining good working 
relations in any context requires clear channels of communication. In order to 
avoid any misunderstanding, therefore, regarding both mine and the 
movement’s expectations for the project that I was conducting on their 
behalf, and how this related to my PhD, I sought to make as clear as 
possible – mainly through the production of documents – my own positions, 
and obtain clarity – through conversations and discussions with my 
counterpart, Nico Verhagen - on the movement’s. This approach 
necessitated an ongoing mindfulness regarding potential areas of 
disagreement and confusion, and a willingness to invest in the 
communicative process. Also, by being completely up front about what I 
wanted from the process and how I sought to use the data generated within 
the project, and giving La Via the right to veto this, it required a willingness to 
be rejected, or for things not to go my way.   
 
Being discrete – Through the project that I conducted for La Via I obtained 
access to a wide range of civil society spaces, such as IPC meetings, civil 
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society preparatory and briefing meetings at the start and finish of the day’s 
proceedings at FAO intergovernmentals, and La Via Campesina caucus 
meetings at events such as the People’s Food Sovereignty Civil Society 
Forum, Rome, 2009. These spaces also included, moreover, informal 
spaces, such as evening meals at which - whilst predominantly social in 
character - important issues were discussed, relationships managed, and so 
forth. From the outset, when entering those spaces, my general attitude was 
“keep silent”. That is, irrespective of the topic being discussed, I understood 
my role as a researcher meant that I had no participation rights, and so I just 
observed (or, more accurately, took notes). My decision to adopt this attitude 
– which seemed to me to be the only ethical one available – was reinforced 
by the comments of the actors themselves within those spaces, who’d had 
past experiences of admitting access to researchers only to have them 
constantly speaking within meetings. In the more structured spaces – such 
as the meetings – this policy was easy to follow, as the boundaries of the 
meeting were clear to discern. In the more informal spaces, however, this 
required a bit more sensitivity and intelligence - knowing when to step back 
from a particular conversation or yield up a seat so that an important 
relationship could be advanced or issue discussed. Though it wasn’t always 
easy, on the whole I think I managed to “keep my place” throughout the 
course of the research.9  
 
                                            
9 There was, however, one instance in which I overstepped the mark. It was one of the few 
civil society meetings I attended at which my status was somewhat blurred, as I had been 
called upon to feedback some of my research findings and also had some insights from my 
background in conflict studies that were of value to the topic being discussed. Warmed up 
as it were by my contributions in the plenary, in a subsequent break-out session I found 
myself – something of a natural talker in any case - waxing lyrical on a UN body that I had 
been reading about recently when suddenly the meeting organiser interrupted me, 
somewhat sternly, to say that this wasn’t really relevant and they needed to return to the 
issue at hand. As a researcher without any representative or organisational legitimacy my 
speaking-rights were minimal and I had liberally exceeded them. Conscious that I had 
overstepped the mark, I approached the organiser during the coffee break to apologise. He 
accepted, and that was the end of it. It reminded me that – particularly as my 
relationships/friendships and the sense of the connection to the movement and its networks 
deepened – maintaining the sense of place appropriate to my status in these meetings and 
encounters required an ongoing diligence.  
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Making (and demonstrating) commitment – Clearly, by choosing to focus 
my research upon La Via Campesina I was committing to the idea that non-
state actors do and should matter in what broadly we can call “international 
relations”. Beyond this, however, the process of establishing a working 
relationship with La Via Campesina required quite a big commitment in terms 
of time and energy and, to an extent, well-being. Indeed, waiting until La 
Via’s International Coordination Committee had approved my proposal 
before I knew exactly what, and how, I would be researching for my PhD 
required quite a bit of brinksmanship on my part. If, in May 2008, nearly two 
years into the process, they had rejected the proposal again, it would’ve 
been difficult for me to recover my position (i.e., find another research 
project). In the end, the process of negotiating with La Via did not cost me 
anything in terms of time for my PhD, as I was fully engaged in general 
preparatory reading (the food and agricultural literature) more or less right up 
to the point at which they “green lighted” our project. Needless to say, the 
presence of a sympathetic and courageous supervisor able to both tolerate 
and encourage a research process of this nature was of inestimable 
advantage.  
 
As a researcher without any pre-existing connection to the movement or to 
food and agricultural activism in general, the persistence that I demonstrated 
in seeking to include La Via within my research plans was important to their 
being able to see that I was in fact committed to working with them and 
contributing to their struggle. In this regard the book review that I was able to 
write for Annette Desmarais’s book was also important, or at least felt 
important to me. When I met La Via personnel at their Vth International 
Conference in Mozambique in 2008, in fact, they joked about the level of 
determination to work with them that I’d shown.  
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4. Engaging with Public Sphere Theory 
 
Conducting a research project for La Via Campesina, then, was at the heart 
of my methodology. It is important to note, however, that from the outset of 
the project I was also exploring questions – related to my overarching 
objectives to understand and contribute to a grassroots struggle for 
subjecthood – that were not subsumable within the research questions that 
provided the focus of my research for La Via. Indeed, most of the time these 
questions were unarticulated, and could probably be better understood as 
orienting “insights”, or will-o’-the-wisp type illuminations. One such early 
insight concerned the relationships between the different ways in which we 
understand the ends of agri-food systems (norms) and the relative decline or 
strengthening in the position of agri-food system actors (discussed in 
Chapter Four). Another – reflecting upon the context in which La Via 
formulated strategy - was related to my (supervisor-facilitated) recognition 
that in transnational food and agricultural policy and governance processes 
there were no publics to speak of, at least not to the extent to be found in the 
national context, where an action or demonstration might find itself being 
reported in a national media and disseminated to the wider media-
consuming public. Media coverage of transnational food and agricultural 
policy and governance processes is exceptionally thin – though, as captured 
in Chapter four, it seems to be improving – and this changes the context. 
However, one of the most important insights of the whole process of 
formulating this thesis was my recognition that far from seeing La Via as 
operating in a context without publics, they were the public. This was in fact 
the critical insight upon which the whole thesis was built.  
 
Following the conclusion of my research trip to Rome in December 2009, 
however, none of these insights had coalesced into a thesis. Indeed, 
throughout most of the period in which I conducted my research I did not in 
fact have any real idea what my PhD was about, let alone have a question.10 
                                            
10 When people asked me what my research was about I said, “Travelling the UN-La Via 
Campesina interface”.  
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My attempts to find a literature that would allow me flesh out my idea of 
“subjecthood” had not been successful, and I had no real conceptual or 
theoretical orientation. However, slowly but surely, working through the data, 
reflecting and talking with my supervisor, and reading, I began to put the 
thesis together. The turn to public sphere theory was, of course, a very 
important part of that process. This provided the final stage in a process of 
reflection that eventually allowed me to “discover” my research focus in early 
April 2010 (three and a half years after the start of the PhD). It also allowed 
me to develop a conceptual tool to interrogate the dynamics of participation 
in discursive processes/arenas – “interlocutionary subjecthood”, discussed in 
Chapter Four.  
 
BOX TWO Data Collection 
 
The data collection for this thesis can be roughly divided into two periods. 
The first period, from May 2008 – April 2010, was one in which I conducted 
“exploratory” research, primarily through a research project conducted for La 
Via Campesina, but also – in my reflections and data collection - through the 
exploration of other themes and ideas. The second period, from April 2010 to 
October 2011, was where – having identified the theoretical and conceptual 
focus of my research – I conducted more focused data collection, specifically 
through interviews and attending the 37th Session of the CFS. The four 
means of data collection in this project were, therefore, document analysis, 
observation, participation (predominantly conducting the research project), 
and interviews and “conversations”. In total, 67 interviews and data-relevant 
conversations were conducted (excluding ongoing dialogue with several 
actors over the course of the research project I conducted for La Via and 
beyond), 24 with FAO officials, 9 with FAO member state representatives, 7 
with officials from other UN entities (IFAD and the HLTF), and 26 with civil 
society actors with experience of UN food and agricultural policy and 
governance activity.11 The process of selecting these constituencies – and 
                                            
11 Though I have quoted directly from only 33 of these interviews and conversations in this 
thesis, this is not to diminish the value of the remaining 34. Each of the interviews and 
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the specific individuals within them – was fairly straightforward. Firstly, with 
the civil society constituency, certain individuals were initially identified to me 
by Nico Verhagen – my counterpart within La Via – as being very worth 
speaking to. These were mainly “sympathetic experts” - civil society actors 
who were very immersed in the UN-civil society interface and who worked 
closely with La Via and who therefore could offer me important insights. As I 
spent more time in both the civil society and FAO spaces I also met or 
observed other actors who stood out to me as being worth talking to. With 
the FAO officials a small number were identified by me by virtue of their 
presence or close proximity to civil society spaces or spaces that civil society 
participated within. These individuals then often referred me on to other 
people worth speaking to.  I also was introduced to a number of officials 
through a somewhat unexpected route – my landlord in Rome, a writer and 
consultant for the Rome-based UN agencies - was friends with a couple of 
UN officials whom I was able to speak to and who also recommended others 
that I should speak to. With FAO member state representatives it was less 
organic. I found a list of Perm Rep (Permanent Representative) email 
addresses online and just contacted them introducing myself as conducting a 
research project for La Via Campesina. Many whom I contacted did not reply 
– none from Asia or Africa, for instance – but with the ones that did, I got 
lucky, as they had occupied or were set to occupy positions within FAO’s 
institutional dynamic that provided or would provide very valuable 
perspectives. And finally, with the actors from other UN entities, this was 
straightforward. They were all globally active individuals whose institutional 
locations afforded them, again, a unique perspective on the field of relations 
that I was researching, whom I was made aware of chiefly through their 
participation in meetings. Appendix 1 contains a list of the individuals with 
whom I conducted interviews and data relevant conversations.  
 
As I mentioned above, my overarching research objective was to understand 
and contribute towards a “grassroots struggle for subjecthood”. Though the 
process was one that was far from steered or managed by me, in this thesis I 
                                            
conversations that I conducted in this research made an important contribution to my 
thinking and the overall perspective formulated across these pages.  
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have nonetheless been able to establish a strong coherence between my 
research objectives, my data collection, and my theoretical and conceptual 
framework. This will hopefully become apparent in the remainder of the 
thesis.  
 
By conducting my research primarily through a research project for La Via 
Campesina, what type of methodology was I using? I propose that this 
methodology can be best understood as a political ethnography.  
 
5. Evaluating The Methodology 
 
Whilst noting that, within the field of cultural anthropology, where 
ethnographic methodologies first developed, there is no agreement about 
what ethnography actually is, in the introduction to his 2009 edited volume 
Political Ethnography: What Immersion Contributes to the Study of Power, 
Schatz identifies two key dimensions to the approaches of those who are to 
varying degrees conducting political ethnography. The first of these 
concerns the equation of ethnography with “participant observation”, which 
is to say that “immersion in a community, a cohort, a locale, or a cluster of 
related subject positions is taken to be the sine qua non of this approach” 
(2009: 5). The second less commonly understood dimension – the 
importance of which emerges from the studies conducted by the contributors 
to his edited volume – is that: 
 
 [E]thnography is a sensibility that goes beyond face-to-face contact. It 
is an approach that cares – with the possible emotional engagement that 
[this] implies – to glean the meanings that the people under study attribute to 
their social and political reality. Thus, while some scholars equate 
ethnography with participant observation, one may nonetheless abstract 
from participant-observation qualities that inform a more general 
ethnographic sensibility. 
  (2009: 5).  
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Burroway, also, introducing another collaborative work of political 
ethnography Global Ethnography: Forces, Connection and Imaginations in a 
Postmodern World, identifies “four dimensions of the extended case method 
with a sensitivity to questions of power and reflexivity” (2000: 26-28). The 
first of these is the “extension of the observer into the world of the 
participant” [Emphasis in original]. That is, the researcher doesn’t seek to 
bring the researched into the lab, but enters their natural field of relations. 
The second dimension “refers to extensions of observations over time and 
space”. This is straightforward. The third dimension refers to “extending from 
micro processes to macro forces” from the “space-time rhythms of the site to 
the geographical context of the field”. And the fourth dimension addresses 
the “extension of theory. Rather than being “induced” from the data, 
discovered “de novo” from the ground, existing theory is extended to 
accommodate observed lacunae or anomalies.” (Burroway, 2000: 28).  
 
How does the research that I have conducted for this thesis embody the 
dimensions identified by Schatz and Burroway as pertaining to political 
ethnography?  
 
Firstly, by conducting a research project for La Via Campesina I entered the 
field of relations in which they are active from their subject position. I 
purposively located myself where they stood, and, assuming their 
problematic as my own – embodied in the focus of the research project that I 
conducted for them - engaged with UN food and agricultural policy and 
governance activity. Of course, this approach did not give me access to the 
on-the-ground, lived realities of La Via Campesina members (their struggle 
as farmers in specific political, social, economic and ecological contexts), but 
it did enable me to understand that the transnational field of relations in 
which La Via is active is one of food and agricultural policy-relevant 
discursive contestation. It also allowed me to understand not just that food 
and agricultural policy is contested, but also the nature of that contestation – 
specifically its normative dimensions (discussed in Chapter Four) Moreover, 
as well as being able to see very clearly the contested nature of food and 
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agricultural policy and governance activity – something lost, for example, on 
more institutional actors such as the authors of the Independent External 
Evaluation of FAO, discussed in Chapter Five – this approach also 
highlighted the importance of the institutional dynamics of transnational food 
and agricultural policy and governance activity, and a range of issues related 
to voice and representation, issues the significance of which was affirmed to 
me as a result of my adopting the perspective of La Via Campesina seeking 
to influence food and agricultural policy and governance processes.  
 
Secondly, this research was extended in time. I entered the field in May 
2008 – when I began to engage with La Via positions and synthesize these 
into a document so that the movement could see that I understood what they 
stood for – and, though the research project that I conducted for La Via can 
be said to have more or less finished with the presentation I made for them 
in June 2010, the process of writing the Civil Society Briefing Paper over 
August-September 2010 extended the process of viewing the field of 
relations from La Via’s perspective. Certainly important insights that I had 
struggled to bring through became established during that experience, an 
experience that leads to the third way in which this research embodies the 
principles of political ethnography: through the cultivation of a sensitivity to 
La Via’s perspective. 
 
At the outset of the research it is fairly accurate to say that as an urbanite 
from an affluent advanced capitalist country I had virtually zero capacity to 
appreciate the dynamics of the grass-roots situation faced by the 
movement’s members, or the specific challenges of establishing and 
maintaining a transnational social movement such as La Via Campesina. In 
my generally secure life, I had never encountered anything near to the type 
of situation in which they exist. As I have learned over the course of this 
research – and which is communicated in the Introduction to this thesis - one 
of the words that La Via members, and other rural constituencies, use most 
often to describe their situation is “crisis”. The sense of crisis decimating 
rural peoples and their livelihoods came across very strong in my journeys 
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through the spaces constituted by La Via and their allies, whether I 
encountered farmers, and other small scale food producers, from Canada, 
Argentina, India, Sri Lanka, Europe, the U.S. and so on. Indeed, the 
universality of the sense of crisis being experienced by rural peoples the 
world over is in part what provokes and sustains the existence of a 
transnational social movement like La Via Campesina in the first place. 
However, I had never experienced such a thing12, and it took – I confess – 
many exposures to their testimony before I finally internalised this important 
dynamic. At the same time, as I struggled to appreciate fully – or, even, in 
part - the reality faced by La Via’s members on the ground – communicated 
to me via their reports and testimony – I also struggled to accept, if you like, 
the non-collaborative, conflictual stance of La Via on certain issues. As I 
discovered through this research, by tendency I am a dialogue-oriented 
person. However, unlike, for instance, many within the UN who are 
seemingly unable to tolerate any form of overt conflict to the extent where 
they will only invite to meetings those organisations that are more compliant 
or collaboration-friendly – and whose power-blindness I jokingly referred to 
with my UN friends (who agreed with me) as an UNconsciousness – over 
the course of this research I have learned to understand that before dialogue 
you must have security.13 When – as with La Via Campesina – your basic 
ontological security is under threat, it’s difficult to shift into a collaborative 
attitude, and as I discuss in the conclusion to this thesis, securing the rights 
of peasant farmers is a prerequisite of any policy dialogue. These dynamics 
have only become apparent to me because of the cultivation of an attitude of 
sensitivity (both as a result of my deliberate efforts, and of the repeated 
“messaging” of the field) on my part.  
 
                                            
12 Though a rather painful and unilaterally imposed restructuring of my department (Peace 
Studies) devoid of any meaningful process of consultation and without any regard for the 
views of those who stood outside of the thinking of senior management and the small group 
of (rapidly promoted) individuals who agreed with them, gave me an unpleasant but 
gratefully received taster. 
13 This tendency – though not endemic – was conveyed to me by interviews with UN 
personnel, observations within meetings, and anecdotes shared to me by civil society 
actors.  
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And finally, the last of the attributes identified above and embodied in my 
approach was the “extension in theory”. Of course, the appropriateness of 
public sphere theory for my research could only have become apparent to 
me after I had been in the research for just under two years, because it was 
only by then that I had identified the key dynamics of the field and of La Via’s 
engagement with it. However, once I alighted upon public sphere theory, 
and particularly the exhortation of Nancy Fraser, in the context of a 
diminished Westphalian state, for us to think through the public sphere in a 
transnational frame, then I could both consolidate my methodology – 
through the development of interlocutionary subjecthood – and understand 
exactly where the bulk of my contribution to a theory/literature was being 
made.  
 
The presence of these dynamics, therefore, within my methodology leads 
me to identify my research approach as a political ethnography. As I said 
above, the “subject position” that I adopted or sought to identify with was of 
La Via’s within a field of discursive contestation (of food policy). This might 
sound quite abstract, but in this research I have attempted to communicate 
both the concrete – actual dynamics of particular sites – and abstract – the 
role of norms – dynamics of this field. This is a field that is constituted, 
therefore, through both ideas, and specific points and actors in space and 
time.  
 
 
BOX THREE Knowing the field 
 
When I talk about “La Via Campesina” whom or what am I talking about? 
How do we “know” them as a movement? Moreover, the body that 
constitutes a central focus of this thesis – the Committee on World Food 
Security –was only reformed in 2009. How do we gain insight into the 
dynamics that might shape its work? This box provides a methodological 
justification for “knowing” both La Via Campesina – predominantly through 
their documents and interviews with La Via leaders – and dynamics relevant 
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to the CFS – by centering an analysis upon its host institution, the Food and 
Agricultural Organization of the United Nations.  
 
La Via Campesina is a big movement. It is constituted by 148 regional, 
national and sub-national organisations in 69 countries, and by some 
estimates represents the interests of 500 million farmer families. The 
movement defines itself as bringing together “peasants, small and medium-
size farmers, landless people, women farmers, indigenous people, migrants 
and agricultural workers from around the world.” Whilst the platform of La 
Via Campesina – food sovereignty, discussed in Chapter Six – is more or 
less clear and straightforward, within and across those constituencies 
important differences have been identified with regards to interests and 
political programmes. This raises the question as to how we “know” 
something as potentially variegated as a movement like La Via Campesina? 
The organisational structure of La Via is important in that regard. 
 
The main decision-making body of the movement is its International 
Conference. Since its inception, in 2003, there have been five of these.14 
Taking place every three-four years, these are where “representatives of the 
member organisations engage in collective analysis and policy development, 
as well as negotiation and consensus-building processes.” (Martìnez and 
Rosset, 2010: 164). The international conferences define the political 
direction and strategies of the movement, as well as its internal functioning.  
 
In-between the International Conferences, strategic decision-making within 
La Via Campesina is undertaken by the International Coordinating 
Committee (ICC). Constituted by a male and female farm leader from each 
of the 8 regions into which La Via is divided, and meeting twice a year, the 
                                            
14 Ist Mons, Belgium, May 15th - 16th, 1993 
IInd Tlaxcala, Mexico, April 18th - 21st, 1996 
IIIrd Bangalore, India, October 3rd - 6th, 2000 
IVth Brazil, São Paulo, June 14th - 19th June 2004 
Vth  Mozambique, Maputo, 17th - 23rd October, 2008 
La Via Campesina Website. “Our Conferences”. 
http://viacampesina.org/en/index.php?option=com_content&view=category&layout=blog&id=
33&Itemid=55 (1.6.2011).  
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ICC ensures compliance with International Conference agreements, 
evaluates the situations in regions, and takes broad strategic decision-
making. It was the ICC that, firstly, rejected my research proposal, and then 
finally green-lighted it.  
 
The day-to-day management of the movement, as it were, is the 
responsibility of the International Operational Secretariat (IOS). This 
coordinates actions and implements the agreements reached at the 
International Conferences. The IOS rotates between La Via Campesina 
organisations/regions every four years, though it was in Honduras for two 
terms and in 2012 – when it rotates to an African organisation – will have 
been in its present location, Jakarta, Indonesia, for two terms. My 
counterpart in the movement, Nico Verhagen, is a Technical Support for the 
IOS of La Via Campesina.  
 
Thus even though it may be said that the movement exhibits a degree of 
heterogeneity at the base, the way that it is structured works to, or aspires 
to, project a reasonably singular and coherent presence at the global, 
translating International Conference decision-making into global action. This 
is achieved, for instance, by the management of movement spokespeoples’ 
communications in intergovernmental fora. In my analysis of La Via, in 
Chapter Six, therefore, given the degree of coordination across the 
movement, I feel reasonably comfortable identifying “La Via positions” in the 
different types of documents that I cite (predominantly Conference 
Declarations, Conference discussion papers, IOS press releases, and ICC 
briefing papers) and the responses of La Via members whom I have 
interviewed (Paul Nicholson, two-term member of the ICC and widely 
recognised as a “key Via Campesina leader” (Borras, 2008); and Nico 
Verhagen, my counterpart in the movement, and Technical Support to the 
International Operational Secretariat).  
 
(Desmarais, 2007; Rosset and Martìnez, 2005; Borras, 2008: Borras and 
Franco, 2009; Martìnez and Rosset, 2010; La Via Campesina, 2011).  
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In the case of the Committee on World Food Security (CFS), and I make this 
point again in Chapter Seven, though it has only been reformed since 2009, 
we can identify dynamics relevant to both its possible attainment of its self-
defined aspirations, and, by extension, the criteria of a public sphere, by 
interrogating the Food and Agricultural Organization of the UN (FAO). This is 
simply because a) the CFS remains an intergovernmental committee in FAO 
with the same formal decision-making dynamics as FAO committees, and 
member states participate in its work predominantly through their FAO 
representations; and b) though less relevant, the fact that the Secretariat of 
the CFS is provided by FAO staff. Indeed, within the blueprint that 
establishes the vision for CFS reform, the content of which is discussed in 
Chapter Seven, the CFS is explicitly defined as an “intergovernmental 
committee in FAO” (CFS:2009/2, Paragraph 4).  
 
6. Chapter Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I have provided a description of how I conducted the research 
for this thesis. As noted above, this approach is perhaps best defined as a 
political ethnography. However, before proceeding to the thesis proper, there 
is one fundamentally important point that needs to be made. 
 
Clearly, in terms of chronology, there was something of a discrepancy 
between the period in which I conducted the bulk of the fieldwork, and the 
period in which I developed the theoretical and conceptual framework that 
provides the analytical framework for this thesis. However, I do not think that 
this poses any problems for the thesis because the themes and questions 
that I was exploring both through my research project for La Via and through 
my own private trajectory have – as will become apparent during the course 
of the thesis – yielded more than enough data for me to be able to be able to 
put my theoretical and conceptual framework to work, as it were. That said, it 
will become apparent that in Chapters Three and Four I outline a research 
agenda that is not exhausted by this thesis. This however, is not the result of 
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a methodological weakness – that of working largely intuitively for most of 
the research and then elaborating a theoretical and conceptual framework 
more or less after the bulk of the fieldwork. This is to say, it is not about the 
relationship between the point in time at which the theoretical framework was 
elaborated and when the fieldwork was conducted. It is however about the 
relationship between the scale of the field of relations, the broad contours of 
which are mapped out in this thesis, and the capacity of one researcher, in 
the lifetime of one PhD, to research it. In Chapter Eight, the thesis 
conclusion, I make this point in more detail, as well as identifying some of the 
many future questions and research projects that are generated by this 
thesis.  
 
DATE DOCUMENT PRODUCED 
1) Jan 2007 Research Proposal for La Via 
(Rejected) 
2) Jan 2008 Follow up Proposal (statement of 
commitment to working with 
movement and inviting them to 
propose research areas) 
3) May 2008 Research Proposal for La Via 
Campesina: “UN Reform” (Appendix 
Two) 
4) Jun 2008 Document for La Via clarifying my 
research interests (“transnational 
power relations”) 
5) Aug 2008 “Five Key Themes” (document 
establishing my understanding of La 
Via positions) 
6) Jan 2009 Rapporteur Report: IPC Meeting, 15-
17 Jan, 2009, Rome  
7) Feb 2009 Report for La Via: “The 
Comprehensive Framework for 
Action of the HLTF” 
8) Mar 2009 Progress Report for La Via 
(seeking to refine the research 
focus)  
9) Jun 2009  Plan: Rome Research Trip  
10) Oct 2009 Report: Findings on FAO Research 
11) Nov 2009 Rapporteur Report: People’s Food 
Sovereignty Forum 2009, Working 
Group One, “Who decides about food 
and agriculture?/ Who decides about 
food policies?”, 13-17 Nov, 2009, 
Rome 
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12) Nov 2009  Declaration: People’s Food 
Sovereignty Forum 2009, Working 
Group One, “Who decides about food 
and agriculture?/ Who decides about 
food policies?”, 13-17 Nov, 2009, 
Rome 
13) Mar 2010 Rapporteur Report: IPC Meeting, 19-
21 March, 2010 
14) Aug 2010 “The Reformed Committee on World 
Food Society: A Briefing Paper for 
Civil Society”, commissioned by 
Basque NGO Mundubat, Facilitated 
by IPC  
 
Table 1. Documents Produced for La Via (and the IPC) during the course of 
the research  
 
 
DATE MEETING ROLE 
1) 19-23 Oct 2008 
 
La Via Campesina’s Vth 
International 
Conference, Maputo, 
Mozambique 
Rapporteur (meeting on 
Strategy for TNCs),  
Observer 
2) 18-21 Nov 2008  FAO Conference, FAO, 
Rome 
Observer 
3) 23-24 Nov 2008  Stakeholder Meeting on 
process to formulate a 
set of Guidelines for the 
Responsible 
Governance of Tenure 
of Land, Forests and 
Fisheries 
Guidelines, FAO, Rome 
Observer 
4) 15-17Jan 2009  Annual meeting of the 
International Planning 
Committee for Food 
Sovereignty (IPC), 
Rome 
Rapporteur 
5) 24-25 Sep 2009 FAO Workshop: “How to 
increase food security 
and empower small 
producers: Learning 
from Good Practices in 
Institution Building” 
FAO, Rome 
Participant 
6) 10-11 Oct 2009 
   
  
IPC Anti-Hunger 
Committee Meeting (To 
finalise Policies and 
Actions to Eradicate 
Hunger and Malnutrition 
Participant 
Chapter Two 
From La Via Campesina to Public Sphere Via Political Ethnography 
 
 36 
document), Rome   
7) 14-17 Oct 2009  35th Session of the 
Committee on World 
Food Security, Rome 
  
Observer 
8) 13-17 Nov 2009  People’s Food 
Sovereignty Forum, 
Rome 
Rapporteur (Working 
Group One, “Who 
decides about food and 
agriculture?/ Who 
decides about food 
policies?”) 
Rapporteur (Alliances 
Caucus) 
Note-taker (La Via 
Campesina Daily 
Caucus) 
9) 18-23 Nov 2009  FAO Conference, 36th 
Session, Rome 
Observer 
10) 25 Nov 2009  FAO Council, 138th 
Session, Rome 
Observer 
11) 19-21 Mar 2010  Annual meeting of the 
International Planning 
Committee for Food 
Sovereignty (IPC), 
Rome  
Rapporteur 
12) 14-16 Jun 2010  La Via Training 
Workshop, FAO, Rome 
Session Presenter 
Observer 
13) 16-19 Jun 2010  FAO Committee on 
Agriculture (COAG), 
22nd Session, FAO, 
Rome 
Observer 
14) 17-22 Oct 2011 Committee on World 
Food Security, 37th 
Session, FAO, Rome 
Observer 
 
 
Table 2: Meetings attended during the course of the research 
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Chapter Three - Defining the Public Sphere: 
Interlocutionary Subjecthood and Other Matters 
 
1. Overview 
 
As stated in the introduction, in this thesis I am doing two things. Firstly, I am 
making the case both that La Via Campesina can be read as seeking to 
provoke, anticipate and constitute a transnational public sphere in food and 
agriculture and that the reformed UN Committee on World Food Security 
promises to institutionalise this public sphere. And secondly, I am identifying 
dynamics relevant to this institutional realisation of the transnational public 
sphere in food and agriculture. In order to first recognise, and then identify 
these dynamics it is necessary to first of all define what I understand as 
being the fundamental characteristics of a public sphere. This is the purpose 
of this chapter. In what follows I will (in section 2) introduce public sphere 
theory as elucidated within Jürgen Habermas’s classic text The Structural 
Transformation of the Public Sphere (which will also be referred to by the 
acronym STPS); (in section 3) pick up two very relevant streams of critical 
response to Harbermas’s normative and historical account of the public 
sphere; (in section 4) develop a concept – interlocutionary subjecthood – 
which allows us to interrogate the dynamics of inclusion and exclusion in the 
discursive arenas of which the public sphere is comprised; (in section 5) 
draw from the public policy literature to identify some categories to help us to 
differentiate the discursive activity of the public sphere; (in section 6) discuss 
Fraser’s concerns around the implication of the transnational for public 
sphere theory; and, finally (in section 7) establish some preliminary 
understandings of the respective boundaries of the public sphere being 
argued for in this thesis.  
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2. Jürgen Habermas’s The Structural Transformation of the 
Public Sphere 
 
 The bourgeois public sphere may be conceived above all as the 
sphere of private people come together to form a public; they soon claimed 
the public sphere regulated from above against the public authorities 
themselves, to engage with them in a debate over the general rules 
governing relations in the basically privatized but publicly relevant sphere of 
commodity exchange and social labor. The medium of this political 
confrontation was peculiar and without historical precedent: people’s use of 
their reason…  
    (Habermas, 1989: 27). 
 
The above quote usefully identifies some of the central elements of the 
bourgeois public sphere which – according to Jürgen Habermas - came into 
existence over the course of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as 
outlined within his 1962 (English translation, 1989) “classic” text The 
Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere (hereafter STPS). Firstly, the 
bourgeois public sphere was made up of private people come together to 
form a public. That is, the bourgeois public sphere had its roots in social 
institutions (the family) and relationships (economic) that were independent 
of state power. Secondly, the bourgeois public sphere came into being as 
this public sought to claim its right to debate with public authority over the 
formulation of rules and regulation which impacted upon the “private sphere”, 
contesting, along the way, the very meaning of “legitimate” political decision-
making.  And thirdly, the bourgeois public sphere was built upon the use of 
reasoned arguments. That is, the public sphere comes into existence when 
the (bourgeois) public sought to rationalize state power through critical-
rational argumentation. Indeed - the degree to which the public in rational 
debate was and is able to articulate with state power to influence political 
decision-making defines, in STPS, the health of the public sphere. And in 
Habermas’s account, the contemporary [1962] picture is a troubling one. For, 
as related in STPS, the bourgeois public sphere which emerged in a number 
of Western European countries over the course of the eighteenth and 
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nineteenth centuries was almost instantaneously undermined going into the 
twentieth century by a number of developments which have resulted in, 
amongst others, the transformation of autonomous, rationally contesting 
citizens into mere clients of the state; and of publically relevant rational 
debate into the mere manipulation of public opinion (Habermas, 1989).   
 
This at least is the view of Habermas as outlined within The Structural 
Transformation of the Public Sphere. Of course, since its publication - and 
particularly its translation into English in 1989 - this work has been the target 
of much critical scholarship (friendly and otherwise), and both the historical 
account furnished by Habermas and the normative framework within which 
that account is situated have been contested - and sometimes rejected - with 
alternate views and ideas modifying, replacing, or expanding Habermas’s 
original thinking. Indeed, some of these alternate views and ideas have 
come from Habermas himself, (Kellner, 2000; Koller and Wodak, 2008; 
Habermas, 1984; Habermas, 1987). However, for both its content and for the 
subsequent debates and discussion that its publication has provoked, STPS 
is a highly valued work, being esteemed for – amongst others – both having 
set the agenda for contemporary public sphere discourse and for enjoying a 
uniquely enduring impact within this discourse. Indeed, long after its initial 
publication it continues to engender a stream of critical and productive 
scholarly engagement (Crossley and Roberts, 2004; Kellner, 2000). For 
these reasons, my discussion of public sphere theory will begin with 
Habermas’s The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere. 
 
i. The Circumstances of the Bourgeois Public Sphere’s Emergence 
 
Habermas’s STPS is a rich and wide ranging book, purporting to chart 
developments spanning three or more centuries, and drawing from changes 
in economy, law, family relations, culture, architecture, philosophy and 
political institutions, amongst others, to make its case. It therefore follows 
that what I can offer here is nothing more than a crudely truncated rendering 
of the account that Habermas makes in this book. According to Habermas 
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the bourgeois public sphere emerged in several European countries during 
the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries, transformed the 
nature of feudal authority and, certainly in the case of Britain, the feudal 
institutions at the heart of government, and then was undermined at the end 
of the nineteenth going into the twentieth century. The conditions of the 
bourgeois public sphere’s emergence are not straightforward, but can be 
traced out of the interaction between, on the one hand, a “top-down” newly 
territorialized state authority acting upon those who were subject to its 
exercise; and on the other, the “bottom-up” emergence of the sphere of the 
private, with particular importance attached by Habermas to changes in 
family structure which resulted in the emergence of the conjugal family. 
Capitalism (and presumably capitalists - though the historical account 
presented in STPS is more or less completely lacking any meaningful sense 
of agency (Calhoun, 2010) is a crucial element in both trajectories. With 
regards to the emergence of state authority, Habermas identifies the 
expansionist ambitions of capitalism – seeking markets oversees - as 
necessitating a degree of political and capital support which could only be 
provided by the mercantilist state. This made private economic activity, in 
various different ways, a matter of public regulation, which provoked in those 
targeted by state ordinances an awareness of their being subject to state 
power. This combined with developments associated with the emergence of 
the intimate sphere of the conjugal family resulting in the class most affected 
by state power– the bourgeois – developing a sense of its own agency, its 
own interest, and seeking to confront the state: “In this stratum, which more 
than any other was affected and called upon by mercantilist policies, the 
state authorities evoked a resonance leading the publicum, the abstract 
counterpart of public authority, into an awareness of itself as the latter’s 
opponent, that is, as the public of the now emerging public sphere of civil 
society. (Habermas, 1989: 23).  
 
At the same time as capitalism was creating the conditions for the 
emergence of state authority, it was also facilitating the emergence of a new 
type of post-medieval family life. This was the conjugal family, which 
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represented a new sphere of intimate relations in which family members 
were able to encounter each other outside of their socially prescribed roles; 
that is, as human beings. Thus, for Habermas, the conjugal family was 
“humanity’s genuine site” (1989, 52) - a sphere of a new type of subjectivity 
which was cultivated further with the emergence of letter writing, which in 
turn led to the novel and various other cultural pursuits which – although 
initially preoccupied with “experiments” in subjectivity (1989, 49) endowed 
the bourgeois with a capacity for critical-rational debate which would 
eventually be turned against the absolute state. The “privacy oriented to a 
public” that emerged in the conjugal family therefore provided the seed of  
“the sphere of the public” (1989, 50) which was developed further via the 
emergence of coffee houses, reading societies and so forth, and, of 
particular importance, the conversion of the instruments of state ordinances 
and commercial information – the press – into instruments of public debate. 
Thus, for Habermas, the sphere of the public “arose in the broader strata of 
the bourgeois as an expansion and at the same time completion of the 
intimate sphere of the conjugal family.” (1989: 50).  
 
Following the emergence of the conjugal family and the sphere of the public, 
the final stage in the emergence of the public sphere  (which in Habermas’s 
account is really a convergence of multiple spheres - the public sphere of 
private people come together to form a public, and the public sphere of that 
public’s articulation with public authority, see: 30-31) is the articulation of this 
emerging public with political authority. In the British case this came about as 
a result of political conflicts between capitalist factions, the weaker side of 
which began appealing to this newly emergent public engaged in critical 
debate to draw support for its case, resulting in this bourgeois public’s 
entering into an ever-closer relationship with the organs of political decision-
making. In time this led to the transformation of the feudal assembly of 
estates into a modern parliament, a process that extended over the course of 
the eighteenth century and beyond (57, 62). In its institutionalized form the 
public sphere was finally able to fulfill its political function as “an organ for the 
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self-articulation of civil society with state authority corresponding to its 
needs.” (1989: 74).  
 
ii. Some Key Attributes of the Bourgeois Public Sphere 
 
However, the bourgeois public sphere not only allowed for the articulation of 
a newly emergent social class with state power, it also sought to transform 
the nature of state power. The transformation that it sought was, according to 
Habermas, rationalization - substituting for the voluntas of princely or 
medieval authority (53,83) the ratio that emerged out of public discourse and 
consensus on the common good (83). It also manifested as a demand for 
general and abstract laws, which, according to Habermas, “had to have a 
peculiar obviousness for privatized individuals who, by communicating with 
each other in the public sphere of the world of letters, confirmed each other’s 
subjectivity as it emerged from their spheres of intimacy.” (Habermas, 1989: 
54). Thus the bourgeois public sphere, and its rational-critical public debate, 
was based on a “claim to power” which was qualitatively different to that of 
feudal era. That is, according to Habermas the bourgeois sought to do more 
than simply substitute one set of elites for another whilst retaining relations of 
domination, seeking instead a discourse-based approach to decision-making 
in which interlocutors enjoyed equal participation rights by virtue of their 
common humanity – the humanity which, again, had its roots in the conjugal 
family (1989, 28).  
 
With regards to the bourgeois public sphere’s mode of rational-critical debate 
Habermas posits three “institutional criteria” that he identifies as central 
features. The first of these was that status was “disregarded”. That is, in 
contrast to the dominating power of medieval social hierarchy, in the 
bourgeois public sphere social, economic and political differences were set 
aside so that “the authority of the better argument could assert itself” (1989: 
36). The second of the three criteria was that discussion in the bourgeois 
public sphere involved an expansion of what were to be regarded as issues 
of “common concern”. This involved a direct confrontation with those 
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authorities – church and state, for instance – who sought to limit public 
discussion on certain matters through the usage of censorship or exclusion. 
In the case of the British state’s attempts to limit public knowledge of 
parliamentary proceedings, and in what constitutes one of the rare moments 
in STPS when the perspective descends low enough for individual human 
beings to become visible, Habermas recounts how the remarkable memory 
of one reporter undermined the state’s attempts to limit parliamentary 
reporting, as he was able to recall whole sessions of parliamentary 
proceedings directly from memory once outside the parliamentary chamber 
(1989, 61-62). The final institutional criteria identified by Habermas was that 
the public was, in principle at least, inclusive, because however small a 
particular manifestation of the public might be at any given time, it was still 
accessible to the broader public – via the acquisition of property and 
education which both safeguarded the autonomy and the inclusivity of 
bourgeois public sphere.15  Of course, as Habermas notes, this meant that 
relative to the unpropertied, uneducated parts of society, the bourgeois 
public sphere was “extremely small” (Habermas, 1989: 36-37).  
 
iii. The Structural Underpinnings of the Public Sphere 
 
Before I briefly discuss Habermas’s account of the decline of the bourgeois 
public sphere, and in order to fully appreciate its dynamics, it’s first of all 
necessary to – expanding the reference above to property and education - 
address the importance that Habermas attaches to the economic 
preconditions of the bourgeois public sphere. These are seen as being vital 
in at least three ways. Firstly they secured the autonomy of the private 
sphere of the conjugal family; secondly, they guaranteed the independence 
and autonomy of the public sphere – in the sense of private people coming 
                                            
15 “The universal accessibility to that sphere whose operation in the political realm was 
institutionalized by the constitutional state must be decided by the structure of civil society 
from the outset, and not only ex post facto by the political constitution that it gave itself. The 
public sphere was safeguarded whenever the economic and social conditions gave 
everyone an equal chance to meet the criteria for admission: specifically, to earn the 
qualifications for private autonomy that made for the educated and property owning person.” 
(Habermas, 1989: 85-86).  
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together to form a public – from the state; and thirdly they established the 
public sphere, as noted above, as an in principle at least inclusive sphere. 
Each of these dimensions is attached to the liberation of the market which 
made economic decision-making a more or less private matter, and gave 
commodity owners private autonomy (1989: 46-47, 74). This economic 
autonomy – founded on the right to property – was reflected, or 
corresponded, according to Habermas, with the autonomy of private people 
within the intimate sphere of the conjugal family, and allowed at least for the 
impression that the conjugal family was the site of voluntary relations, or free 
humanity (1989: 46-48). At the same time as economic autonomy 
underpinned or corresponded with the freedom to be human within the 
conjugal family, it also safeguarded the autonomy of society as a sphere 
separate from the state. Thus there was a sort of convergence between on 
the one hand the specific interests of the class of property owners and the 
interests of society more generally, in that by seeking to secure their rights 
they ensured the freedom of society: “…only property owners were in a 
position to form a public that could legislatively protect the foundations of the 
existing property order: only they had private interests – which automatically 
converged into the common interest in the preservation of civil society as a 
private sphere.” (1989: 87).  Moreover, because they were economically 
autonomous they could more effectively pursue the general interest in the 
public sphere. Thus “for the private person, there was no break between 
homme and citoyen, as long as the homme was simultaneously the owner of 
private property who as citoyen was to protect the stability of the property 
owner as a private one.” (1989: 87). And, finally, because in Habermas’s 
account entry to the public sphere was acquired through education and 
property, both of which in different ways were accessed via the market, the 
fact that – to the bourgeois and their philosophers at least – the market was 
essentially just meant that in principle the public sphere was inclusive (1989: 
46).  
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iv. The Disintegration of the Public Sphere 
These, then, are the structural underpinnings of the bourgeois public sphere 
as outlined within STPS, and, as the title suggests, the central argument of 
this book is that these structural conditions have been transformed, and, in 
fact, undermined, with serious consequences for the contemporary 
relationships between publics and public authority: “The downfall of the 
public sphere… had its source in the changing structural transformation of 
the relationship between the public sphere and the private sphere in 
general.” (1989: 142-143). The importance attached to the economic 
preconditions of the public sphere’s emergence is retained in Habermas’s 
account of its transformation. Habermas describes how the power relations 
of the economic sphere were transformed by the emergence of capital 
concentrations and oligopolistic economic units arising from the mergers of 
large companies. These resulted in the displacement of the equality that 
characterized relations between petty commodity traders by relations of 
inequality and concentrated social power (1989: 145). However, the classes 
subject to this inequality in the economic and social spheres, now 
institutionalised in the political sphere through the public sphere, could take 
their conflict into the political sphere and seek legislative protection. This 
resulted in a fundamental breakdown of the division between the two 
different spheres of, on the one hand, private people come together to form a 
public, and, on the other, public authority, with the state, amongst others, 
taking on “formative functions” – that is, entirely new functions related to the 
protection of social classes etc (1989: 147). Through this process the liberal 
state of the bourgeois public sphere was transformed into the welfare state 
of mass democracy (1989: 231).  
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The blurring of the boundaries of civil society and the state in Habermas’s 
disintegration thesis, is also accompanied by a related degradation of culture 
and the capacity of critical debate more generally. Habermas’s account turns 
on a fairly sophisticated notion of culture, which I won’t go into here, but 
which differentiates between the mass consumeristic culture which prevails 
today in most democracies, according to Habermas in STPS, and the 
authentic culture - non-ideological, political, decoupled from production and 
consumption activities - that prevailed in the bourgeois public sphere and 
which initially enabled the emergence of the critical-rational activity which the 
bourgeois transferred to their engagement with political authorities. 
According to Habermas, “rational-critical debate had a tendency to be 
replaced by consumption” (1989, 160-161).  
 
One major criticism of Habermas’s account of the structural transformation of 
the bourgeois public sphere is that Habermas leaves the reader with no real 
sense of how to recover the public sphere which he claims has been lost in 
the Twentieth (and Twenty-first) century. Of course, the viability of his 
disintegration thesis rests in part on the degree to which it is accepted that 
Habermas had captured the empirical details of the bourgeois public sphere 
accurately, or that the normative framework within which he situates his 
analysis is acceptable. Critical responses to STPS have challenged both of 
these claims.  
 
3. Critical Responses to STPS 
 
After its translation into English in 1989 Habermas’s The Structural 
Transformation of the Public Sphere quickly assumed “classic” status (at 
least amongst the English-speaking world for whom the English translation 
most mattered) and continues to provide the main point of departure for 
contemporary academic public sphere discourse (Kellner, 2000; Crossley 
and Roberts, 2004). Indeed, in the breadth and depth of the critical 
engagement that it has provoked, its contribution is regarded as being 
unique, few books having “been so systematically discussed, criticized, and 
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debated, or inspired so much theoretical and historical analysis” (Kelner, 
2000: 266). Critical responses to The Structural Transformation of the Public 
Sphere fall essentially into two categories (Crossley and Roberts, 2004). On 
the one hand there are those that contest the historical accuracy of 
Habermas’s account, seeking to modify or reject outright some aspect of his 
treatment of the historical “facts”. And on the other, there are those that 
contest the normative desirability of Habermas’s framework (within which his 
account of the bourgeois public sphere’s structural transformation is implicitly 
embedded). With regard to historical accuracy many scholars have shown 
how the bourgeois public sphere was in fact built upon a number of 
exclusions that meant that it was never as inclusive as Habermas originally 
maintained. Whilst Habermas himself acknowledged in STPS that non-
property owning non-males were in practice excluded from the public sphere, 
for a range of critics these exclusions did not represent simply the inability of 
the bourgeois public sphere to live up to its ideal, but rather were 
“constitutive”. That is, they argue that these groups were deliberately 
excluded as the bourgeois public sphere sought to define and assert its 
distinctive qualities and status (Fraser,1990; Landes, 1988; Eley, 1987; 
Calhoun, 2010).  
 
Two particular sets of critical responses to, and modifications of, Habermas’s 
account deserve special attention. 
 
i. The Public Sphere and Symbolic Communication 
 
The first of these addresses the emphasis placed by Habermas upon the 
role of reason in the public sphere. Recall how, in Habermas’s account the 
emergent class of the bourgeois, provoked into an awareness of its interests 
by being subject to state authority, confront power with critical rational 
debate:  
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 The bourgeois public sphere may be conceived above all as the 
sphere of private people come together to form a public; they soon claimed 
the public sphere regulated from above against the public authorities 
themselves, to engage with them in a debate over the general rules 
governing relations in the basically privatized but publicly relevant sphere of 
commodity exchange and social labor. The medium of this political 
confrontation was peculiar and without historical precedent: people’s use of 
their reason… 
    (Habermas, 1989: 27). [Emphasis added].  
 
To some scholars, however, this is overly restrictive, and they have been 
concerned to show that communications in the public sphere take many 
forms not simply reducible or limited to rational debate. These include, 
amongst others: “forms of socio-cultural criticism (including aesthetic 
gestures, street demonstrations, and the like) that are entirely legitimate on 
their own terms” (Gardiner, 2004: 44); “symbolic codes, values and 
representations that help to formulate individual and public orientations” 
(Wodak and Koller, 2008; Crossley and Roberts, 2004; Melucci, 1988); and 
“world disclosing” public discourse which involve “crucial redefinitions of the 
issues and identities involved in political struggles.” (Calhoun, 1992: 34). Of 
course, social movement theorists have for some time now been attentive to 
the role of social movements’ symbolic communications in expanding more 
generally social capacity for, and understanding of, different ways of being 
and knowing. These have been theorised as “collective action” by (Melucci, 
1996: 73) and “cognitive praxis” by Eyerman and Jamison (1991). Together 
with the more explicitly public sphere focused theorists, whose work 
sometimes draws from this social movement theory, theorists like Melucci, 
and Eyerman and Jamison, remind us therefore of the important role of this 
“non-rational” or symbolic communication in the public sphere.  
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ii. Status and Power in the Public Sphere 
 
Another important branch of criticism that I want to pay close attention to 
addresses the extent to which Habermas – in his claim that status within the 
public sphere was “suspended” – fully captures the power dynamics of 
discursive interaction, and particularly the ways in which these affect 
participatory parity amongst the different actors seeking to gain – or indeed, 
restrict - entry to discursive arenas. In Habermas’s account one of the 
ubiquitous institutional criteria of the bourgeois public sphere was that status 
was “suspended” so that the “force of the better argument could assert itself” 
(Habermas, 1989: 36). This view has however been refuted by a number of 
scholars who contend that, in contrast to this somewhat idealised account, 
social and economic inequalities did in fact impinge upon the public sphere, 
with the effect that participatory parity was in practise not fully realised. 
Fraser, for instance, drawing from revisionist historiographies which reveal 
the extent to which non-bourgeois non-males - non-property owning plebian 
men, women on the basis of their gender, and both men and women on the 
basis of their racialized ethnicity - were excluded from the bourgeois public 
sphere, argues that Habermas’s conception is seriously challenged by the 
presence of “informal impediments to participatory parity that can persist 
even after everyone is formally and legally licensed to participate.” (Fraser, 
1990: 63; referencing: Ryan, 1990; Landes, 1988; Eley, 1987). These 
include “protocols of style and decorum that were themselves correlates and 
markets of status inequality” (Fraser, 1992: 63). Alongside these cultural 
attributes, Fraser contests that the political economy of the public sphere is 
also an important determinant of access, particular when marginal groups 
lack the material resources through which entry is gained. In response to 
these dynamics Fraser rejects the desirability of “bracketing”, calling instead 
for the “explicit thematizing” of economic and social inequality in public 
sphere discourse. She discards as inappropriate the liberal distinction 
between political and economic spheres with which Habermas’s normative 
framework accords - arguing instead that “political democracy requires social 
equality.” (Fraser, 1990: 64).  
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Calhoun, again paying close attention to the dynamics of class in and at the 
edge of the historical bourgeois public sphere, argues that “stylistic 
conventions and lack of personal connections excluded many from the 
“entitled” public sphere.” (Calhoun, 2010: 318). As with Fraser, Calhoun 
rejects the account provided by Habermas, finding instead that the public 
sphere was never free from power:  
 
 According to the ideals that Habermas reconstructs for what he calls 
the bourgeois public sphere, there was no power in the public sphere save 
the power of persuasion by rational-critical argument. Whatever the ideal, 
though, the actually existing public sphere was neither so egalitarian nor so 
rational. Some participants benefitted from “cultural capital” in the form of 
credentials, reputation, publications, or training in the arts of rhetoric and the 
capacity to support their quotations in Latin and Greek. Not surprisingly (and 
not perfectly), these gifts were correlated with social-class background. 
    (Calhoun, 2010: 323). [Emphasis added].  
 
4. Interlocutionary Subjecthood  
 
For this thesis, informed both by my observations in the field and the 
concerns and criticisms of Fraser and Calhoun, I have developed a 
conceptual tool which allows us to explicate the dynamics of interaction 
within discursive arenas. This conceptual tool is “interlocutionary 
subjecthood”, which can be defined as being exercised when an 
interlocutor’s capacity to speak converges with the recognition of their right to 
speak. To arrive at this conceptual tool it’s first of all necessary to organise 
the obstacles to participatory parity identified by Calhoun in the quote above. 
These can be arranged into two main groupings. The first grouping consists 
of factors that elicit or diminish a recognition of the right to speak from 
potential interlocutors within a discursive arena, and includes: “credentials, 
reputation, publications”. The second grouping consists of factors that are 
part of an actor’s capacity to participate in the discursive arena of the public 
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sphere, and include “training in the arts of rhetoric and the capacity to 
support [one’s] quotations in Latin and Greek” (Calhoun, 2010: 323).  
 
The identification of these two dimensions is useful because they allow us to 
pay close attention to the dynamics of discursive interaction. Particularly, 
they allow us to capture more fully the “informal impediments to participatory 
parity that can persist even after everyone is formally and legally licensed to 
participate.” identified by Fraser (1990: 63). For instance, Fraser highlights 
the findings of feminist studies on the impacts of gender distinctions in 
shaping discursive interactions in mixed gender meetings which show that 
“men tend to interrupt women more than women interrupt men; men also 
tend to speak more than women, taking more turns and longer turns; and 
women’s interventions are more often ignored or not responded to than 
men’s.” (Fraser, 1990: 64). Using the categories introduced above, we can 
say that what this suggests is that gender – in this case, being a woman - 
functions as a factor that diminishes a recognition of the right to speak from 
(male) interlocutors. Mindful of Fraser’s emphasis upon political-economic 
constraints, we might also include within capacity the (material) resources 
that enable participation - time, cash, and so on. If we wanted to go further 
we could differentiate between more immediately – in principle at least - 
accessible capacity (e.g., cash) – and longer term acquired capacity (e.g., 
education, or enculturation in a particular mode of communication).16  
 
                                            
16 The concept “mode of communication” as I use it here simply speaks to the idea that 
people speak different languages, and that languages can be differentiated from each other 
according to the extent/degree to which they are, for instance: 
Formal/Codified-Informal; 
Professional (nomenclature etc)-Lay-Slang; 
Visual-Oral-Text-based; 
Literal-Symbolic; 
Primary (language)-Secondary-Minor-Unrecogonised; 
Official-Unofficial; 
Direct-Indirect; 
Personal-Impersonal; 
And so on.  
Rather than constituting an explicitly defined framework, this idea is invoked simply to 
sensitise us to recognise that interlocutors and discursive arenas take up and are most at 
home in different modes of communication.  
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Bringing the two different dimensions into a definition, therefore, we can say 
that Interlocutionary subjecthood - an indicator of meaningful participation 
within discursive arenas - is exercised when a potential interlocutor’s 
capacity to speak converges with the recognition of their right to speak.  
 
However, it is important to note that these two dimensions – capacity and a 
recognition of the right to speak – are not completely distinct, and interact 
with a third – the mode of communication – to complete a framework within 
which to explicate the dynamics of discursive interaction, and particularly the 
extent to which they provide meaningful participatory opportunities for 
“affected publics” such as La Via Campesina. For instance, using the 
example cited by Calhoun, in the bourgeois public sphere being able to 
support one’s arguments with Greek or Latin quotes could be regarded as 
part of an interlocutor’s capacity. But this capacity only derives its value from 
its being recognised as conforming with the general mode of communication 
valued within the discursive field. The capacity to speak Greek is only a 
capacity when speaking Greek is valued in the discursive field. This means 
that actor’s capacities are not fixed but depend on the mode of 
communication as dominant in the discursive field. For example, in a EU 
Commission meeting in a Brussels conference room, being able to talk in 
measured, technical language, backed up with supporting data and statistics 
are of course useful capacities. This is the dominant mode of communication 
in this discursive arena. However, in an outdoor village meeting amongst 
farmers in Karnataka, South West India, impassioned oratory supported with 
emphatic gesticulation may well be the dominant mode of communication 
and those who are able to communicate in this manner possess the capacity 
for that discursive arena. When the impassioned farmer steps into the 
technical meeting, or the dry official out into the village meeting, they may 
find that the capacities which see them in such good stead in their native 
discursive arenas may be of reduced value. Competence/capacity in one 
field may in fact be ineptitude in another.  
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Capacities are not fixed and vary in accordance with the dominant mode of 
communication in the discursive arena. In order to enter into a discursive 
arena, therefore, potential interlocutors may seek to acquire new capacities. 
This strategy has been referred to as “discourse design” or “discourse 
engineering”, one well known example of which is the professionalisation of 
NGO communication (Mautner, 2008).  
 
As capacities shift or are variable in relation to the dominant mode of 
communication in the discursive field, so the mode of communication itself 
can vary in relation to the degree to which an interlocutor’s right to speak is 
recognised by the other interlocutors within the discursive arena. What this 
simply means is that interlocutors in the discursive field may choose to 
accommodate or not different communicative modes, depending on the 
extent to which they recognise the right to speak of the aspirant interlocutor. 
A willingness to accommodate based on a recognition of the right to speak is 
evident, for instance, in such well known practices as the provision of 
translation services in multi-language meetings or of special assistance for 
the speech, sight or hearing impaired. This indicates that the recognition of 
the right to speak falls on a continuum where at one end is located the 
recognition of the right to speak in the dominant mode of communication 
(that is, potential interlocutors have to acquire the capacities to participate in 
the dominant mode of communication within the discursive arena), and at the 
other is the recognition of the right to speak in the “natural” mode of 
communication of the aspirant interlocutor (that is, the discursive arena will 
shift its mode of communication to accommodate potential interlocutors 
whose right to speak it recognises). Public sphere oriented academics have 
recognised this relationship between the mode of communication and the 
recognition of the right to speak, noting, for instance, how elites adopt modes 
of communication which function to exclude other aspirant interlocutors: 
“exclusion from public discourses is also shown to work more covertly, 
relying on consensus-based hegemonic forms such as public debate 
formats” (Richardson, 2008). 
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In Habermas’s orginal account status was deemed to be suspended in the 
public sphere. Prominent academics such as Fraser and Calhoun have 
questioned this, drawing attention to the “informal impediments to 
participatory parity that can persist even after everyone is formally and 
legally licensed to participate.” (Fraser, 1990: 63). These informal 
impediments can be tracked using the concept interlocutionary subjecthood, 
which is attentive to the interactions between the capacities that actors bring 
with them to the discursive arena, the extent to which their right to speak is 
recognised by other interlocutors, and the dominant mode of communication 
within the discursive arena.  
 
The concept of interlocutionary subjecthood is useful in at least three 
regards. Firstly, it allows us, as will be demonstrated in Chapter Five, to 
identify what La Via Campesina and their allies have been attempting to do 
as they contest food and agricultural policy-making and governance, issue 
their own declarations, press releases, demands, policy statements and so 
forth, and take the floor within various international food and agriculturally 
relevant fora. Secondly, as a methodological tool, it helps us to explicate to 
quite a fine degree the dynamics of inclusivity and exclusivity within 
discursive arenas. That is by tracking the interaction between the capacities 
that interlocutors bring with them to discursive arenas, the extent to which 
their right to speak is recognised by their potential interlocutors, and the 
mode(s) of communication dominant in the discursive arena, we can 
establish the extent to which this or that arena is inclusive or not. Given the 
emphasis upon inclusivity by public sphere theorists, interlocutionary 
subjecthood therefore allows us to anticipate the types of challenges faced 
by affected publics – in this case, La Via Campesina – as they seek to gain 
access and participate within the discursive arenas of public spheres, 
specifically, in this research, the reformed Committee on World Food 
Security. And finally, and related to the above, it alerts us to the potential 
adjustability of the three different variables and therefore to the possibility of 
perhaps somewhat more sophisticated interventions than had been 
entertained by public sphere theorists concerned by inequality in the public 
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sphere. For example, as discussed above, Fraser, taking issue with 
somewhat idealistic separation of the political and economic spheres in 
liberal thinking, and noting, as discussed above, the “informal impediments 
to participatory parity that can persist even after everyone is formally and 
legally licensed to participate.” argues that:  
 
 [T]he weight of circumstances suggests that in order to have a public 
sphere in which interlocutors can deliberate as peers, it is not sufficient 
merely to bracket social inequality. Instead, it is a necessary condition for 
participatory parity that systemic social inequalities be eliminated. This does 
not mean that everyone must have exactly the same income, but it does 
require the sort of rough equality that is inconsistent with systematically-
generated relations of dominance and subordination. Pace liberalism, then, 
political democracy requires social equality.     
   (Fraser, 1990: 65).  
 
However, with its identification of the three different elements which interact 
to determine participatory parity, interlocutionary subjecthood makes it 
possible, at a theoretical level at least, to conceive of targeted interventions 
which make participatory parity a possibility despite the persistence of 
structural inequality in the broader social and economic field. For instance, 
elites can be educated to recognise the specificity of – and biases inherent 
within -  their own modes of communication, or to recognise the distinctive 
needs and preferences of affected publics, through, for example, adjusting 
the mode of communication. And affected publics can have their capacities 
increased through training or resource transfers. The possibility of these 
interventions suggests that it might not be necessary to wait for broad social 
equality before attaining participatory parity. Whether or not in practice this is 
attainable is a question, however, for future research. 
  
5. Defining the Public Sphere 
 
At this stage in the Chapter I want to offer this definition of a public sphere: 
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 A public sphere is the site in which affected publics communicate and 
contest (symbolically and rationally) with (political) authority in the context of 
policy and governance debate. 
 
In STPS Habermas is very clear about this manner of engagement between 
affected publics and political authority. Claiming the domain of political 
decision-making for themselves, the bourgeois sought to engage with 
political authorities “in a debate over the general rules governing relations in 
the basically privatized but publicly relevant sphere of commodity exchange 
and social labor.” (Habermas, 1989: 27). This attribute of the public sphere – 
as the site in which affected publics articulate with political authority through 
debate and contestation – is considered to be fundamental to the normative 
meaning of the theory (Fraser, 2007). In this section, drawing from the public 
policy literature, I am going to establish some categories that allow us to 
organise and understand what it is that is being contested and debated in 
public spheres. That is, they help us to organise the content of the discursive 
arenas of which public spheres are comprised.  
 
i. Policy Debate 
 
Setting aside the question of whether or not there exists an authority with the 
capacity to respond to and implement the articulations arising from the 
discursive arenas of the public sphere – the answer to which question the 
viability of the transnational public sphere hypothesis developed in this thesis 
hinges upon – which will be explored later, this section focuses upon the 
nature of the communications addressed to political authorities in general. 
For example, in the context of this thesis, when La Via Campesina issue 
statements, press releases and policy documents, and take the floor at 
intergovernmental meetings, what is it that they are doing? How do we 
organise their interventions, and the content of the discursive arena in 
general?  
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One way of answering these questions is to turn to the public policy literature 
the proponents of which have been studying the dynamics of collective 
political action for at least over seventy years (Laswell, 1935). Particularly 
useful in this regard is the idea of policy stages, or the policy cycle, which is 
used by public policy scholars to identify the different stages of political 
action. These stages are divided up differently by different public policy 
scholars, but as Jann and Wegrich note, today “the differentiation between 
agenda-setting, policy formulation, decision-making, implementation, and 
evaluation (eventually leading to termination) are among the most widely 
adopted stages.” (2007: 43). Though fairly self-evident, I’ll briefly describe 
what each stage involves. 
 
a) Agenda‐Setting 
 
For political authorities to act requires, firstly, the recognition of a policy 
problem, and, secondly, that the problem finds its way onto the political 
agenda “for serious consideration of public action” (Jann and Wegrich, 2007: 
45). In the context of the discursive arena of the public sphere, therefore, this 
category allows us to identify communications that seek to identify problems 
or issues as a prelude to or in expectation of political action.  
 
b) Policy Formulation 
 
Following the identification of a problem and its making it onto the political 
agenda, the next stage of the policy-cycle concerns the formulation of the 
ends of the policy or intervention, and the “consideration of different action 
alternatives.” (Jann and Wegrich, 2007: 48). When thinking about this 
domain of activity its useful to bear in mind some of the key developments in 
the field of policy-making which are identified by public policy scholars as 
shaping the present policy environment. One of these concerns the shift from 
government to governance, which involves an expansion in both the types of 
actors involved in public policy (i.e., social and economic actors as well as 
government) and also the types of instruments utilised in the pursuit of public 
Chapter Three 
Defining the Public Sphere: Interlocutionary Subjecthood and Other Matters 
 
 58 
policy objectives, such as “grants, contracts, agreements” (Milward and 
Proven, 1999: 3; Hupe and Hill, 2006). These developments are associated 
in part with a general context of neoliberalism, which involves a redefinition 
of the roles and responsibilities of the state and an associated shift in policy 
style, from “command and control” towards the “regulatory state” which 
seeks “to produce and deliver public service in concert with the market and 
civil society.” (Peters and Pierre, 2006: 21). It is worth noting that the shift 
from government to governance means that some public policy scholars tend 
not to differentiate between “policy-making” and “governance”, both now 
regarded as indicating a general sphere of activity “concerned with creating 
the conditions for ordered rules and collective action.” (Milward and Proven, 
1993: 3; quoted in Hupe and Hill, 2006). Thus, in this thesis I will use policy-
making and governance interchangeably to refer to a general sphere of 
political activity that involves the setting of objectives and the identification of 
instruments for attaining those objectives. In the context of the discursive 
content of the public sphere, therefore, this category allows us to identify 
communications that assert objectives for political action and the means for 
attaining those objectives.  
c) Decision‐making, implementation, and evaluation 
 
Once a policy option - or options - has been defined the next stage involves 
the exercise of political authority and the decision to follow or adopt a 
particular course of action. This of course then leads to implementation. 
Eventually, though not inevitably, some attempt may be made to evaluate 
the impact or effect of the intervention to try to identify the extent to which it 
has successfully met the objectives for which it was utilised (Jann and 
Wegrich, 2007: 48-55). Clearly, in a debate over policy action the question of 
evaluation is a very pertinent one, because in the absence of some form of 
evaluation it’s difficult to build up an empirical understanding of the extent to 
which this or that chosen intervention did or did not meet the specified 
objectives.  
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Within the public policy literature there have been substantial debates 
around the extent to which the idea of policy-stages is useful in explicating 
the dynamics of actual real world processes of policy-making, with many 
arguing that it is too abstract and tidy and fails to capture the incoherence 
and messiness at the heart of political action (Hupe and Hill, 2006). 
However, my goal here is not to explain how policy-making works in practice, 
but to define categories which help us to organise the content of discursive 
interaction in the discursive arenas of the transnational public sphere in food 
and agriculture being argued for in this thesis.  
 
The categories defined above then help us to understand what is being 
contested in the debate between affected publics and political authority. For 
example, through various different forms of communication ranging from 
press releases to interventions within official meetings, affected publics might 
seek to raise an issue onto the political agenda; or, within the context of an 
issue having already found its way onto the political agenda, they might seek 
to argue for particular types of policy responses and action; or, they might 
seek to contest the modes of decision-making through which policies are 
adopted; and finally, they might take issue with the way a policy or decision 
is being implemented, or seek some kind of formal process of evaluation of a 
previously implemented policy, particularly one that was adopted under 
controversial circumstances. Moreover, at the same time as they help 
organise the content of the discursive field, these categories also sensitise 
us to the different processes of political action – how agendas are formed, 
how decisions are taken, how decisions are implemented, and how those 
actions are evaluated. 
 
6. Transnationalising the Public Sphere 
 
Before moving on to the final section of this Chapter, which focuses on the 
boundaries of the public sphere, it’s first of all necessary to discuss a 
relatively recent set of concerns expressed by public sphere theorists that 
are particularly relevant to this research. Indeed, these do in fact provide a 
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significant part of the analytical framework for this thesis, in the form of 
specific research questions. In essence, these concerns address the viability 
of public spheres in the context of a range of developments that in different 
ways are seen to undermine the viability of the state as the locus of a 
legitimate, politically efficacious public sphere. Nancy Fraser, again, is at the 
vanguard of this discussion. According to Fraser, both Habermas and his 
critics, herself included, whilst discussing and reflecting on the public sphere, 
have failed to appreciate the extent to which their discussions were anchored 
within a “Westphalian political imaginary” (Fraser, 2007: 8). That is, when 
thinking and writing about the public sphere, they operated within a tacit 
assumption that the sovereign state and its citizens, underpinned by a 
shared social imaginary, and communicating through a single language and 
a coherent and politically focused media, was the basic context in which they 
operated (Fraser, 2007, 9-10). This is problematic, according to Fraser, for at 
least six reasons (2007: 15-18).   
 
Firstly, governance responsibility is now shared between a range of state 
and non-state actors, including international organisations and other 
supranational, or transnational bodies. It is, in Fraser’s words, 
“disaggregated” (2007, 16). Secondly, contemporary public spheres are not 
coextensive with political communities. That is, contemporary discursive 
arenas – be they oriented to global warming, immigration, women’s rights, or 
the terms of trade – breach the boundaries of the state and incorporate 
interlocutors from all over the world. Thirdly, also, economic governance 
been ceded to transnational entities who are more responsive to capital than 
public opinion, which raises important questions about how to regulate the 
activities of economic actors and, more generally, about the relationship 
between politics and the market, with Fraser seeing this trend as 
“systematically” undermining the democratic project “using markets to tame 
politics instead of politics to tame markets” (2007: 17). Fourthly, national 
medias have been undermined, fragmented downwards into more niche 
markets, and dissolved upwards into “market driven, corporately owned” 
global media. Fifthly, contemporary discursive arenas breach linguistic 
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communities, and – as also within states containing multiple linguistic 
communities - undermine the possibility of an “inclusive communications 
community of all those affected?” (Fraser, 2007: 18). And, finally, whereas in 
Habermas’s account the public sphere emerged out a shared culture, today’s 
discursive arenas again breach shared cultural frameworks. This raises 
important questions about where to find the “shared social imaginary needed 
to underpin [the] solidarity” which Fraser sees as a prerequisite of public 
spheres (Fraser, 2007: 18). According to Fraser, the upshot of these 
developments is that it has become necessary to  “rethink the public sphere 
theory in a transnational frame.” (Fraser, 2007: 8).  
 
For Fraser, thinking about these developments, there are two central 
attributes of public spheres which are central to their normative meaning, 
and to which it is essential to hold onto if the concept of the public sphere is 
to retain its “critical force and its political point.” (Fraser, 2007: 8). These are 
embedded in Fraser’s definitions of the public sphere as, firstly: 
 
  [A] space for the communicative generation of public opinion. Insofar 
as the process is inclusive and fair, publicity is supposed to discredit views 
that cannot withstand critical scrutiny and to assure the legitimacy of those 
that do. Thus, it matters who participates and on what terms. 
    (Fraser, 2007: 7).  
 
And secondly: 
  
 [A] vehicle for marshaling public opinion as a political force. Mobilizing 
the considered sense of civil society, publicity is supposed to hold officials 
accountable and to assure that the actions of the state express the will of the 
citizenry. Thus, a public sphere should correlate with a sovereign power. 
    (Fraser, 2007: 7).  
 
The first of these attributes refers to the normative legitimacy of public 
opinion, and the second to its political efficacy (Fraser, 2007: 7). Thus, 
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Fraser is concerned with the extent to which the conditions of the ‘post-
national constellation” (Habermas, 2001) have undermined the legitimacy 
and political efficacy of public opinion. 
 
Critics have responded to Fraser’s account in a number of ways. Some, for 
example, have seen her account of the erosion of the state and the 
subsequent legitimacy and efficacy questions that this raises as exaggerated 
(e.g., Ugarteche, 2007). However, as will be seen in Chapter Four, (which 
identifies the context of food policy contestation) many of her concerns echo 
with those taken up by both a range of different scholars interrogating in 
different ways the politics and trajectories of food and agricultural policy-
making and governance, and also affected publics such as La Via 
Campesina, which sees its own mobilisation as a response to both the 
undermining of national sovereignty resulting from the transfer upwards of 
policy-making authority to supra- or transnational political spaces (particularly 
the WTO) and the emergence of powerful economic actors – Agribusiness 
TNCs – who operate outside of the regulatory authority of the state. How La 
Via Campesina locates itself in relation to this broader environment will be 
explored in more detail in Chapter Five. Therefore, accepting the concerns of 
Fraser as being entirely legitimate, and adapting those that she herself 
poses in response to these developments, we get the following set of 
questions that are framed, firstly, in terms applicable to public spheres in 
general, and secondly, specifically focused upon the hypothesis being 
argued for in this thesis: 
 
General Question One 
 
How can transnational discursive arenas be efficacious if they do not 
articulate with political authority or if important actors operate outside of 
democratically accountable political authority? 
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 Specific Research Questions One 
 
What is the likelihood of the CFS attaining the political authority that it 
aspires after in its reform document?  
Which actors are relevant in this regard?  
What are the obstacles to their being brought under the political authority of 
the CFS and what mechanisms is the CFS likely to adopt and develop in 
order to achieve this?  
How can affected publics such as La Via Campesina articulate with the 
CFS?  
How can the CFS be accountable to affected publics? 
 
General Question Two 
 
How can transnational public spheres be legitimate if participation rights are 
not defined by membership of a bounded political community that secures in 
principle the inclusion of those affected by the exercise of political authority?  
 
Specific Research Questions Two 
By what criteria do La Via Campesina establish their legitimacy as affected 
publics? 
If inclusivity is a prerequisite of legitimate public spheres, to what degree are 
La Via Campesina – and the mechanisms being established in the CFS – 
legitimate? 
By what criteria did emerging publics such as La Via Campesina – and their 
allies in the IPC – seek to establish participation rights in the reformed CFS? 
 
General Question Three 
How can transnational public spheres build the social imaginary which is 
founded upon shared cultures and languages in a national context? 
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 Specific Research Question Three 
What notions of identity and culture are being mobilised by La Via 
Campesina, and their allies, as they seek to invoke and realise a 
transnational solidarity?  
 
General Question Four 
How can transnational public spheres communicate in the absence of 
coherent and politically focused media equivalent to national press and 
broadcasting, and in the context of multiple linguistic communities?  
 
Specific Research Question Four 
What are the mechanisms and mediums of communication in the 
transnational public sphere being created by La Via Campesina and their 
allies?  
 
Until now I have discussed the classic exposition presented in Habermas’s 
Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere; engaged with some critical 
responses to Habermas’s account; developed a concept – interlocutionary 
subjecthood - which allows us to interrogate the dynamics of affected 
publics’ participation in the discursive arenas of the public sphere; identified 
some categories drawn from the public policy literature that allow us to 
organise the content of discursive arenas and understand what is being 
contested in “policy debate”, and; finally; discussed Nancy Fraser’s concerns 
regarding the implications of transnationality for public spheres. Before 
bringing this chapter to a close in the conclusion I finally want to establish 
some parameters for identifying the boundaries of the public sphere(s). This 
is important in order to be able to recognise the different spaces and 
activities in the global field of food and agricultural policy-making and 
governance and to relate them to each other.  
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7. The Boundaries of the Public Sphere 
 
Before embarking on the attempt to define some of the public sphere’s 
boundaries it’s important to note that one line of criticism against Habermas’s 
original formulation of the public sphere concerns the boundaries that he 
established between the public and the private spheres. This criticism has 
been particular taken up by feminists who contend that, in Habermas’s 
account “[b]ecause the public sphere and the conditions for publicity 
presupposed a distinction between public and private matters, [the public 
sphere] was ill equipped to consider in public fashion the political dimension 
of relations in the private sphere.” (Landes, 1998: 142). These relations, of 
course, include male domination and misuse of women that, regarded as 
falling within the “private sphere” of the family, were rendered invisible to, 
and inadmissible as topics for, public debate or political attention. In contrast 
to the static distinctions of public and private within Habermas’s account, 
authors such as Benhabib have contested that “public space is essentially 
porous: neither access to it nor its agenda of debate can be predefined by 
criteria of moral and political homogeneity. With the entry of every new group 
into the public space of politics after the French and American revolutions, 
the scope of the public gets extended.” (Benhabib, 1998: 71). Indeed, this 
last point is important. With the emergence of new political subjects comes a 
struggle to redefine the distinctions of public and private, including the rights 
and obligations of public authorities, and the freedoms and vulnerabilities 
enjoyed and experienced by actors in the private sphere: “Democratic 
politics challenges, redefines, and renegotiates the divisions between the 
good and the just, the moral and the legal, the private and public.” 
(Benhabib, 1998: 77). This suggests that two things are distinct: On the one 
hand, the formal/legal boundaries of political authority (distinguishing the 
sphere of public authority from the sphere of private freedom and 
vulnerability); and on the other expectations and aspirations for those 
boundaries in the broader field of relations. This means that whilst 
determining the formal boundaries might be an empirical matter, determining 
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the normative boundaries will be a matter of perception, and cannot be 
objectively determined.  
 
i. The Potential Plane 
 
This distinction is bound up with how we define the transnational public 
sphere being argued for in this thesis. For example, as I have discussed 
above, Nancy Fraser has argued that various developments associated with 
the emergence of a “transnational frame” have problematised the boundaries 
of the public sphere that, in the writings of Habermas and his critics, was 
implicitly correlated with the boundaries of the state. The boundaries of the 
demos, she argues, were assumed to demarcate the boundaries of the 
public sphere (Fraser, 2007). Moving beyond the expression of concern in an 
attempt to identify the boundaries of a public sphere in which participation 
rights can no longer be defined by citizenship, Fraser returns to Habermas’s 
work to find a new principle of inclusion, the “all affected principle”. According 
to Fraser, this holds that “all potentially affected by political decisions should 
have the chance to participate on terms of parity in the informal processes of 
opinion formation to which the decision-takers should be accountable.” 
(Fraser, 2007: 21). Notwithstanding the question of whether the participation 
of affected publics in the public sphere ought to be limited to “informal 
processes of opinion formation”, which I – using Fraser and Habermas’s 
earlier work – disagree with below, we can say that, initially, the first 
boundary of the transnational public sphere includes all those who might be 
affected by the exercise of transnational food and agriculturally relevant 
political authority. However, a few qualifications are necessary. Firstly, 
“affected” is quite a vague term. For instance, I might be materially, 
personally, or directly affected by something, or I might be affected indirectly 
by virtue of my standing in solidarity with those being directly affected, or 
even through my values. Secondly, recalling the spirit of Benhabib’s 
arguments above, one can also be affected, in both a negative and positive 
sense, not just by the exercise of political decisions or public authority but 
also by its absence. For instance, whether political authorities are able to act 
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or not to confront the challenges of climate change has serious implications 
for a great many people on this planet, and a significant amount of global 
activism is channeled into fighting to ensure that political authorities do act at 
the scales deemed necessary to address the climate crisis. And in the 
opposite sense, those that prosper or suffer in spaces devoid of public 
authority (free markets, for instance) have an interest in restricting or 
expanding its reach, and will lobby public authorities extensively to achieve 
this. The 1999 repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act in the US – which removed 
legislation put in place after the 1930s Wall Street crash to restrict the 
freedom of movements of investment banks (in order to limit the public risk of 
their activities) – and which cost the banking sector $300million in lobbying 
fees, for example, is a clear example of an attempt to restrict public authority 
and expand the sphere of private autonomy (Mason, 2009: 56). The 
campaign by La Via Campesina – the peasant farmer social movement that 
forms the focus of my research – to enact a Charter of Peasants Rights, is 
one contemporary and relevant example of an attempt to expand it. 
 
Thus, whilst we can offer a provisional definition of the furthest reaches of 
the public sphere - including: 
 
 All those affected – directly and indirectly – by the exercise of political 
authority, or the absence of its exercise; 
 
- the question of who should be included in this category will be and is a 
matter of diverging perspective. More than this, not just diverging 
perspective, but also contestation. However, irrespective of how we define 
the reach of this sphere, what differentiates it from the following sphere is 
that those within it – whilst they might have an interest in so doing – are not 
discursively active in a way that is relevant to food policy. For this reasons, 
this first sphere I’m calling the Potential Plane of the nascent transnational 
food and agricultural public sphere. 
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ii. The Aggregate Plane  
 
The second level of the public sphere contains the distinctive discursive 
arenas that – though they are not necessarily in direct relations with each 
other – are locatable on the same plane by virtue of their shared referent. 
That is, they address, with varying degrees of directness and influence, the 
general question of “What should global (food and agriculturally relevant) 
political authority do?” Differentiating between discursive arenas on this 
plane we might be attentive to such questions, the relevance of which has 
been established above, as: 
 
What are the dominant modes of communication? 
Who is licensed to participate within the discursive arena? 
Who controls the dynamics of the discursive arena?  
 
For instance, the dominant mode of communication in an academic 
discursive arena possess certain attributes which differentiate it from the 
village meeting in Karnataka, South West India. Moreover, whereas the right 
to participate – formal or otherwise – might be tightly controlled in an 
intergovernmental meeting, later, in the pub next door, access points to the 
discussion might not be so strictly regulated. And in addition, a group of 
activists meeting to plan a direct action against a coal fired power station 
may discuss the rules of their deliberations in some detail before adopting 
processes via a consensus decision, whereas in a parliamentary debate the 
modes of communication and rules of participation are fairly rigidly codified 
and protected by institutionally sanctioned enforcement powers. The second 
layer of the public sphere, then, is defined: 
 
 By the discursive arenas which are located on the same plane by 
virtue of the fact that they share the same referent, but which are 
differentiated from each other by virtue of their different modes of 
communication, participation rights, and control arrangements for 
determining both. 
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This plane I’ll call the aggregate plane of the public sphere (because it exists 
as an aggregate of explicit discursive activity – multiple discursive arenas - 
oriented to the same referent).  
 
As well as differentiating the activity on this plane according to the three 
criteria identified above, there is another important way in which it can be 
organised, and this is in regards to the influence that these discursive arenas 
– and acts of communication within them – have over actual processes of 
policy-making and action.  
 
a) Empirically Measuring Policy Influence 
 
When thinking about this mode of distinction it’s useful to bear in mind 
Fraser’s distinction between “weak” and “strong” publics (Fraser, 1990). 
According to Fraser, weak publics are those “whose deliberative practice 
consists exclusively in opinion-formation and does not also encompass 
decision-making.” (Fraser, 1990: 75). In contrast, strong publics are those 
“whose discourse encompasses both opinion-formation and decision-
making.” (Fraser, 1990: 75). One such example of a strong public quoted by 
Fraser is a parliament, and it’s useful to remember that for Habermas it was 
through the transformation of the medieval Assembly of Estates into a 
modern parliament - in the case of Britain - that the public sphere was able to 
fulfill its function “as an organ for the self-articulation of civil society with state 
authority corresponding to its needs.” (1989: 74). In addition, we might also 
recall Fraser’s insistence on the centrality of the public sphere’s  - or rather 
the discursive arenas’ of which it is composed  - articulation with political 
authority for its normative meaning. Thus we can differentiate between the 
discursive arenas on the aggregate plane according to the degree to which 
they articulate with political authority. Of course, this is in part a matter for 
social theory, with different theoretical frameworks – and their different 
ontologies – linking different types of activity with political institutions in 
different ways. That is, different social theories identify “political” action in 
different ways. That said, I am going to define the meaning of articulation 
Chapter Three 
Defining the Public Sphere: Interlocutionary Subjecthood and Other Matters 
 
 70 
with political authority in the terms more or less established by Fraser, and 
also Habermas in STPS, that is, in terms of the proximity between discursive 
activity and political decision-making. That is not to say of course that 
decision-making elites are not influenced by what is going on in the 
aggregate plane, or that they are influenced by their proximity – in a 
straightforward geographical sense - to this or that communication 
(parliamentary debates would take on a slightly different hue if this were so, 
with government being more responsive to the voicings of the opposition 
front bench than to their own party ranks). It means that firstly we have to 
define what we mean by proximity.  
 
Interlocutionary subjecthood is again a useful way of interrogating proximity, 
in that we can say that proximity to political authorities is in part a function of 
the extent to which a potential interlocutor’s right to speak is recognised by 
political authorities. Thus, for instance, participants within “policy 
communities” - networks of political authorities and interest groups with 
“coherent world-views and shared policy objectives” (Jann and Wegrich, 
2007: 50) – whilst not necessarily possessing formal participation rights thus 
enjoy a high degree of recognition of their right to speak by political 
authorities. Policy communities usually involve some degree of regular face-
to-face contact between their members and political authorities, but at the 
same time we can imagine that, for all sorts of different reasons, interlocutors 
from the aggregate plane are successfully able to communicate with and to 
political authorities and influence political decision-making in the absence of 
face-to-face contact. At the same time, we can imagine – recalling Fraser 
and Calhoun’s concerns about the obstacles to participatory parity in 
response to which I develop the concept of interlocutionary subjecthood – 
actors who are in close physical proximity to political authorities, but who are 
remote in terms of the extent to which they are recognised as having the 
right to speak or, indeed, even if they enjoy recognition of their right to 
speak, have no influence over policy-makers. In essence, what these 
distinctions mean is that determining proximity to political authorities is an 
empirical matter, and would ultimately involve first of all, beginning with the 
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communication attempts of interlocutors, an identification of what it was that 
a potential interlocutor attempted to communicate, and secondly, an attempt 
to determine the extent to which this was “heard” by political authorities. 
Another avenue might involve trying to identify with political authorities which 
discursive arenas and communications they were influenced by and why. 
Interlocutionary subjecthood allows us to identify some of the factors that 
might distort the communication stream, resulting in an effective distance 
between political authority and affected publics, for instance, whatever the 
physical proximity. At a conceptual level, at least, we can differentiate in the 
aggregate field between interlocutors and discursive arenas that are 
proximate to political authority, and those that are remote. Broadly these 
correspond to Fraser’s strong and weak publics, at least in spirit.  
 
iii. The Policy Action Plane 
 
To recall, in Habermas’s original account of the emergence of the public 
sphere civil society was provoked into an awareness of itself as a result of 
being affected by public authority:  
 
 In this stratum, which more than any other was affected and called 
upon by mercantilist policies, the state authorities evoked a resonance 
leading the publicum, the abstract counterpart of public authority, into an 
awareness of itself as the latter’s opponent, that is, as the public of the now 
emerging public sphere of civil society. 
    (Habermas, 1989: 23). 
 
The final plane of the public sphere, therefore, is the plane of public 
authority, or policy action. The presence of this plane or sphere, and the 
possibility of affected publics articulating with, it is central – as discussed 
above – to the fulfillment of the normative criteria of the public sphere, as first 
articulated by Habermas and reinforced by Nancy Fraser. I have discussed 
above Fraser’s general concerns about the implications of the emergence of 
a) sites of supranational decision-making, and b) transnational economic 
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relations and actors for the possibilities of the Westphalian state fulfilling the 
conditions of the public sphere and the subsequent need, therefore, to 
rethink the public sphere in a transnational frame. In the following chapter I 
capture how the concerns and the research agenda identified by Fraser can 
be applied to the more specific field of transnational food policy contestation.   
 
In Chapter Five I narrow the focus, establishing some key dynamics around 
the operation of public authority. In order to do this I first deduce some of the 
properties that we might expect a public authority capable of fulfilling the 
requirements of a public sphere to exhibit.   
 
8. Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I have embarked on a discussion of public sphere theory as a 
prelude to the analysis and argument building of the following chapters. 
Initially I discussed Habermas’s formulation of the public sphere within 
STPS. Then I picked up two streams of critical response, the first taking 
issue with the notion that contestation within public spheres is limited to 
reasoned argument, the second rejecting the idea that the bourgeois public 
sphere described by Habermas was as inclusive as he had stated. Moving 
from these critical responses I defined a conceptual tool – interlocutionary 
subjecthood – that will be of use in this thesis (and beyond) explicating the 
dynamics of affected publics’ participation in discursive arenas. Then I 
moved to define the public sphere, first of all by identifying some categories 
– using the public policy literature – to help us to organise the 
communications whose content constitutes the discursive contestation of the 
public sphere. Then I engaged with Fraser’s concerns about the significance 
of the transnational for public sphere theory. And finally I closed with an 
attempt to define different planes of the public sphere. In the following 
chapter I will demonstrate the usefulness of these theoretical and conceptual 
reflections for the rapidly shifting field of (transnational) food policy 
contestation.  
 
Chapter Six 
Contextualising Food Policy Contestation  
Chapter Four - Contextualising Transnational Agri-
Food Policy Contestation  
1. Overview  
 
In this chapter I introduce the general context for this thesis. This is a context 
defined by a series of transformations that are reconfiguring and have 
reconfigured agri-food systems with a number of important implications. This 
chapter proceeds in the following way: In Part 2 I identify some important 
developments in agri-food production, consumption and distribution. In Part 3 I 
discuss some of the impacts of these developments, and particularly the issues 
that they have generated around unequal farming systems, ecological impacts, 
health, food safety, and power and control over and within agri-food systems. In 
Part 4 I identify some important dynamics of the environment within which food 
policy is contested, noting the different periods of post-war food policy thinking 
and the importance of the transnational as a reference for national food policy-
making. In Part 5 I conclude the chapter by applying the conceptual framework 
elaborated in Chapter Three to the developments mapped above.  
 
2. Key Agri-Food System Transformations 
 
It is widely accepted by food and agricultural analysts the world over that food 
and agriculture have in relatively recent years undergone a series of profound 
transformations - transformations that are continuing today with all sorts of 
wide-ranging implications and impacts. For example, Tansey and Worsley were 
observing back in 1995 that “[t]he food system has changed rapidly in the last 
century.” (Tansey and Worsley, 1995: 6).  More recently, Lang argued that 
“[t]he last half century ushered in a period of unprecedented and rapid change 
in the food system” (Lang, 2004: 22). For some analysts, such as the editors of 
a 2008 volume entitled The Transformation of Agri-food Systems, all FAO staff 
members at the time of its publication, the analysis of these developments is 
focused upon their impacts upon developing countries: “The reorganization of 
supply chains, from farm to plate, is fuelling the transformation of entire food 
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systems in developing countries.” (McCullough et al., 2008: 3). Whilst for 
others, the West is the primary locus of these changes: “In the Western world 
the modernization of agriculture has fundamentally altered how we value food 
and agriculture.” (Desmarais, 2007: 42). For still more, the breadth and scale of 
the these transformations are so wide ranging that distinctions such as 
“developing” and “developed” have lost some of their analytical purchase: “Our 
view is that the world of food supply chains and food decision-making now 
overlaps continents, in which case a bi-polar distinction like rich-poor, 
developed-developing, male-female, urban-rural, production-consumption, etc., 
while hugely important, can restrict understanding if applied singularly.” (Lang et 
al., 2009: 4). My goal in this section is to discuss some of the key developments 
being referred to by these analysts, so as to provide some context for the wider 
set of relations and dynamics being discussed in this thesis.  
 
To understand something of the nature of the changes now affecting 
contemporary agri-food systems, and which indeed as mentioned above render 
the idea of separate, local agri-food systems now problematic, it’s first of all 
necessary to visualise an agri-food system as being comprised of three 
separate spheres of activity. The first of these involves production. That is, 
something has to be grown, harvested, collected, reared, and so forth. Then 
there is also consumption. That is, whatever has been produced has to be 
consumed: Food is eaten, leathers are turned into shoes, timbers become 
furniture, and so on. And of course, linking production and consumption, there 
is distribution: Whatever is produced has to be transported in some way to the 
site of consumption. In a very simple agri-food system, such as that in 
subsistence farming, the geographical distance between these three different 
activities is very short. What is produced is consumed on-farm. The means of 
production are low-tech, and owned by the farmer. The diet is restricted to local 
availability and the passage of the seasons. And the number of actors 
participating in the agri-food system are very few, perhaps the farmer and her 
family, and the local community who grow and eat together. Addressing each 
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stage individually I will first of all highlight some of the key changes within 
each17  
 
i. Production 
 
In the simple farm system, and all farm systems in fact, the basic elements of 
which I crudely described above, the productive capacity of the farm is 
prescribed by the extent to which the farmer is able to optimise or augment the 
natural context within which the farm is located. There are certain basic 
conditions that have to be met before, simplistically, things can grow, including 
an availability of water, sunlight, and fertile soil. Indeed, looking at soil in a bit 
more detail helps to explore this relationship between natural context and 
productive capacity. (Many analysts have done exactly this, but this discussion 
draws in particular from Tansey and Worsley, 1995: 17-22; Mazoyer and 
Roudart, 2006: 55-63; Harvey, 2006: 23-26; and Harvey, 2008: 37-40).   
 
In a natural ecosystem biomass growth is a function of the system’s capacity to 
regenerate and maintain the nutritive matter (e.g., carbon dioxide, water, 
mineral salts) necessary for plant life. Nitrogen is one such nutrient that is 
essential for plant growth. The irony is that whilst nitrogen exists in plentiful 
supply in the atmosphere, this is not in a form that is accessible to plant life. In 
order to become accessible it has to be “fixed” into the soil. There are various 
ways of achieving this. One way is through returning organic wastes to the soil. 
Another is through leguminous plants such as clover and beans “which form 
symbiotic relationships with soil bacteria” (Harvey, 2008: 38) and distribute 
                                            
17 Before beginning this discussion, however, it is important to note that I am not an agronomist 
or soil scientist, nor have any specific training – or indeed, experience – in food and agricultural 
production. This is relevant because whilst my discussion below draws from –  is entirely 
dependent upon – the work of experts or those far more considerably informed in these areas 
than I, and I believe accurately reflects the significance of their analysis, at times I simplify 
otherwise complex relationships or use somewhat modified language in order to circumvent 
otherwise protracted and potentially technical discussion. This is related to the fact that my 
interest here is not to provide a technically accurate account of all of the different facets of food 
and agricultural production, but rather to convey their implications for food and agricultural 
policy-making and governance and the transnational public sphere in food and agriculture the 
existence of which I am arguing for in this thesis. My interest, to put it simply, is in showing what 
is contested, who is contesting it, and the context or environment in which they are contesting it.  
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nitrogen into the soil. These natural processes of maintaining the nutrients in 
the soil – whilst not fully understood by science – seem to be dependent upon 
the self-sustaining equilibrium of the biocenosis: the living population of the soil 
comprising bacteria, protozoa, soil fungi, and, “the stars among the larger soil 
animals”, nematodes such as earthworms (Harvey, 2008: 38). Essentially there 
are two classes of this soil population, the decomposers – who break down soil 
organic matter, and their predators, who make the nutrients which the 
decomposers break down in the soil and store in their body tissue available to 
plants by feeding on the decomposers and releasing these nutrients. The 
scientific understanding of soil fertility is still regarded as being insufficient to 
fully understand everything involved in this process, as evidenced, according to 
some, by the discovery of entirely new forms of microbial life which exists 
almost entirely beyond the scope of scientific knowledge, but which are 
regarded as playing essential structural roles in the system of life (Manning, 
2000: 16). However, it is generally accepted that in the natural ecosystem “All 
things considered, over the course of a given period, the fluctuations in the 
inflow and outflow of minerals in the soil solution are equilibriated according to a 
sort of balance sheet.” (Mazoyer and Roudart, 2006: 59).  
 
In a fairly simple sense, therefore, the challenge for farmers is to find ways of 
preserving – or, as we shall see, substituting – the fertility of the soil in order to 
maintain productive capacity. In some respects the history of agricultural 
development reflects the evolution of techniques for addressing this dynamic. 
Mazoyer and Roudart, in their comprehensive 2006 (English translation) A 
History of World Agriculture: From the Neolithic to the Current Crisis identify five 
major agricultural revolutions. Each is distinguished from the rest in terms of, 
amongst others, their development of productive technology and techniques for 
managing or substituting soil fertility. The first agricultural revolution, the 
Neolithic was, as we might expect, quite primitive in that it basically involved 
exhausting the productive capacity of the soil before moving onto new land, 
allowing the depleted land to recover. The second and third revolutions – the 
Ancient and Medieval, incorporated fallowing – a rotation cycle involving several 
fields, one or more of which would be left unplanted for a period to allow them 
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to regenerate. The First Modern Agricultural Revolution (16th -19th centuries) – 
which through a massive increase in productivity allowed for the first time the 
rural population to support a significant non-rural population and therefore 
created the conditions for the industrial revolution – replaced fallowing with the 
planting of pasture crops which increased the amount of livestock that could be 
kept and, subsequently, the amount of organic fertiliser – manure – being 
produced. This allowed an increase in productivity whilst also maintaining soil 
fertility (Mazoyer and Roudart, 2006: 313-375).   
 
The Second Modern Agricultural Revolution (from the first half the twentieth 
century onwards) in many respects represents a significant breach from those 
earlier revolutions, because for the first time synthetic or chemical fertilisers 
began to be used (Mazoyer and Roudart, 2006: 385). This development of 
chemical fertilisers was made possible by advances in biochemistry that 
allowed both an understanding of the soil degradation caused by practices such 
as monocultural crop production, and the development of inputs that could 
offset the destructive impacts of these practices without necessitating an 
accommodation with the natural growing cycle. In other words they could 
“override ecological limits and accommodate capital-driven practises” (Weis, 
2007: 55, referencing Duncan, 1996). This practice is captured – in a term that 
develops Marx’s ideas about the relationship between capitalism and the soil – 
in the idea of the “metabolic rift” (McMichael, 2011: 65). 
 
Without wishing to dwell on the interrelationship between capitalism and 
agriculture alluded to above - we can say that, therefore, the development of 
chemical fertilizers added, in principle, to the range of options available to 
farmers in terms of techniques for feeding plants with nutrients, all associated 
with different production systems. For instance, we might envision an 
agroecological system in which livestock and crops are contained within the 
same system so that manure from the former is recycled to maintain and 
regenerate soil fertility. Weed and pest management is achieved through “multi-
cropping” in which crops are interspersed with other plants which act as natural 
weed and pest repellents. Because the distribution of crops in a multi-cropped 
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system is non-uniform, which prevents mechanization, this type of system is 
labour intensive. At the other end of the spectrum we can find an industrial 
system in which crops are bred for specialist traits and grown in monocultures 
in which both nutrient provision and weed and pest management is achieved 
chemically. Monocultures are amenable to mechanized management and so 
this type of system is less labour intensive than the agroecological system, but 
the capital requirements of such a system are much more intense. And in 
between are a range of different types of system, which are partly reliant on 
processes which work with nature such as monocultures alternating between 
maize and soya – which is a leguminous crop and which therefore fixes the 
nitrogen drained by the hungry maize crops back into the soil - and zero tillage, 
or conservation agriculture approaches, which refrain from disturbing the top 
soil to maintain soil integrity but which still utilise synthetic fertilisers, pesticides 
and herbicides.  
 
At an abstract level, then, contemporary farmers face a wide choice of different 
means, that is, different productive technologies and processes to assist them 
in their food and agricultural production.18 As well as the development of 
chemical fertilisers, we might also include mechanization (tractors, combine 
harvesters, etc); chemical herbicides; irrigation; the invention of steel; the 
modified seeds of the Green Revolution19; and, more recently, biotech such as 
GMOs, as all examples of developments in productive technology which are in 
an abstract sense available to farmers. Of course, as has been suggested 
above, the take up of a new technology is not neutral and brings with it 
implications. For instance, mechanization radically reduces the amount of 
labour required in agricultural productivity; chemical herbicides increase the 
health risks to which farm workers, and those residing in close proximity to 
farms, are exposed, whilst also – in conjunction with mechanization and 
chemical fertilisers – permitting vast monocultures with field many hundreds of 
acres in size; the invention of steel results in tough new ploughs which can rip 
                                            
18  As will be discussed below, this contest over means is one of the primary characteristics of 
the present food policy era (Maxwell and Slater, 2004; Lang et al., 2009).  
19  The Green Revolution has been described, by Mazoyer and Roudart as “a variant of the 
contemporary agricultural revolution but without the large-scale motorization and 
mechanization.” (Mazoyer and Roudart, 2006: 12).  
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away previously impenetrable turf layers, leading to both an expansion in the 
availability of fertile land and the chronic soil erosion of the 1930s Dust Bowl in 
the US; the advancements in productivity of the Green Revolution, allegedly, 
rescues countries like India from the brink of famine, but impose upon the 
farmers that wish to participate in the new technology a capital requirement that 
they are unable to meet resulting in a pressure for economies of scale which 
make small farmers commercially unviable in many parts of the world; and 
GMOs, allegedly, permit reductions in chemical herbicide use whilst at the 
same time locking farmers into a type of dependency upon the corporations that 
supply them by prohibiting their reuse of the seeds generated by the GMO crop 
and necessitating the purchase of additional proprietary technology which are 
required for their functioning. However, as I will show below, the determination 
of which impacts are relevant to policy discussion depends in part on the ideas 
that one holds regarding the ends of agri-food systems, and the rights to be 
enjoyed and responsibilities owed by different actors in the agri-food system.  
 
ii. Distribution 
 
Clearly, then, there have been significant innovations in the productive 
technology that is in principle available to farmers and policy-makers. This 
impacts of course on the first sphere of the agri-food system – that of 
production. However, there have also been many significant developments in 
the second sphere – that of distribution. Some of these developments in fact 
are the same more or less as those in production but just have different 
consequences. For whilst motorisation, for example, in production permits both 
greater scales of production and less labour, it also, along with other 
technologies, enables the distance between production and consumption 
activities to grow ever longer. For instance, Mazoyer and Roudart argue that:  
 
 [I]ndustry revolutionized transcontinental transportation with the 
development of railroads and transoceanic transportation with the development 
of steamships. More extensive new territories were opened to European 
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agricultural colonies, and European markets were brought within the reach of 
these colonies’ exports. 
    (Mazoyer and Roudart, 2006: 356-357).  
 
Thus, revolutions in transport technology brought different farming systems, 
both consumers from one system and farmers from another, and farmers from 
one system and farmers from another, into contact with each other.  
 
Another important development in the sphere of distribution concerns both the 
emergence of supermarkets and of the information technology that they use to 
organise their supply chains. Whilst supermarkets have been part of the food 
landscape of developed countries for many years, they have recently began 
rapidly expanding through the South also and, for example, in 2000 were 
recorded as controlling 50-60 % of food marketing in Latin America 
(Weatherspoon and Reardon, 2003), with similar, though somewhat slower, 
rates of penetration in Africa and Asia (Maxwell and Slater, 2004: 5). The 
extended supply chains that serve these supermarkets have been facilitated, 
amongst others, by the development of information technology – which allows 
sales, stocks, and orders to be rapidly calibrated to each other - and plant 
breeding – both conventional and biotech – which tailors specific traits for these 
extended supply chains, such as increased shelf life (McCullough et al., 
2007).20 
 
Another important dynamic relevant to the expansion of supermarkets is the 
amount of concentration within the sector. For example, in a 2006 report, the 
UK’s Office of Fair Trading found that in the UK just five retailers control 75 % of 
the total grocery market (OFT, 2006:12). The same report observed that this 
has serious implications for the bargaining power of these major retailers vis-à-
vis both food producers and processors.  
 
                                            
20  The significance of Information Technology for modern supply chains is captured by the fact 
that: “One of the world’s largest supercomputers is in Bentonville, Arkansas, the headquarters 
of Walmart.” (Timmer, 2009: 1815).  
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iii. Consumption 
Finally, it is worth considering some key developments in the sphere of 
consumption. Farming produces basic crops, meats, vegetables and so forth, 
but these can be consumed in a wide variety of ways. Increasingly, in the rich 
industrialised countries of the North, but also in the developing world, farm 
produce is being processed by intermediaries between producers and 
consumers before being “cooked” and eaten. For instance, in 1992 the OECD 
reported that the global food processing industry was worth about $1.5 trillion a 
year, making it “one of the world’s largest industries.” (OECD, 1992; quoted by 
Tansey and Worsley, 1995: 111). The diffusion of processed foods is suggested 
by the fact that in 1990 barely 8 % of the food found in US supermarkets was 
not processed – a ratio which more or less conforms with the UK experience 
also (George, 1990, quoted in Weis, 2007: 78).  
 
Another important indicator of changes in consumption behaviour is indicated 
by the spread of fast food outlets. In the US, for instance, annual fast-food 
expenditure rose “from US$6billion in 1970 to US$110 billion in 2001” (Weis, 
2007: 78, referencing Schlosser, 2002). However, this trend is being reflected in 
developing countries also. For instance, in 2004 FAO reported that: 
 
 The past decade has seen a dramatic increase in convenience food 
markets in developing countries. In 1985, the McDonald’s restaurant chain 
operated 9 000 restaurants worldwide; by 2001 this number had expanded to 
30 000 restaurants in 121 countries (Ghezan, Mateos and Viteri, 2002). In 
China, the first foreign fast food company, Kentucky Fried Chicken, opened a 
restaurant in Beijing in 1987 and, after nine years, the business had expanded 
to 100 restaurants. Today, 15 years after the opening of the first restaurant, 
there are 600 Kentucky Fried Chicken outlets in China, the majority in urban 
centres (Agriculture and Agri-food Canada, 2002). Similarly, in Latin America 15 
years ago there were 100 McDonald’s outlets, whereas today there are 1 581, 
with one-third located in the urban areas of Brazil (Ghezan, Mateos and Viteri, 
2002). 
    (FAO, 2004: 12).  
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Indeed, the proliferation of fast food outlets has been associated with another 
significant feature of shifts in consumption behaviour, the convergence of global 
eating habits around what – perhaps rather pejoratively – has been termed the 
‘western diet”. This entails a diet “high in saturated fats, sugar and refined foods 
and low in fibre” the change to which, in conjunction with reduced physical 
activity, is “reflected in nutritional outcomes, such as changes in average 
stature, body composition and morbidity.” (Popkin, 2004: 43). Popkin has 
referred to this as the “nutrition transition” (Popkin, 2004, Hadaad, 2004).  
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3. Agri-food System Transformations: Impacts  
 
The developments outlined above in a by necessity impressionistic account 
represent some of the key transformations regarded by a range of scholars as 
transforming Agri-food systems in the late twentieth, early twenty-first century. 
Beyond those identified above what follows is a summary overview of some of 
the impacts of these developments that are regarded as being particularly 
important. These impacts fall within six main thematic areas: Differentiated (and 
unequal) farm systems; ecological impacts; health; food safety; new actors in 
the agri-food system and, relatedly; issues of power and control. Each of these 
will be discussed in turn.  
 
i. Global Farming Systems: Differentiated, and Unequal 
 
Over the course of many millennia’s worth of development, since the Neolithic 
agricultural revolution, diverse farming systems have emerged reflecting, in 
part, adaptation to such factors as local climate and geography. However, whilst 
diversity between farming systems is perhaps part of the “natural order” of 
things, in the past 50 years or so this diversity has taken on extreme 
proportions, with radically diverging levels of output between, at one end, those 
farmers fully availing of the innovations in ‘modern’ productive technologies, 
and at the other, those who continue to work in a “traditional” fashion.  
 
The FAO, for instance, estimates that there are 525 million farms worldwide, 
and the total active agricultural population is estimated at around 1.3 billion out 
of a total rural population of 3 billion. By far, the greater number of these farms 
– ninety percent in fact - are small farms, “defined as having less than two 
hectares of land” (IAASTD, 2009: 8; Mazoyer and Roudart, 2007: 13). Out of 
this global population of farms Mazoyer and Roudart differentiate between three 
different types of farm system, each with varying levels of productivity. In the 
first category are those who have fully benefited from all elements of the 
contemporary agricultural revolution, particularly extensive motorisation and 
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mechanisation, whose productivity equals “2, 000 tonnes of grain, or grain 
equivalent” per worker, per year. The number of farmers in this category is 
suggested by the fact that there are only 28 million tractors in the world.  The 
second category contains those who benefit from advances in selected varieties 
associated with the Green Revolution, and here productivity varies between 
“ten and a few dozen tonnes” per worker, per year. And in the third category - 
the 400-500 million farmers “who have never been in a position to buy either a 
tractor, a draught animal, a cultivator, selected seeds, mineral fertilisers, or 
pesticides” productivity is 1 tonne per worker, per year (Mazoyer and Roudart, 
2007: 6). Thus between the most productive (per labour unit) fully modernised 
farms and the least productive (per labour unit), there is a divergence in 
productive output of a factor of 2,000. The locations of these farms is reflected 
in the percentage of the population involved in agriculture from country to 
country:  “In low-income countries, agriculture employs more than 70% of the 
population, in middle-income countries it employs 30% and in high-income 
countries only 4%.” (Consumers International, 2001: 4).  
 
 
 
Figure 1. Regional distribution of small-scale farms21 
                                            
21 Note: Small-scale farms are defined as those of less than 2 hectares. The total number of 
small scale farms is 404 million (IAASTD, 2009b).  
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(IAASTD, 2009b: 8; from Nagayets, 2005, based on FAO 2001c, 2004c and 
national statistical agencies).  
 
However, whilst productivity output (per labour unit) is a useful way of 
differentiating between farming systems, it is not the only way. Indeed, as I will 
show in the conclusion to this chapter, the criteria that are used to differentiate 
farm systems are highly contestable, and are implicitly informed by such factors 
as what we regard as being the ends of agri-food systems and also the rights to 
be enjoyed and responsibilities owed by different agri-food system actors. In 
this regard, even something as apparently “neutral” or “technical” as devising a 
typology of farm systems can have hugely important (political) implications. For 
example, another distinction that can be made is between “through-flow” and 
“closed-loop” farming systems. In essence this distinction hinges upon the 
extent to which a farming-system recycles biomatter to meet nutrient needs etc 
or is reliant upon chemical inputs, synthesized off-farm. A major critique of the 
industrial farming system, for instance, is that by decoupling the growing 
process from the ecological limits of fertility management it locks farmers into a 
chemical fertilizer dependence (Weis, 2007: 56).  
 
At the same time as farming systems have been transformed, debates and 
concerns have emerged over their ecological impacts. 
 
ii. Ecological Impacts 
 
At a general level the significance of agriculture in both a negative and positive 
sense for the natural world is widely acknowledged (see, for example: MA, 
2005; IAASTD, 2009b). Humans have been practicing agriculture for over 
10,000 years, and because agriculture involves a human intervention into the 
natural world, it’s inevitable that this would impact on the environment. From the 
outset making land available for agriculture typically involves clearing forest, 
and this has implications, for example, for biodiversity. The long history of 
agriculture and its interpenetration with the natural world is indicated by the fact 
that, in the words of the IAASTD (International Assessment of Agricultural 
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Knowledge, Science and Technology for Development) there is “often a 
continuum between a farming system and a natural ecosystem” (IAASTD, 
2009b: 36).  
 
As has been discussed above, there are many different types and scales of 
farming system, which can be distinguished according to different indicators, 
and one way is in the extent to which nutrient supply and pest and weed 
control, for instance, is achieved through “natural” or “synthetic” means. The 
latter is associated with industrial agriculture and, for instance, chemical 
fertilisers. Whilst both small scale, largely “natural” systems and large scale, 
industrial agricultures have been identified as having – at least, in the former, 
tendencies towards – negative environmental impacts (IAASTD, 2009b), in the 
past 40 years or so a particularly strong critique of industrial agriculture has 
emerged centering on its negative environmental impacts.22 For example, in 
1962 Rachel Carson published Silent Spring, which drew attention to the impact 
that the chemical pesticide DDT had upon biodiversity in the US, and which led 
both the banning of DDT and, it is argued, the emergence of the nascent 
environmental movement. It has also been argued (Bartlett, 1984) that the 
techniques of industrial agriculture - the use of heavy machinery; uniform, deep 
cultivation; a decline in use of organic fertilisers; crop residue-free fields, and a 
tendency toward specialization that reduces crop rotation - increase the erosion 
and depletion of soil, whist also suppressing or destroying its natural capacity to 
recycle fertility or manage pests and weeds. Soil becomes, in effect, “addicted” 
to industrial inputs (Barlett, 1987: 144-145, referencing Sampson, 1984: 15). 
Whilst in the mid-80s nearly one quarter of all US soil was experiencing 
“unacceptably high levels of erosion”, more recently the IAASTD stated that 
agricultural practices account for about a quarter of total global soil degradation 
(Barlett, 1987; IAASTD, 2009b: 40, referencing GACGC, 1994).  
In addition to soil degradation, industrial agriculture has been very strongly 
critiqued for its impacts across a range of other indicators. For instance, in 1993 
the FAO found that “as much as three quarters of the genetic diversity of 
                                            
22  Notwithstanding Marx’s earlier critique of the tendency of capitalism to decouple agricultural 
production from natural ecological cycles – the “metabolic rift”.  
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agricultural crops may have been lost” as a result of the spread of industrial 
agriculture and “the displacement of more diverse, traditional agricultural 
systems.” (Shaw, 2007: 441, referencing, FAO, 1993). Moreover, soil salination 
due to over irrigation, and “nitrification” due to run off from nitrogen fertilisers 
have also been recognised as major issues. Indeed, nitrogen pollution from 
overuse of chemical fertilisers is responsible, in the US, for creating a vast 
“dead-zone” in the Gulf of Mexico resulting from the growth of algae blooms 
which choke the oxygen from the water (called eutrophy) (Weis, 2007: 31; 
IAASTD); whilst in the EU the cost of nitrogen pollution is estimated at a 
€320million per annum (Dudley, 2011, referencing The European Nitrogen 
Assessment, (Sutton et al., 2011)). Though it seems careful to keep from too 
overt a critique, the International Assessment of Agricultural Science 
Knowledge, Science and Technology for Development contextualised itself as 
responding to the “widespread realization that despite significant scientific and 
technological achievements in our ability to increase agricultural productivity, 
we have been less attentive to some of the unintended social and 
environmental consequences of our achievements.” (IAASTD, 2009a: 3) Adding 
that “successfully meeting sustainability goals” would require a “fundamental 
shift” in agricultural knowledge, science and technology (IAASTD, 2009a: 6).  
iii. Health 
 
In 2008 at the height of the food price crisis it was estimated that the total 
number of chronically hungry human beings on the planet had eclipsed the 1 
billion mark (FAO, 2008b). An additional 2 billion, moreover, are regarded as 
suffering from micronutrient deficiency, particularly devastating for young 
children and pregnant women (FAO, 2008b). Whilst the record on hunger 
reduction in the post-war period is not regarded as being one that collectively 
humans can be proud of (Shaw, 2007), increasingly a range of “new” nutrition 
problems associated with overnourishment are vying for global attention 
(Tansey and Worsley, 1995: 50; Popkin, 2004). The bulk of these problems are 
centred on the rich industrialised countries, where the “western diet” is of 
course more prevalent. In the US, for example, “the medical costs of treating 
obesity-related diseases doubled between 1998 and 2008 to reach $147billion, 
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which is about 9 percent of all medical costs.” (Paarlberg, 2010: 83). Similar 
trends are observable in Europe too, where, in the case of the UK, for example, 
overall health expenditure comes in at just under £70 billion, an expanding 
amount of which is dedicated to the “health toll of diet-related disease” (Lang, 
2004: 31).  
 
Increasingly, however, the tendency for global convergence around the 
“western diet” is creating overconsumption issues in other parts of the world 
also. Popkin notes that, within just a ten year period, “overweight and obesity 
status has emerged as a major health problem” across a range of developing 
countries, including Mexico, Brazil, Egypt and Morocco, South Africa, Thailand 
and China (Popkin, 2004: 51-52). Moreover, the WHO predicts that by 2015 2.3 
billion people on the planet with be technically obese, which will pose a massive 
health issue alongside the 1 billion or so suffering chronic hunger and the 2 
billion experiencing ongoing micronutrient deficiency. In short, the global food 
system is regarded as failing in no small measure the health needs of the 
greater part of the world’s population. And in the face of such widespread diet-
related ill health, questions have been asked about the amount of resources 
that are spent to promote, on the one hand, the sweetened beverages that are 
regarded by some as being the “single largest driver of the obesity epidemic” 
(Paarlberg, 2010: 81) vs. on the other, those that are allocated to support global 
public health bodies.23 
 
iv. Food Safety 
 
In providing an overview of the typological framework that they use to organise 
the different food systems of the world in their survey of agri-food 
transformation, McCullough et al., (2009), when describing their third type, “the 
industrialized food system” include amongst its attributes “strong perceptions of 
safety” (McCullough et al., 2009: 4). Interestingly, this view is almost 
                                            
23  “In 2006 over US$2.5 billion was spent advertising Coca-Cola while McDonald’s selling, 
general and administrative expenses amounted to over $2.3 billion. These figures are much 
more than the annual budget of the WHO and around three years of the FAO’s 
budget.”(Tansey, 2008: 19).  
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diametrically opposed to that offered by other authors. For instance, Lang and 
his collaborators identify the period of 1980-2000 as a period of “public crises”, 
in which a series of food safety scandals across Europe – including the BSE, or 
‘mad cow’, and foot and mouth outbreak in the UK – transformed concern about 
the safety of industrial agricultural systems from an issue at the social fringes in 
the early 70s to one garnering main stream public attention (Lang, 2004: 27-28; 
Lang et al., 2009). So undermined, in fact, was public confidence in the food 
system during this period that it forced governments, food scientists and 
technologists, and market leaders to a redrawing of the state-market boundary 
away from the laissez-faire approach of the Washington Consensus towards 
one which ascribes a more robust regulatory role for the state (Lang et al., 
2009: 41).24  
 
Food safety is however not regarded as being a new issue or one limited to 
industrialised countries alone. For example, rapid urbanisation in the developing 
world and an attendant increase in the consumption of street foods is seen as 
generating important hygiene issues, but, again, Maxwell and Slater note  
“[m]ore generally there are many food safety problems associated with the 
industrialised food system” with 30 % of people suffering food-borne illness 
each year (Maxwell and Slater, 2004: 7, referencing: Tomlinsons et al., 2001; 
and Lang, 2004). One particular element of the dynamic of safety issues in 
industrial agriculture is related to their scale. As Tansey and Worsley noted in 
1995: “As the food chain has lengthened and the scale of processing has grown 
larger, now if something goes wrong, many more people may be affected.” 
(Tansey and Worsley, 1995: 59). Thus, industrial agriculture has been 
associated with new kinds of “safety risks”, which may be spreading as 
industrial agriculture spreads (Paarlberg, 2010: 161).25 
 
                                            
24  Smythe also notes “Having faced several food scares, state regulatory failures, and the 
flawed assurances of experts, EU consumers have become highly skeptical of scientific experts 
and have demanded stronger precautionary regulations” (Smythe, 2009: 119).  
25  “[T]he number of reported cases of food-borne diseases is increasing world-wide. In 
Venezuela, for example, from 1976 to 1987, the number of reported cases of food-borne 
disease more than tripled, up to 90 per 100, 000. In the USA, there are an estimated 6.5 million 
cases of food poisoning a year.” (Tansey and Worsley, 1995: 59).  
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v. Agri-Food Systems, Power and Control  
 
One characteristic of the developments affecting each of the three spheres of 
the agri-food system is that – compared to the simplistic agri-food system 
characterised above – they all permit or are related to a significant expansion in 
the number of actors involved in the agri-food system. This is true with regards 
to both “upstream” (before production) activities like providing the new inputs 
such as chemical fertilisers, pesticides and herbicides; enhanced seeds; feed 
and so forth; but also “downstream” (after production) with regards to 
distribution, processing and retail activities etc (Mazoyer and Roudart, 2006: 
376).  
 
a. New Agri-food System Actors  
 
The growth of the chemical fertiliser market is illustrative. From the first decades 
of the 20th century when the German chemical company BASF first 
commercialised chemical fertilisers, total global fertiliser consumption has 
grown and grown (Weis, 2007: 55). At the beginning of 1920, it was less than 2 
million tonnes, grew steadily to about 20 million tonnes in 1950, peaked in the 
late 80s at around 140 million tonnes, declined, and then attained 162 million 
tonnes in 2010 where the total value of fertiliser trade that year was $130.1 
billion (IFA, 2002: 12; FAO; 2005; Stockenews, 2011). The recent explosion in 
fertiliser useage is captured by the fact that: “More than half of all the synthetic 
nitrogen fertilizer ever applied on the planet has been used since 1985, and 
phosphorus use tripled between 1960 and 1990.” (IAASTD, 2009b: 6, 
referencing MA, 2005b). The scale of the market is significant, and the IFA (the 
International Fertilizer Industry Association) estimate that 2.2 billion people on 
the planet consume food that has been produced using chemical fertiliser (IFA, 
2002: 12). Indeed, in the early 2000s it was estimated that “synthetic fertilizer 
accounted for roughly 60 per cent of total fertilizer consumption” (Weis, 2007: 
56, referencing Gilland 2002). Whilst the International Fertilizer Industry 
Association (IFA) counts a diverse range of enterprises within its membership, 
from the relatively locally-based to the global (IFA, 2011), the overall level of 
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concentration within this industry is staggering, with the top six agrochemical 
producers – all TNCs - controlling about three quarters of the total market value 
(Bloom et al., 2009: 12).  
 
Corporate concentration within the agri-food sector is not, however, limited to 
agrochemicals only. Indeed, it is a feature of all sectors. For example, a 2005 
report by the Erosion, Technology and Concentration Group (ETC) found that: 
 
• The top 10 seed companies control nearly 50 percent of the US 
$21billion annual global commercial seed market and nearly all of the 
genetically engineered seed market. 
• The top 10 pesticide companies control 84 percent of the $30billion 
annual global pesticide market. 
• The top 10 food retailers control 24 percent of the estimated $3.5 trillion 
global food market. 
• The top 10 food and beverage processing companies control 24 percent 
of the estimated $1.25 trillion global market for packaged foods. 
  (ETC, 2005: 1).  
 
Figures capturing how market share is being redistributed, even between the 
largest participants, add some dynamism to these statistics. For instance, Lang 
has observed that “In the period 1993-99 the aggregate concentration of the 10 
grocery retailers in the EU grew by 24.9%, whereas the market share of the 
bottom 10 companies in the EU top 50 declined by 72.2%. The larger are 
getting larger and the small (even though large in relative historical terms) are 
being squeezed.” (2004:12, referencing Dobson, 2003).  
 
A concern with the emergence of both TNCs and concentration in agri-food 
systems is not new, and has been the focus of much academic work, stretching 
back to the 60s, but particularly in the last 20 years or so (e.g., see: Friedland, 
1994; Heffernan and Constance, 1994; Bonanno et al., 1994; Higgins and 
Lawrence, 2005; Clapp and Fuchs, 2009). In tracing their provenance, the 
expansion of TNCs and the restructuring of international markets which is 
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associated with their emergence is correlated by McMichael (1994), for 
instance, with the collapse of Bretton Woods economic order in the early 70s, 
when the US uncoupled the dollar from gold. Prior to this there existed a sort of 
stable international economic order in which states pursued national 
development projects in a global economic climate underpinned by the US 
deficit, a situation that by the late 60s the US could no longer sustain. 
Decoupling from the gold standard ushered in a new era of floating exchanges 
rates and unstable trade, during which governments had to negotiate their 
international competitiveness, with the effect of “elevating internationalization 
forces” (McMichael, 1994: 2). Heffernan and Constance (1994) identify three 
stages to agribusiness TNC formation. The first stage is vertical integration, 
during which the expanding company seeks to acquire ever-greater degrees of 
control over both upstream and downstream processes (e.g., in the case of 
broiler - chickens for meat consumption – production: expansion into feed 
production, broiler production, and broiler processing). In this stage the farmer 
is usually reconstituted merely as a source of labour in the production cycle, 
with the ownership of the produce and strategic decision-making retained by the 
contracting firm (Heffernan and Constance, 1994: 32). The second stage is 
conglomerate integration, during which corporations expand horizontally, 
merging across commodities to establish market dominance in a range of 
sectors. ConAgra is a good example of this, being, in the early 90s, “the largest 
U.S. turkey processor, sheep slaughterer, flour miller, and seafood processor. It 
is the second largest broiler processor, pork processor, cattle feedlot, and 
catfish processor.” (Heffernan and Constance, 1994: 37). And the final stage, 
as one might expect, is global integration. Here the conglomerate begins to 
operate globally - behaviour which is captured by Sanderson’s (1985) idea of 
“global sourcing”, referring to “the ability of TNCs both to obtain inputs and to 
market outputs at various sites around the globe, thereby reducing the 
uncertainty of commodity procurement and product sales, as well as to their 
ability to play different nation-states against one another to obtain maximum 
profits.” (Heffernan and Constance, 1994: 41, referencing Friedmann and 
McMichael, 1989; and Sanderson, 1985).  
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The emergence of TNCs has, as suggested above, a number of important 
implications. Two, in particular, are relevant for my thesis.  
 
b. TNCs – Breaching/Shaping Regulatory Authority? 
 
Firstly, by extending their operations beyond the boundaries of the state, TNCs 
are regarded as breaching existing regulatory authority. That is, they exceed 
the regulatory authority of the state. Indeed, in 1994 Bonanno et al., reflecting 
on the implications of TNC emergence for the future, found that: “The main 
burden of our projections about the future of the nation-state… is that it can be 
expected to decline, become somewhat irrelevant, but not disappear in the 
foreseeable future.” (Bonanno et al., 1994: 3). Despite its economic irrelevance, 
they argued, the state would continue to persist as the focal point for a citizenry 
seeking regulatory control over globalised economic forces, but now without 
problems: “The current freedom of the TNCs – the freedom to relocate, engage 
new labor forces, shift capital, and so on – will continue to post dilemmas for 
national governments.” (Bonanno et al., 1994: 20). More recent scholarship has 
supported this view. For instance, the editors to a 2005 volume entitled 
Agricultural Governance: Globalization and the New Politics of Regulation 
argued in their introduction that 
 
 [T]he rise of transnational corporations (TNCs) in the agribusiness 
industries […] has resulted in a reconfiguration of political power in which the 
state is no longer the predominant actor.  
    (Higgins and Lawrence, 2005: 1).  
 
The second major implication, and related to the first, is that TNCs are now 
regarded as exerting a disproportionate or questionable degree of power and 
influence over agri-food policy-making and governance, both national and 
international. For example, probably the most recent and most comprehensive 
study of the role of TNCs in global agri-food governance, by Clapp and Fuchs 
(2009), argues that as fundamentally important actors within the global agri-
food system, agribusiness TNCs ought to be governed by the rules which are 
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being established at the international level to provide “safeguards from potential 
negative socioeconomic and ecological consequences of a globalized food 
system.” However, these very same corporations play key roles in the 
formulation of the rules themselves, whether they are formulated at the state 
level, the intergovernmental level, or privately. This naturally raises important 
questions about the extent to which such rules are going to be able to 
guarantee an agri-food system which is economically, socially, and 
environmentally sustainable (Clapp and Fuchs, 2009: 1).  
 
Clapp and Fuchs develop a threefold schema of power to explain the influence 
that agribusiness TNCs have over the global rule-making environment. Firstly, 
there is the instrumental power that they wield through their direct influence, 
through the exercise of financial, organisational, or human resources, and their 
access to policy-makers (Clapp and Fuchs, 2009: 8). Secondly, TNCs influence 
the rule-making environment through their structural power. This captures the 
fact that TNCs occupy fundamentally important structural positions now in the 
global food economy, and therefore are in a position “to punish and reward 
countries for their policy choices by relocating investments and jobs” (Clapp and 
Fuchs, 2009: 9, referencing Cox, 1987; Gill and Law, 1989; and Fagre and 
Wells, 1982). Another dimension of structural power is related to the fact that 
corporate actors have control of “pivotal networks and resources” which endows 
them with a de facto private regulatory authority. A good example of this 
concerns, as discussed above, standard setting by retailers, through which they 
impose operational requirements upon all the different actors that deal with 
them, including farmers, with important distributional outcomes (Clapp and 
Fuchs, 2009: 10).  
 
The final type of power exercised by TNCs, according to Clapp and Fuchs, is 
discursive power. This refers to a type of power that is “a function of norms and 
ideas”. This refers to the ways in which these norms and ideas – often in the 
background – shape both the definition of policy problems and of solutions. In 
other words it captures how policy decisions “are a function of discursive 
contests over the framing of policies and the assignment of problems into 
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categories by linking them to specific fundamental norms and values.” (Clapp 
and Fuchs, 2009: 10, referencing Hajer, 1997; Koiiman, 2002). According to 
Clapp and Fuchs, this type of power is “reflected in discourse, communicative 
values, and cultural values and institutions” and in the specific case of TNCs, 
through their use of “media and public relations efforts” to “socialize politicians 
and the public into accepting “truths” about desirable policies and political 
developments” (Clapp and Fuchs: 10). To effectively exercise this type of 
power, however, requires “political legitimacy”, because “discursive power is 
relational in that it relies on the willingness of message recipients to listen and 
place at least some trust in the validity of the contents of the message.” (Clapp 
and Fuchs, 10-11). According to Clapp and Fuchs, the utilisation by corporate 
actors of discursive power is associated with growing public awareness around, 
for example, issues of sustainability and safety in the agri-food system. This has 
led to a series of public debates on various issues which corporate actors have 
become “much more active in attempting to influence” (Clapp and Fuchs, 2009: 
13).  
 
c. Power and Control Within Agri-food Systems 
 
However, issues of power and control relate not just to the capacities of political 
authorities vis-à-vis agri-food system actors, but also to relations between the 
agri-food system actors themselves, particularly those between small farmers 
and corporations. For, to quote Tansey: 
 
 The various actors in the food system are engaged in a struggle over 
who will have power and control over the production and supplies of food, and 
how the benefits and risks arising from different activities will be distributed. 
    (Tansey, 2008: 8). 
 
As was noted above, the transformations reshaping agri-food systems in the 
19th, 20th and 21st centuries are associated with, amongst others, an increase in 
the different types of actors participating within agri-food systems. In part, this is 
a function of the increase in commercial opportunity created by technological 
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advances. For example, as discussed above, breakthroughs in scientific 
understanding of the biochemistry of plant nutrition enabled the synthesis of 
chemical fertilisers and an increased role for petro-chemical companies within 
agricultural and food production. Where technology is less obviously the 
enabling force – though, for instance, it seems difficult to imagine the huge 
expansion of supermarkets in the absence of technological advances in 
transportation – they are still highly relevant in terms of translating the presence 
of new actors into new conditions for farmers. For example, Reardon et al., note 
that the growth of supermarkets does not in itself have any impact upon 
smallholder producers, but when supermarkets “modernize” their procurement 
systems, it does (Reardon et al., 2009: 1719). This is associated with a range of 
developments, some of which are technological, some of which involve the 
development of private retail standards to which producers have to comply if 
they want to sell to supermarket procurement officers or their intermediaries.26 
However, the net effect of this modernization is that small farmers are excluded 
from the modern markets served by supermarkets. Thus, supermarket 
expansion is associated with small farmer exclusion (Maxwell and Slater, 2004: 
6; Reardon et al., 2009).27  
 
                                            
26  “Procurement system modernization includes (Reardon and Berdegué, 2002) three 
elements: (1) a shift from no standards or public standards to use of private standards of quality 
and safety; (2) a shift from spot market relations in traditional wholesale markets to use of 
vertical coordination mechanisms; the latter include explicit contracts or implicit contracts such 
as preferred supplier lists, and market inter-linkages such as linking output procurement to 
provision of credit or input and (3) a shift from local procurement by each store to centralized 
procurement using distribution centres, coupled with a shift to procurement catchment area 
broadening from local into sourcing via national, regional, and global networks.” (Reardon et al., 
2009: 1719).  
27 For example, Fuchs et al., 2009, note how: 
“Thousands of small dairy operations have gone out of business in the past five years in the 
extended MERCOSUR area, because they were unable to meet new quality and safety 
standards for milk and milk products that required large investments in equipment and buildings 
and a high level of coordination and management, and; 
Whilst in 1992 nearly 75 percent of fresh fruit and vegetables grown for export in Kenya were 
produced by smallholders, by 1998 the four largest exporters in Kenya derived only 18 percent 
of their produce from smallholders. In the same year the five largest exporters in Zimbabwe 
sourced less than 6 percent of produce from smallholders.”  
(Fuchs et al., 2009: 46, referencing: Reardon et al., 2001; and Brown and Sander, 2007).  
The impacts of retailers upon small farmers, moreover, mirror  those arising from the 
emergence of large processors who impose similarly excluding standards (Tansey and Worsley, 
1995).  
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Another important set of developments regarded as impacting deleteriously 
upon small farmers are those relating to the development of IP (intellectual 
property rights) and particularly their extension over plant and animal food 
genetic resources (Tansey, 2008; Rajotte; 2008).28 Indeed, for Tansey “rules on 
IP are central to struggles over the distribution of wealth and power in the 21st 
century.” (Tansey, 2008: xi). IPs have a long history, going back to the end of 
the 19th century with the signing of the 1883 Paris Convention for the Protection 
of Industrial Property. In the post-war period the internationalisation of IP 
concern is embodied in the creation of the World Intellectual Property 
Organization (WIPO), a specialized agency of the United Nations, in 1967. 
However, allegedly as a result of concern over the sustainability of their 
business model in the face of increasingly globalised and liberalised markets, 
and related shortcomings in WIPO, a number of industries – pharmaceuticals, 
music and film, and software in particular – pushed for the IP system to be “fully 
integrated into the new multilateral trading system that was taking shape in the 
second half of the 1980s.” (Roffe, 2008: 49). This was achieved on the 15th April 
1994, Morocco, with the signing of the Marrakesh Agreement establishing the 
World Trade Organisation, which included the Trade Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement.  
 
Article 47.3b is regarded as being both one of the most controversial provisions 
of the TRIPS Agreement and “of great importance for agriculture, biodiversity 
and the future of food” (Roffe, 2008: 55). It states that 
 
 Members may also exclude from patentability: plants and animals other 
than micro-organisms, and essentially biological processes for the production of 
plants or animals other than non-biological and microbiological processes. 
However, Members shall provide for the protection of plant varieties either by 
patents or by an effective sui generis system or by any combination thereof. 
                                            
28  Intellectual Property rights are described as “legal and institutional devices to protect 
creations of the mind such as inventions, works of art and literature, and designs. They also 
include marks on products to indicate their different from similar ones sold by competitors. Over 
the years, the rather elastic (and arguably misleading) intellectual property concept has been 
stretched to include not only patents, copyrights, trademarks and industrial designs, but also 
trade secrets, plant breeders’ rights, geographical indications and rights to layout designs of 
integrated circuits.” (Tansey, 2008: 12, from Dutfield, 2003a: 1-2).   
Chapter Four 
Contextualising Food Policy Contestation  
 
 98 
    (Article 27.3b, TRIPS Agreement).  
 
Whilst patents have been important for some time for the development of 
agrochemicals, their relevance and future significance has been extended with 
the controversial development of modern biotechnology, including genetic 
engineering and nanotechnology (Tansey, 2008: 20, referencing Barton, 2003). 
Indeed, following the US Supreme Court’s decision to authorise the patenting of 
genetically engineered microrganisms in 1980, it has been observed that there 
has been a rush of investment into the new technologies, as companies seek to 
exploit the potential of genetic engineering to open up new markets (Tansey, 
2008: 20, referencing Millstone and Lang, 2003: 40). Some of this has fuelled 
the conglomeration of food agribusiness: 
 
 The potential of genetic engineering to manipulate plants which could be 
patented drew new players into the business of seed production, largely from 
the chemical and pharmaceutical industries. 
    (Tansey, 2008: 22).  
 
The TRIPS Agreement did not come into force for developing countries until 
2005, so it is regarded as being too early to measure its impacts and little 
research has been done in this regard. However, concern has been expressed 
about a number of its possible impacts. These include increasing farmer 
dependence upon the TNCs who distribute and increasingly own the genetic 
material (seeds, plants, fertilisers etc) upon which they rely; eroding both the 
rights of farmers to save seeds, and of researchers to access “proprietary 
germplasm”; and, more generally, increasing corporate control with negative 
impacts upon livelihoods, local farming systems, and consumption patters (CI, 
2001; Action-Aid International 2005; Shaw, 2007; Rajotte, 2008; Tansey, 2008). 
The profusion of IP, therefore, through TRIPS – which is especially significant 
because it locks the IP regime into the enforcement mechanisms of the WTO – 
is regarded as posing a major threat to smallholder producers the world over.  
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4. The Policy Environment 
 
Before proceeding to the conclusion it is necessary in this final section to touch 
upon some of the key dynamics identified by analysts as shaping and 
constituting the environment in which, in the 21st century, food policy is 
formulated. Two elements are particularly relevant here: Historically evolving 
understandings of and attitudes towards food policy; and the emergence of the 
transnational as a driver of national food policy outcomes. Each of these 
elements will be addressed in turn. 
 
i. A Brief Overview of Post-War Food Policy: From Consensus to 
Contestation 
 
To understand the present context in which food policy is debated and 
contested, it is necessary to situate it in its historical context. Indeed, situating 
food policy in its contemporary and historical context underscores and amplifies 
the importance attached by Clapp and Fuchs to discursive power, for it reveals 
precisely that 21st food policy is indeed the site of ongoing debate and 
contestation. Broadly speaking, the historical context of food policy can be 
divided into a number of different periods identified by food policy scholars 
between now and the post-war period.29 Lang et al., for instance, identify “four 
phases in the evolution of modern food policy” (2009: 27). The first of these is 
captured by the heading “1940s and 1950s: food policy as agricultural 
productionism” (27-31). This was a period in which, immediately following 
                                            
29 Whilst different scholars – and their influential accounts - have divided up this period 
differently, e.g., Maxwell and Slater, (2004), I am going to draw from the overview provided by 
Lang et al., (2009), because their account is the most comprehensive (beginning their analysis 
in the post-war period and situating post-war food policy in its pre-war historical context, in 
contrast to the account provided by Maxwell and Slater, which begins in the early 70s (2004: 2). 
However, irrespective of differences in perspective, accounts of the post-war history of food 
policy share in common the recognition that we have moved/are moving from an era of state-
centred productionism, through a neoliberal-dominated food security era, to one in which food 
policy is presented with a wide range of diverse issues and challenges, defined by Lang (2010) 
as the “new fundamentals” of food policy and by Maxwell and Slater as the criteria for a “new 
food policy”, and including issues of energy, biodiversity, poverty reduction, human rights, 
health, food safety and so on. In total Maxwell and Slater identify 18 criteria for evaluating food 
system performance (2004: 12), and Lang identifies 10 ‘new fundamentals” for food policy 
(2010: 90-93).  
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WWII, a strong belief in the need to raise production and in the ability of science 
and state intervention (involving a contraction of the market) to do this were 
prevalent. The overall mood was one of optimism and of unrealised potential, 
and this infused both the attitudes of national governments (who developed 
sizeable programmes of agricultural intervention and support) and the creation 
of international organisations such as the FAO.  
 
The second period, defined as: “1970s: food policy for markets or 
development?” (31-37), was one in which the optimism of the previous years 
was eclipsed by two sets of crises: the first, the famines in Sudan and 
Bangladesh, which had the effect of casting doubts on the effectiveness of the 
productionist policy approach; and the second, the oil shocks of the 70s, which 
exposed the oil dependence of industrial agriculture. These crises were seized 
upon by neoliberals, who mounted a strong critique of the previous period’s 
policies and argued that market liberalization and unrestrained commerce were 
the way forward. This is the period, therefore, in which the top-down, statist 
approach to food policy “began to fragment” and “markets replaced planning” 
(2009: 36). In this period the narrower agenda of “food security” replaces the 
broader perspective of “food policy”, food security being seen as a residual of 
state-intervention for poverty reduction in the context of the neoliberal shift to 
market-orientation (Maxwell and Slater, 2005, referencing Maxwell, 1990; 
Hindle, 1990). This period also featured, moreover, a “burgeoning civil society 
presence” as, emerging out of the informal politics of 60s and 70s activism, a 
range of NGOs active on a broad platform of issues, including Greenpeace, 
Friends of the Earth, and Oxfam began to debate and contest food and 
development policy more generally, particularly from social, environmental, and 
human rights perspectives.  
 
The third period identified by Lang et al. is captured under the heading “1980s-
2000s: the slow emergence of ecological crisis and market failure” (37-42). 
During this period confidence in the technological advances that had provided 
the “engine” of the productionist effort in the earlier periods – the Green 
Revolution – gave way to concern over four “cross-cutting crises” – nutrition 
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(over- and under-), community development, the environmental impacts of food 
and agriculture, and food safety. Indeed, this is the period in which public 
confidence in the industrial food system more generally was rocked by a series 
of public health crises (discussed above), which led, in countries like the UK, to 
the redefinition of the state-market boundary and the dissolution of the 
agricultural ministry in favour of the relocation of food and agricultural policy to a 
more environmentally sensitive location. According to Lang et al., this was a 
“confused period”, as the logic of neoliberalism embodied in the Washington 
Consensus was confronted, and undermined by, a range of issues calling for 
increased regulation. It was also, therefore, a period of “fragmentation”.  
 
The final period identified by Lang et al., is of course the present one, described 
by the heading “21st century: rising to the challenge of ecological public health?” 
(42-45). As suggested above, it’s important to note that for Lang et al. each 
period within the post-war history of food policy can be differentiated from the 
other, in part, according to the dynamics of contestation and collaboration that 
existed therein. Period 1, for instance, was a period of “consensus”, period 2 of 
“uneasy truce”, period 3 – as above – of “confusion” and “fragmentation”, and 
the present period is defined as being one in which, whilst, according to Lang et 
al. whilst there is a general consensus regarding the range of issues that 21st 
food policy needs to address  - the “new fundamentals”, which include: price 
volatility, dwindling productivity, declining grain stocks, struggling and collapsing 
fish stocks, concerns over meat consumption and the nutrition transition, 
climate change, water stress, rapidly rising oil prices and oil dependence, the 
inability of world markets to feed the poor, the continuing centrality of agriculture 
to human development, ongoing food insecurity, urbanization, the nutrition 
transition (driven, in part, by marketing), the impact of livestock production, 
deep ecological crisis (threatening food capacity, biodiversity and soil), and old 
and new forms of food waste (43-44) – there is no such consensus about how 
to do this: “For each of the new fundamentals of the 21st century food-policy 
outlined above, there are competing solutions. As ever, in food policy, there is 
no single way; there are always options.” (Lang et al., 2009: 44). Importantly, 
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the multidimensionality of the new food policy agenda requires an integrated 
approach, a point I pick up on in the conclusion.  
 
In each of the periods identified by Lang et al. the locus of food policy action is 
different. In the first period, it is the state that is regarded as being the primary 
agent in securing food policy objectives. In the second period, the state is 
displaced by the market and, indeed, the possibility of an integrated food policy 
gives way – under the constraints of neoliberalism - to a much more narrower 
focus upon food security (Fairburn, 2010; McMichael, 2005). In the current 
period a complex array of public and private actors, operating at different levels 
– from the local up to the international – constitute the terrain of food policy 
action (Lang et al., 2009; Maxwell and Slater, 2004)30 and indeed, a central 
component of contemporary food policy contestation concerns the question of 
where authority for agri-food system governance ought to reside, and how far it 
should extend over the behaviour of agri-food system actors. Central to my 
thesis – of a transnational public sphere in food and agriculture – however, is 
the significance of the international as a driver of food policy outcomes. If a 
transnational public sphere is to exist, then there must exist the possibility of 
attaining efficacious political authority at the transnational level.  
 
BOX FOUR Neoliberalism  
 
According to David Harvey, Neoliberalism is the view that: 
 
 [H]uman well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual 
entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework 
characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade.”  
    (Harvey, 2005: 2). 
 
Neoliberalism became a serious policy influence largely under the ideological 
leadership of US President Ronald Regan and UK Prime Minister Margaret 
                                            
30  “Today, more than at any time in human history, institutions central to food and health 
governance are multi-level: they can be placed in at least five levels of governance, from the 
global to the community” (Lang and Heasman, 2004: 258-259).  
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Thatcher, but its antecedents stretch back to post-war European intellectuals 
and its influence shaped policies in countries as diverse as China, Sweden, and 
Brazil. Moreover, institutions such as the Bretton Woods organisations (the IMF 
and World Bank), and the WTO have become important drivers of neoliberal 
reform at the global level. It is also argued that many institutions closer to the 
“core” UN have internalised neoliberal precepts in their policies and activities. 
 
Since their rise to prominence in the late 70s early 80s neoliberal ideas have 
influenced food and agriculture in a variety of ways. For instance, the 
liberalisation and deregulation of markets has enabled both corporate 
consolidation and market expansion, leading to, for instance, the emergence 
and growth of Agri-business TNCs (South and North) and the rapid spread of 
large food retailers across much of the developing world. Neoliberal reforms, 
moreover, under the auspices of the World Bank and the IMF have impacted 
profoundly and devastatingly upon developing country smallholders, by both 
exposing them to competition from farming systems with radically asymmetrical 
rates of productivity, encouraging a shift into the production of “cash crops” for 
export into weak and variable markets, and dismantling the state support 
structures through which they were provided access to credit, inputs, and fair 
and stable prices. The influence of neoliberal discourse in food and agriculture 
can be seen vividly at work both in constructions of where the private 
autonomy/risk-public authority boundary ought to lie (markets should be 
unregulated/ the private sector ought to be free to self-regulate) and in 
expectations around the behaviour and attitudes of farmers (who should be 
innovators, risk takers, subject to the disciplines and commercial pressures of 
markets and so on).  
 
Some have argued, in the wake of the various food, financial, and climate crises 
and in the difficulty encountered in advancing its agenda in the WTO (whose 
latest round of multilateral trade negotiations – the so-called Doha Development 
Round – has stalled repeatedly since its launch in November 2001 and is now 
regarded by many trade insiders as being “dead”) that neoliberalism is 
“faltering” (Shaw, 2007; Lang et al., 2009). Others, however, struck by the 
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seeming incapacity of policy-makers to think outside of neoliberal frameworks 
when responding to these crises, have begun to reflect on the reasons for its 
“strange non-death” (Crouch, 2011). And others have argued that the purity of 
neoliberalism at the discursive level has never been matched in reality, with 
even its strongest advocates exempting (politically important) markets or 
sectors from strict neoliberal disciplines (Oya, 2005). The notion that 
neoliberalism is faltering, however, finds compelling support in the importance 
increasingly attached by TNCs to “discursive power” (Clapp and Fuchs, 2009, 
also see below) and, perhaps most tellingly, in the fact that when reform of the 
international food security institutional architecture became high on the global 
political agenda following the food price crisis of 2007-2008, one of the key 
roles that was assigned to the body that came out of this process – the 
Committee on World Food Security, discussed in Chapter Seven – was to 
facilitate policy convergence. This can be regarded as institutional recognition 
of the fact that no one policy-approach is hegemonic.  
 
(Khan, 1999; Saad-Filho and Johnston, 2005; Oya, 2005; Harvey, 2005; Shaw, 
2007; Lang et al., 2009; Clapp and Fuchs, 2009; Crouch, 2011; GRAIN, 2011; 
Wilkinson, 2011).  
ii. The Institutional Environment of Food Policy: The Emergence of the 
Transnational  
 
The history of transnational level food and agricultural organisation in the 
modern era stretches back at least to 1905 when American farmer David Lubin 
successfully managed to mobilise the international community to create an 
international body that would engage in global food and agricultural data 
collection, so as to break the food cartels’ monopoly on information and redress 
power imbalances faced by farmers (Hecht, 2008). In 1945 the body that Lubin 
created – the International Institute for Agriculture – was folded into the newly 
created FAO. Since that time, however, the number of transnational level 
bodies deemed to be food and agriculturally relevant has mushroomed to, by 
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some estimates, over 30 institutions.31 This list comprises a great many varied 
entities, from those that are specifically mandated in food and agriculture – such 
as the FAO (Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations), IFAD 
(the International Fund for Agricultural Development), and the WFP (the World 
Food Programme) to others whose significance and role in food policy is widely 
acknowledged but who may not have a specific mandate for this area, such as 
the Bretton Woods institutions (the World Bank and the IMF) and, more 
recently, the WTO (the World Trade Organization).  
 
a. The Bretton Woods Institutions  
 
Founded, like the FAO, in the late stages of the Second World War, the Bretton 
Woods institutions (the IMF and the World Bank) were conceived as important 
elements of a post-war international economic order. The role of the IMF was to 
help states stabilise, by rectifying or adjusting, short-term balance of payments 
disequilibria. The World Bank – or its precursor, the International Bank of 
Reconstruction and Development, which now forms one entity of several within 
the World Bank group – was founded to assist with the post-war reconstruction 
and to provide funding to states for specific development projects or crises. 
Over time (from the 1950s in the case of the IMF and from the 1980s for the 
World Bank) both institutions have expanded their activities well beyond the 
                                            
31 For example, Shaw records how when in 1990 the now-defunct World Food Council 
conducted a review of UN agencies working on hunger and malnourishment issues, it identified 
“well over 30 multilateral institutions”. (Shaw, 2007: 206). A more recent illustration of the 
number of food and agriculturally relevant entities operating at the global level is suggested by 
the fact that when UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon convened a High Level Task Force to 
respond to the 2007/2008 food price crisis, it counted no less than twenty different bodies within 
its membership. The full list of HLTF members includes: Food and Agriculture Organization 
(FAO), International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), Office of the High Commissioner 
for Human Rights (OHCHR), Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), 
International Labour Organization (ILO), International Monetary Fund (IMF), UN Office of the 
High Representative for the Least Developed Countries, Landlocked Developing Countries and 
Small Island Developing States (OHRLLS), UN Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD), UN Development Programme (UNDP), UN Environment Programme (UNEP), 
Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), World Bank, World Food 
Programme (WFP), World Health Organization (WHO), World Trade Organization (WTO), 
Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA), Department of Political Affairs (DPA), 
Department of Public Information (DPI), Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). This 
list also excludes potentially important bodies such as those working on food and agricultural 
genetic resources such as the International Treaty for Plant Genetic Resources for Food and 
Agriculture (ITPGRFA) and the Convention on Biodiversity (CBD).  
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scope of their original mandates and have become heavily involved in the 
domestic affairs of the countries they lend to.32 This has been achieved 
primarily through the vehicle of loan-conditionality, imposed firstly by the IMF 
through austerity loans and then subsequently by the World Bank providing 
longer term funding, partly in response to the crises created by the IMF’s 
austerity loans. The breadth of these institutions’ reach is well acknowledged, 
with O’Brien et al., for example, noting that “by 1998 eighty-four states had 
borrowed from the Fund for at least ten years” (O’Brien et al., 2000: 162). Of 
particular concern – and the focus of much criticism – has been the doctrinaire 
(some would say, ideological) nature of the Bank and the Fund’s policy 
prescriptions, which are by and large premised upon neoliberal thinking. For 
instance, as described by Patomäki and Teivainen: “The IMF conditions imply a 
capitalist market society with a weak state, providing infrastructure and stability 
for the private economy but not capable of (or interested in) industrial planning 
or providing welfare to the population at large; and a capitalist market society 
with doors wide open to foreign economic interests, couple with a weakened or 
“co-operative” labour movement.” (2004: 51). The core components of the Bank 
and IMF’s “structural adjustment programmes” have been well documented, 
and include: the deregulation of domestic markets (to allow a greater role for 
the private sector); the dismantling or removal of state support and services 
(including subsidies); the elimination of government controls on trade; and the 
privatisation of state enterprises (UNCATD, 2000; SAPRI, 2004).  
 
The historical record and impacts of World Bank and IMF interventions into the 
domestic affairs of member states are regarded problematically, and include 
“severe” impacts upon the poor (Pinstrup-Andersen, 1989: 90) and hundreds of 
“serious political upheavals” around the world as a result of a deterioration in 
living standards for large swathes of the societies where structural adjustment 
programmes have been imposed (Patomäki and Teivainen, 2004: 41-42).33 
                                            
32 The debt crisis of the 1970s is regarded as being critical to the leverage that the Bretton 
Woods institutions enjoy over the domestic affairs of member states: “If the debt were drastically 
reorganized or “dropped”, the Fund’s power over most countries would be great reduced.” 
(Patomäki and Teivainen, 2004:55).     
33 Patomäki and Teivainen, for instance, argue that “it was the IMF that played a key role in 
stopping Indonesia’s socio-economic development, and in reversing it in many important 
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Small farmers, moreover, have been “particularly affected” because “as a result 
of the reforms, production subsidies were removed, public expenditure on 
extension services declined, and obtaining credits became more costly” 
(SAPRIN: 2004: 150). Thus, these interventions are associated with declining 
numbers of smallholder producers (Khan, 1999: 183). 
 
The Bretton Woods institutions, therefore, are regarded as important drivers of 
food policy outcomes in a range of developing countries. The principle 
instruments of their influence are the loans that they issue and the conditionality 
that is attached to those loans. Another institution that is also regarded as an 
increasingly important driver of domestic food policy is the WTO. In contrast to 
the Bretton Woods institutions, however, whose influence is channelled 
bilaterally on a loan by loan basis, the WTO seeks to establish global rules for 
trade that are binding on all of its members. In this regard, whilst the Bretton 
Woods are regarded as, in the area of trade liberalisation for example, having 
had more of a direct impact upon the openness of developing country 
economies (by insisting upon trade liberalisation as a condition of loan 
assistance), the WTO is seen as having more of an impact on future policy 
options, by restricting the range of policy instruments, for instance, available to 
its members.34 
 
b. The WTO  
 
Multilateral trade negotiations have been a consistent part of the international 
economic order since the establishment of the GATT (General Agreement on 
Trade and Tariffs) immediately after the Second World War in 1947. Through 
                                            
respects.” (2004: 48). Moreover, one FAO official I spoke to who had himself been at the 
vanguard of structural adjustment implementation during the 1980s traced the beginning of 
Liberia’s conflict and political instability to the IMF imposed removal of an important food 
subsidy.  
34  One study of the impacts of trade liberalisation was published by the FAO in 2006. This study 
followed, and was deemed necessary, after an earlier investigation into the effects of WTO 
liberalisation upon food security found that “the implementation of AoA [the WTO’s Agreement 
on Agriculture] commitments did not imply any major change to domestic agricultural policy, 
including trade policy. The main reason was that most of the countries had implemented during 
the 1980s and early 1990s unilateral reforms including the liberalization of international trade, 
often as part of the conditionality of adjustment loans.” (Sarris, 2006: v).  
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various “rounds” of negotiations many areas of (and commodities within) 
international trade have been subject to the multilateral disciplines of the GATT, 
but until the early 80s food and agriculture were largely exempt from these 
efforts. However, in 1986 a new round of negotiations was launched in Punta 
Del Este, Uruguay - the so-called Uruguay Round – and food and agriculture 
were an important part of its agenda.35 The Uruguay Round concluded in 1994, 
bringing into existence the World Trade Organization, and, of particular 
significance for food and agriculture, its Agreement on Agriculture (AoA).36 The 
on-the-ground impacts of the AoA are contested, with some arguing that it has 
had a very limited if non-existent impact (Hathaway and Merlinda, 1996; Ingco 
and Croome, 2004; FAO, 2006), and others arguing instead that its impacts 
have been “dramatic”, particularly upon smallholder producers (Windfuhr, 2001: 
24; Desmarais, 2007).37 A great deal can – and has – been said about both the 
content of the AoA and the process through which it was negotiated. Here it is 
sufficient for me to note, however, simply that the AoA, by incorporating 
agriculture into WTO trade disciplines, both establishes the norm of agricultural 
liberalisation for its members and ties that to a binding rules-based system for 
the realisation of that norm.38 The WTO is unique amongst International 
                                            
35  Four reasons have been offered why food and agriculture were brought into the GATT 
negotiations at this time. Firstly, the turn to neoliberalism in many countries undercut support for 
regulated markets and high levels of domestic support; secondly, countries with unsubsidized 
globally competitive agro-exporters (the “Cairns Group”) advocated for reform so that their 
producers could gain access to protected markets; thirdly, innovative analysis by organisations 
such as the OECD helped increase understanding of the indirect costs of high levels of 
domestic support to food and agriculture being borne by consumers in those countries were 
such regimes operated, and; fourthly, agribusiness TNCs wanted a supranational authority 
responsive to their needs so that a) they could maximise their flexibility to sell and source 
between different countries, shifting the locus of regulatory authority beyond the state, and b) 
enshrine the intellectual property rights that protected their investments, and secured their 
control and rents  (Hathaway and Melinda, 1996; McMichael, 2000; Ingco and Croome, 2004; 
Weis, 2007).  
36  The AoA is not the only WTO agreement of significance for food and agriculture. Also 
important are the TRIPS agreement (discussed above), the SPS (Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
(SPS) Agreement, and the Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) Agreement (Lang et al., 2009: 84).  
37  Former Director of International Trade Programmes at UNCTAD, Bhagirath Lal Das states 
that: “The importance [of the AoA] does not lie so much in the actual quantitative commitments 
as in the initiation of a process and in providing a frame for further commitments on 
liberalisation.” (2000: 227).  
38  For instance, Weis notes how, under the WTO, the principle of Special and Differential 
Treatment for developing countries was greatly diluted, meaning that – though the periods in 
which they were expected to implement trade reforms may have been longer, and the 
obligations lesser than those for developed countries – essentially the norm was that developing 
countries are expected to liberalise. This reflected a “huge shift” from the view that trade was 
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Organisations in that it possesses a dispute resolution capacity and also, 
importantly, an enforcement capacity (Hoekman and Kostecki, 2001: 74). 
Where a member is found to be in breach of WTO rules, the aggrieved country 
has the right to impose sanctions in the forms of restrictions to the offending 
country’s imports. Thus, even though in terms of reducing domestic support and 
export subsidies, and increasing market access – its three main “areas of 
commitment” – the AoA’s impact is regarded as being diluted by various 
exemptions attained by member states both during and after the negotiating 
process39, by binding members to the norm of trade liberalisation, and an 
accompanying commitment to reduce or eliminate various forms of domestic 
support, the AoA is regarded as reducing the policy instruments that are 
available to countries, particularly developing countries for whom, lacking the 
fiscal capacity to match the subsidy regimes of the EU and US, tariff measures 
are some of the only policy instruments available (Windfuhr, 2001; Weis, 2007). 
Of course, to the proponents of liberalisation these “alternate” policy 
instruments are redundant, seeing the principles of open markets and 
comparative advantage as being far more efficient and effective than any forms 
of state intervention, irrespective of the policy goal.40 However, irrespective of 
one’s views on the virtues or otherwise of “market disciplines” (and the 
accuracy of the theory that underpins the neoliberal economic commitment to 
them), the WTO is regarded as shifting in part the locus of food and agricultural 
                                            
something that needed to be managed for development to one where “liberalizing trade is in 
itself portrayed as a development policy.” (Weis, 2007: 129-130).  
39  The AoA is regarded as a qualitative shift in the nature of agricultural trade regulation, 
because, amongst others, it “binds” the agricultural tariffs (import taxes) of its members. To 
facilitate future negotiations and increase transparency on domestic support for agriculture, 
WTO members have undergone a process of “tariffication” through which they converted non-
tariff support into tariffs. The process of tariffication was fairly loose, however, and many 
members ended up with tariffs that were much higher than the levels of support that were in 
place before. Moreover, with regards to domestic support – more relevant in the case of the EU 
and the US – it has often be noted that total support given to agriculture has actually increased, 
not diminished, in the wake of the AoA. Much of this support has been reclassified by the 
country providing it, so as to be acceptable to WTO disciplines, but the general consensus is 
that the AoA has not been able to impact significantly upon rich country subsidy regimes 
(Hathaway and Melinda, 1996; Ingco and Croome, 2004; Khor, 2005). 
40  “Comparative advantage”, of course, is the theory that underpins neoliberal economists 
commitment to trade liberalisation. For instance: “Economic research suggests agricultural 
intervention is not the appropriate policy if the objective is food security. Instead, the key need is 
to have the foreign exchange (and access to credit) to be able to buy food in terms of scarcity. 
Having the domestic ability to produce food is not required – countries should only specialize in 
food production if they have a comparative advantage in this activity.” (Hoekman and Kostecki, 
2001: 225).  
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policy-making – certainly in the area of trade – to the transnational level. At the 
very least, the WTO has created a transnational reference point for domestic 
and regional level processes of food and agricultural policy-making and 
governance (Paarlberg, 1997; Lang et al., 2009).41  
 
5. Conclusion  
 
In this chapter I have outlined the context for the emergence of the 
transnational public sphere anticipated, constituted and provoked by La Via 
Campesina and promising to be institutionally realised by the reformed 
Committee on World Food Security. Some key elements of this context include 
a series of – ongoing - agri-food system transformations; a range of actors 
affected by and affecting those transformations; a policy environment that 
includes transnational sites of influence and a post-war history of food policy 
leading from consensus to contestation, partly as a range of new and old issues 
capture specialist, public and policy attention. Moreover, various interrelated 
dynamics identified by food policy and agri-food system scholars communicate 
the importance and relevance of discursive contestation to food policy in the 
21st century. These include: increasing awareness and critiques of various 
aspects of the functioning of the industrial food system and associated 
technological approaches; the recognition of agribusiness TNCs of the 
importance of discursive engagement with policy-makers and publics; and, a 
growing sense within food policy experts of the need to re-tool food policy to 
address the “new fundamentals”, but uncertainty about exactly how to do this. 
 
Having provided this brief overviews, and applying the theoretical framework 
developed in the previous chapter, it’s now possible to start defining the 
                                            
41 Lang et al. after noting the significance of WTO processes for provoking domestic and 
regional level food and agricultural policy reform (e.g., the EU’s CAP) acknowledge the idea of 
“global governance” as a framework for understanding power and authority in the context of IOs 
like the WTO. They suggest, however, that “once the focus of global or international policy-
making alights on individual international regimes, it becomes clear that states play key roles as 
the decision-makers and brokers of competing interests in such regimes.” (Lang et al., 2009: 
86). On the surface this may well appear to be the case, but as I discuss in the following 
chapter, the “fuzziness” that often exists between states (capitals) and their representatives may 
well require us to consider what we mean by “the state” in such contexts.  
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different planes or spheres of the public sphere the existence of which I am 
arguing for in this thesis.  
 
i. The Potential Plane of the Transnational Public Sphere 
 
In Chapter Three I stated that the potential plane of the transnational public 
sphere in food and agriculture – and which comprises its furthest reaches – can 
be defined as including: 
 
 All those affected – directly and indirectly – by the exercise of political 
authority, or the absence of its exercise. 
 
Inherent in the process of identifying those that can be counted within this 
category is the act of defining what counts as a legitimate object of political 
authority’s attention, and, indeed, such “boundary contestation” – contesting the 
boundary between public authority and private autonomy/risk - is a critical 
dynamic of this emerging public sphere. Thus, as I stated in Chapter Three, it is 
important to differentiate between the formal definitions of what counts as an 
appropriate object of political/public authority, and the norms, expectations and 
aspirations that may exist around this in the broader field of relations. In 
Chapter Seven, discussing the extent to which the CFS can be said to be 
institutionalising the public sphere, I capture some important dynamics related 
to the divergence of perception and expectation between actors engaged in 
policy debate at the global level around this dynamic.  
 
That said, it is important to note that in the 21st century the category of those 
who might be said to be directly and indirectly affected by the exercise (or 
absence) of (food and agriculturally relevant) political authority comprises 
nothing less than the entire population of the planet. This is essentially because 
of the global integratedness of agri-food relations, something expressed in part 
through the transnationalisation of rule-making and supply chains, but perhaps 
most visible in the ecological dynamics of agri-food systems, with climate 
change providing a focused illustration.  
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Food and agriculture are related to climate change both as a source of Green 
House Gas emissions (GHGs), and through being subject to the impacts of its 
effects. Depending on how one calculates it, food and agriculture generate at 
least around 13.5 % of global GHGs, though if one incorporates transport, land 
usage conversion, and industrial processes into the calculation food and 
agriculture’s share of GHGs increases (WRI, 2005). Climate change is 
anticipated (and some would say being observed) to impact upon food and 
agriculture in various ways. These include generating more extreme weather 
events such as floods and droughts, increasing water stress, and producing 
other impacts upon terrestrial and aquatic biological systems of relevance for 
food and agriculture (UNFCC, 2011). Whilst the effects of climate change are 
regarded as falling disproportionately (relative to their share of GHG emissions) 
upon the poor populations of developing countries, uncertainties regarding the 
exact dynamics of climate change impacts upon food and agriculture, 
particularly around scale and location (Nelson, 2009), enhance the status of 
climate change as an issue of “global” concern. Moreover, this is underscored 
by the fact that by far the biggest source of GHGs – just under 64% - is energy 
(fossil fuel) consumption, related to the energy-intense consumeristic lifestyles 
of western industrialised countries. Thus in so far as – through in its causes and 
effects – climate change emphasises the food and agriculturally relevant 
linkages between human beings in all different parts of the planet, and insofar 
as these geographically dispersed behaviours, rights and vulnerabilities are 
modified or not by the attempt to articulate a political response to anthropogenic 
climate change, then we can say that it indicates that we can count within the 
category of those affected directly or indirectly by the exercise (or absence) of 
food and agriculturally relevant political authority the whole planetary 
population.  
 
ii. The Aggregate Plane of the Transnational Public Sphere 
 
In Chapter Three I stated that the aggregate plane of the transnational sphere 
comprised all the discursive arenas that – though they were not necessarily in 
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direct relations with each other – are locatable on the same plane by virtue of 
their shared referent. That is, they address, with varying degrees of directness 
and influence, the general question of “What should global food and 
agriculturally relevant political authority do?” The context setting above 
introduces a number of the actors who can be said to be locatable on this 
plane. This includes academics, journalists, think tanks, UN officials, state 
officials, affected publics (such as La Via Campesina) and, increasingly, the 
private sector, of which TNCs are an important component. For instance in 
2010 the World Economic Forum published a document entitled Realizing a 
New Vision for Agriculture: A Roadmap for Stakeholders, that was, according to 
the authors, the result of an 18 month consultation with ”global and regional 
stakeholders to identify priorities for action and opportunities for collaboration” 
and that sought to address “the major challenges of global food and agricultural 
sustainability” (WEF, 2010: 3). Amongst the constituencies referenced as 
participating within the consultation, the documents speaks of “over 350 leaders 
of business, government, civil society, international organizations and 
academia” (WEF, 2010: 3). However, the initiative itself was “championed” by 
17 agribusiness TNCs, with massive market presences in seeds, food retail, 
fertilizers, and processing, and including such global brands as Coca Cola, 
Pepsi Cola, Unilever, and Kraft foods.42 Legitimacy was leant to the initiative, 
by, amongst others, the fact that IFPRI (the International Food Policy Research 
Institute) – part of the 15 organisation Consultative Group on International 
Agricultural Research (CGIAR), an “alliance of 64 governments, private 
foundations, and international and regional organizations” (IFPRI, 2011) – was 
formally involved as a “Knowledge Partner”.  
 
The significance of this initiative in terms of its representing TNC activity on the 
aggregate plane (discursive activity addressing the question “What should food 
and agriculturally relevant policy do?”) is emphatically underscored by the fact 
of its relationship to a more permanent WEF initiative: the Global Agenda 
Council on Food Security (GACFS), which provided “project leadership and 
                                            
42  Archer Daniel Midlands, BASF, Bunge, Cargill, The Coca-Cola Company, DuPont, General 
Mills, Kraft Foods, Metro, Monsanto Company, Nestlé, PepsiCo, SABMiller, Syngenta, Unilever, 
Wal-Mart Stores, and Yara International (WEF, 2010: 3).  
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support”. The GACFS was founded in 2008, when the WEF created the 
Network of Global Agenda Councils, comprising Councils “on the foremost 
topics in the global arena”, each of which seeks to convene “relevant thought 
leaders from academia, government, business and other fields to capture the 
best knowledge on each key issue and integrate it into global collaboration and 
decision-making processes.” (WEF, 2011a). Thus, in the production of specific 
acts of communication and in the constitution of discursive arenas, the WEF 
indicates the growing importance of TNCs/the private sector in food and 
agriculturally relevant discursive activity. Moreover, that the discursive arenas 
established by the WEF enjoy a high degree of legitimacy amongst policy 
actors is evidenced by the composition of the Global Agenda Council for Food 
Security, whose 14 members include a number of high ranking officials from the 
UN, including the Secretary General’s Special Representative for Food Security 
and Nutrition, David Nabarro and the President of IFAD, Kanayo Nwanze 
(WEF, 2011b).43, 44 
a. Directly and Indirectly Targeting Policy  
 
In Chapter Three I stated that discursive arenas on the aggregate plane can be 
differentiated from each other according to such categories as: the mode of 
communication, the actors recognised as having the right to speak, and the 
mechanisms/actors for determining both. For example, the Global Agenda 
Councils of the WEF seek to convene “thought leaders”, but this generates a 
whole range of questions around who gets to be recognised within this 
category, who is excluded, the terms upon which inclusion and exclusion are 
defined, and so on. In the conceptual space being mapped out within this 
thesis, these distinctions might be said to identify horizontal distinctions within 
discursive activity on the aggregate plane. An important vertical distinction, 
                                            
43  Though, interestingly, state participation is virtually non-existent.  
44  Another important group of actors relevant to this plane are Foundations. For instance, in 
May 2011 “eight of the world’s leading foundations” launched an initiative to “tackle long-term 
food and agricultural policy issues”, the mission of which was “to nurture dialogue among 
diverse opinions on agricultural issues” (Soyatech, 2011). The Foundations promoting this 
initiative include the Ford Foundation, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, The William and 
Flora Hewlett Foundation, The David and Lucile Packard Foundation, the W.K. Kellogg 
Foundation, The McKnight Foundation, the Rockefeller Foundation and The Walton Family 
Foundation.  
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however, can be made between those discursive arenas (and specific acts of 
communication) that explicitly seek to influence policy, and which therefore 
aspire to be policy prescriptive, and those that are policy relevant. This is a 
question of author intention, not of empirical influence.  
 
It is through the application of the different policy stages that we can define 
discursive activity as being policy relevant. Policy relevant discursive activity is 
that which provides information, commentary, evidence, perspectives, 
testimony etc on developments in agri-food systems, the performance of past 
policies, unfolding events, the conditions faced by different actors, and other 
dynamics related to the field of action etc and therefore expands and informs 
the context of policy agenda setting, policy formulation, implementation, and 
evaluation. By so doing, this type of communication is – potentially at least – 
relevant to policy. The difference between this type of communication and 
policy prescriptive communication is that the authors of the latter make policy 
influence an explicit goal. For instance, a historian may produce a work that 
discusses in great detail the impacts of Structural Adjustment Programmes on 
smallholder producers in Sub-Saharan Africa. By providing detailed, 
comprehensive data on this topic she expands the amount of information that is 
available on the field of action for which political-authorities are still making 
policy. However, by producing her work in the form of a book, which is only 
narrowly distributed to specialist libraries and whose publication is not 
accompanied by any attempts to raise awareness of its existence to policy-
making communities, we can infer that the author did not aspire to articulate her 
findings with contemporary, on-going policy processes. The work is implicitly 
policy relevant, but the author did not intend it to be policy prescriptive. In 
contrast, a think tank, or NGO that produces a policy paper the publication of 
which is timed to coincide with a significant meeting of policy authorities, whose 
publication is marked by a launch event either on the fringes or in close 
proximity to that meeting, which is distributed through both formal and informal 
channels, and which makes a number of specific, detailed policy 
recommendations, can be regarded as intending the paper to be policy 
prescriptive. However, this distinction hinges upon the intent of the author, and 
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the mode of communication, distribution and so forth reflects in part the author’s 
understanding of how communication articulates with policy processes. This is 
to say that whilst certain objective criteria can be used to determine whether an 
act of communication aspires to be policy relevant or policy prescriptive45 – the 
format of the communication, the timing of the publication, the location of its 
release, the channels of its distribution, and so forth – the extent to which a 
specific act of communication fulfills these criteria or not may not be a reflection 
of the author’s lack of intent or aspiration to influence policy, but rather of their 
particular understanding of the field of relations in which they are embedded, 
including, of course, the relationship between themselves as communicators 
and policy-makers as audience. At the same time, the distinction between 
policy relevant and policy prescriptive is not at attempt to differentiate according 
to influence. It is an empirical question whether a book whose author didn’t 
intend to influence policy or a report whose authors did, did or did not actually 
influence policy.  
 
b. Linking Background Norms to Food Policy Contestation 
 
Recalling above, according to Clapp and Fuchs, the latest type of power being 
utilised by TNCs is discursive power – a type of power that is “a function of 
norms and ideas”. This refers to the ways in which these norms and ideas – 
often in the background – shape both the definition of policy problems and of 
solutions. In other words it captures how policy decisions “are a function of 
discursive contests over the framing of policies and the assignment of problems 
into categories by linking them to specific fundamental norms and values.” 
(Clapp and Fuchs, 2009: 10, referencing Hajer, 1997; Koiiman, 2002). In a very 
basic sense the relationship between norms and food policy contestation can 
be seen in the layout of this chapter. For instance, it only makes sense to 
highlight issues around food safety, power and control, food security and so 
                                            
45  For instance, the Executive Summary of the International Assessment of Agricultural 
Knowledge, Science and Technology for Development (IAASTD) states that “The IAASTD does 
not advocate specific policies or practices; it assesses the major issues facing AKST and points 
towards a range of AKST options for action that meet development and sustainability goals. It is 
policy relevant, but not policy prescriptive.” (IAASTD, 2009a: viii-ix). [Emphasis added].  
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forth if you believe that agri-food systems ought to produce safe food or that 
peasant farmers have a right to control their means of production or to an 
equitable share in the benefits of modernised supply chains, or that people 
have a right to eat. Thus, when thinking about the background norms that 
structure food policy perspectives, perceptions on the ends of agri-food systems 
and the rights to be enjoyed and responsibilities owed by different agri-food 
system actors are crucial.  
 
For instance, one group of authors, discussing the transformations of agri-food 
systems associated with the growing importance of supermarket retailers, state: 
 
 Given the potential mobility of retailers with regards to sourcing, it is 
unrealistic to expect them or their procurement agents to pay prices that are 
higher than they would pay elsewhere, or to tolerate high transaction costs in 
the procurement process. For this reason, sustainable inclusion of smallholders 
in modern chains must rely on cost-effective models for bridging the scale 
discrepancies between individual smallholders and modern buyers. 
    (McCullough et al, 2008: 21).  
 
The implicit norm within this statement, however, is that supermarkets have a 
right to purchase wherever is cheapest (with the lowest transaction costs) and 
that it is small farmers who must adapt to this reality. Thus, the right of retailers 
to freedom of (procurement) movement is privileged over that of smallholder 
producers to remuneration at the cost of production, or to participation in local 
food markets. This passage comes from an edited volume produced by authors 
who were all FAO - which sees itself as a “technical” agency – staff at the time 
of its publication but it demonstrates the implicit influence of background norms 
on the work of authors who otherwise would seek to claim a high degree of 
impartiality. Invoking alternate ends or constructing the rights and duties of agri-
food system actors differently results in a different perspective. Esteva and 
Prakash (1998), for example, identify the importance of food practices for 
indigenous peoples in Mexico as the means through which they weave and 
sustain their identity, cultures and communities. This can be seen through the 
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geography and roles of food production - that is, through the different ways that 
food actors relate to each other and identify themselves through the roles that 
they occupy within the agri-food system and, relatedly, their geographical 
location.46 It can also be seen through the taking of communal meals, or 
comida, and through such practices as the automatic sharing of cooked food to 
guarantee even the poorest a minimal intake, or impostura, all of which “create 
“we’s” in and through the communion of food embedded in soil (agri)culture.” 
(Esteva and Prakash, 1998: 58-60). Thus for indigenous peoples, and also, for 
La Via Campesina, there is an important qualitative difference between 
participation in an agri-food system and other forms of “economic” activity, 
derived from the culture- and community-sustaining ends of agri-food systems.  
 
These background norms are of fundamental importance because they inform 
how we think and feel about a particular transformation or trend (good or bad), 
how we organise and evaluate different farm systems (“productive” “equitable” 
“ecologically sustainable”), and how we both define policy problems and 
solutions.47 Some of the dynamics of discursive relations in the aggregate plane 
are captured in Figure 2, below.  
 
                                            
46  Esteva and Prakash discuss, for instance, the significance of the location of the cooking fire 
in the centre of an indigenous household in, Oaxaca, Mexico that, in the words of one mother, 
allows her to be the queen of her household and family rather than their servants (1998: 57).  
47  That the presence of these background norms can be so buried as to be almost unknown by 
those holding them was suggested to me during an interview I conducted with a middle 
manager (Assistant Division Director) of FAO, whose work was fairly high profile and which 
involved a lot of analysis of contemporary trends and developments in food and agriculture. In 
the course of a wide-ranging and dynamic interview lasting nearly 2 hrs I asked him “How do we 
know whether a trend is good or bad? Actionable or unactionable?” He began his answer by 
noting that in the analytical work that FAO do there are some parts of the landscape – the 
increasing importance of private retail standards, for instance – that they know have a negative 
impact upon developing country trade, but which they accept. And there are other parts of the 
landscape that that confront. Recognising this distinction, he continued:  
 
 “So… but I wonder what the difference is?...  You know, why on the one hand do we 
say “This is part of the landscape you just deal with it” the other one, “We don’t like this we’re 
going to put it right”? I haven’t really thought about, but it’s a very interesting question, and 
whether we see things as – how do we see things, how we decide what things are good and 
what things are bad… yeah… Well I’d need to think about that.” 
    (Interview, FAO Official, 15.9.2009) 
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iii. The Policy Action Plane 
 
And finally, with regards to the plane of policy action, defined as the plane of 
public authority/political action, the discussion above has highlighted some 
important dynamics. These include the emergence of sites of 
supranational/transnational sites of policy influence; the emergence of private 
regulatory authority; and a recent history of food policy defined by the 
hegemony of neoliberal thinking. Also of significance of course are the 
questions being asked by a range of analysts about the degree to which TNCs 
can be said to have breached the regulatory capacity of the state. Of course, 
the degree to which these general dynamics translate into effects on the ground 
– and the specific constellation of effects and influences they constitute there - 
will vary from context to context, from locality to locality, but these 
developments are nonetheless regarded as sufficiently general to merit the 
attention of food policy scholars and, as we shall see in Chapter Six, affected 
publics such as La Via Campesina. These dynamics highlight both the 
applicability of the concerns being expressed by Fraser around the undermining 
of the Westphalian state to the broad set of relationships implied within 
transnational agri-food policy-making and governance, and reinforce the 
importance of the public sphere agenda for this field.  
 
In the following chapter– continuing the discussion on the authority components 
of the public sphere – I narrow the focus, isolating some key dynamics around 
the operation of public authority. In order to do this I first deduce some of the 
properties that we might expect a public authority capable of fulfilling the 
requirements of a public sphere to exhibit.  
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Figure 2. Dynamics of Discursive Activity on the Aggregate Plane 
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Chapter Five - Establishing Key Dynamics of Public 
Authority in Transnational Agri-food Governance and 
Policy-Making  
 
“The global governance of food and agriculture is fragmented and incoherent.”  
    (Clapp and Cohen, 2009: 6). 
 
“The creation of mechanisms for an integrated government overview of food 
policy is now urgently required. There is an immense body of knowledge waiting 
to inform food governance and to encourage a change of policy direction but 
there are few institutions or mechanisms by which this can happen.”  
    (Lang and Heasman, 2004: 261).  
 
1. Overview  
 
In Chapter Three I discussed how the presence of a public authority with which 
affected publics could articulate was central to the normative meaning of the 
idea of the public sphere. I also noted Fraser’s concerns regarding the extent to 
which the Westphalian state could fulfill these conditions in the context of the 
increasing importance of the transnational (as both the locus of decision-making 
and of economic relations and actors). In Chapter Four I identified how the 
concerns identified and expressed by Fraser can be applied to the field of food 
and agricultural relations. In this chapter, focusing upon the (transnational) 
authority components of the public sphere, my goal is to sensitise us to some 
key dynamics of public authority in transnational agri-food governance and 
policy-making, attention towards which, I believe, is crucial if we want to identify 
the extent to which decision-making processes at this level are capable of 
meeting the political authority requirements of a public sphere. 
 
I begin this analysis by deducing some key properties that we might expect a 
public authority capable of fulfilling the criteria of the public sphere to exhibit. I 
then follow this, using data derived from practitioner interviews and official 
reports, by identifying dynamics relevant to these properties. This analysis is 
divided into two sections. The first of these is a horizontal analysis, and looks at 
the relationships between different agri-food relevant public authority entities at 
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the transnational level; the relationships between public and private actors also 
at this level; the relationships between different food and agriculturally relevant 
government departments within states; and the relationships between states 
(OECD and G77) in a specific institutional context. The second section 
conducts a vertical analysis concentrating on the relationship between states 
and (an institution at) the transnational level. In both of these sections the 
analysis centres upon the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United 
Nations (FAO) – the methodological justification for which is provided below.  
 
2. Deducing the Properties of Authority in the Public Sphere 
 
According to Fraser, the possibility of the Westphalian state fulfilling the criteria 
of a public sphere is undermined by the emergence of transnational decision-
making and economic relations. This directs our attention towards the 
transnational in search of an authority capable of realising the public sphere. 
Before explicating the dynamics of public authority relevant to this level it’s first 
of all necessary to define the properties that we might expect a public authority 
capable of fulfilling the criteria of the public sphere to exhibit. These can be 
deduced from the definition of the public sphere provided in Chapter Three. 
That is, as the site in which affected publics contest with public authority in 
policy debate. Three sets of properties are meaningful in this regard: being 
authoritative; being open; and being capable of receiving multiple inputs.  
 
i. Properties of Public Authority I: Being Authoritative 
 
The case for a public authority capable of fulfilling the criteria of a public sphere 
needing to be authoritative is not one that has to be laboured. As has been 
already recognised multiple times within this thesis, this is implicit within the 
normative meaning of the idea. Central to the concept of authority is the notion 
of compliance (Rittberger et al, 2008; Kahler and Lake, 2004). Rosenau states, 
for example, that the “sphere[s] of authority” of informal or formal governance 
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arrangements are defined by “the range of their capacity to generate 
compliance on the part of those persons towards whom their directives are 
issued.” (Rosenau, 2003: 72). Determining the extent to which a global food 
and agricultural policy-making and governance body is capable of fulfilling the 
political efficacy requirement of the public sphere, therefore, requires us to 
identify such dynamics as the actors and entities from whom compliance is to 
be sought, and the nature of their relationship with the body seeking authority.  
 
ii. Properties of Public Authority II: Being Open 
 
Secondly, as noted in Chapter Three, policy debate is a central component of 
the public sphere. In Habermas’s original formulation the bourgeois sought to 
engage with political authorities “in a debate over the general rules governing 
relations in the basically privatized but publicly relevant sphere of commodity 
exchange and social labor.” (Habermas, 1989: 27). To be receptive to the 
communications of affected publics in policy debate, therefore, political authority 
capable of realising the public sphere needs to be open. If all the key decisions 
are taken by states – or other actors - for instance, behind closed doors, or in 
alternate fora, then there is no opportunity for affected publics to influence 
decision-making outcomes through discursive contestation.  
 
iii. Properties of Public Authority III: Receptive to Multiple Perspectives 
 
And finally, as discussed above, food policy contestation is implicitly informed 
by views on the ends of agri-food systems and the rights to be enjoyed and 
responsibilities owed by different agri-food system actors. As noted in Chapter 
Three, both the status of agri-food system actors and ideas about appropriate 
policy instruments and means – regulations, funding, guidelines, laws, 
subsidies, taxes and other interventions – are conditioned in part by views on 
each of these. To be capable, therefore, of responding to a broad range of ends 
–different views over which constitutes an important part of the implicit context 
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for food and agricultural policy debate – the authority needs to be receptive to 
multiple perspectives.48  
 
To successfully fulfill the criteria of political efficacy in a transnational public 
sphere in food and agriculture, therefore, a global body needs, at a minimum, to 
be authoritative, open, and receptive to multiple perspectives. In this thesis I am 
arguing that the recently reformed Committee on World Food Security promises 
to be such a body. In order to identify the extent to which it will be capable of 
meeting these criteria it is useful to capture certain key dynamics of 
transnational food and agricultural policy-making and governance. As stated 
above, in this chapter I will draw predominantly from a) data collected in 
interviews with system practitioners (members of country delegations to the UN, 
and UN officials), and b) official reports. My analysis, moreover, will be mainly 
centred on the FAO. The methodological justification for this is provided by the 
nature of the relationship between the body that I am arguing has the potential 
to institutionalise the transnational public sphere in food and agriculture – the 
Committee on World Food Security – and the FAO. As the document that 
provides the blueprint for the CFS’s reform states: “The CFS is and remains an 
intergovernmental Committee in FAO.” (CFS:2009/2, Paragraph 4).  The 
concrete meanings of this are that the Secretariat of the CFS is at present 
provided by FAO; the CFS’s meetings are physically located in FAO; and 
member states participate in its work predominantly through their 
representations at FAO (the participation of ministers or other senior politicians 
limited in the main to the annual plenary). Thus the dynamics of the reformed 
CFS will be very closely related to the dynamics of the FAO, and the history of 
the latter will be relevant to the future of the former.  
 
3. Horizontal Dynamics 
 
Interrogating horizontal relationships between i) different global food and 
agriculturally relevant bodies, ii) between global political authority and non-state 
                                            
48 Described by Lang et al., (2009) Lang (2010) as the “new fundamentals” and by Maxwell and 
Slater (2004) as the focus of the “new food policy”.  
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actors (TNCs), iii) between different internal sections of government, and iv) 
between states in the global policy bodies (the FAO) through which they seek to 
exercise political authority is important in determining the extent to which a 
global food and agricultural policy-making and governance body (such as the 
CFS) will be able to fulfill the criteria identified above.  
 
i. Relations Between, and Dynamics of, Global Entities 
 
a. The International Food and Agricultural Institutional Architecture: A “Vastly 
Increased Complexity” 
 
The first thing to note when considering the dynamics of political authority at the 
global, or transnational level, is the sheer number of entities of relevance in 
different ways to food and agricultural policy-making and governance operating 
at this level. For instance, when, in 1990, the now-defunct World Food Council 
conducted a review of UN agencies working on hunger and malnourishment 
issues, it identified “well over 30 multilateral institutions” at work in this area 
(Shaw, 2007: 206). As previously noted, a more recent illustration of the 
number of food and agriculturally relevant entities operating at the global level is 
suggested by the fact that when in 2008 UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon 
convened a High Level Task Force to respond to the 2007/2008 food price 
crisis, it counted no less than twenty different bodies within its membership.49  
 
                                            
49 The full list of HLTF members includes: Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), 
International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), Office of the High Commissioner for 
Human Rights (OHCHR), Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), 
International Labour Organization (ILO), International Monetary Fund (IMF), UN Office of the 
High Representative for the Least Developed Countries, Landlocked Developing Countries and 
Small Island Developing States (OHRLLS), UN Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD), UN Development Programme (UNDP), UN Environment Programme (UNEP), 
Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), World Bank, World Food 
Programme (WFP), World Health Organization (WHO), World Trade Organization (WTO), 
Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA), Department of Political Affairs (DPA), 
Department of Public Information (DPI), Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). This 
list also excludes other important bodies such as those working on food and agricultural genetic 
resources, including the International Treaty for Plant Genetic Resources for Food and 
Agriculture (ITPGRFA) and the Convention on Biodiversity (CBD).  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An insight into the present status of the international food and agricultural 
architecture, and the fragmentation therein, can be obtained by adopting the 
perspective of one particular institution: the Food and Agricultural Organization 
of the United Nations, the history and changed circumstances of which 
comprises an important section in the report by FAO’s external evaluation, the 
IEE (Independent External Evaluation of the FAO), published in 2007. As a 
prelude to a deeper analysis of various different aspects of the FAO’s 
functioning, including its technical work, governance, organizational culture, 
programming, and so forth, the IEE sets out to describe how the context since 
the FAO’s founding in 1945 has been radically altered, leading to, for the FAO 
(and by extension, all actors at the global level including La Via Campesina) a 
situation of “vastly increased complexity and uncertainty” (IEE, 2007: 68).50  
 
According to the IEE the history of FAO can be divided into three periods, each 
distinguished from the other according to, in part, both the status accorded to 
FAO (both within its specific sector of food and agriculture, and within the 
broader development field) and to food and agriculture as an area of 
international cooperation more generally. Phase 1, covering the period from 
1945-1970, is captured by the heading FAO as the pre-eminent agricultural 
organization” (IEE, 2007: 53-55). This charts how the FAO was founded in the 
“never again” spirit of immediate post-war period, with a clear mandate to lead 
international efforts in the fight against hunger, and operating as a sui generis 
agency, with no competitors. Phase 2, covering the period from 1970-1980 was 
one that saw: New organizations emerge but FAO still very active (IEE, 2007: 
57-58). The description of this period charts how food and agriculture were still 
relatively high priority areas – as evidenced by the World Food Conference in 
1974 – but that the number of actors involved in the field increased significantly 
as a result of both the establishment of new institutions (e.g., IFAD – the 
International Fund for Agricultural Development, for agricultural funding, WFC – 
the World Food Council, for general governance, and CGIAR – the Consultative 
                                            
50  It will be noted that I refer to the FAO variously as “the FAO” and “FAO”. In the former I am 
using the acronym – The F.A.O. In the second, I am taking up the moniker deployed by those 
within, or familiar with, the organization, and which is pronounced as a word, sounding 
something like faow.  
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Group for International Agricultural Research, for agricultural research) and the 
entry into food and agriculture of pre-existing entities such as the World Bank. 
The IEE suggests that this expansion resulted “at least partially from 
dissatisfaction with FAO’s performance” (IEE, 2007: 57).51  
 
The most recent period of the FAO’s history, according to the IEE, covering the 
period 1980-2007, is captured by the heading: FAO is challenged on all fronts. 
During this period the context faced by the FAO reflects the changing fortunes 
of the UN more generally, as donors move to more bilateral and extra-
budgetary funding, withhold support from UN institutions and place more 
emphasis upon the Bretton Woods bodies. Moreover, within this period: 
“Globally, agriculture and poverty-focused rural development projects gave way 
to structural adjustment programmes […] and then to more policy-based 
operations.” (IEE, 2007: 61). At the same time, food and agriculture were being 
demoted in the global political agenda, giving way to new issues around 
sustainability and the environment, an expanded social agenda around health, 
education and so forth, and an emphasis upon short-term emergency response. 
Moreover, within this period FAO sees a further deterioration in its status as a 
result of continued institutional proliferation. Summing up, the IEE states that 
“the virtual explosion of international agencies concerned in one way or the 
other with agriculture that has taken place means that FAO now operates in a 
very crowded field.” (IEE, 2007: 60-68).52 
                                            
51 It is important to note, however, that this explanation of the history behind this fragmentation 
of the international food and agricultural institutional architecture is not shared by everyone. For 
instance, in a communiqué issued in January 2008, Ottawa based ETC Group – whose ranks 
count globally respected long-term agri-food governance watchers (and participants) such as 
Pat Mooney – explaining the fragmentation of the multilateral food and agricultural system, 
assigned more explanatory power to the desire of the OECD countries to insulate the areas 
through which they advanced their interests in the face of a changing geopolitical reality 
heralded by the post-colonial era, and the rise of the New International Economic Order. In the 
one-country one-vote context of the FAO, the increased voting power of the developing 
countries meant a politicization of FAO’s agenda, and so “[d]uring the 1970s and ‘80s, the 
OECD took away the highly-political management of food aid, agricultural and rural finance, and 
responsibility for the science and technology necessary to advance industrial agriculture.” (ETC, 
2008: 8). 
52  Noting that: “FAO today faces a much changed basic architecture of international 
development.” the IEE counts “an estimated 280 international organizations and initiatives 
directly or indirectly competing with each other for donor resources.” (FAO/IEE, 2007: 62).  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It is important to highlight two interrelated characteristics of this complex and 
very crowded field. The first is that transnational food and agricultural policy-
making and governance is fragmented, or divided into multiple issue spheres. 
And the second is that it is this plane of activity is fragmented, or divided – and 
sometimes competing – into multiple authority spheres.  
 
b. Multiple Issue Spheres 
 
The transnational entities engaged in food and agriculturally relevant activity 
can be differentiated from each other in a number of different ways, one of 
which is according to their areas of activity. For instance, the FAO, with a 
general mandate in food and agriculture, engages across a very broad range of 
different areas, from crop production and protection, resource management, 
investment, regulation, agri-food actor capacity building, energy, climate 
change, sustainability, consumer protection, food security, and so on (FAO, 
2011); UNICEF, with a more focused mandate to protect children’s rights, 
adopts a child-centred focus on issues of nutrition and water provision, 
(UNICEF, 2011); and the WTO, with its specific trade liberalisation mission, 
seeks to increase agricultural “market access and reduce trade-distorting 
subsidies” (WTO, 2011). There are also bodies engaged, amongst others, in 
emergency food assistance (WFP); the management of genetic resources 
(CBD, ITPGRFA); nutrition (SCN); funding and investment (IMF, World Bank, 
IFAD), and agricultural research (CGIAR). Moreover, some of these bodies are 
directly mandated in food and agriculture (FAO, WFP, IFAD, CGIAR) whilst 
others are not (World Bank, WTO, UNDP, UNEP etc). Thus, for instance, 
seeking to coordinate global level child-centred policy on agricultural trade with 
a nutrition focus could theoretically involve the WTO (trade), UNICEF (children), 
the Standing Committee on Nutrition (nutrition), the World Bank (finance), and 
FAO (food security). We might also wish to include WHO (health) and UNCTAD 
(trade).   
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c. Multiple Spheres of Authority and Influence 
 
At the same time as the international institutional architecture is divided 
according to issue, there are also important distinctions to be observed with 
respect to spheres of authority and influence. This applies in relation to the 
degree of authority that a specific institution has in its area of mandate, both 
with regards to its member states but also to other institutions.53 The dynamics 
around trade and food security capture this well.  
 
As noted above, at its founding in 1945 the FAO enjoyed unique status as the 
predominant food and agricultural international entity, but since its creation in 
1995 “[i]ssues of trade in agricultural and food products have become 
principally the purview of the World Trade Organization (WTO).” (IEE, 2007: 
24). As has also been noted above, the principle objective of the WTO – at least 
according to its mandate – is to foster trade liberalisation. In order to promote 
this task the WTO was created with a degree of authority over its members that 
is significantly more than that assigned to institutions, entities, declarations and 
so forth brought forth in pursuit of other ends, such as, for instance, food 
security.  The WTO has been described as “essentially a set of shared rules 
about a the degree to which governments can protect and subsidize domestic 
economic activity, a judiciary to enforce commitments and a forum to recurrently 
draw countries together to rework these rules.” (Weis, 2007: 129). The 
enforcement component of this definition is important and situates the WTO in 
contrast to the outputs of international conferences convened to address global 
food insecurity, such as the World Food Summit in 1996, the member state 
                                            
53  When thinking about UN institutions and other international organisations it is important to be 
mindful of the important distinction that needs to be made between the members of a specific 
institution who are states, and the secretariat, who are, in the case of the UN, UN officials. In 
the formal division of responsibility between the two constituencies, member states typically 
exercise governance responsibility – taking all the major “political” decisions with regards to the 
institution’s work in its area of mandate – and provide funding. The Secretariat undertakes the 
technical work, the exact nature of which will depend on the institution. This distinction is 
important to bear in mind, particularly when thinking about the degree to which the actual 
behaviour of the respective constituencies conforms to these formal distinctions, as discussed 
below in the case of the FAO.  
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declaration of which is essentially non binding and which enjoyed no follow up 
enforcement mechanism (Shaw, 2007).54  
 
If the enforcement capacity of the WTO differentiates it from other food and 
agriculturally relevant entities, another important reflection of its influence is 
captured in the degree to which its agenda is recognised as being important by 
member states. Both the economic rationale for trade liberalisation and the 
extent to which it is appropriate to subject food and agriculture to this have been 
the target of a very strong critique by a wide range of different actors, including 
academics from economic and non-economic disciplines, and affected publics 
such as the anti-globalisation movement that has mobilised at WTO Ministerials 
to demonstrate its opposition to this way of thinking (Rosset, 2006; Weis, 2007; 
Desmarais, 2007; Murphy, 2010). However, in the immediate context of the 
food price crisis various declarations and policy responses have continued to 
assert the importance of trade liberalisation (and the latest round of WTO 
negotiations – the Doha Development Agenda, or DDA), connecting it with the 
concern for food security objectives engendered by the post-food crisis context. 
For example, in July 2009 the G8, in its “L’Aquila” Joint Statement on Global 
Food Security, stated that “Open trade flows and efficient markets have a 
positive role in strengthening food security. […] To this end, we aim at an 
ambitious, comprehensive and balanced conclusion of the Doha Development 
Round” (G8, 2009). This perspective, however, is not one that is shared by FAO 
analysts. For example, a 2003 report by the FAO on the relationship between 
trade reform and food security urged caution over the assumption that trade 
liberalisation benefited food security, especially when taking into account its 
effects upon those communities with no means of benefitting directly from 
“open” markets, particularly non-commercial farmers. In contrast to the 
sweeping generalisation embodied in the G8 statement – trade benefits food 
security - the report emphasised a more nuanced approach, including the need 
“to pace reforms and to implement compensatory policies to facilitate 
adjustment to more productive activities and/or compensatory policies to 
                                            
54  A distinction that is recognised by system practitioners (Interview, OECD Country 
Ambassador, FAO, 27.10.2009).  
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alleviate the possible negative consequences faced by some groups.” (FAO, 
2003: 1).  
 
At the time that the G8 declaration came out I was conducting interviews with 
FAO officials, trying to understand more about the dynamics of food policy 
contestation at the global level. One of those I spoke to was very closely 
involved with the analytical work undertaken by FAO on agricultural trade, and I 
asked him to explain the disconnect between the nuance in FAO’s analysis and 
the positions taken by the G8. He replied: 
 
 I think that FAO has been not very effective in getting its messages out. 
  (Interview, FAO Official, Division Deputy-Director, 15.9.2009) 
 
He also recalled the “huge controversy” that had been generated when the FAO 
had first began to produce trade analysis that contradicted the “doctrinaire” 
position of institutions like the World Bank, and how this resulted in them being 
“branded” protectionist.  
 
Whichever way we capture it the dynamics of an international food and 
agricultural institutional architecture comprising diverging spheres of authority 
and influence have been identified as a major obstacle to the attainment of 
system coherence. Returning to the perspective of the FAO brings this 
challenge to the fore. One of the criteria that the FAO’s Independent External 
Evaluation used to evaluate the institution’s work was “Governance”, which it 
defined as “the exercise of political authority” by FAO Members (states), 
including the development of “global policy coherence and law in the 
Organization’s area of mandate” (IEE, 2007: 169).55 Noting the expansion in the 
                                            
55 The mandate of FAO is defined in its Constitution (FAO, 1945):  
“The Nations accepting this Constitution, being determined to promote the common welfare by 
furthering separate and collective action on their part for the purpose of: 
raising levels of nutrition and standards of living of the peoples under their respective 
jurisdictions; 
securing improvements in the efficiency of the production and distribution of all food and 
agricultural products; 
bettering the condition of rural populations; 
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number of other global fora whose work overlaps with FAO’s area of mandate, 
the IEE found that in global governance of food and agriculture FAO’s role “has 
declined in comparison with that of others, and risks further decline.” (IEE, 
2007: 173). Moreover, the report recorded high degrees of dissatisfaction 
amongst FAO membership in relation to their performance of this role, with the 
absence of good links and institutional relationships with other global bodies 
being identified as a major contributing factor (IEE, 2007: 172). These findings 
underscore the dynamics of the international food and agricultural institutional 
architecture as being divided – or fragmented – into multiple issue, authority 
and influence spheres. Certainly for system practitioners – particularly those 
whose focus is overall system coherence – these dynamics are problematic. 
For instance, one official from the mechanism established by the UN Secretary-
General in the wake of the food price crisis to improve UN system-wide 
coherence – the High Level Task Force (HLTF) – when asked by me to 
comment on the challenges of establishing an authoritative and effective forum 
at the global level, replied: 
 
 I would say it has to go out side of Rome also [to] Geneva-based 
institutions. New York based institutions. At least these two poles. What about 
the World Bank? What about UNDP? What about UNICEF? What about 
UNEP? The list is long.  
  (Interview, HLTF Official, 30.10.2009). 
 
Clarifying the nature of their concerns, they said: 
 
 [I]t’s not the place which is important […] we need to have something 
where trade experts discuss with agricultural experts […] the problem is not 
Rome in itself, for sure. It’s the fact that it is agricultural specialists by 
themselves. 
  (Interview, HLTF Official, 30/10/2009). 
 
                                            
and thus contributing towards an expanding world economy and ensuring humanity's freedom 
from hunger”. 
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The dynamics that exist between different global food and agricultural entities 
are an important part of the picture when seeking to understand the context in 
which the reformed CFS is located, and the challenges confronting its 
institutionalisation of a public sphere in food and agriculture. However, the 
extent to which the CFS is able to attain the properties of a public authority 
capable of realising a public sphere – authoritative, open, and capable of 
receiving inputs from multiple perspectives - will depend not just on the broader 
environment, but also on the dynamics existing between member states within 
CFS. For the reasons cited above, a focus upon the FAO is illuminating in that 
regard. 
 ii. Inter-state relations: Power and collaboration 
 
As already noted, the Independent External Evaluation of the FAO concluded 
that – in relation to its global governance role – the member states of the FAO 
were underperforming. Another finding of the IEE, however, was that member 
states were also underperforming with regards to their role governing FAO 
itself. In regards to this latter responsibility, in fact, the IEE found that FAO “has 
a serious governance problem” (IEE, 2007: 169). Quite a few issues were 
identified by the IEE as contributing to this, but a range of dynamics around 
what can be termed the “collective spirit” both within the membership, and 
between the membership and the Secretariat, were identified as being 
important:  
 
 The main factor inhibiting effective governance of FAO is a low level of 
mutual trust and understanding within the membership and between some parts 
of the membership and the Secretariat.  
  (IEE, 2007: 4).  
 
One consequence of this was that the membership as a collective were ceding 
many of their governance responsibilities to the Secretariat, whose creeping 
involvement within the strategic governance of FAO extended from, amongst 
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others, the setting of meeting agendas, formally approving the reports of 
meetings, and determining budgetary priorities (IEE, 2007: 181).  
 
Like other UN institutions, the participation of member states of FAO is 
structured around their regional groupings (Latin America, Europe, etc). 
However, a fundamentally important way in which member states are organised 
is between, on the one hand, the OECD countries, and on the other, the G77 
countries, divisions that correspond roughly with North and South, and with 
donors and recipients (FAO, 2011a). Interviews with member states from both 
groups capture how, historically, relations between these two groupings have 
been – as commented on by the IEE – poor. For instance, one OECD country 
Ambassador recalled to me her experience of the low levels of mistrust and 
suspicion that existed between the two groups in FAO when she first took up 
her position: 
 
 When I arrived here, people were not used to talk to people from other 
camps at all. So the receptions were white, the drinks were white, we didn’t see 
black people in our receptions. And I said, “What is this? We are in a 
multilateral environment, we have to run over.” So I invited people from Africa, 
from Asia to talk about the big document – the IEE. And the Africans, they rang 
twice to our Secretariat and they said, “We are invited, why?” And [our 
Secretariat] said, “Our ambassador they want to discuss with you the outcome 
of the IEE.” And they said, “Yes, we want to do that as well, but why we should 
do that at the Perm Rep of the [Ambassador’s Country].” And [our Secretariat] 
said. “Our Ambassador is anxious to learn from you, and so on.” But they were 
not used to being invited by white-headed people, because they were black, or 
yellow or whatever. 
  (Interview, OECD Country Ambassador, FAO, 20.10.2009). 
Chapter Five 
Establishing Key Dynamics of Public Authority in Transnational Agri-food Governance 
and Policy-Making 
 
 135 
a. G77-OECD: Votes Vs. Dollars?  
 
When reflecting on the relationship dynamics of OECD-G77 countries in FAO, 
it’s important to be conscious of the different types of power and influence that 
each respective grouping wields within the institution. Unlike the Bretton Woods 
institutions, for example, where member state voting power is weighted in 
relation to the size of contributions to the institutional budgets, in FAO the 
decision-making principle is, formally at least, one-member-one-vote. With the 
G77 countries comprising 130 of the FAO’s total membership of 191 countries, 
and constituting by far the biggest grouping within the membership, on the face 
of it this endows them with a powerful decision-making influence – a view found 
amongst, for instance, OECD countries: 
 
 FAO is not a multilateral institution but a G77 institution, so whatever 
they want, whatever they are asking for, we have to give it to them because we 
are a minority in OECD countries. 
  (Interview, OECD Country Ambassador, 20.10.2009). 
 
And also G77 countries: 
 
  Developing countries have a lot of say in FAO since a lot of time 
already. The way it is composed.      
  (Interview, G77 Country Representation, 25.11.2009). 
 
Interestingly, however, this view was contradicted by others within the G77 
grouping. One interviewee –a previous Chair in fact of the G77 – compared the 
voting power possessed by the G77 with the “real” power of the OECD, 
exercised through their financial contributions.56 To his mind this meant that 
attempts to drive through decisions in the face of OECD opposition would be 
unproductive and, in fact, dangerous to the whole spirit of multilateralism: 
 
                                            
56  The 2 largest contributors to the FAO’s Core Budget of about €1billion per biennium are 
respectively the US and Japan (IEE, 2007: 176).  
Chapter Five 
Establishing Key Dynamics of Public Authority in Transnational Agri-food Governance 
and Policy-Making 
 
 136 
 The issues that require a vote would only create divisiveness and might 
threaten to kill the system itself – I’m talking about FAO, I’m talking about the 
UN system. 
  (Interview, Former Chair, G77, FAO, 23.10.2009). 
 
In this context, therefore, it was important, indeed, fundamentally necessary to 
work for consensus: 
 
 The things we do are done by consensus. It’s frustrating, it’s irritating, it’s 
slow, but it’s absolutely necessary… It’s only a rhetorical principle, the one-
country-one-vote, because it’s not really feasible, to bring it to fruition, because 
it just won’t happen, for these self-evident reasons. So then comes the salvation 
of the system, through consensus building. 
  (Interview, Former Chair, G77, FAO, 23.10.2009). 
 
These latter comments suggest that the different types of power possessed by 
the two major groupings – OECD and G77 – condition the voting power of the 
G77. Certainly the dynamics attending the follow up process of the International 
Conference on Agrarian Reform and Rural Development (ICARRD), discussed 
in Box FIVE, below, reinforce this impression. In this regard it is important to 
note that the same perhaps cannot be said about G77 influence on OECD 
countries. The IEE found, for example, that OECD dissatisfaction with the 
functioning of FAO – particularly in the context of unreconciled differences 
between “various country group’s interests” – has resulted in their seeking “to 
dictate policy through their power as major contributors. This has included the 
earmarking of trust funds to their own priorities” (IEE, 2007: 181).  
 
Irrespective of the divergences that may be said to exist regarding the relative 
types of power and influence exercised by G77 and OECD country groupings, 
there is however a consensus on the vast improvement in relations between 
these two sets of countries – and in the quality of member state participation in 
FAO’s governance work in general – as a result of their collective participation 
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in the process of FAO reform following the institution’s independent evaluation, 
which reported in 2007.  
 
BOX FIVE The ICARRD Follow-Up Process: Exposing Dynamics of Power 
and Influence within the FAO Membership 
 
In 2006, Porte Allege, Brazil, from the 7th – 10th March, 1 400 participants, 
including 450 NGO observers, delegations from 96 FAO member countries, 
international experts and representatives from over 130 farmer and civil society 
organisations met for the International Conference on Agrarian Reform and 
Rural Development – ICARRD. An FAO conference organised at the behest of 
Brazil, ICARRD was the first international conference to address the issue of 
agrarian reform since the World Conference on Agrarian Reform and Rural 
Development, some 27 years earlier, in 1979. In terms of format, ICARRD 
represented a progressive experiment in inclusivity, with its organiser 
recognising very early that its success depended upon its being as inclusive as 
possible. This was reflected in the strong participation opportunities made 
available within the conference to civil society - the right to prepare documents, 
nominate a speaker for the inaugural ceremony, and participate in the 
discussion spaces on equal terms with governments - which also hosted its own 
concurrent parallel forum with “meaningful and well defined opportunities to 
interact with the official conference.” (McKeon, 2009: 99). La Via Campesina 
participated extensively within ICARRD, and was also very involved in the 
preparation of the CSO parallel forum in collaboration with the international food 
sovereignty alliance – the International Planning Committee for Food 
Sovereignty (IPC).  
 
To many of its participants, including its organisers, its Brazilian hosts, and the 
IPC and La Via Campesina ICARRD was a strong success, and all parties 
looked forward following the articulation of a positive declaration to the follow up 
process. However, by the time that I began conducting research with La Via 
Campesina (mid-2009) it was evident that the follow up process was falling a 
long way short of these expectations. Thus, identifying the reasons for this 
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became one of the objectives defined by La Via for the research project that I 
conducted for them. 
 
Following interviews with six people (including the ex-organiser of the ICARRD 
conference, and those within the Natural Resources Department (NRD) 
responsible for its implementation, including its AD-G (the head of the 
Department) and others within FAO and IFAD sympathetic to its Declaration) it 
became evident that there were essentially two camps with regards to 
perception of ICARRD follow-up. On the one side there were those who 
believed that the follow-up process was dead, that the vision and collaborative 
breadth of the conference had been lost when the follow up process transferred 
to FAO headquarters (Rome), and that all that was left was a nominal 
commitment devoid of substance. And on the other side – predominantly 
comprising those within the NRD with official responsibility for its follow-up – 
there were those who believed that it was continuing, but under a constricted 
and difficult political environment.  
 
Indeed, to those within the NRD the argument was – and they defended it with 
a lot of vigour – that agrarian reform is a very politically sensitive idea towards 
which some member states within the FAO demonstrate a strong opposition. 
Under these circumstances, in fact, they said it had been a challenge even 
keeping land on FAO’s work agenda at all, something that they felt they had 
been able to achieve (with their process on voluntary guidelines on natural 
resource tenure). They regarded ICARRD as too “hot” a concept to be 
addressed directly, and so preferred instead to work on elements of its agenda 
in a more subtle fashion. They also added that there were new issues now – 
land grabbing, climate change – that have changed the context. Their position 
was that it is better for civil society to work constructively with their work, rather 
than trying to call for a process that is politically very difficult.  
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 Reasons cited why the ICARRD follow-up had stalled: 
 
1) Lack of donor country buy-in. Whilst the big donor countries had nominal 
roles in the preparation of the conference, the perception was that they never 
really accepted its value and, in fact, were opposed to the particular approach 
to agrarian reform embodied in ICARRD. This diminished the political space 
available to FAO officials to work with the follow up agenda. However, there are 
disagreements about how much freedom of movement FAO officials have. 
Some say they could have gone further.   
2) The controversy of agrarian reform. It is a politically sensitive issue that 
evokes strong positions both for and against (including within developing 
countries). This, again, limits the political space for follow up.  
3) Lack of broad-based support for the follow up process. Generally, there was 
a perception that the only consistent demander of ICARRD follow up is Brazil. 
This diminishes the legitimacy of the process.  
4) Lack of civil society pressure. Some within FAO complained that civil society 
did not sustain the commitment that led up to ICARRD into pressure for the 
follow-up process. They say that there has been a political vacuum where civil 
society should have been.  
 
Indeed, my personal observations at the 35th Committee on World Food 
Security, 15th October 2009, in which ICARRD follow up was an agenda item, 
confirmed the importance of some of the elements identified above. Whilst a 
few countries called for a more expansive ICARRD follow-up (Brazil, Ecuador, 
the Philippines), the EU urged a “cautious” approach, and, indeed, the US 
called into question whether FAO had any legitimacy on land work at all. This 
resulted in the Assistant Direct-General of the Natural Resources Department, 
Alexander Mueller, having to give a defense of FAO’s land competency by 
stating that FAO was regularly approached for technical advice from a number 
of “partners”, including the World Bank.  
 
The dynamics generated around the ICARRD follow-up process suggest – 
despite the vastly superior voting weight of G77 countries – the necessity of 
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OECD consent for the progress of FAO initiatives. At the very least they 
communicate the importance of negotiating OECD country resistance.  
 
 (Interview with FAO Official, Deputy-Director, 14.9.2009; Interview, FAO 
Official, Division Director, 16.9.2009; Interview, IFAD Official, Director, 
16.9.2009; Group Interview, Officials from Natural Resources Department, 
FAO, 23.9.2009;  McKeon, 2009: 98-100). 
b. A Shifting Mindset: “Touched” by the IEE 
 
In 2007 the Independent External Evaluation of the FAO – the largest external 
evaluation of any global intergovernmental organisation ever conducted – 
published its final report. The IEE was a huge undertaking, being conducted in 
just over a year, during which time the evaluation team conducted “over 2 500 
structured and semi-structured interviews” and analysed “over 3 000 responses 
to twelve separate questionnaires” (IEE, 2007: 6). According to member states, 
the first murmurings of the need for an evaluation of FAO first became audible 
in 2003, though it wasn’t until April 2006 that the actual work begun. The 
context for the reform has been identified as a widespread level of 
dissatisfaction with FAO’s performance, though the perspective amongst many 
in FAO was that the specific impetus for a reform process came from OECD 
countries/the major donors who were unhappy, in various ways and for various 
reasons, with the institution.57 Indeed, some have speculated that the 
motivation for the big donors to initiate a reform process was their desire to see 
FAO wound down, the final act of giving way to the other entities relevant to 
food and agriculture at the global level, and which were deemed to be more 
sympathetic to the donor’s agenda.58 However, whatever the motivations 
behinds its launch, the IEE’s findings were essentially positive towards the 
                                            
57 This perception was expressed by a wide range of different actors – both in and out of FAO – 
in multiple conversations, though I did not identify exactly the origins of the reform impetus in 
my data collection.  
58 One FAO Official, seconded to the Conference Committee that was convened to provide a 
focal point for FAO Member State engagement with the IEE and the reform process, recalling 
member state response to the report’s initial publication observed: “[S]ome of the governments 
weren’t in agreement with the IEE at all, [seeing] it as the North trying to eliminate an 
organization that was predisposed towards the South.” (Interview, FAO Official, 24.11.2008).  
Chapter Five 
Establishing Key Dynamics of Public Authority in Transnational Agri-food Governance 
and Policy-Making 
 
 141 
existence of FAO, concluding that if the organization didn’t exist it would in fact 
need to be re-invented – give its unique role in the global governance of food 
and agriculture. In the context of, amongst others, an uninterrupted downwards 
slide in budgetary contributions and various different manifestations of serious 
governance problems, the IEE’s central message was that the new agenda for 
FAO needed to be in fact “reform with growth” (IEE, 2007: 3). However, the 
particular significance of the IEE and the broader reform process within which it 
was situated that I want to capture here concerns its impacts upon both the 
quality of member state engagement with the work of the institution, and the 
tone of their relations with each other.  
 
The IEE published its report in September 2007. At the end of 2007 the 
membership of FAO convened a Conference Committee with the special 
function of providing a forum for member state to formulate their response toits 
findings. In the absence of a specific institutional context for them to be able to 
do this they were concerned that the space for an institutional response would 
be taken up by the Secretariat (the senior management of FAO), and so they 
decided to establish this interim body.59 According to both member states and 
officials, prior to the reform process the quality of FAO members’ engagement 
with the institution was undermined by two dynamics. On the one hand, and 
captured above, were the dynamics of mistrust that existed within the 
membership, particularly between the G77 and OECD country groupings. 
Another important dynamic, however, derived from the somewhat short-term 
and self-centred attitude of the membership towards the institution’s work. For 
instance, one FAO official, with long-term experience of the work of FAO’s 
governing bodies, when I asked him in 2009 about the dynamics that existed 
therein, replied: 
 
                                            
59  This account of the member state reaction to the reform process is derived from interviews 
with both member state representatives and FAO officials with a close-hand experience of it. 
Two interviews in particular were important - one with an ambassador from a country who Co-
Chaired the Conference Committee established by the membership to formulate their response 
to the reform, and another with an FAO official who was seconded to this committee to assist in 
its work.  
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 It’s gotten better. The governing bodies – I mean, it used to be, basically 
as long as each country could claim that they had one thing that they could 
identify in FAO’s programme that they helped put there, they didn’t care what 
happened with the rest of it. Now we’re in a conversation. [Emphasis in 
Original]. 
  (Interview, FAO Official, Division Deputy-Director, 4.11.2009).60  
 
Indeed, the sense that the reform process had effected a major shift both in the 
quality of FAO member state relations and in their attitude towards the 
institution was widely shared amongst the members themselves and amongst 
FAO staff. Representatives of member states I interviewed spoke of their being 
“touched” by the reform process, and of “positions moving from that kind of 
division OECD-G77 to a common understanding, common… union around a 
purpose that fits everyone.” Indeed, to those members of country 
representations who had taken up their positions after the commencement of 
the reform process and the shift in attitudes that it produced, there was no real 
sign of these older dynamics. When I asked one diplomat, appointed to Rome 
at the beginning of 2009, about the degree to which members’ participation in 
FAO’s governing bodies was still being driven by individualistic competitive 
tendencies he replied:  
 
 [F]rom the meetings I’ve been there is a general concern with that, and I 
do not see narrow interests guiding the acting of countries in those 
Committees… in the past I think it was much more divided from what I hear 
people celebrating this kind of spirit… […] and I think we should continue to 
                                            
60 Indeed, this was also captured within the IEE, which identified that “The self-interest of 
individual countries often prevails in discussions, over and above the interests of the 
membership at large.” (IEE, 2007: 175). This type of attitude towards FAO on the part of its 
members is captured in a anecdote told to me by a member of an NGO who orbits in her work 
between FAO headquarters and her country level. She recalled attending a meeting at which 
her country’s FAO Permanent Representative was briefing various members of government and 
civil society on the work that he had conducted during his posting. Somewhat depressingly for 
her, the presentation was dominated by his account of what he had been able to do to advance 
the interests and prestige of their country, and demonstrated no engagement beyond this 
narrow interest (Conversation with Civil Society Actor, 20.1.2009).  
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push that spirit forward, because it does no good to Rome and to the 
multilateral system that kind of polarization. 
  (Interview, G77 Country Representative, 25.11.2009) 
 
How did this change come about? How did the FAO manage to go from a 
situation where the self-interest of member countries “prevailed” over the wider 
interest, to one in which a collective spirit was instead being celebrated? An 
insight into this was provided to me by an FAO ambassador who was one of the 
Chairs of the Conference Committee in which this transformation was wrought. 
She recalled: 
 
 In the first month when we started with that, Jan 2008, nobody said 
anything at all, because they were afraid, they were not prepared, and they 
didn’t want to give their position. And they said things like “I haven’t seen the 
document, not yet.” Or “I have to consult my capital.” Or “We didn’t discuss that 
not yet in our group.” And that took, you know, weeks. And we were sitting 
there, in the Bureau, and we said, “We continue, continue, continue.” And all of 
a sudden, well, not all of a sudden, there were some groups that said “Well, we 
have to prepare ourselves, so let’s give input to these three people so you can 
not go on like that.” So then, the common sense, or the normal sense came up, 
and they started to discuss, amongst groups. But in the first months they only 
discussed from their own perspective, they did not listen to others. But then all 
of a sudden, you heard somebody said, “I agree with Canada.” Somebody from 
Mali, or Malawi – that was new. That had not happened in FAO at all, you know. 
And then Canada said, “I agree with Zimbabwe, or I will follow on what the 
Zimbabwean said.” And then you had normal, cross-cutting discussions. A 
debate. A dialogue. And we did that for two years, and then after one year we 
had to come up with a document and then the old reflexes came up again. 
Which we overcome. But now with the CFS it’s totally eradicated by Brazil and 
others. 
  (Interview, OECD Country Ambassador, FAO, 20/10/2009) 
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Whilst it is not my goal in this chapter to identify the factors that contributed 
towards the shift in attitudes identified as having taken place among the 
member states, the quote above and the broader context provided by the 
reform allude, if nothing else, to the range of factors that were significant in this 
regard – including a gigantic, unparalleled external review which set the 
context, and the determination of some member states to create an 
environment and set of working relationships through which the divisions of the 
past could be negated, which shaped the collective response. The quote above, 
however, also alludes to the precarity of the new-found spirit amongst the 
membership. Though, again, perceptions within the membership of the state of 
their collective relationships diverge, as indicated by this comment I recorded in 
an interview just days after the interview conducted above: 
 
 We the countries saw very clearly that there was a technical need to do 
away with the politicization of the past, which still remains, and in one way or 
another, in certain aspects it has not changed, in others it is changing, in others 
it will change, but if I was to make an assessment right now, I would say that 
the mindset of all has been touched. 
  (Interview, G77 Ambassador, FAO, 23.10.2009).61 
 
The experiences discussed above capture some interesting dynamics in terms 
of the relations between member states in FAO. The relevance of these 
dynamics for this thesis is straightforward. If member states can not work as a 
                                            
61 When thinking about the dynamics of member state group interaction, however, it is important 
not to overstate the cohesiveness of the respective sub-groupings into which the membership is 
organised. For instance, whilst from the outside it might appear that the EU acts in a fairly 
unified body (and certainly I encountered this perception amongst civil society FAO watchers) 
discussions with, for instance, various members of country delegations holding the rotating EU 
Presidency revealed that internally there is a lot of conflict and disagreement (Email from 
Member of EU Presidency Country Delegation, FAO, 7.3.2010) Indeed, I witnessed this 
disagreement in close quarters when at the start of an interview with a European country 
ambassador and upon receiving a copy of the latest version of the Declaration presently being 
negotiated (in advance of the forthcoming 2009 FAO Summit) by FAO members and which 
exhibited proposed amendments tabled by a fellow EU member that diverged significantly from 
their agreed positions, they shared with me their frustrations at the “double play” of certain 
countries within the EU grouping, stating that it was  “not astonishing that the G77 never trust 
us. They have the same feelings as I have, of course.”  
  (Interview, OECD Country Ambassador, 20.10.2009).  
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collective, sustaining focus, maintaining “dialogue”, and addressing in a 
meaningful way issues beyond the narrow horizon of their self interests then 
there is absolutely no point civil society expecting to engage this fragmented 
field of relations and find a “political authority” capable of responding to their 
policy contestation. At the same time, it seems difficult to imagine such an 
agglomeration of member states being capable of taking up their role in global 
governance, as defined by the IEE, for the very same reasons. The distinction 
that emerges in terms of the different kinds of influence exercised by member 
states, moreover, confirms the importance of this attention to inter-member 
dynamics, both within the narrow terms of this thesis, and - connecting to a 
concern with system effectiveness more generally – beyond.  
 
Thus far, in an attempt to determine the context and obstacles conditioning the 
likelihood of the CFS fulfilling the political authority criteria of a public sphere I 
have discussed the dynamics of FAO’s location in the broader field of relations 
comprising transnational agri-food policy and governance and the dynamics of 
relations between FAO member states. Another important set dynamics are 
those that can be found existing within governments. That is, between different 
food and agriculturally relevant ministries.  
 
iii. Intra-State Dynamics 
 
When thinking about the context for the establishment of an authoritative, multi-
dimensional food and agricultural body at the global level it is clear that the 
number of entities existing there poses a major challenge. Indeed, this has 
been recognised explicitly by the Independent External Evaluation of the FAO – 
reflecting on the possibility of FAO member states being able to fulfill their role 
in global governance - and is implicit within the formation of the Secretary-
General’s High Level Task Force, with its 20- body membership. It is also 
squarely communicated by the reformed CFS, which counts, indeed, the 
promotion of Coordination at the Global Level, as its first role (CFS: 2009/2). 
The problem of fragmentation, however, is not limited to the transnational or 
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global level, with many of the same dynamics to be found – according to system 
practitioners – at the national level. This is to say that coordination mechanisms 
between the various different ministries and departments relevant in one way or 
another to food and agriculture62 are typically weak to non-existent. 
 
The experiences of an ex-civil servant from a large European country whose 
responsibilities included promoting inter-Ministerial food security cooperation 
highlight some of these dynamics. Despite a reasonably significant political 
commitment to this goal, they found it to be “impossible”, as the divergent 
working practices and institutional defensiveness of the relevant bits of their 
government were too entrenched to be overcome (Conversation with European 
Country Ex-Civil Servant, 2009). Interviews with other practitioners confirm the 
prevalence of these dynamics in other locales. For instance, an official from the 
UN’s High Level Task Force, whose work focused explicitly on country-level 
coordination, observed to me that “it will be difficult for the G8 countries […] 
they are the ones in the worst situation regarding coherence of their policies.” 
However, this wasn’t to say that in the developing countries things were any 
better, as they added, regarding the comparative state of inter-ministerial food 
security coordination in European and West African countries: “the lack of 
coordination is the same.” (Interview, HLTF Official, 30.10.2009). 
 
There are signs, however, that in the wake of the food price crisis countries are 
taking the problem of coordination more seriously. For instance, U.S. Secretary 
of State Hillary Clinton made this observation during a speech given at the FAO 
during her visit there in May 2011: 
 
 We need a common vision and a coordinated approach. I know this is 
hard even in our own government, where we are coordinating and leveraging 
the distinct capacities of multiple agencies, from AID to Department of 
Agriculture to the trade representative. It’s been a major challenge. We held the 
first meeting where we had in one room everyone in the United States 
                                            
62  We could include, for instance, Agricultural, Environmental, Development/Cooperation, 
Business, and Foreign Service ministries within this list, as well as Prime Ministerial or 
Presidential offices, just to get started.   
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Government who worked on food. And it had never been done before and a lot 
of people wondered why we were doing it, because they had gone along in their 
own programmes, in their own stovepipes, answering to their own higher 
authorities. And we were trying to break down a lot of that bureaucratic obstacle 
course and get people to actually run the race together. 
  (U.S. Secretary of State Hilary Clinton, FAO, Rome, 6.5.2011). 
[Emphasis Added].  
 
The scale of the challenge of achieving national level coordination, however, is 
captured vividly by Lang et al., who, looking at the situation in the UK, observe 
that  “A 2008 report on UK food-retailing governance found that UK government 
has at least 100 points of policy entry into the food supply chain, involving at 
least 19 government ministries, agencies and bodies. In such a policy world, co-
ordination and coherence become problematic.” (Lang et al., 2009: 26).  
 
Of course, when thinking about the possibilities of establishing the type of 
political authority capable of realising a transnational public sphere, given the 
developments identified in Chapter Four around the emergence and importance 
of TNCs, it is at the very least important to be sensitive to the dynamics of the 
relationship between political authorities and this group of actors.  
 
iv. The Importance of Non-State Actors 
 
As will be recalled, Chapter Four described how TNC expansion and market 
dominance has become a source of concern to a range of scholars, particularly 
in terms of what this means for the governance of agri-food systems. For 
example, Clapp and Fuchs questioned both the role that agri-food TNCs play in 
the very rule-making that is meant to regulate their activities, and the influence 
that they enjoy over “state-based and intergovernmental mechanisms of 
governance” (Clapp and Fuchs, 2009: 1). Higgins and Lawrence, moreover, 
begin their edited volume addressing globalization and agricultural governance 
with the observation that “the regulatory dynamics underpinning agriculture in 
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Western nations have shifted dramatically. Where, previously, the nation-state 
exercised considerable control over the regulation of agriculture, the rise of 
transnational corporations (TNCs) in the agribusiness industries […] has 
resulted in a reconfiguration of political power in which the state is no longer the 
dominant actor.” (2005: 1). Indeed, the IEE – describing the challenges of the 
new context in which FAO operates – itself notes “the private sector has 
become a major driver of change in the global food and agricultural system.” 
(IEE, 2007: 35).  
 
When thinking about the dynamics of interaction between political authorities 
and TNCs, however, its important to recognise that, rather than simply seeing 
TNCs as breaching the regulatory power of the state, their emergence and 
growth is in fact tied to the exercise of state power. For instance, Wilkinson 
observes how the emergence of Brazilian agribusiness TNCs and the opening 
up of Chinese food markets to TNC investment are connected to government 
policies in both countries, with Brazil embracing neoliberal reforms whilst China 
“has traditionally conditioned foreign direct investment on the establishment of 
joint ventures with local capital and agreements on capital transfers.” (2010: 
165). Indeed, a conversation that I had during a research trip to Geneva with a 
senior member of the US trade mission enforces this notion of state-enabled 
capitalism. Explaining to me the historic transition of US trade policy from a 
post-war emphasis upon the trade interests of America’s trading partners, to 
one which placed the strategic interests of American agribusiness TNCs at its 
heart, they described how the US Trade Representative was now legally 
obligated to consult with these commercial actors through consultative 
committees63 when formulating trade negotiation objectives.  Indeed, the 
relation between the interests of the TNCs and the US’s negotiation objectives 
was very direct: “They say to us: ‘This tariff in that country is hurting us.’ And 
that defines our negotiation objectives.” (Conversation with member of US 
Trade Mission, Geneva, 2008).  
 
                                            
63 In the case of agriculture this would be APAC – the Agricultural Policy Advisory Committee, a 
list of the membership of which can be found here: http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/advisory-
committees/agricultural-policy-advisory-committee-apac.  
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Indeed, the enthusiasm that powerful states have for TNCs finds 
correspondence in the history of relations between the UN and this powerful set 
of economic actors, as described within a recent study (Sagafi-nejad and 
Dunning, 2008).64 In the immediate post-war period this was fairly 
uncontroversial, even harmonious, but in the post-independence context of the 
New International Economic Order (NIEO), and an increasing sensitivity 
amongst developing countries to exploitation and dependence, a demand for 
more TNC oversight emerged. This resulted in the establishment of the United 
Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations (UNCTC), which “engaged in 
three main activities: providing information, analyzing policy, and providing 
advisory services.” (Emmerij and Jolly, 2009: 2). The UNTNC was also charged 
with conducting a study of the feasibility of negotiating a multilateral agreement 
– a code of conduct - to regulate TNC activity. However, with the ascendency of 
neolberalism the work of the UNTNC fell out of favour, and the body was 
abolished in 1993, with some of its roles being absorbed by UNCTAD. More 
recently, in the context of public and specialist concern over the inequities and 
irrationalities generated by, for example, economic globalisation, attempts to 
engage TNCs in the realisation of public goods have taken the form of 
“compacts” – voluntary commitments by TNCs to principles of good corporate 
practice – the most well known of which is probably the Global Compact 
initiative established by the then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan in 1999. 
Thus, in general terms, the history of UN engagement with TNCs is one in 
which “the context and tenor of the debate moved from confrontation toward 
collaboration.” (Emmerij and Jolly, 2009: 2). 
 
The wisdom of working cooperatively with profit driven actors in the pursuit of 
public goods has, as one might expect, been questioned by a wide range of 
actors, both inside the specific field of food and agricultural relations, and 
beyond. Marion Nestle – an academic and nutritionist with 30 years experience 
advising U.S. public bodies on nutrition matters – begins her study of the role of 
                                            
64 One of the observations and criticisms of the IEE was that FAO does not engage to any 
significant extent in relationships with the private sector. Thus, we have to look outside of FAO 
across the broader UN system to obtain insights into the dynamics of UN-TNC/private sector 
relations (IEE, 2009).  
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the food industry in the U.S food system with an account of the shift in 
understanding that followed her attempts to understand the factors driving poor 
nutrition and food health choices in the U.S. As a nutritionist she recognised 
that the advice on good nutrition had basically stayed constant in the past 30 
years or so – plenty of fruit, vegetables, and grains, a little meat from time to 
time – but despite this American diets had got worse. She was used to working 
with the presence of the food industry close at hand, and like many of her 
colleagues tended to think of them in a collaborative light, but in the process of 
trying to explain the contradictions between the consensus on nutrition and US 
dietary trends she began to understand that, in fact, the food industry did not 
care about matters of public health or nutrition, but only about profit:  
 
 [F]ood companies – just like companies that sell cigarettes, 
pharmaceuticals, or any other commodity – routinely place the needs of 
stockholders over considerations of public health. This conclusion may not 
surprise anyone who follows the political scene, but I had heard few discussions 
of its significance among my professional colleagues, despite evident 
implications. Food companies will make and market any product that sells 
regardless of its nutritional value or its effects on health.  
  (Nestle, 2007: xiv). [Emphasis added]. 
 
Along the way, Nestle observes, they will utilise all and every available legal 
marketing practices to achieve this, though Nestle, of course, questions the 
ethical and public benefit implications of their practices.65 
 
In their review of Sagafi-nejad and Dunning’s (2008) work looking at the history, 
mapped very briefly above, of UN-TNC relations, whilst recognising that UN 
attitudes are very much defined, and therefore constrained, by the attitudes of 
                                            
65  The choice by the U.S. of Marion Nestle for the 6th McGovern Lecture on World Food Day, 
16th October, 2009, FAO, communicates perfectly well the fragmentation that exists even within 
states. Despite being committed to TNC market expansion in one forum, they (or someone in 
the United States Agricultural Department, I was informed) had chosen a critic of the role of 
food businesses for this honorary address (“JCU Delegation Attends World Food Day Event at 
FAO”,JCU,18.10.2009.) 
http://www.johncabot.edu/About_JCU/News_Events/NewsRead.aspx?IDN=355.) 
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its member states, Emmerij and Jolly are nonetheless optimistic about the role 
that the UN can play, believing that: 
 
 If, as the ultimate “born global” institution, the UN can combine the 
collective knowledge and expertise of its constituent parts on TNCs and FDI 
together with its unique capacity to act as a “consensus builder,” a fertile future 
can materialize. 
  (Emmerij and Jolly, 2009: 5). 
 
Indeed, moving closer to the focus of this thesis, this notion of the role of the 
UN as consensus builder, or partnership enabler is very much evident in the 
attitudes of senior UN officials reflecting on the tone of responses to the food 
price crisis in the context of a fragmented global agri-food system in which a 
wide array of different actors pursue different agendas with varying degrees of 
power and capacity. This is expressed in language in which the UN is 
conceived as an “honest broker” or enabler of “constructive dialogue”, bringing 
a wide range of different actors to the table in order to develop a “movement for 
change”.66 For UN officials trying to create system coherence or maintain the 
political commitment to food security in the context of a broader political climate 
in which (powerful) member state support for TNCs and market-based solutions 
appears to be largely unwavering, an attitude of collaboration is no doubt 
pragmatic and sensible. That is not to say, however, that these officials are not 
themselves aware of the potential incompatibilities – captured by Nestle - 
between the commercial agendas of corporate actors and the pursuit of public 
goods.67  
                                            
66 Quoted from interviews with David Nabarro, Coordinator of the UN Secretary-General’s High 
Level Task Force on the Global Food Security Crisis and the UN Secretary-General’s Special 
Representative on Food Security and Nutrition (28.8.2009), and Alexander Mueller, Assistant 
Director-General, Natural Resources Department, FAO (23.9.2009).  
67 As evidenced, for instance, in a response given by AD-G Alexander Mueller to a question I 
put him: 
 
Josh: How far do you think we have to go before we actually have the mechanisms in place 
that can facilitate the type of dialogue and negotiation that you’re talking about, and that would 
enable an actor like La Via Campesina to feel comfortable about entering into a dialogue 
process with a commercially driven actor who’s operating within a short term commercial time 
horizon and who does not have public policy objectives as part of their mandate or their primary 
objectives? What in practice do you think we need to have in place before we can bring those 
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4. Vertical Dynamics: State-global relations 
 
Global level decision-making only has meaning in so far as it translates into 
local level realities. For a global level body to have authority requires that it 
enjoy a degree of political recognition in state capitals, or, at a minimum, that 
political authorities are aware of and following its work. Interviews with system 
practitioners, again, suggest that – using FAO as a reference point for the 
reasons cited above – in the case of the CFS this is not to be assumed. Indeed, 
various different interviewees conveyed to me the sense of a “fuzziness” 
existing in the relationship between state capitals and their “representatives” at 
the global level. The experiences of the civil servant with responsibility for 
achieving inter-ministerial food security coordination, for example, suggested 
that the problems were not just horizontal, i.e., between ministries, but also 
vertical, i.e., between the government and its representatives in global bodies, 
as the latter became more responsive to the logic and rhythms of the body in 
which they were situated than their own government’s agenda (Conversation 
with European Country Ex-Civil Servant, 15.10.2009).  This notion was also 
relayed to me from another perspective, this time from a professional diplomat 
from a Latin American country, who described many of the Permanent 
Representatives at FAO as being “disconnected” from their capitals - their 
behaviour being more determined by their FAO-based regional networks and 
alliances  (Conversation with G77 Ambassador, 26.11.2011).68  
 
If one side of this dynamic is that state representatives might be somewhat 
disconnected from their capitals, the other is that capitals can be disconnected 
from the work that their representatives are doing at the global level. This can 
                                            
actors together, in a way which is actually going to produce some sort of shift in their behaviour, 
across the board?  
 
Alexander: [quietly] …This is the billion dollar question. 
68 This dynamic was evident to me at FAO when I observed at one meeting the representatives 
of two countries whose “real world” relationship was going through a period of rapid 
deterioration (military threats had passed between them) laughing and chatting jovially. In an 
interview with one of them a week or so later I commented on this, and laughing he agreed that 
relationships between FAO diplomats – certainly from the same region – were somewhat 
insulated from country-level reality.  
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be seen, for example, in the lines of reporting between a FAO Perm Rep from a 
large European country and his capital, which saw him feeding back to two civil 
servants at the “medium senior” level, one from the agricultural ministry, the 
other from development.  In our interview I asked him what this meant and 
where we were in terms of the degree of political profile that the work around 
the process of reforming the CFS enjoyed. He answered: “Where are we there? 
I would say we’re pretty much at base camp really.” Adding that he did not get 
the sense that the senior levels of his government (including the premiere) were 
following this work (Interview with OECD Ambassador to FAO, 27.10.2009).  
 
If authority implies compliance, then the fact that state capitals might not even 
be aware of the work – including decisions - being conducted at the global level 
by the body aspiring to political authority raises serious questions about the 
degree to which that compliance is likely to be forthcoming. Indeed, this seems 
very unlikely. It is however worth noting that for the representatives themselves 
the absence of high-level political oversight of their work was not necessarily a 
problem, and in fact could increase their freedom of movement. For instance, 
one diplomat, when I asked how state’s representatives coped with a lack of 
high-level political attention being given to their work, replied: 
 
 Perhaps I question the premise. Sometimes, when you, perhaps things 
can be more difficult when you have high level clearance at home [laughing] or 
a higher level of following the issue at home than when you don’t. Sometimes 
when there is none you are more free to work as you would think appropriate, 
and sometimes the capital could tie your hands.  
  (Interview with G77 Country Representative to FAO, 25.11.2009).  
 
This is a fundamentally important point, because it suggests the presence of a 
dialectic between, on the one hand the degree of openness of the arena, and, 
on the other, the level of authority at the domestic level with which it can 
articulate. If the decision making arena at the global level has strong links with 
the national, in that its work is being monitored by and reacted to by the highest 
levels of government, then this increases the likelihood of its attaining political 
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centrality. If this comes, however, at the cost of openness, then this could 
diminish the capacity of the body to respond to policy contestation. Attention to 
this potential dialectic is critical to determining the extent to which this or that 
global level body – in this case, the CFS – is capable of fulfilling the public 
authority criteria of a public sphere.69  
5. Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I have sought to identify key dynamics attention towards which is 
critical to identifying the extent to which the CFS will be capable of fulfilling the 
political authority requirements of a public sphere. Identifying some of the 
properties of such a political authority as being authoritative, being open, and 
being responsive to multiple inputs, I have moved the analysis through a series 
of different perspectives that allow us to identify some dynamics relevant to 
their realisation. At the global level, these dynamics consist of a complex and 
fragmented institutional architecture, in which a wide range of different entities 
address different aspects of food and agricultural policy-making and 
governance with varying degrees of authority and influence. They also include, 
however, the presence of non-state actors – TNCs – the nature of whose 
relationship to states requires closer attention. At the global level, moreover, are 
to be found the inter-state dynamics of the FAO, the recent history of which 
alerts us to the fundamental importance of attention to this strata of relations 
and its relevance to both the possibility of political authority exercise, and – 
because of the impossibility of maintaining “dialogue” when each state seeks 
only to attain its own interest – of policy debate. Continuing the focus on policy 
debate, I also identified the possible trade offs between meaningful connections 
between national level authorities and global decision-making, on the one hand, 
and openness, on the other. The possibility of meaningful articulation with 
national level authorities, however, might be diminished by – focusing upon 
                                            
69 This dialectic was also communicated to me at a residential weekend convened by the UK’s 
Foreign Office on the future of WTO negotiations. In response to a criticism made by an 
American trade expert of the low profile that China had adopted since becoming a member of 
the WTO, a Chinese diplomat responded by explaining that because Chinese political 
administration was so hierarchical, and decision-making so slow, it made more sense for them 
to transfer negotiation leadership to a developing country ally who would be better placed to 
respond to the relatively quick rhythms of ongoing trade negotiations (Field Notes, 12.5.2007).  
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inter-ministerial dynamics – the lack of effective coordination that exists 
between the different institutional sites relevant to food and agricultural in 
national governments, and beyond. Moreover, the institutional and authority 
fragmentation that exists at the global/transnational and national levels, 
suggests that creating decision-making spaces that are responsive to the full 
range of meanings attached by different actors to food and agriculture will not 
be straightforward.  
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Anticipating and Constituting a Public Sphere  
 
1. Overview  
 
In this chapter I establish why it is that I believe that La Via Campesina can be 
read as seeking to both provoke and constitute a transnational public sphere. I 
then – using the components of interlocutionary subjecthood as a framework for 
analysis – identify what granting La Via Campesina the opportunity for full 
participation in this public sphere might entail. I close the chapter with a 
discussion on the inherent dynamism in the relationship between the different 
components of interlocutionary subjecthood.  
2. La Via Campesina: Provoking a Public Sphere 
 
There are three principal reasons why I believe it is possible to read La Via 
Campesina as seeking to provoke and participate within a transnational food 
and agricultural public sphere. Firstly, because of their strategic objective to 
seek a single space in global food and agricultural policy-making and 
governance; secondly, because of their articulation of their “food sovereignty” 
framework, and; thirdly, because of their both seeking to extend the “publicity” 
of food and agricultural policy-making by creating new autonomous spaces for 
affected public deliberation, and by seeking to open up pre-existing spaces to 
affected public participation. Each of these will be discussed in turn. 
 
i. Seeking a Single Space for Food and Agricultural Governance and 
Policy-Making at the Global Level 
 
During the course of my research project for La Via Campesina there were 
periods when – after being confronted with the breadth of the field(s) of relation 
unfolding before me – I felt a strong need to tighten up the parameters of the 
project. During one such period I thought it would be of assistance to me to 
have a clear idea of what it was, from a strategic perspective, that La Via 
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Campesina were trying to achieve. What, exactly, did they want from the global 
level? When I made this request to my counterpart in the movement, technical 
assistant to the IOS Nico Verhagen, he gave me this reply: 
 
 We think that the decision-making in the area of food and agriculture 
should not be done by the World Bank, the WTO and the IMF. This has to take 
place within the UN system. We want to come to one single space to handle the 
issue, because otherwise it is scattered. In the Sixties/Seventies beside FAO 
other agencies were created such as IFAD, CGIAR and World Food 
Programme. And later on the WTO started to take decisions about agricultural 
policies as well. We think that these issues should be handled again in one 
single space within the UN system. 
  (Phone Conversation, Nico Verhagen, Technical Support to the 
IOS of La Via Campesina, 6.4.2009). [Emphasis added]. 
  
The previous chapter has captured some of the dynamics of the international 
food and agricultural policy/governance architecture, particular the issue and 
authority fragmentation to be found therein. This was, it will be recalled, 
identified by the external evaluation of FAO as constituting an environment of 
“vastly increased complexity” (IEE, 2007: 68) within which member states were 
failing to exercise their political authority in the areas of FAO’s mandate. If 
member states struggle to project a coherent and meaningful presence in this 
complex field, for a social movement such as La Via Campesina seeking to 
articulate a global presence in food and agricultural policy-making and 
governance, the challenges are even greater. Indeed, when, in a follow-up 
interview conducted during the writing up period, I asked Nico Verhagen what 
the benefits of a single space for food and agriculture at the global level were 
for La Via, he replied: 
 
 Well a single space has an advantage because before a movement like 
Via Campesina can follow a policy process in an effective way, that means, 
participating effectively, understanding what is going on, participating effectively 
in the different steps of the process, it requires a lot of preparation and analysis. 
And as a movement of course we have a limited capacity, so if the debate is 
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shifting around from one space to another, as has been done by certain 
governments, it becomes very difficult for a civil society organization to really 
follow what is going on. And even less to really, to take influence in the process. 
So if there is one single space in the UN system that has also a minimum of 
let’s say democratic, that fulfills also a minimum democratic criteria which allows 
also [the official] participation of civil society movements in the process of 
debate, then this can give us a much more effective impact in the policy 
process. 
  (Interview, Nico Verhagen, Technical Support to the IOS of La Via 
Campesina, 28.2.2011).  
  
The challenges identified by Nico will be addressed in more detail below when – 
in the framework of interlocutionary subjecthood developed in Chapter Three – I 
discuss the issue of La Via’s capacity. For now it is sufficient to note that, from 
La Via’s perspective, the pursuit of a single space at the global level is in order 
so that they may be able to participate within and “influence” global policy 
processes. So that, in other words, it will be easier for them to be included 
within global policy debates. (Indeed, the challenge of participating in global 
level food and agricultural policy processes is conveyed by the meeting 
dynamics of the Codex Alimentarius, captured in BOX SIX below.) That they 
wish this space to be not just inclusive but also authoritative is conveyed by the 
fact that when I asked Nico what expectations La Via have for the reformed 
CFS, which we had both clarified embodies the possibility of fulfilling La Via’s 
aspirations for a single space at the global level, he replied: 
 
 Well I think the first thing is that the CFS itself has to assert its central 
role in the UN system on food and agriculture, and it has to be very ambitious – 
that they really want to coordinate policies around food and agriculture. And that 
they also become very critical towards the WTO, the World Bank, and other 
agencies that try to gain control over this policy space.  
  (Interview, Nico Verhagen, Technical Support to the IOS of La Via 
Campesina, 28.2.2011).   
 
Their pursuit of a single, authoritative and inclusive space for global food and 
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agricultural policy and governance is, therefore, the first reason why I think that 
La Via can be read as seeking to provoke and constitute a public sphere in food 
and agriculture. The second reason concerns the articulation of their food 
sovereignty framework. 
 
BOX SIX: The Codex Alimentarius  
 
The importance and meeting dynamics of the Codex Alimentarius Commission 
are illustrative of the challenges faced by constituencies such as La Via 
Campesina when seeking to participate in global food and agricultural decision-
making bodies. The Codex was founded in 1962 as a joint body of the FAO and 
the WHO (the World Health Organization). Its mandate was “to develop and 
harmonize food standards”, through the promulgation of voluntary guidelines for 
states, and was considered a relatively minor body until its work became linked 
to the WTO through the latter body’s agreements on Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
(SPS) measures and Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT). This – through the 
articulation of the Codex’s food labelling work with the WTO’s dispute-
settlement mechanism – meant that Codex standards are now “seen by most 
legal experts as ‘semi-binding’ on states.” (Smythe, 2009: 95, referencing 
Victor, 1997). The work of Codex, therefore, is seen as being an important 
driver of national food policy and governance outcomes, and is seen as being 
able to “reduce or expand the policy space for national food regulation in the 
name of public safety or other values, such as environmental sustainability.” 
(Smythe, 2009: 96). As a result of its fairly recent WTO-related relevance, 
analysts have observed both an increase in the politicization of the Codex’s 
work, and the number of actors – particularly corporate actors – trying to 
influence this. Debates on the desirability or otherwise of GMO identification in 
food labelling have provided a recent heated focal point. The challenge of 
participating in Codex work, however, is indicated by the snapshot of its 
schedule between mid-October 2011 and March 2012 included below, within 
which 8 of its sub-committees meet in no less than 7 different countries. Given 
the capacity limitations faced by La Via Campesina (discussed below), which 
contrast starkly with the endowments of corporate interests, who “have the 
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resources to guarantee a lobbying presence across a range of relevant 
international regimes and organizations” and  “are able to shift the debate 
across a range of policy-making arenas.” (Lang et al., 2009: 87), serious 
questions are being asked about the interests that prevail in arenas such as 
Codex and, by extension, their legitimacy (Clapp and Fuchs, 2009; Smythe 
2009). 
 
 
Codex Meetings 17/10/2011 – 26/3/2011 
http://www.codexalimentarius.net/web/current.jsp?lang=en (5.6.2011).  
 
 
ii. Contesting and Debating Policy Through Food Sovereignty  
 
La Via Campesina emerged in 1993 as a direct response to the threat to the 
their interests and ways of life posed by the impending establishment of the 
WTO and its various food and agriculturally relevant Agreements (Desmarais, 
2007). However, within just three years they had anchored their opposition to 
the WTO within a framework of alternate ideas and principles that they called 
“food sovereignty”. Food sovereignty emerged out of La Via’s Second 
International Conference in Tlaxcala, Mexico in 1996, and was first defended 
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publically at the World Food Summit at FAO, also in 1996 (Delforge, 2008: 
457). Since then, however, it has been taken up by much wider “food 
sovereignty movement” that extends beyond La Via’s core constituency of 
peasant, family, and small- and medium-sized farmers to incorporate other 
sectors, such as poor consumers, and agricultural workers.70 It also has also 
been discussed and researched by institutional actors such as the FAO and 
others (see, for instance, IAASTD, 2008), and has even been formally 
incorporated within the programmes and constitutions of states such as 
Venezuela, Mali, Nepal, and Bolivia (McKeon, 2009a: 84-85).   
 
La Via Campesina, on their website, define food sovereignty in the following 
way: 
 
 Food sovereignty is the right of peoples to healthy and culturally 
appropriate food produced through sustainable methods and their right to define 
their own food and agriculture systems. It develops a model of small scale 
sustainable production benefiting communities and their environment. It puts 
the aspirations, needs and livelihoods of those who produce, distribute and 
consume food at the heart of food systems and policies rather than the 
demands of markets and corporations. 
 
Food sovereignty prioritizes local food production and consumption. It gives a 
country the right to protect its local producers from cheap imports and to control 
production. It ensures that the rights to use and manage lands, territories, 
water, seeds, livestock and biodiversity are in the hands of those who 
                                            
70  The range of constituencies mobilising behind a food sovereignty perspective is illustrated by 
the breadth of participation at the Nyéléni 2007 Forum for Food Sovereignty, held between 23rd 
- 27th February 2007 in Sélingué, Mali. Amongst constituencies being represented by the 500 
delegates from over 80 countries, alongside smallholder and peasant food producers, were also 
to be found artisanal fisherfolk, indigenous peoples, landless peoples, rural workers, migrants, 
pastoralists, forest communities, consumers and environmental and urban movements. 
http://www.nyeleni.org/spip.php?article290 (21.7.2009). Whilst the rapporteur for the Working 
Group on Transnational Corporations at La Via’s Vth International Conference, in Mozambique, 
2008, I also witnessed concrete evidence of the breadth of the food sovereignty movement, 
through the fact that participants in that meeting included representatives of constituencies as 
diverse as Korean street vendors and a Brazilian Movement of Those Affected by Hydroelectric 
Companies.  
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produce food and not of the corporate sector. Therefore the implementation 
of genuine agrarian reform is one of the top priorities of the farmer's movement.     (La Via Campesina, 2011). [Emphasis in original].   
Another definition states that food sovereignty means: 
 
• Placing priority on the production of healthy, good quality and culturally 
appropriate food primarily for the domestic market. It is fundamentally 
important to maintain a food production capacity based on a system of 
diversified farmer-based production – one that respects biodiversity, 
production capacity of the land, cultural values, preservation of natural 
resources – to guarantee the independence and the food sovereignty of 
populations. 
• Providing remunerative prices for farmers (men and women) which 
requires the power to protect internal markets against imports at low 
prices. 
• Regulating production on the internal market in order to avoid the 
creation of surpluses.  
• Stopping the process of industrialization of production methods and 
developing family farm based sustainable production. 
• Abolishing all direct and indirect export aids.  
  (La Via Campesina, 2000b, quoted in Desmarais, 2007: 34).  
 
In Chapter Four I argued that positions on food policy are implicitly and explicitly 
informed by views on the ends of agri-food systems, and the rights to be 
enjoyed, and responsibilities owed by different agri-food system actors. Both 
what counts as problem (for the policy agenda) and a solution (or means) are 
informed by diverging views on these two areas. For instance, in the statements 
above, La Via Campesina implicitly define the ends of agri-food systems as:  
 
• To produce healthy and culturally appropriate food; 
• To respect communities;  
• To benefit the environment, and; 
• To guarantee the independence and (food) sovereignty of populations. 
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To achieve these the following means are advanced: 
 
• Prioritizing small scale sustainable/ diversified farmer-based production; 
• Prioritizing local food production and consumption; 
• Providing remunerative prices for farmers (men and women) which 
requires the power to protect internal markets against imports at low 
prices; 
• Regulating production on the internal market in order to avoid the 
creation of surpluses; 
• Stopping the process of industrialization of production methods; 
• Abolishing all direct and indirect export aids; 
• Agrarian reform. 
 
And the rights to be enjoyed and responsibilities owed by different actors in the 
food system include, by actor: 
 
• Countries have the right/duty to protect their local producers from cheap 
imports and to control production;  
• People have the right to healthy and culturally appropriate food 
produced through sustainable methods and to define their own food and 
agriculture systems; and, 
• Food producers should have the right to use and manage lands, 
territories, water, seeds, livestock and biodiversity and not the corporate 
sector. 
 
Clearly, the means to be employed and the rights to be enjoyed and 
responsibilities owed posited by La Via Campesina flow immediately from their 
view on the ends of agri-food systems. That is, the emphasis upon small scale, 
ecologically sustainable, people-centred agri-food systems grows directly out of 
the idea that agri-food systems should preserve political independence, benefit 
nature, protect community and produce healthy and culturally appropriate food.  
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The relationship between ends and means in food and agriculture – and the 
implications of views on the former for perceived rights and duties of agri-food 
actors – can be visibly demonstrated by the following two quotes:  
 
 [I]n many circumstances, agriculture can be the engine of pro-poor 
growth, and small farmers can participate in that growth directly. But they might 
also participate indirectly – perhaps more effectively – by getting jobs in rural 
non-farm activities or by migrating to urban jobs. 
    (Timmer, 2008: 81). 
 
 An African woman bent under the sun, weeding sorghum in an arid field 
with a hoe, a child strapped on her back – a vivid image of rural poverty. For her 
large family and millions like her, the meagre bounty of subsistence farming is 
the only chance to survive. But others, women and men, have pursued different 
options to escape poverty. Some smallholders join producer organizations and 
contract with exporters and supermarkets to sell the vegetables they produce 
under irrigation. Some work as laborers for larger farmers who meet the scale 
economies required to supply modern food markets. Still others, move into the 
rural nonfarm economy, starting small enterprises selling processed foods.  
    (World Bank, 2007: 1).  
 
In each of these passages the ends of agri-food systems are identified as “pro-
poor growth”, or escaping from “poverty”. The means proposed included moving 
into rural non-farm jobs and “migrating” to urban jobs. It is clear that these 
quotes evidence an inescapable link between what are identified as being the 
ends of agri-food systems and the means that flow from them. Where the ends 
of agri-food systems are reduced to income generation then there is an 
equivalence between being a farmer, working in the non-farm rural economy 
and migrating to urban jobs. However, when, for instance, the cultural or 
community dimensions of rural life are introduced, then it is perhaps an 
understatement to say that there are important distinctions between being a 
small-holder producer and moving to a foreign city to work in a factory.   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 Food Sovereignty Economistic Approach (WDR 
2008, etc) 
Ends of 
agri-
food 
systems  
Health; Culture; Political autonomy; 
Benefiting the environment. 
Escaping from “poverty”. 
Means Prioritizing small-scale production; 
Providing remunerative prices for 
farmers; Regulating production, 
Agrarian Reform: etc.  
Scaling up; Growing for export; 
Moving into rural non-farm sector; 
Migrating to urban jobs. 
Rights 
and 
Duties 
People have the right to define their 
own food policies; 
Farmers have right to control their 
productive resources; 
Governments have duty to regulate 
the agri-food system.  
(Patents; IP; Uninterrupted capital 
flows etc). 
 
Table 3. Agri-food system ends, means, and rights and duties: Comparing food 
sovereignty with economistic approaches   
The World Bank quote cited above comes from the World Development Report 
2008, entitled Agriculture for Development. When we compare the narrow 
understanding of food and agriculture posited within this report with the breadth 
of La Via Campesina’s, then we can identify fairly fundamental disagreements 
regarding the focus of food and agricultural (relevant) policy-making and 
governance. Indeed, it was to contest the narrow construction of food and 
agriculture within neoliberal policy prescriptions that La Via Campesina first 
emerged (Desmarais, 2007); and the World Bank has and continues to be a 
strong target of La Via contestation. By articulating their food sovereignty 
framework La Via assert alternate meanings and ends for food policy and 
contest those within what are regarded as the dominant framings (Desmarais, 
2007; Martìnez and Rosset, 2010; McMichael, 2011). What distinguishes this 
activity, however, from general discursive activity on the aggregate plane and 
makes it relevant to my thesis of a public sphere, is that La Via visibly and 
actively taken their opposition to the dominant model and their articulation of 
alternatives through their food sovereignty framework into formal arenas. For 
example, La Via Campesina take the floor at intergovernmental meetings, such 
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as those at FAO71 and of other international bodies whose work they follow, 
such as the meetings of the Governing Body of “the Treaty” (the International 
Treaty for Plant Genetic Resources in Food and Agriculture) (e.g., La Via 
Campesina, 2011b) and UN climate change negotiations (UNFCC) (La Via 
Campesina, 2011c) as well as distributing statements during meetings such as 
that of the Convention on Biodiversity (CBD) (La Via Campesina, 2008c). This 
verbal or written communication, moreover, is augmented by a great deal of 
symbolic communication, including demonstrations and, of particular 
importance: mistica, defined as “shared ceremonies or performances that build 
cross-cultural peasant solidarity” (Martìnéz-Torres and Rosset, 2009: 167) and 
which I will discuss below.  
 
By articulating food sovereignty and taking the floor in formal arenas (that 
aspire to be) relevant to food and agricultural policy-making and governance, La 
Via can be read as seeking to provoke a public sphere in food and agriculture, 
in its sense of a policy debate with political authorities. Indeed, this “meaning” of 
La Via has been explicitly recognised by its members. For example, La Via 
Campesina leader Paul Nicholson, stated at their Second International 
Conference in 1996: 
 
 To date, in all the global debates on agrarian policy, the peasant 
movement has been absent; we have not had a voice. The main reason for the 
existence of the Via Campesina is to be that voice… 
  (Paul Nicholson, founder member of La Via Campesina, and two-
term member of the ICC, quoted in Desmarais, 2007: 77).  
 
By articulating their food sovereignty perspective in formal arenas La Via are 
both contesting food and agriculturally relevant governance and policy-making, 
and also seeking to expand the number of actors involved in its formulation. As 
an organisation representing peasant and small- and medium-sized food 
producers, in fact, La Via seek to gain voice for an affected public in global 
                                            
71  I have personally witnessed La Via representatives take the floor at FAO intergovernmental 
meetings to make statements on at least four occasions: At the FAO Conference in November 
2008, at the Committee on World Food Security, in October 2009, and at FAO’s Committee on 
Agriculture in June 2010, and again at the Committee on World Food Security in October 2011.  
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policy debates. As well as expanding the inclusivity of these formal arenas, 
moreover, there is at least one last one other way in which they can be read as 
seeking to provoke and constitute a public sphere, and that is through the 
provision of new public spaces.  
 
iii. Providing New Public Spaces 
 
In a recent article discussing Transnational Agrarian Movements, Borras and 
Franco, focusing upon La Via Campesina, note at least two ways of 
understanding the movement. On the one hand, they see the movement as an 
actor – contesting neoliberalism, delegitimising certain institutions, presenting 
alternatives, and so on. At the same time, however: 
 
 Via Campesina has emerged as an important arena of action, debate 
and exchange between different national and sub-national peasant and farmers’ 
groups. Put differently, Via Campesina is an ‘institutional space’ itself.  
  (Borras and Franco, 2009: 11). [Emphasis in original].  
 
It is this sense of La Via – as an “arena”, or “institutional space” - that I wish to 
emphasise here. I have argued already that La Via can be read as seeking to 
provoke a public sphere by a) seeking a single space for food and agriculture at 
the global level, and b) by contesting dominant food policy framings through 
their food sovereignty framework and, importantly, the articulation of that in 
formal arenas. Whilst the desire for a single space might be just an aspiration – 
in the sense that it is outside of La Via’s hands so to speak whether or not one 
actually emerges, but in this thesis of course I am arguing that one has, in the 
form of the renewed CFS – through their articulation of food sovereignty and 
related communications La Via can be read as not just seeking to provoke, but 
also as constituting a public sphere. That is, in so far as a public sphere is 
defined by the presence of affected publics debating and contesting policy with 
political authorities, by mobilising as an affected public, and articulating 
alternate meanings (understandings of the ends of agri-food systems and the 
rights to be enjoyed and responsibilities owed by different agri-food system 
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actors) La Via enact, or constitute a public sphere in food and agriculture. At 
least, a nascent public sphere. La Via constitute the public sphere in another 
important way also, which connects with the sense expressed above by Borras 
and Franco, and this is through the creation of new public spaces or 
autonomous discursive arenas within which La Via and other affected publics 
can reflect and discuss and develop understandings and proposals regarding 
the broader developments in food and agriculture that form the environment in 
which they are embedded. 
 
There are at least two principal manifestations of La Via being seen to be 
constituting the public sphere through the creation of autonomous discursive 
arenas. The first of these is through their international conferences. The second 
is through their participation in, and, indeed, their significant commitment to, the 
creation of more expansive civil society spaces such as the Nyéléni 2007 - 
Forum for Food Sovereignty, held between 23rd - 27th February 2007 in 
Sélingué, Mali and the People’s Food Sovereignty Civil Society Forum, in 
Rome, Italy, between the 13th – 17th November 2009. The latter of these two 
events was timed to coincide with the World Food Summit being held at FAO as 
part of the international community’s ongoing response to the 2007/2008 food 
price crisis, from the 16th – 18th November, and followed quickly upon the 
successful resolution of the “Contact Group” process through which the 
blueprint for the CFS’s reform was negotiated, and within which La Via and their 
allies – through the IPC (International Planning Committee on Food 
Sovereignty) which will be discussed below -  played a major role. The 
aspirations of the Forum organisers to create an autonomous discursive arena 
through which to try to influence political authority is captured very clearly in the 
invitation letter that went out to delegates, and which stated their intention for 
the Forum to be “an autonomous and self-organized space which aims at 
debating and articulating processes and proposals on Agriculture, Fisheries and 
Food Policies as an input to the action of the social movements and to the 
Intergovernmental Summit.” (International Steering Committee for the People’s 
Food Sovereignty Forum 2009, 2009).  
 
The structure of the Forum reflected this goal. Along with the Plenary Sessions, 
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which focused upon such dynamics as the recent history of CSO “global 
actions”, and the “new institutional framework” heralded by the recently 
reformed CFS, and which featured presentations by a range of civil society, 
state, and UN actors; the Forum was also organised into four working groups, 
each fully open to participation by delegates as choice dictated, each 
addressing a different thematic, each meeting over three two hour sessions, 
and each also having had a Discussion Paper prepared for it in advance to form 
the basis for its discussions.72 To conclude its work each of the working groups 
prepared a declaration which then fed in to the preparation of a Forum 
Declaration, and which was presented to the Summit being hosted just a five 
minute drive away at FAO headquarters. In total 642 persons coming from 93 
countries and representing 450 organisations of “peasant and family farmers, 
small scale fisher folk, pastoralists, indigenous peoples, youth, women, the 
urban people, agricultural workers, local and international NGOs, and other 
social actors, participated in the forum” (People’s Food Sovereignty Civil 
Society Forum, 2009). 
 
Alongside having a sizeable La Via contingent participating within the Forum 
(easily the biggest single entity represented amongst the delegates, with at 
least 30 members) La Via’s involvement also extended to its organisation, 
visibly captured by the presence of an official representative, ex-ICC member 
(and now academic) Nettie Webbe, upon the Forum’s Steering Committee, but 
also, and less-visibly, by a range of background support provided by La Via 
staff people during the event’s preparation. The 2009 Forum is an example of 
an autonomous discursive arena that aspires to articulate with and influence an 
“official” policy space in the form of the FAO-hosted World Food Summit. 
However, the articulation with political authority is less clear in the case of other 
autonomous discursive arenas, such as La Via’s international conferences. 
That distinction made, I believe that both the international conferences and the 
2009 Forum are different kinds or examples of the same thing. Indeed, as is the 
movement itself.  This can be seen by looking at the answer that Paul 
                                            
72  The four working groups, each headed by a question, were 1) Who Decides About Food 
Policies? 2) Who Controls Food Producing Resources? 3) How is Food Produced? and 4) Who 
Has/Needs Access to Food?  
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Nicholson gave me when I asked him why La Via seek to create autonomous 
discursive arenas such as the 2009 Forum and their own international 
conferences? What value do they serve? When I put these questions to Paul 
Nicholson, he replied: 
 
 One is, to generate common knowledge of what is happening. The 
common, the specific interests and values – that is very important because food 
providers are between food gatherers, agricultural farmers, agricultural workers, 
fisherfolk etc etc etc, and we have to develop our proposals through a non-
sectoral basis, we have to have a citizen view, a civil society view, and that we 
have to develop with the different parties, and there is the role of the different 
civil society specific spaces for that. So that is developing common strategies 
and position points, and a second one which I think is very important is alliance 
building. And thirdly I think, and that’s very important too, is dissemination of the 
proposals. Food sovereignty is not just a farmer’s, a peasant’s proposal. It’s a 
social movement’s proposal, of both rural and urban societies. So I think those 
three are the main reasons why we need that. 
  (Interview, Paul Nicholson, founder member of La Via Campesina, 
and two-term member of the ICC, 19.8.2011). [Emphasis Added]. 
  
 
Sharing knowledge, identifying common interests and values, developing 
proposals from a citizenship view – these attributes resonate very strongly with 
Nancy Fraser’s notion of the subaltern counterpublic, which she defines as 
“parallel discursive arenas where members of subordinated social groups invent 
and circulate counterdiscourses, which in turn permit them to formulate 
oppositional interpretations of their identities, interests and needs.” (Fraser, 
1990: 67). Fraser develops the idea of the subaltern counterpublic to identify 
the status of the non-bourgeois discursive arenas that were constituted in part 
by their members’ – women, the working classes, non-white ethnic groups – 
exclusion from the discursive arenas of the formal or bourgeois public sphere 
discussed by Habermas in STPS, and spaces such as the Forum also both 
expand and constitute the global public spaces, in that they provide global 
opportunities and spaces for affected publics to come together as citizens to 
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reflect and discuss, and plan how to transform, their conditions -  spaces and 
opportunities that would otherwise not exist. In this regard I see the movement 
itself (La Via Campesina), their international conferences (and other La Via 
specific arenas), and the broader, civil society spaces, as manifestations of the 
same thing (though varying of course in their inclusivity): new public spaces at 
the global level. This sense is certainly captured, again, by Borras and Franco, 
who argue that “Via Campesina has advocated for, created and occupied a new 
citizenship space that did not exist before at the global governance terrain – a 
space distinct for poor peasants and small farmers from the global South and 
North.” (Borras and Franco, 2009: 38). Indeed, the movement itself also sees 
itself in this way:  
 
 For the last 10 years since its foundation, in 1993, Via Campesina has 
succeeded in constructing an international space for peasant voices to express 
and articulate their demands and interests. It has provided an autonomous 
forum for progressive rural organisations throughout the world to conduct 
collective analysis, to exchange ideas, experiences and strategies, and to work 
collaboratively towards collective mobilisation against neoliberalism.  
  (ICC of La Via Campesina, 2004: 42).73 
 
These then are the three reasons why I think that La Via can be read as 
seeking to provoke and constitute a public sphere in food and agriculture: firstly, 
because they aspire for a single political space at the global level for food and 
agricultural policy-making and governance; secondly, because they seek to 
debate and contest agri-food policy through the formulation and articulation of 
their food sovereignty framework; and, thirdly, because they – through the 
creation of the movement itself and of more place and time specific 
autonomous discursive arenas - constitute new public spaces for affected 
                                            
73 Annette Desmarais shares this perspective also. Concluding her book on La Via Campesina 
with a chapter “Reflecting on the Meanings of Via Campesina”. In its final paragraph she states 
“In framing the Via Campesina, peasants and farm organizations effectively 
transnationationalized and succeeded in carving out a space in the international arena. The Via 
Campesina is filling that space with peasant voices, articulating peasant demands and peasant 
alternatives in efforts to resist the imposition of a corporate model of agriculture.” (Desmarais, 
2007: 200).  
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publics to deliberate, reflect, and articulate new proposals (on the basis of a 
citizen’s perspective). Indeed, the second and third dimensions, as discussed 
above, do in fact, I believe, provide the basis for an emerging or nascent 
transnational public sphere in food and agriculture – nascent, because of 
uncertainties regarding the extent to which these activities articulate with 
efficacious political authority.  
3. La Via Campesina: Participating within the Public Sphere  
 
My central argument in this thesis is that not only can La Via be read as seeking 
to provoke (and constitute) a transnational public sphere in food and agriculture, 
but that the recently reformed Committee on World Food Security – through its 
aspirations for political centrality and inclusivity, and through its role creating 
policy debate – promises to realise this nascent transnational public sphere. In 
light of La Via’s struggle to be the “voice” of peasant farmers and the 
significance of the public sphere to the movement’s objectives at the global 
level, I believe that the CFS presents La Via with an historically unprecedented 
opportunity. Indeed, at a celebratory dinner for the CSOs who had been 
attending the 36th CFS meeting in Rome October 2009 (at which the reforms 
were adopted), a long term La Via staff member reflecting upon the meeting’s 
successful resolution said to me that this would’ve been “unimaginable” to them 
ten years ago (Field Notes, 17.10.2009). As will be discussed in Chapter Eight 
the CSOs involved in the reform process won for themselves participation rights 
in the reformed CFS that are unprecedented in intergovernmental bodies 
(McKeon, 2009b). These include the right to intervene in plenary and breakout 
discussions, approve meeting documents and agendas, and submit and 
present documents and formal proposals (CFS:2009/2: Paragraph 12). Through 
the creation of new mechanisms, moreover, such as the Advisory Group, CSOs 
including La Via now have the opportunity to participate in the intersessional 
work of the CFS. That is, its ongoing programme of work between plenaries. 
However, these participation rights are not just limited to CSOs, and extend 
also to IFIs (i.e., the Bretton Woods institutions), the WTO, and also 
representatives of private sector organisations. In the remainder of this chapter 
I will reflect upon some of the factors that might provoke or inhibit La Via’s 
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ability (and willingness) to take up the new participation opportunities within the 
reformed CFS. I do this in three parts: Firstly, I describe the core elements of La 
Via’s perception of the “field of action” in which they are embedded; secondly, I 
identify dynamics relevant to La Via’s being recognised as having the right to 
speak; and finally I discuss the dynamics of La Via’s capacity.  
 
i. La Via and the Field of Action  
 
Social movement theorists have long been attentive to the importance of the 
processes of knowledge construction through which social movements 
formulate understandings of both themselves and their places in the world. 
Alberto Melucci, for instance, has explored this through the idea of collective 
identity, which as a process involves the production by social movements of 
“cognitive definitions concerning the ends, means, and the field of action.” 
(1996: 70). These definitions are significant because, amongst others, they 
enable social actors “to act as unified and delimited subjects”. (1996: 72).  
Whilst wishing neither to objectify La Via Campesina, nor to simplistically 
portray them as a unitary actor, I believe it is methodologically legitimate to 
attempt to anticipate important constraints upon La Via’s actions, specifically, 
participation in the reformed CFS, by interrogating – seeking to identify 
cognitive definitions within - the movement’s understanding of their field of 
action through various framing texts. These are significant because, whilst 
within a movement as large as La Via Campesina, which attempts to articulate 
locally situated peasant farmers with the complexity of global agri-food 
dynamics, there will no doubt be radically diverging perspectives on, and 
understandings of, the field of action within which the movement moves, in 
practice the movement’s articulation into global spaces is very often a managed 
process, and ensuring a faithfulness to the positions articulated within these 
framing texts is part of that.74  
                                            
74 For example, when I asked Paul Nicholson about the importance of participation in the global 
spaces for peasant leaders, he replied…“Very, very important. Very important. But, there has to 
be a certain training, a certain preparation before. There has to be a collective sense and not an 
individual sense. And that person has to be supported, by a team of other people to help, to 
help mould the mindframe, the message…” (Interview with Paul Nicholson, 19.8.2011).  
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Looking at the creation narratives that chart the movement’s emergence 
provides us with early reflections of the collective identity of La Via Campesina. 
In these accounts, whilst peasant and small family farmers are recognised as 
having been for many years conducting locally-based struggles to improve their 
conditions, it was the GATT Uruguay Round’s inclusion of agriculture within its 
multilateral trade negotiations and the anticipated creation of the WTO (in 1995) 
that signaled to them the necessity of mobilising at a global level. By promising 
to incorporate food and agriculture within its liberalising agenda, whilst at the 
same time transferring policy authority away from the state, peasant farmers 
anticipated that the creation of the WTO would mean “fundamental changes to 
the structure of agricultural economies and the social fabric of rural 
communities.” (Desmarias, 2007: 74). However, as suggested above, the seeds 
of their global mobilisation were established in regional level alliances, as 
farmers, coming together through opposition to, for instance, regional 
agreements such as NAFTA and the EU’s CAP, began to appreciate the 
commonality of their difficulties, despite different geographical and national 
locations (Desmarais, 2007; Martìnez and Rosset, 2010). By going a bit deeper 
into a range of different documents through which La Via Campesina have 
outlined its perspective on the field of relations in which the movement is active, 
we can identify the nature of the concern that La Via express towards the 
WTO.75  
 
At the heart of La Via Campesina’s perspective is the view that both national 
and global elites have been privileging capital accumulation over both agri-food 
system actors (farmers) and their communities, and other non-monetary ends of 
                                            
75 Since their emergence La Via have produced a sizeable amount of press releases, policy 
documents, declarations and various other forms of communication. Here I draw specifically 
from a diverse range of documents, including a document prepared for La Via Campesina’s 
fourth international conference (Stédile, 2004a); a declaration produced by La Via Campesina 
and its allies (La Via Campesina et al., 2003); a declaration produced by La Via Campesina (La 
Via Campesina, 2000); a document prepared by the ICC of La Via Campesina for pre-
conference discussion amongst its regions (La Via Campesina, 2009); and an internal 
discussion document (La Via Campesina, 2008b). What unites these documents – with the 
exception of the Stédile piece - is that they were all forwarded to me by La Via Campesina, in 
the course of our research project, to famaliarise me, or keep me informed about La Via 
Campesina positions. I augment these documents by drawing on an interview with technical 
support to the IOS, staff-person Nico Verhagen.  
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agri-food system actors, with devastating impacts upon rural peoples and rural 
communities. For instance, in a document prepared for La Via Campesina’s 
IVth International Conference in São Paulo in 2004, entitled The International 
Context of Agriculture, João Pedro Stédile, of key La Via member Brazilian 
organisation the MST (Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra, or 
Landless Workers’ Movement) charts the processes through which “capitalism 
came to dominate world agriculture.” (Stédile, 2004a: 8). In its most recent 
phase this involves the preeminence of financial capital over industrial capital, 
with six major consequences, including concentration, the diminishment of the 
state, and privatisation (Stédile, 2004a: 11-12).76 To La Via Campesina, the 
privileging and dominance of capital is no accident, but reflects the prevailing 
political-economic reality. This is a reality dominated by neoliberalism, and the 
actors and institutions and actors that champion it. For instance, after noting the 
importance of food and agriculture across a range of non-economic indices, a 
declaration issued by La Via and its allies states: 
 
 All of these are being undermined by the increasing emphasis on neo-
liberal economic policies promoted by leading political and economic powers, 
such as the United States and the European Union, and realised through global 
institutions, such as the World Trade Organisation, International Monetary 
Fund, and the World Bank. 
  (La Via Campesina et al., 2003).  
 
And this neoliberal agenda is intrinsically unsound and antithetical to humans 
and nature, being “designed to enhance corporate profit and concentrate power 
without regard for the destruction of nature, culture, community or the well-
being of people.” (La Via Campesina, 2000a).  
 
The dominance of financial capital has led to the emergence of Agribusiness 
TNCs (Stédile, 2004a: 11) and their control over agri-food systems is of major 
                                            
76  The full six consequences are: the domination of agricultural trade by corporations; an 
acceleration of processes of concentration and de-nationalisation; the standardisation of (poor 
quality) food; the diminishment of the state’s role in food and agriculture; agricultural 
investments channeled into technologies of control, and; attempts to privatise water (Stédile, 
2004a: 11-12). 
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concern to La Via Campesina. For instance, the opening sentence of a 
preparatory document for a meeting of the ICC77 in 2009, entitled Major 
Strategic Paths for the Next Four Years states:  
 
 Via Campesina assumes as a political position that the transnational 
corporations are our principal enemies. They are the current form of capital to 
control our economy, natural resources, land, water, biodiversity and 
agricultural production and trade and in the exploitation of the family 
farmers/peasants. For this reason, we need to prioritise the struggle to defeat 
them. 
  (La Via Campesina, 2009).  
 
In other documents the movement states that it sees itself as being in an 
“ideological struggle” against TNCs (La Via Campesina, 2009). The “central 
conflict” that they face, in fact, is against them, and they seek “to stop them 
destroying the peasant sector.” (La Via Campesina, 2008a). 
 
La Via’s perspective on the global field of relations, therefore, is a strongly 
polarised one. On the one hand, there are actors and institutions – TNCs, 
northern industrialised countries, Bretton Woods institutions and the WTO – that 
are champions of neoliberalism (and provide capital/TNCs with “legal 
protection” (Stédile, 2004: 13), and on the other there are UN institutions – the 
FAO, IFAD, UNCATD, the ILO, the UNCHR etc – which, though often 
performing badly, failing to uphold their mandates, and in many respects 
complicit in the neoliberal agenda themselves – are somehow more open to La 
Via’s engagement and positions (La Via Campesina, 2009). Moreover, in 
institutions such as FAO, with one-member-one-vote decision making, southern 
states - despite their (local and national) elites themselves often being complicit 
in the neglect/exploitation of peasant farmers and the championing of 
neolberalism - are better able to resist the neoliberal project, in contrast to the 
Bretton Woods (with one-dollar-one-vote decision making), the WTO and other 
“spaces where the TNCs, US government and others, and also the donor 
                                            
77  The International Coordinating Committee of La Via Campesina.  
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countries, could more easily control the outcome” (Nico Verhagen, Interview, 
28.2.2011). Thus, La Via seeks to “delegitimize” the institutions, actors and 
spaces that are dominated by neoliberalism, whilst fighting for “progressive and 
positive change” within those other spaces (La Via Campesina, 2008b).  
 
ii. Recognition of their Right to speak 
 
In Chapter Three, anchoring my thinking within the work of public sphere 
theorists such as Nancy Fraser and Craig Calhoun, I introduced the idea of 
interlocutionary subjecthood, which I defined as being exercised when an 
actor’s (or group of actor’s) capacity to speak converges with the recognition of 
the his or her (or their) right to speak. I distinguished between the recognition of 
the right to speak, on the one hand, in the native language of the interlocutor, 
and on the other, in the language of the mode of communication dominant in 
the discursive arena. This distinction suggests that the recognition of the right to 
speak involves the recognition of someone’s right to be an interlocutor, and the 
degree to which that right is recognised being reflected in such factors as the 
extent to which any specific demands or needs they have relevant to their ability 
to participate in the discursive arena are themselves recognised and 
accommodated. In this section I continue my reflection upon the factors that 
might inhibit or promote La Via’s participation in the nascent public sphere by 
identifying the dynamics around the recognition of their right to speak. This will 
involve, firstly, identifying the terms in which La Via ground their right to speak 
in global level policy debates, and, secondly, identifying any specific demands 
or needs that they might have relevant to the fulfillment of that right.  Exploring 
these dynamics contributes to our understanding of what is entailed in 
recognising an actor’s right to speak in a discursive arena, and by extension, to 
he/she/their being able to exercise their interlocutionary subjecthood.78  
                                            
78  In this section, as well as referring to various La Via declarations, I draw in particular from 
two interviews conducted in the final phase of data collection. The first of these was with Paul 
Nicholson, two-term ICC member and considered by other La Via leaders to be hugely 
important in the movement. The second was with Sofia Monsalve from the NGO FIAN - who 
have had a strong alliance with La Via Campesina through the Global Campaign for Agrarian 
Reform – and who has gained important insights into civil society-global policy dynamics 
through her experiences facilitating social movement participation in FAO (land) policy 
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a. La Via: Grounding Their Right to Speak in Policy Debates 
 
Though La Via actually allocate little energy to communicating the grounds 
upon which they deserve to be included in global policy debates79, from a 
reading of their declarations and of the ways in which the movement’s right to 
speak has been understood in previous scholarship, we can identify at least two 
bases upon which La Via grounds the rights of its members to participate in 
global level policy-making.  
 
The first of these is rooted in the status of La Via Campesina members as food 
producers, as those working at the ground to feed humanity and steward the 
earth’s productive resources. For instance, noting that the FAO is holding a 
World Food Summit in 1996, “ostensibly to solve the problem of millions of 
people who face the crisis of food shortages and malnutrition” the Tlaxcala 
Declaration of La Via Campesina states that “no solution will be found for this 
without the active intervention of those who grow food.” (La Via Campesina, 
1996: 1). And in the same year, Paul Nicholson, after noting the historic 
absence of peasant farmers from “global debates on agrarian policy” stated that 
“as those responsible for taking care of nature and life, we have a fundamental 
role to play…” (Paul Nicholson, Second International Conference of La Via 
Campesina, 1996, quoted in Desmarais, 2007: 77). The introduction to the 
Declaration of the movement’s fifth International Conference, held just outside 
Maputo, Mozambique, captures this idea in more detail: 
 
 We are men and women of the earth, we are those who produce food for 
                                            
processes, particularly the International Conference on Agrarian Reform and Rural 
Development (ICARRD) and the Guidelines on natural resource tenure. I augment this data, 
moreover, by drawing from the work of Nora McKeon who, through her position as head of the 
FAO unit in charge of FAO-civil society relations (which she executed with a very pronounced 
sensitivity to and sense of solidarity with People’s Organisations such as La Via Campesina) 
has extensive experience of the civil society-UN interface (McKeon, 2009).  
79 For example, reading through the declarations produced by the movement at their 
international conferences (and the Managua declaration, which pre-empted La Via’s founding) 
reveals that there are only two (out of a possible six) occasions in which La Via explicitly (or 
implicitly) invokes a justification for their inclusion in policy debates: Managua 1992 – Yes;  
Mons 1993 – No; Tlaxcala 1996 – Yes; Bangalore – 2000 – No; Sao Paolo – 2004 – No;  
Maputo – 2008 – No. 
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the world. We have the right to continue being peasants and family farmers, 
and to shoulder the responsibility of continuing to feed our peoples. We care for 
seeds, which are life, and for us the act of producing food is an act of love. 
Humanity depends on us, and we refuse to disappear.”  
  (La Via Campesina, 2008: 1).  
 
This can be regarded as a functional basis for the inclusion of peasant farmers 
in global policy debate.  
 
The second of the two bases upon which La Via ground their right to participate 
in global policy debates finds the movement invoking the normative framework 
of public sphere theory (adding further support to the idea that La Via are 
seeking to invoke a public sphere). For instance, the signatories of the 
Managua Declaration (the result of a first international meeting by peasant, 
small and family-farmers’ organisations, and which established the conditions 
for, and pre-empted, the formation of La Via Campesina, (Desmarais, 2007; 
Martinéz-Torres and Rosset, 2010)), after establishing that the proliferation of 
neoliberal policies imposes  “a dramatic constraint on farmers around the world, 
bringing us to the brink of irredeemable extinction and further aggravating the 
irreparable damage which has been caused to our rural environs”, demand “real 
participation in the formulation of policies which affect the fundamental condition 
of our sector in order to overcome the injustices which we bear.” (Asocode et 
al., 1992, Managua Declaration). [Emphasis added]. Indeed, Annette 
Desmarias, in the final page of the final chapter of her study of La Via 
Campesina’s mobilisation, states that “The Via Campesina insists that peasants 
and small farmers have a unique place and critical role in redefining agricultural 
policies. For far too long rural and food policies have been developed in the 
absence of those most affected.” (Desmarais, 2007: 199). [Emphasis added].  
 
La Via Campesina, therefore, establishes the legitimacy of its inclusion in global 
policy debates in terms that are rooted in both the functional status of its 
members, and in their being affected by activity at this level. Drawing from 
interview data and relevant, pre-existing scholarship it’s possible to anticipate 
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what the realisation of La Via’s claim for inclusion in policy debates – that is, the 
fulfilment of the movement’s right to speak – might entail.  
 
b. La Via: Accommodating The Movement in the Fulfillment of Its Right to Speak 
 
To participate in a discursive arena it is necessary to be recognised as an 
interlocutor by those within the arena already. The following are four important 
dynamics connected to La Via’s being recognised as having the right to speak 
in policy debates.  
 
Firstly, La Via is an institutional actor, a new public space seeking to articulate 
affected publics with global policy-making. One fundamental dynamic of this 
articulation concerns the ability of those engaged in the global level work to 
maintain dialogue with the membership at the base. This dynamic has been 
recognised already in previous scholarship, with Desmarais for example, noting 
that La Via’s horizontal structure “makes decision-making an extended, time-
consuming, and sometimes long-winded affair.” (Desmarais, 2007: 28).80 This 
suggests that recognising La Via’s right to speak in global policy debates in 
principle extends to more than just acknowledging the movement’s right to 
attend, but also includes, on the basis of their unique identity as a 
representative body seeking to remain inclusive and connected with its base, 
the accommodation of their specific rhythms and processes, which, of course, 
differ greatly from those of intergovernmental fora (McKeon, 2009: 89). As Paul 
Nicholson put it when I asked him to reflect upon the challenges faced by La 
Via as they sought to participate in global policy fora:  “we have to understand 
timing, process, very often [the intergovernmental] process doesn’t take into 
                                            
80  Desmarais states: “The Via Campesina has an elaborate and carefully groomed system for 
being accountable to, and consulting with, its grassroots organizations. Clearly, this 
representational structure and various consultative processes heighten the organization’s 
legitimacy as an authentic representative of peasants’ and farmers’ interests in the international 
arena. But it also makes decision-making a more convoluted and time-consuming endeavour, 
thus often trying the patience of NGOs and other institutions that are not encumbered by such 
structures and that seek more immediate responses to global events. The Via Campesina 
would rather give up participation in certain international fora than compromise its commitments 
to building a peasant and farm movement built on relations of trust, respect, gender and ethnic 
equality and accountability. “ (Desmarais, 2007: 121).  
Chapter Six 
La Via Campesina: Provoking, Anticipating and Constituting a Public Sphere 
 181 
account civil society articulation.” (Interview, Paul Nicholson, founder member 
of La Via Campesina, and two-term member of the ICC, 19.8.2011).81 
 
Secondly, La Via’s entry to global space is often mediated by officials who are 
unfamiliar with the basis of their mobilisation as citizens. For example, one 
consultant I spoke to shared with me her experience following a national 
consultation that she had helped to organise and facilitate in Mozambique, the 
purpose of which was to gain the perspectives of farmer’s organisations on 
Large Scale Land Acquisitions taking place there. During her participation in an 
FAO workshop afterwards in Rome, however, her recollection of the outcomes 
– and the reports of the women farmers of displacements occurring as a result 
of land being leased to investors without local consultation – were dismissed as 
“anecdotal evidence” by a World Bank official. (Discussion with Magdalena 
Kropiwnicka, International Consultant, 6.2.2011). Sofia Monsalve from FIAN 
shared the same concern: “when people of course talk about their experiences 
and then the technical people dismiss that – “Where’s the evidence? This is just 
your particular experience. You can’t generalise…” – that sort of thing.” 
(Interview, Sofia Monsalve, FIAN, 29.8.2011). This suggests that the 
recognition of La Via’s right to speak involves understanding the specific nature 
of the status that they seek as a mobilising affected public. They are not data, 
they are citizens.82  
 
Thirdly, whilst participation in policy-relevant discursive fora may be important 
or potentially useful, the importance of this participation is diminished if the 
distinctiveness of La Via’s articulations are not recognised. This can be seen 
particularly in regards to the struggle to have dissenting positions recognised in 
official reporting. In interviews with Paul Nicholson and Sofia Monsalve, for 
                                            
81  The fundamental importance of the movement operating at the global level being able to 
retain strong links to the base was first suggested to me in conversation with Nico Verhagen, 
during which he spoke of the importance of working within a “mobilising agenda”, which is to 
say, an agenda that mobilised the base (Conversation with Nico Verhagen, Technical Support 
to the IOS of La Via Campesina, 18.1.2009). 
82  Another manifestation of this problem is the perception amongst both some UN officials and 
country representatives that La Via Campesina are something like a professional members 
organisation, or can unproblematically occupy the spaces available to private sector 
organisations. This, again, misses the movement’s distinctive status as an affected public. 
(Interview, OECD Country Ambassador, FAO, 20.10.2011; Interview, Alexander Mueller, 
Assistant Director-General, Natural Resources Department, FAO (23.9.2009). 
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example, both of them identified this as an important issue, with Paul observing 
that: “Historically United Nations has worked on the understanding that civil 
society should have a consensual point of view, and that is not possible. It is not 
possible.” (Interview, Paul Nicholson, founder member of La Via Campesina, 
and two-term member of the ICC 19.8.2011). Whilst for Sofia, obtaining the 
recognition of dissent in official reporting can be a major struggle, because in 
international policy spaces: “this logic of consensus is very strong, to fabricate 
some sort of apparently existing consensus on certain things. It’s extremely 
difficult, and we have this discussion over and over again and it’s always a fight, 
to record dissenting positions. And we say: “We are not asking that you say 
that, but that you record that we say that we don’t agree. What’s the problem 
with that?” It’s always very difficult.” (Interview with Sofia Monsalve, FIAN, 
29.8.2011). This indicates that, again, there is more to the recognition of the 
right to speak than mere admittance to discursive arenas.83  
 
And, fourthly, as noted in Chapter Three, whilst in a general sense the modes of 
communication utilised by La Via, both in their distinctive discursive arenas and 
in the arenas that they constitute with their allies, are in many respects not 
dissimilar to that of the intergovernmental spaces – some form of collective 
discussion, facilitated by a chair, mediated by interpreters – there are some 
important distinctions, particularly when one considers the importance of 
symbolic communication for La Via Campesina. The most immediate example 
of this is the use of and importance attached to mistica, which can best be 
described as a sort of symbolic enactment of La Via’s values, identity, 
collectivity and so forth: “The mistica plays a key role in making [the unity in 
diversity of La Via Campesina] possible. All La Via Campesina meetings begin 
with a mistica using powerful imagery and symbols – typically seeds, soil, 
water, fire – to create a strong sense of collective belonging and commitment.” 
(Martìnéz and Rosset, 2010: 166). The use of this symbolic communication is a 
strong feature of La Via Campesina’s international conferences, where the 
                                            
83  This importance of this point is underscored by Desmarais. Reflecting on the different ways 
in which global bodies have attempted to co-opt La Via Campesina to legitimise their own work, 
she recalls the difficulties they faced in the GFAR (the Global Forum for Agricultural Research), 
which from the outset of its May 2000 Conference seemed incapable of recognising La Via as a 
distinctive interlocutor and in the end ignored their opposition and, in the final report, “fabricated 
consent” (Desmarais, 2007: 119).  
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distinctiveness of La Via’s mode of communication – and its contrast to the 
dryness of the intergovernmental spaces – is particularly evident. For instance, 
at their fifth international conference, one long-term La Via Campesina ally, as 
we looked out upon a large group of farmers (African, Latin American, Asian, 
North-American, and European) performing a mistica – they were locked arm in 
arm around a large expanse of soil bearing the words “food sovereignty” 
signifying: “farmers united in food sovereignty” - enthused to me – “this isn’t just 
a conference, it’s a religion!” (Field Notes, 21.10.2008). Moreover, Nora 
McKeon quotes the words of a UN official from IFAD who, having being invited 
to the Nyéléni Forum in 2007, felt that “encountering the social movements in 
their own space made their aspirations and discourse far more understandable 
than they were in the ‘normal’ mode in which the UN and social organizations 
meet.” (McKeon, 2009: 91). For Paul Nicholson, this symbolic communication is 
extremely important because “we very clearly see that the governments are 
very far away from reality”, and so symbolic communication and other aspects 
of La Via’s approach are vital to “transmit a sense of urgency and reality of what 
we’re trying to do.” (Interview, Paul Nicholson, founder member of La Via 
Campesina, and two-term member of the ICC, 19.8.2011).84 This supports the 
idea asserted in Chapter Three that there is a distinction between the 
recognition of the right to speak in the dominant language of the discursive 
arena, and a recognition of the right to speak in the language of the interlocutor.  
 
In Chapter Three I established that being recognised as having the right to 
speak was a necessary precondition of participation in discursive arenas. The 
above suggests that there is more to the recognition of the right to speak for La 
Via Campesina, however, than simple admittance to a discursive arena. This 
                                            
84  Interestingly, Paul Nicholson, when reflecting on the communication strategies that La Via 
have used to maximise the often quite limited speaking opportunities assigned to them at 
intergovernmental meetings, related how “when we have our spokesperson speaking in these 
arenas, we don’t necessarily try and find a great speaker, very often we will choose a speaker 
who is going to speak in his third, or second language, with difficulty, but who with his or her 
presence, will transmit what we want, in another language. So very often it will be a woman who 
for the first time in her life has left her locality, an indigenous woman from, for example, Bolivia, 
or Ecuador, or Guatemala, or Indonesia, who will transmit in extremely bad language, but who 
will transmit a sense of urgency and reality of what we are trying to do.” (Interview, Paul 
Nicholson, founder member of La Via Campesina, and two-term member of the ICC 19.8.2011). 
Determining, however, whether the mode of communication adopted by La Via in these 
instances produces the desired effect is an empirical matter, and should not be taken for 
granted.  
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includes the recognition of their specific status both as a representative body 
with their own internal rhythms of consultation, and as an affected public, as 
citizens and not “data”; the need – for their participation to have meaning – for 
their dissent to be recorded and, finally; the potential need for the 
accommodation of their distinctive modes of communication. Recalling the 
different components identified in Chapter Three as being relevant to the 
concept of interlocutionary subjecthood, the final section of this chapter will 
discuss the dynamics of capacity relevant to La Via’s participation in global 
policy debates.  
 
iii. Capacity 
 
In Chapter Four, drawing from the work of Fraser and Calhoun, I identified the 
category of “capacity” as being significant in explicating the dynamics of 
interaction in discursive arenas. Citing Calhoun, I defined this category as 
consisting of those factors that are part of an actor’s capacity to participate in 
the discursive arena of the public sphere, identifying “training in the arts of 
rhetoric and the capacity to support [one’s] quotations in Latin and Greek” as 
examples (Calhoun, 2010: 323). I also noted the interrelationship between 
capacity, the recognition of the right to speak, and the mode of communication. 
This is important to note because it captures the dynamism and relationality that 
– irrespective of the degree of formalisation of this or that particular case – is 
inherent within discursive arenas. Before exploring this interrelationship in more 
detail I’ll first of all begin by proposing that what I’m referring to as “capacity” 
can be understood as something like a sub-set of a broader category called 
requisites of effective participation. What are the requisites of effective 
participation for La Via in global policy debates? In this discussion I identify just 
four, but no doubt there are many others. 
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 a. Articulating with Global Level Policy Processes(s) 
 
To participate effectively in global level discursive arenas and policy processes 
requires, at a minimum, that La Via Campesina can articulate with these spaces 
and processes. There are three principle characteristics of global level food and 
agricultural policy processes that are relevant here.  
 
Firstly, a typical policy process at this level is extended through time. For 
example, in October 2008 I attended a two-day meeting that marked the 
commencement of a stakeholder consultation on a FAO land policy initiative to 
formulate a set of Guidelines on natural resource tenure. This process followed 
the FAO’s successful formulation of other Voluntary Guidelines, including those 
on the Right to Food. The adoption of these guidelines, however, having been 
moved due to a lack of agreement on some key points from its scheduled slot 
on the first day of the 37th CFS, on October 17th 2011, is not anticipated until 
early 2012, the entire process having taken, therefore, in excess of three years. 
CSOs – including La Via – have participated extensively throughout this 
process, conducting autonomous and ongoing consultations and feeding into 
the official process at different points. This illustrates the extended nature of 
participation in these processes.  
 
Secondly, as has been discussed in more detail in the previous chapter, at the 
global level there is more than one food and agriculturally relevant policy space 
or process. La Via might be seeking a single space at the global, and the CFS 
might promise to institutionalise that, but in the intervening period between now 
and the realisation of that aspiration a great many spaces and processes at the 
global are going to continue to be relevant. As Sofia Monsalve put it “you can’t 
just do Rome” (Interview, Sofia Monsalve, FIAN, 29.8.2011). Thus as well as 
participation needing to be extended, it also needs to be simultaneous.  
 
And thirdly, global policy processes and spaces are, of course, non-local. By 
this I mean that – whilst e-participation is becoming or aspires to become a 
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growing feature of participation in these processes85 - inevitably they will involve 
periodic physical meetings convened in specific points in space and time. And 
this means that there will inevitably be a geographical distance that needs to be 
bridged between the location of the interlocutor and the location of the meeting. 
The extended, non-local nature of global processes is captured in the schedule 
for the Codex Alimentarius Commission featured above.  
 
At the same time, of course, as well as effective participation in global policy 
processes needing to be extended, simultaneous and non-local, it also needs to 
be active. By this I mean, that La Via Campesina don’t just want to be there, 
they want to be influential, and this means, for example, both following the 
process and being able to offer proposals.86  
 
Articulating with global policy processes, therefore, requires extended, 
simultaneous, non-local, active participation. To what extent do La Via possess 
the capacity at present to be able to undertake this?  
 
This question can in part be answered by drawing from previous scholarship on 
La Via Campesina, the value of which is enhanced in part from the fact that it 
has been conducted by analysts very close to the movement itself.87 In charting 
                                            
85  See, for example, the Global Forum on Food Security and Nutrition hosted by FAO and 
which aims “at achieving greater interaction and effectiveness within the global Food security 
and nutrition community by:  
Bridging the knowledge divide through the dissemination of achievements, research outputs 
and best practices in the area of Food Security and Nutrition;  
Strengthening the interaction and knowledge exchange within the community;  
Encouraging connections among professionals with different cultural backgrounds and 
affiliations.  
http://km.fao.org/fsn (21.11.2011).  
86 The aspiration for “active” involvement is captured in this comment by Nico Verhagen during 
an interview: “[B]efore a movement like Via Campesina can follow a policy process in an 
effective way, that means, participating effectively, understanding what is going on, participating 
effectively in the different steps of the process, it requires a lot of preparation and analysis. And 
as a movement of course we have a limited capacity, so if the debate is shifting around from 
one space to another, as has been done by certain governments, it becomes very difficult for a 
civil society organization to really follow what is going on. And even less to really, to take 
influence in the process. So if there is one single space in the UN system that has also a 
minimum of let’s say democratic, that fulfills also a minimum democratic criteria which allows 
also [the official] participation of civil society movements in the process of debate, then this can 
give us a much more effective impact in the policy process.” 
    (Interview, Nico Verhagen, 28.2.2011).  
87  As mentioned previously, before becoming an academic Annette Desmarais was herself a 
Canadian grain, and then organic, farmer, and was present at La Via Campesina’s founding 
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the dynamics of La Via’s activities since its emergence, Desmarais, for 
instance, notes that “[m]obilization and public protest” have been the 
predominant form of action (Desmarais, 2007: 27). These have been directed 
particularly against the WTO, the demonstrations against which have been 
described by Paul Nicholson as “[for] some years the main landmarks of the Via 
Campesina mobilizations” Paul Nicholson quoted in: Delforge, 2008: 457; 
Desmarais, 2007). Martinéz-Torres and Rosset, moreover, whilst noting that La 
Via does sometimes engage, with its allies, in attempting to influence states 
through less-confrontational strategies, assert that “[t]he political tactics of La 
Via Campesina are more ‘outside’ than ‘inside”, and more protest than lobby” 
(2010: 157). Indeed, whilst both Desmarais, and Martinéz-Torres and Rosset 
suggest that these approaches reflect La Via’s identity as a “poor peoples’ 
movement” (Martìnéz-Torres and Rosset, 2010: 158)88 or a “critical” or “radical” 
social movement (Desmarais, 2007: 23), Desmarais also identifies capacity 
shortfalls as significant. For example, as La Via has risen to prominence in the 
international scene, international organisations such as the WTO have 
attempted to be seen to be consulting with them, but for La Via this has not 
been possible because “active participation at this level requires a substantial 
range of human and financial resources, something that grassroots 
organizations like the Via Campesina simply do not have.” (Desmarais, 2007: 
122).  
                                            
conference in 1993 as part of the NFU’s delegation. She has continued to work very closely with 
La Via through her role as a technical support, and is also at present formulating, with La Via, a 
protocol for researchers and academics wanting to conduct research on the movement. She 
can be seen, moreover, to be providing intellectual leadership to the movement’s intellectual 
project by, amongst others, convening food sovereignty academics and intellectuals in 
collaborative projects. (See, for instance, Wittman et al, 2011). Peter Rosset is another who has 
moved between academia, independent research bodies, and La Via Campesina, having taught 
fairly extensively across North and Latin America; served as, for example, co-director of Food 
First/The Institute for Food and Development Policy in Oakland, California, and now taken up a 
position of technical support in the movement. In 2004-2005 he conducted a participatory 
evaluation of La Via Campesina for the movement (Rosset, 2005) and publishes regularly on La 
Via and relevant themes (Martinéz and Rosset, 2010, Rosset et al., 2006; Rosset, 2006). Jun 
Borras was also present at the founding meeting of La Via and has been a member of their ICC. 
In various different institutional contexts he has published various different articles on La Via, 
particularly around their activity on agrarian reform (e.g., Borras, 2008; Borras et al, 2008; 
Borras and Franco, 2009) 
88 Which is of “people who have been pushed to the edge of extinction by dominant power in 
their countries and in the world, people who have usually not been taken into account, who 
have been ‘fooled too many times’ by smooth-talking politicians and NGOs, people who were 
never invited to sit at the table and had to ‘elbow their way’ into the seat they now occupy.” 
(Martinéz and Rosset, 2010: 158).  
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At this present time there is a strong sense within the leadership that La Via is 
experiencing a capacity deficit, particularly in light of the new participation 
opportunities that have (been) opened up (by civil society) in the reformed CFS. 
For instance, Nico Verhagen, Technical Support to the International Operational 
Secretariat of La Via Campesina, notes that:  
 
 It is indeed a challenge for Via Campesina to respond effectively to these 
spaces, these political spaces that have opened up. By keeping on mobilizing 
and raising pressure, but at the same time being capable at the political-
technical level to respond to the decision-process that will take place, or the 
policy process that will take place in the CFS. And this means of course that we 
need to follow closely the discussions in the CFS, and that we also need to be 
capable to translate our agenda in… in proposals that… that are, that can be 
brought to the table of the CFS, and on which we hope the governments will 
take positive decisions in the near future.  
  (Interview, Nico Verhagen, Technical Support to the IOS of La Via 
Campesina, 28.2.2011). 
 
The reasons for this are not overly complex. Being made up of peasant and 
smallholder producers, who are often fighting for their existences in the face of 
adverse political and economic environments, it is to expected that La Via will 
struggle to meet the requisites for effective participation identified above, the 
resource implications of which do not need to be spelled out. Furthermore, La 
Via’s members, and their most active leaders are not global specialists. By this I 
mean that at the same time that they participate in global level processes they 
are also deeply immersed within and in fact often focused upon national and 
local struggles (Desmarais, 2007: 158).89 However, even if La Via were capable 
of extended, simultaneous, non-local, active participation, effective participation 
                                            
89 I experienced this first-hand when – conducting my field-work in 2009 - a series of 
preparatory meetings I was due to have with La Via’s Latin America-based expert on the 
International Treaty for Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (in advance of a 
meeting I had scheduled with this body’s Secretariat) were cancelled at very short notice due to 
his having to redeploy his energies as part of the movement’s response to the coup in Honduras 
which was unfolding at that time and which threatened the lives of some Honduran peasant 
leaders, including Rafael Alegría, previously La Via Campesina’s  International Coordinator. 
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would still require the ability to communicate in a manner that is recognised by 
other interlocutors within the policy process – including, of course, political 
authorities – as authoritative.  
 
b. Communicating Effectively in Global Level Policy Processes  
 
It is fairly self-evident that determining what counts as an “effective” or 
“authoritative” communication in a particular discursive arena is a matter of 
empirically investigating what other interlocutors in the arena regard as such, 
because the effectiveness of the communication is – in policy debate – a 
reflection of the extent to which those towards whom the communication was 
directed have been persuaded or moved by it. It therefore follows that what 
counts as effective or authoritative communication will vary from discursive 
arena to discursive arena. One group of actors who have reflected on the 
dynamics of communication in global policy processes, and the requisites of 
effective communication at this level, are policy-oriented researchers. For 
example, in August 2005 the Journal of International Development dedicated a 
special issue to the challenge of “Bridging Research and Policy in International 
Development”. Reflecting on the eight papers featured in the edition – four by 
researchers, four by policy practitioners – the editors of the special issue 
identified four new lessons, one of which was that “research needs to be 
specific and detailed, often based on case studies and on the detail of policy 
instruments and inputs.” (Court and Maxwell, 2005: 722).  
 
To an extent, the degree to which La Via have been able to meet this criteria or 
not can be captured by these responses of FAO officials invited during an 
interview to reflect on the role of La Via Campesina in policy debates:90 
 
 I think if La Via Campesina was stronger in some of the technical areas, 
it would definitely give a better visibility, a better clout than what it has… 
                                            
90  One of these respondents can be regarded as a “natural” La Via Campesina ally in FAO, in 
that the commitment to small-scale, agro-ecological farming has been a strong and visible 
feature of his work. The other is less naturally sympathetic to their positions, but carries a  
respect for La Via and civil society more generally, and as such is less directly supportive.  
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because sometimes, sometimes, I mean, they do say things which are not 
necessarily correct…” 
  (Interview, FAO Official, Division Director, 16.9.2009). 
 
 I personally value Via Campesina… a lot, but in some ways they’re 
dismissed by people who think of themselves as more serious thinkers, as 
shooting from the hip, or being far too left field, not being pragmatic, and not 
necessarily… helping the cause…”  
  (Interview, FAO Official, Division Director, 21.8.2009).  
 
Another interesting snapshot of La Via’s capacity in this area can be provided 
by looking at a document produced by an alliance of CSOs, including La Via 
Campesina, in 2009 (La Via Campesina et al., 2009). Entitled Policies and 
Actions to Eradicate Hunger and Malnutrition, this document was an attempt by 
food sovereignty CSOs to respond to the post-food price crisis attention being 
given to food and agriculture, and articulate some of their own proposals to 
counter those articulated within institutional responses such as the 
Comprehensive Framework for Action of the High Level Task Force (Field 
Notes, 10.10.2009).  This objective can be seen stated within the document 
itself. On page 8, for instance, the authors state their aim to “inform 
governments, national, regional and international institutions, and other actors 
committed to eradicating hunger and malnutrition” (La Via Campesina et al., 
2009: 8).91 Whilst the process of formulating this document was no doubt 
important in terms of its consolidating and maintaining important civil society 
networks and alliances92, and, in the absence of the relevant empirical data, its 
impacts are uncertain, what can be observed is that the document features no 
references to empirical data. In this regard, we can say that it falls short of the 
criteria identified by Court and Maxwell above, that is of being “specific and 
detailed […] based on case studies” (2005: 722). That this document was 
produced by La Via Campesina and a range of their important allies precisely to 
                                            
91  The intention of the authors to influence policy formulation was also indicated by the fact that 
the document was made available to member states at various FAO intergovernmental 
meetings (Field Notes, 2009).  
92 The depth of collaboration involved in the production of this document is captured by the 
number of organizations represented on the Drafting Committee, which totalled 30 in all, both 
NGOs and food producer movements (La Via Campesina et al., 2009: 45). 
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influence and articulate with policy processes, and represents to an extent the 
best of their capacity in this area,93 suggests that communicating in a manner 
considered commensurate with “effective” communication in policy debates will 
not come easily to La Via. At least so long as we impose upon La Via the same 
expectations or criteria that we would upon “expert” contributors.  
 
These then are some of the requisites of effective participation in global policy 
debates, with snapshots of La Via’s capacity in these areas also provided. A lot 
more detailed analysis and discussion could be offered on each of them, and 
probably more could be identified, but as I’ve said above, my goal here is just to 
identify the sorts of things we need to be thinking about (and ways we need to 
be thinking) in order to fully explicate the dynamics of power and voice inherent 
in the nascent transnational public sphere. Moreover, each of the observations 
made above can be regarded as being relevant to La Via’s capacity to impact 
the discursive arenas of global policy debate, but it’s fundamentally important to 
note that, as a collective actor, as well as meeting the criteria identified above, 
“effective” participation also entails the ability of La Via’s representatives 
(participating in global level processes) to maintain clear and ongoing 
communications with the membership at the base. Thus, in total, effective 
participation is, in the words of Sofia Monsalve “extremely demanding!!!!” 
(Interview, Sofia Monsalve, FIAN, 29.8.2011). A first-person perspective on the 
issue of capacity is captured in BOX SEVEN: Beatriz Gascó Verdier and the 
IPC, below. 
 
BOX SEVEN Beatriz Gascó Verdier and the IPC 
 
When I began my research with La Via Campesina I was, given their more 
positive attitude towards this institution, keen to interrogate the pre-existing 
relationships that the movement enjoyed with the FAO. As the research process 
unfolded I began to appreciate the importance of the role played by the 
International Planning Committee for Food Sovereignty (IPC) in facilitating La 
                                            
93 As reflected, for instance, in the fact that the initiative had dedicated funding. 
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Via’s engagement in FAO processes and bodies. Indeed, I came to realise – in 
contrast to my expectation - that more or less all of the movement’s 
participation within FAO headquarters policy and governance processes was in 
fact facilitated by or through the IPC - a global network organised into various 
geographical and constituency “focal points”, but whose Secretariat – which 
expands and contracts between 2-5 people or so – operates predominantly out 
of Rome.  
 
Though its roots stretch back to frustrations emerging out of participation within 
various different UN spaces in the preceding years, it was in 2001 that the 
proposal to establish an autonomous civil society group to interface with FAO in 
the preparations for the World Food Summit: five years later (scheduled for 
2001 but rescheduled to 2002 following “9/11”) and the World Summit on 
Sustainable Development, 2002 was first made (McKeon, 2009: 54). In the 
course of negotiating UN imposed organisational criteria, and the related 
tendency of NGOs to dominate so-called “civil society” spaces, for the 
organisations who would establish what came to be known as the International 
Planning Committee for Food Sovereignty, the need for a dedicated body to 
facilitate the participation of food producer constituencies in UN food policy 
processes was very clear. Unlike the intergovernmental-imposed categories 
and dynamics that normally structured civil society participation in UN spaces, 
the IPC would function with a clear and self-defined modus operandi in which 
producer constituencies were recognised as being the political actors and 
NGOs were defined a technical, supporting role. The principle of autonomy, 
moreover –the right of its members to define their own terms of participation 
within FAO processes – was recognised as being fundamental.  
 
For IPC International Focal Point, Antonio Onorati, whose over 30 years of 
accumulated experience in food and agricultural activism and shrewd political 
intelligence stands him in high regard amongst La Via Campesina leaders (and 
many others within civil society) the IPC can be differentiated from other 
network spaces, such as the World Social Forum, by, amongst others, its focus 
on concrete, concerted action. And it can be differentiated from other groups of 
perhaps more traditionally organised civil society actors, by its capacity –rooted 
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in the structural location of its members - to resist and contest the status quo, 
unlike those who are locked into the “logic of the industrial model”. According to 
Antonio there are three primary meanings to the participation of core rural 
constituencies within global food and agricultural policy processes: The first is 
to enable the self-recognition of agency by the interlocutor and their broader 
constituency;94 the second is the opening up of political space and of 
“contradiction”; and the third is introducing new views, positions, reflection and 
actors. (Interview, Antonio Onorati, International Focal Point, International 
Planning Committee on Food Sovereignty, Rome, 17.1.2009). 
 
Since its launch the IPC has facilitated the participation of many hundreds of 
rural peoples in both UN and civil society events and processes (three stand-
out episodes of which include the successful negotiation of the Voluntary 
Guidelines on the Realization of the Right to Food, participation within and the 
creation of an autonomous civil society space at the International Conference 
on Agrarian Reform and Rural Development, and, pertinent to this thesis, the 
reform process of the Committee on World Food Security, discussed in the 
following chapter), and organised multiple global fora.95  
 
The work of core IPC Secretariat member (at some times, virtually the only 
member) Beatriz Gascó Verdier has been crucial to these achievements. Over 
the course of the two-three years in which I conducted this research Beatriz and 
I became very good friends.96 Over two days in Madrid, in March 2011, I was 
                                            
94 “The first rule of the work that we have done in front of FAO is not really to think that we will 
move FAO and it will be the place where alternatives will be. FAO is an intergovernmental 
institution, it is the process that is important. Leaders learn how to confront government and 
learn an essential lesson – that they can stand up and speak at the same level as the dominant 
forces. 
  (Interview, Antonio Onorati, International Focal Point, International Planning 
Committee on Food Sovereignty, Rome, 17.1.2009). 
95 The value of the IPC’s achievements, for example, is recognised by the FAO: “The IPC has 
continued since [it’s establishment in 2002] to facilitate participation of representatives of rural 
peoples’ organizations in FAO’s technical committees, Regional Conferences and special 
conferences, bringing to the table the voice of the end beneficiaries of FAO policies and 
programmes which had heretofore been missing from global policy forums.” (FAO, 2008: 4).  
96  The first time I met Beatriz was at La Via Campesina’s Vth International Conference in 
Maputo, Mozambique, October 2008. We were being introduced by Annette Desmarais as part 
of my introduction to the network of important allies to La Via Campesina with whom I was to 
consult in the preparation of the research project I was conducting for them. She was seated 
beneath a tree amidst a group of African farmers and activists when we came over, talking and 
laughing in her typical fashion, and rose to meet us. Annette explained to her who I was and 
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able to conduct an extended interview with her, the goal of which was simply to 
capture as much of her first person perspective on the field of relations being 
addressed by my research as possible. The importance of this perspective had 
been impressed upon me by various conversations that I’d had with Beatriz 
over time. Of course, Beatriz’s particular set of experiences are especially 
relevant to understanding the challenges faced by civil society as they seek to 
both gain voice within formal discursive arenas and establish their own 
autonomous arenas.  
 
Beatriz, in her words, has always been a “militant”. Even from a very young age 
she had found manifestations of injustice, poverty and violence physically 
oppressive, and as her interest in food and agricultural matters developed 
through her teens and beyond – she has a degree in agronomy – it was natural 
that her activism should find expression here. Like many of those working at the 
global level - both within civil society and the UN – Beatriz is a gifted linguist, 
fluent in five languages, in four of which she can pass for a native-speaker. 
However, initially coming into the IPC network - at the 2002 civil society parallel 
forum to the FAO’s official summit - volunteering as a translator (who 
themselves, along with interpreters, are a very important group of activists 
without whose voluntary contributions the global networks constructed by civil 
society could not exist), soon after she applied for a position within the IPC 
Secretariat, where she has worked ever since.  
 
The roles of a small secretariat within a network like the IPC – seeking to 
facilitate civil society in global policy and governance processes - are many and 
varied, and down the years Beatriz has had to acquired a wide range of 
different knowledge and skills. This extends to relatively straightforward tasks 
like the booking of flights, hotel rooms and conference venues and the 
arranging of visas, but also more difficult, skill-specific activities, such as the 
management of budgets, fundraising, political and financial negotiation (with 
governments, UN officials and others), the general – high pressure - 
                                            
what I was doing. Standing less than a foot away from me, she fixed me with an interrogative 
stare, looking straight into my eyes. Then she said, “You do realise that probably no one will 
read the reports that you write?” I laughed. We were friends straight away.  
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coordination of global conferences, and many others. However, as challenging 
as this range of duties are in themselves, their difficulty is often exacerbated by 
the context in which they are performed. This is a context characterised by, 
typically, uncertainty and irregularity in funding; informal (and sometimes weak) 
infrastructure; extremely tight deadlines; the fact that many if not most of the 
organisations with which the IPC works are themselves operating under 
conditions of resource over-stretch, financial precarity, and political hostility; 
multiple time zones and variability in the access that different organisations and 
individuals have to communication media; and, as one would expect in a global 
network of this scale and type, the challenge of bringing together so many 
different cultural understandings, discursive modes, organisational realities, and 
political styles. 
 
In part these challenges are a consequence of the fact that the work that the 
IPC does – facilitating the participation of food producer constituencies in global 
policy and governance discussions – and the political style of many of its 
members, are not always so amenable to formal donors. The IPC – though it is 
essentially a participation-oriented network – seeks to challenge the status quo, 
something that, more often than not, power finds difficult. But the challenges 
faced by the IPC are also a reflection of the fact that they are literally having to 
construct the networks, practices, and relationships through which they work 
out of nothing, or very little.  And although some within their global network are 
paid for the work that they do, a great many – probably the majority - participate 
voluntarily, finding time and capacity in the margins of their national work, 
where they can, when they can. Indeed, in the specific case of Beatriz, though 
she receives a salary for her role in the IPC, the nature of the work that she 
does and the strength of her commitment have meant that on many occasions 
her contribution has had to far far exceed the bounds of what might have been 
expected, even for a committed activist.  
 
Inevitably, given the dynamics and scale of the challenges confronting the IPC, 
there have been times when relationships have faltered, or when personal 
wellbeing has had to take a back-foot to the demands of the hour (and minute). 
Indeed, Beatriz, like many activists, in the context of the informality which is a 
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characteristic of the networks built by civil society as they try to avoid rigid 
hierarchies and formal structures, has had to learn the hard way how to 
personally manage the balance between commitment and personal health. 
Maintaining morale, moreover, in the face of the recurrent inability – or 
unwillingness - of the international community and its representatives to 
respond to the challenges of global hunger with the gravity and energy that this 
issue deserves, has not always been easy.  
 
But for every difficulty, and every struggle, there are positive experiences to 
celebrate and savour.97 These include the lasting friendships formed in the 
crucible of international conference organising or through the mutual recognition 
of shared values and struggles; the political successes negotiating a key 
agreement or document, or affecting a shift in the terms upon which institutional 
actors relate towards civil society; and the concrete work of building a global 
movement that allows its members - rural constituency leaders - to recognise 
themselves and their local struggles as part of a much bigger global movement 
and struggle.98  
 
A dedicated and principled activist whose personal commitment has on (too) 
many occasions had to make the difference between success and failure, 
Beatriz is emblematic of many activists to be found within the IPC, La Via 
Campesina and beyond. It is through their efforts, mostly unseen and often 
unrewarded, that the possibility of democratic food and agricultural policy and 
governance processes – as within this thesis - can be entertained at all. It is to 
them that this thesis is dedicated.  
 
 (Interview, Beatriz Gascó Verdier, Secretariat of the International 
Planning Committee for Food Sovereignty, 23-24.3.2011).  
 
                                            
97  Indeed, the experience of “the possibility to share and live different values other than the 
ones imposed by capitalism” was identified by Beatriz as the “true reason for all of us that 
makes also the strength of these kind of movements.” (Comment, 21.12.2011).  
98 The answer of a pygmy farmer from Cameroon when asked by Beatriz what his IPC 
facilitated participation in a particular global event had meant to him captures this last point very 
well. He replied  “I’ve learned something important. We are not alone. When I go back home, 
and I tell to my community what I’ve seen here, they won’t believe me… to see how many we 
are, and that we can make it.”  
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4. Conclusion  
In this chapter I have done two principal things. On the one hand, I have argued 
that La Via Campesina can be read as seeking to provoke a public sphere in 
food and agriculture. This is for three reasons: their pursuit of a single 
(authoritative and inclusive) space at the global level for food and agricultural 
policy, their contesting food policy through their articulation of food sovereignty 
and their entry into formal discursive arenas, and their constitution of new public 
spaces for affected publics to reflect, deliberate and so forth. Following this I 
have explored various dynamics of La Via relevant to their participation in the 
CFS. I will briefly recall each of these and, where necessary, make their 
significance for La Via’s participation in the CFS more explicit and add any 
conceptual clarification. 
 
The first dynamic I explored addressed La Via’s perception of the field of 
relations in which the movement is embedded. This contains a number of 
important elements including a pronounced opposition to capitalism, 
neoliberalism and TNCs. Indeed, the latter are defined in La Via texts as the 
movement’s “principal enemies” (La Via Campesina, 2009). Recalling both the 
objective articulated in the introduction to this thesis – to identify the sorts of 
things that we need to be thinking about and observing to be able to track the 
extent to which the field of relations targeted in this research is capable of 
fulfilling the criteria of the public sphere – and the fact that the reformed CFS 
assigns participation rights not just to CSOs but also to “Representatives of 
private sector associations” (CFS:2009/2, Paragraph 11.v) it is evident that an 
important dynamic of the reformed CFS concerns such related factors as the 
extent to which agribusiness TNCs (through the private sector channel) take up 
their participation rights as defined above, the terms on which they do this, the 
responses of the Bureau and the CFS Secretariat (amongst others) to this, and, 
of course, the response of La Via Campesina. Also important, considering the 
snapshot of the UN approach to TNCs captured in Chapter Five, is the extent to 
which the perspective of La Via Campesina is likely to find traction amongst 
member states. As policy-oriented researchers say, before you can win the 
battle to define the solution, you have to win the battle to define the problem 
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(Court and Maxwell, 2005), so if La Via want to see states act to curtail the 
increasing control and influence that TNCs have in agri-food systems, then 
establishing an acceptance of this problem amongst policy-makers and political 
authorities will be critical.99  
 
The second set of dynamics I explored were organised under the theme of 
recognising La Via’s right to speak. Here I captured the terms in which La Via 
justify their inclusion in policy debates – functional, and affected – and identified 
some important considerations relevant to the question “What would the 
recognition of La Via’s right to speak entail?” In this regard I noted La Via’s 
status as a representative actor with internal rhythms of democratic 
consultation, and as citizens and not data. I also noted the importance of 
registering dissent to the recognition of the right to speak, and wondered what 
the distinctiveness of La Via’s modes of communication – particularly their use 
of symbolic communication – might entail for the recognition of their right to 
speak. It is important, therefore, to track the extent to which the recognition La 
Via’s right to speak within the CFS incorporates these different dynamics or not 
and the extent to which La Via feel comfortable or satisfied with the modes of 
communication available to them Moreover, an important line of future 
questioning concerns the attempt to clarify the terms in which La Via seek to 
participate in global policy debates. At the moment – given the paucity of data – 
there is an uncertainty about the nature of the status claim that the movement is 
making. I have accentuated one of the two bases in which La Via justify their 
inclusion in policy debates, but there is another. We have to ask therefore 
whether they are claiming the right to participate in global policy debates on the 
basis of being affected by decisions taken at this level, or by virtue of their 
functional role as food providers? Do these different claims imply different types 
of recognition? Do they imply different types of participation? Are there any 
tensions between these claims? And so forth. In Chapter Eight, the conclusion 
to this thesis, I suggest that there are important differences between these two 
                                            
99 Above I quoted senior UN officials whose attitude of collaboration towards different agri-food 
system actors seemed to reflect the general thrust of UN-TNC relations as captured within a 
recent study of that history. However, conversations with more junior FAO officials revealed a 
wide spread concern with the role of TNCs in modern agri-food systems, and something of a 
stronger appetite for a more interventionist approach (Field Notes, 2009).  
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bases, which reflect the difference in food policy debates between 
normative/moral issues and technical issues.  
 
Having discussed the dynamics around the recognition of the right to speak, I 
then moved to the question of capacity. I began by noting the dynamism 
inherent in the relationship between capacity and the recognition of the right to 
speak before moving to identify some of the requisites of participation of 
participation in global policy debates, and brief snapshots of La Via’s capacity in 
this area. At this point I want to elaborate a little future on the inherent 
dynamism between capacity and the right to speak.  
 
A hypothetical example is useful in highlighting the dynamics inherent in the 
relationship between the two variables. Let’s say, for instance, that the 
dominant mode of communication (a requisite of effective participation) in a 
discursive arena is Mode X, but that an aspirant interlocutor communicates in 
Mode Y. We can say that they lack the capacity to participate in this arena. 
However, it is important to avoid the implicitly normative assumption that the 
degree to which an actor is able to participate effectively in discursive arenas is 
a function of her capacity, by observing that there are instances when 
discursive arenas facilitate the participation of interlocutors when their right to 
speak is strongly recognised. For instance, let us imagine a potential 
interlocutor whose right to speak is very strongly recognised (indeed, whose 
contribution is deemed important to the legitimacy or meaning of the arena) but 
who, due to limited capacity (time constraints) can’t physically attend. The 
strength with which her right to speak, however, is recognised is reflected in the 
willingness of the arena to facilitate her participation through the provision of 
video conferencing, thus making up the capacity shortfall.100 The implication of 
this is that, as above, the degree to which an actor’s capacity shortfall is 
significant in impacting their participation is in part determined by the degree to 
which their right to speak is recognised. To return to the example above, where 
an aspirant interlocutor communicates in Mode Y, and the arena in Mode X, 
                                            
100  This hypothetical example is reflected in reality. In this year’s (2011) CFS the Secretary-
General of the UN Ban Ki-Moon is scheduled to participate via a Webcast, the only actor who 
will do so as far as I am aware.   
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there are two possible outcomes. Either the interlocutor has to acquire the extra 
capacity, or the arena will facilitate their participation (through, for instance, 
translation). Of course, these are two possible outcomes when the right to 
speak of the interlocutor is recognised, but in the dominant mode of 
communication of the arena.  
 
However, another degree of the recognition of the right to speak is recognition 
to speak in the mode of communication of the actor. For instance, returning to 
the example above, rather than seek to acquire the capacity or have their 
participation facilitated, the aspirant interlocutor may seek to embed a new 
norm (or rule) in the arena, one that recognises her right to speak in her natural 
mode of communication. When she takes the floor, therefore, she might engage 
in a process of norm contestation by doing precisely this – speaking in her 
language and not the language of the arena. The question here, however, 
concerns the appropriate cost of loss of effectiveness when seeking to embed a 
new norm, because the requisites of participation (an empirical category, 
representing, in this case the actual modes of communication that will be 
effective given the expectations, conditioning, education, culture etc of the 
interlocutors of the arena) are not necessarily convergent with the norms (or 
even codified rules) that govern the modes of communication deemed 
acceptable within the arena, or amongst interlocutors.  
 
Returning to La Via Campesina, all of these dynamics are visible. For instance, 
Paul Nicholson recognises the distinction between the normative right to speak 
and the requisites of participation when he notes that “we need… means and 
processes which are inclusive, and that of course will not very often coincide 
with the wishes of governments or states, even those who want civil society 
included, but who cannot bare to listen to civil society.” (Interview, Paul 
Nicholson, 19.8.2011). Moreover, Sofia Monsalve related to me the thoughts of 
a young La Via Campesina leader reflecting on her experiences participating for 
the first time in an FAO policy process: 
 
 [A]nd she said - well, the whole situation was new for her, and when she 
arrived the whole days, she was… intimidated by the atmosphere. And she 
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thought she needed to become like the diplomats discussing, so that’s she’s 
heard or that our message gets across. But then, the she realised that that’s the 
wrong way to go. “We have to talk, and speak as we are” she said, “and we 
speak differently. 
  (Interview, Sofia Monsalve, FIAN, 29.8.2011).  
 
What I infer from this is that rather than seek to acquire a new communication 
mode (through extra capacity or facilitation), the young farmer is in fact ready to 
contest the norm that interlocutors must communicate in the dominant mode of 
the arena. As above, this raises interesting questions about the possible cost in 
terms of being effective and where the appropriate trade off between norm 
contestation and effective participation ought to be. If this is the actor-centric 
version of this question, the arena-centric version - addressing the issue of 
modes of communication - concerns the appropriate boundary between 
exclusion and inclusion, in that whilst there may conceivably be many different 
modes of communication in usage amongst the different peoples of the world 
wanting to participate in global food and agricultural policy debate, in practice it 
will not be possible to accommodate them all. In her determination to “speak 
differently” the young farmer seeks an expansion in the modes of 
communication that are permissible in policy debate, but how many modes of 
“speaking differently” ought to be accommodated in a global policy process? 
One would anticipate an expansion in the modes of communication of global 
policy debates following the expansion of their participants – beyond diplomats, 
UN officials, and professional NGOs - to include affected publics, but it remains 
to be seen what demands are made by these affected publics – such as La Via 
– for distinctive modes of communication, and where the renegotiated – if 
renegotiated – boundary between included and excluded modes will lie
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Chapter Seven - Institutionalising the Public Sphere?: 
The United Nations Committee on World Food Security  
 
1. Overview 
 
So far this thesis has covered a broad terrain. In Chapter Three, before 
engaging with critical responses to this work and also introducing some new 
conceptual tools, I discussed public sphere theory, beginning with a review of 
Habermas’s The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, In chapter 
Four, applying concepts elaborated in the previous chapter, I established the 
general context for this thesis. In Chapter Five I identified some key dynamics 
relevant to the attainment, at the transnational level, of a political authority 
capable of meeting the authority requirements of a public sphere. In Chapter 
Six, focusing predominantly upon La Via Campesina, I argued why it was that 
the movement can be read as seeking to provoke and constitute a public 
sphere. I also sought to capture some important dynamics relevant to their 
participation in this regard.  
 
In this chapter I establish why it is that we can read the recently reformed UN 
Committee on World Food Security as promising to institutionally realise the 
public sphere that La Via Campesina are seeking to both provoke and 
constitute. Three of its attributes are relevant in this regard, all defined in the 
reform blueprint that provides the contours of the reformed body: its aspiration 
for political centrality, its aspiration for inclusivity, and its role facilitating policy 
debate. Using data captured following the reform process, moreover, I identify 
what post-reform experience of the CFS tells us about the extent to which it is 
meeting, or looks likely to meet, these aspirations.  
 
However, before embarking on this discussion, it’s beneficial to situate the 
reform of the CFS in its immediate context – the “food price crisis” of 
2007/2008. This is relevant in a number of different, though interrelated, ways. 
Firstly, it stimulated high-level political attention in food and agriculture (food 
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security). Secondly, it dynamised discursive activity in the aggregate plane. And 
thirdly, and relatedly, it allowed for the transformation of a wide-spread 
dissatisfaction with the international food and agricultural institutional 
architecture into a process of reform, resulting in a much transformed UN 
Committee on World Food Security – a body that existed before the food price 
crisis but whose continued existence and value was subject to doubt.  
 
2. The Context of CFS Reform  
i. The “Food Price Crisis” 2007-2008 
 
As scholars of processes of public policy-making know, the level of public and 
media attention being given to a potential policy issue at any given time has a 
significant impact in determining whether or not that issue makes it onto the 
political agenda (Hupe and Hill, 2006). Events following the food price crisis of 
2007-2008 have supported this view. Whilst the amount of global public and 
political attention given to food security prior to the crisis was, arguably,  fairly 
negligible, the rioting and civil unrest that broke out in over 30 countries around 
the world as a result of sudden steep rises in the international prices of some 
key food staples captured both public and political attention alike, resulting in, 
amongst others, both a significant increase in the amount of media attention 
being given to this issue and, perhaps more importantly, a concerted effort to 
reform the institutional architecture of global food security, concern over which 
was shared amongst a wide group of constituents, from civil society like La Via 
Campesina to member states and beyond (Oxfam International, 2009).101 
Indeed, the body which resulted from this process – the reformed UN 
Committee on World Food Security – is fundamental to our being able to 
entertain the possibility of the transnational public sphere that is being argued 
for in this thesis, aspiring, as it does, to institutionalise inclusive policy debate in 
a politically efficacious discursive arena. The food price crisis of 2007-2008 then 
                                            
101 La Via Campesina’s concerns with the institutional architecture of food and agriculture have 
been captured in Chapter Six.  
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is an important part of the context for my thesis, and it is here that I will begin 
this chapter.  
 
i. The “Unjustified Complacency” of Global Food Security Efforts Prior to 
2007 
 
In the first half-decade or so of the 21st century the fact that many millions of 
people around the planet suffered chronic hunger was not new to global 
attention. Since the Second World War in fact, numerous international summits, 
particularly in 1974, 1996, and 2002, had in one way or another addressed the 
question of what to do about the millions of people on this planet suffering 
chronic malnourishment.102 Indeed, even before that the architects of the post-
war order had hunger in their sights. Established in 1945, the preamble to the 
Constitution of the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations, for 
instance, explicitly states its purposes of “raising nutrition” and “ensuring 
humanity’s freedom from hunger” (FAO, 1945). The continuing post-war 
commitment to ending – or at least significantly reducing – mass hunger is best 
captured, perhaps, in Target C of Millennium Development Goal 1, which aims: 
“To halve, by the year 2015 the proportion of the world’s people […] who suffer 
from hunger” (UN, 2000: 5).103 
 
However, despite these periodic commitments, in the years approaching what 
in the official discourse is now referred to as the “2007-2008 food price crisis”, 
the amount of political attention and action being captured by the issue of 
hunger was low and apparently diminishing. For example, food aid, considered 
by the World Food Programme as a useful way of “assessing the fight against 
hunger” had, in the run up to this period, been steadily dropping, and in the 
                                            
102 The World Food Conference took place in Rome, at the FAO, from the 5th – 16th November, 
1974. In 1996, from the 13th-16th November, the World Food Summit was also convened by the 
FAO, in Rome. And 2002 saw FAO once again host the World Food Summit: five years later, 
10-13th June, delayed from its originally scheduled spot due to the attacks on the World Trade 
Centre, New York, in September 2001.  
103  “According to one calculation, more than 120 [international conferences] have been 
addressed on various issues relating to the right to food since the League of Nations was 
founded (Pinstrup-Andersen et al., 1995).” (Shaw, 2007: 388).  
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early 2000s had reached in fact a twenty year low (Webb 2003; Maxwell, 2006; 
WFP, 2011).104 This was paralleled by a contraction in general levels of 
agricultural investment across the board, from developing countries, OECD 
donors, and IFIs.105 In addition, as previously noted, the relevance of the only 
global forum specifically tasked with monitoring international hunger reduction 
commitments – the United Nations Committee on World Food Security – had, in 
a 2007 review of its host institution the FAO, been called into doubt, the 
reviewers reporting that “questions have arisen as to whether it meets for too 
long and too frequently” (IEE, 2007: 178). At the same time, however, and 
moving in the opposite direction to the food aid trends, the number of globally 
undernourished in the world had been steadily rising, from a 1995-97 “low” of 
about 780 million, climbing steadily to about 850 million ten years later 2005-
2007  (See Figure 3: Number of undernourished in the world 1969-2008). Whilst 
there certainly were institutional voices expressing concern at these trends – 
the Director-General of the International Food Policy Research - Institute 
Joachim von Braun, for instance, began his institution’s 2004 annual report by 
expressing “dismay that there is slow progress against hunger in 2003/2004.” – 
looking back, the FAO would describe this as a period of “unjustified 
complacency” (FAO, 2008b: 4).106 However, by the end of 2008 this 
complacency had been – for awhile at least – suddenly interrupted, leading to a 
considerable escalation in the amount of attention being given to food security 
issues by both political elites and non-specialist publics.  
                                            
104  “[G]lobal food aid supplies climbed steadily from less than 10 million tons in the first years of 
the 1980s to more than 17 million tons in 1993. This was followed by a precipitous fall to less 
than half that peak by 1996, the year of the World Food Summit in Rome. Two years later, 
global food aid flows again reached almost 14 million tons, only to collapse once more in the 
early 2000s, to 11 million tons—the level attained 20 years before (FAO 2000).” 
(Webb, P.  (2003)  “Food as Aid: Trends, Needs and Challenges in the 21st Century”, World 
Food Programme Occasional Papers No.14.  
http://www.wfp.org/content/occasional-paper-14-food-aid-trends-needs-and-challenges- 21st-
century-patrick-webb 
105  “Agricultural investment in 2007 was only 4 percent of public spending in sub-Saharan 
Africa, while the share of agriculture in official development assistance declined from 18 percent 
in 1979 to just 3.5 percent in 2004 (World Bank 2007, 40-42, quote in Clapp and Cohen, 2009: 
5) . The World Bank’s lending for agriculture dropped even more sharply, from 30 percent of its 
loans in 1980 to just 3 percent in recent years (World Bank, 2008). Donor support for public 
agricultural research has barely kept pace with inflation.” (Clapp and Cohen, 2009: 5).  
106  A complacency that is perhaps embarrassingly captured in the FAO’s own assessment in 
2006 that “the world is on a path towards meeting the Millennium Development Goal on hunger 
reduction” (FAO, 2006a).  
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Figure 3: Number of undernourished in the world 1969-2008 
(Source: FAO, 9.6.2011) http://www.fao.org/publications/sofi/en/).  
 
ii. Food Riots and Focused Attention 
 
For many years international agricultural prices has been on a downwards 
trend, but from the beginning of 2005 onwards they began to rise, a trajectory 
which spiked throughout 2007 leading to international prices for many basic 
foodstuffs in excess of anything seen for at least the previous thirty years (FAO, 
2011). The impact of these trends upon net food importing countries was 
severe, depriving many of basic foodstuffs and provoking outbreaks of rioting in 
over 30 countries and related civil unrest in another 20 more (Benson et al, 
2008). By 2009 the crisis had increased the total number of globally hungry 
from an already intolerably high number of around 850 million to just over one 
billion (See Figure 3 above).  
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Awareness of the “food price crisis” of 2007-2008, as it has come to be 
known,107 spread relatively quickly once it had caught the attention of 
specialised food and agricultural actors to mainstream media the world over. 
Throughout 2007, at the vanguard of awareness, the FAO began to issue 
warnings of the rising prices, particularly with regard to their impacts upon Low 
Income Food Deficit Countries (LIFDCs) who were dependent upon food 
imports and therefore much more sensitive to the impacts of steep rises within 
international markets (2007a, 2007b, 2007c, 2007d). Towards the end of the 
year the story breached the narrow focus of specialist agencies and entered the 
mainstream media, where, unsurprisingly, a large part of the focus was placed 
on the social unrest generated by the rapid rise in the cost of basic foodstuffs 
for many of the world’s poorest people.   
 
At the beginning of September 2007 The Times of India ran a story about 
India’s unexpected purchase of 800,000 tonnes of wheat from international 
markets to replenish its national buffer stocks, situating it in the context of the 
steeply rising prices, and quoting FAO Director-General Jacque Diouff’s 
warning that these were creating a situation which had the potential for “social 
tension, leading to social reactions and eventually even political problems." 
(The Times of India, 8.9.2007). In November 2007 Time Magazine, 
acknowledging food riots in India, Mexico, Yemen, and manifestations of food 
related civil unrest in Argentina, Russia and Italy wondered: “Is the world 
heading for a food crisis?” (Time Magazine, 16.11.2007). In December a 
Guardian headline announced “Riots and Hunger Feared as Demand for Grain 
                                            
107 See, for example:  
Alnap.  (2008) “The Global Food Price Crisis: Lessons and Ideas for Relief Planners and 
Managers”. www.alnap.org/pool/files/ALNAPLessonsFoodPriceCrisis.pdf (28.11.2011).  
Financial Times. (22.3.2011) “How To Avoid a Global Food Price Crisis”. 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/88fa144c-54c2-11e0-b1ed-00144feab49a.html#axzz1f0QwKAfN 
(28.11.2011).  
Green, D. (11.1.2011) “The food price crisis and the World Bank’s blind spots”,  From Poverty 
to Power, (Blog of Duncan Green, Head of Research for Oxfam GB). 
http://www.oxfamblogs.org/fp2p/?p=4229 (28.11.2011).  
Cohen, M and Garret, J.L. (2009)  “The Food Price Crisis and Urban food (In)security”, 
International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED) and United Nations 
Population Fund (UNFPA). pubs.iied.org/pubs/pdfs/10574IIED.pdf (28.11.2011).  
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Sends Costs Soaring” (The Guardian, 4.12.2007) and, in the same month, The 
Economist declared The End of Cheap Food, noting that its “food-price index is 
higher today than at any time since it was created in 1845” (The Economist, 
6.12.2007).  
 
This growing public awareness of the food price crisis - signaled by its journey 
from a concern of specialist attention to an item of mainstream media reporting 
– anticipated, some might say, provoked, its adoption by various global policy 
and political actors as part their agenda for discussion and action throughout 
2008.  
 
Again, at the vanguard, in December 2007 the FAO launched its “Initiative on 
Soaring Food Prices” explicitly aimed at helping smallholders boost their 
production and take advantage of the increased prices (FAO, 2011a). Then, on 
the 28th April 2008 the Chief Executives Board of the United Nations - 
comprising the Executive Heads of the United Nations specialised agencies, 
Funds and Programmes and Bretton Woods institutions – and acknowledging 
that “[t]he world food situation is rapidly being defined” dedicated their annual 
meeting to the emerging food crisis. As well as agreeing a strategy to help 
developing countries, a decision was also taken to establish the UN Secretary 
General’s High Level Task Force on the Global Food Security Crisis, to respond 
to the need for “urgent, comprehensive and closely coordinated action” (HLTF, 
2008). Comprising no less than 20 different bodies within its membership – 
drawn from all quarters of the international policy environment - the HLTF was 
chaired by the Secretary-General Ban ki-Moon himself, who warned, in a UN 
News Centre press release on the 29th April, of the imminent “spectre of 
widespread hunger, malnutrition and social unrest on an unprecedented scale.” 
(UN News Centre, 2008). Just a month later, another part of the UN – this time 
the assembled member states – acknowledged the importance of the unfolding 
food crisis when, through ECOSOC (The Economic and Social Council of the 
United Nations), they convened a Special Meeting of the Food Crisis from the 
20th to the 22nd of May, the context setting for which began with the simple 
statement “The global food crisis threatens millions of the poor and vulnerable.” 
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(ECOSOC, 2008: 2). This preceded, by less than two weeks, the “High-Level 
Conference on World Food Security: The Challenges of Climate Change and 
Bioenergy” which met from the 3rd to the 5th of June. Hosted at FAO 
headquarters, Rome, the High-Level Conference – featuring the participation of 
forty-two Heads of State and Government and one hundred “high-level” 
Ministers from one hundred and eighty-one member countries – stated within its 
Declaration the pressing need to address  “the current situation of soaring food 
prices that is having adverse impacts on food security” (FAO, 2008d). And 
finally, from July 7th -9th, at their meeting in Hokkaido, Japan, and allegedly 
following a personal request from the then British Prime Minister Gordon 
Brown108, the G8 put the food crisis onto their official agenda also. The 
subsequent “G8 Leaders Statement on Global Food Security” expressed their 
“deep concern” at the steep rise in global food prices and pledged their 
determination to “take all possible measures in a coordinated manner.” The 
statement also noted that since January between them the G8 countries had 
committed “over US$10 billion” for various short-, medium-, and long-term 
interventions (G8, 2008). At a subsequent G8 meeting in L’Aquilla, Italy, (8-10th 
July, 2009) this figure was bumped up to $20billion, leading some 
commentators to suggest “the protracted period of diminished external 
assistance to agriculture appeared at last to be ending.” (Paarlberg, 2010: 189).  
 
In the period between 2007 and 2008, therefore, there was something of a shift 
in the scale of both the amount of media coverage of the food price crisis and 
the level of political attention given to this issue. Indeed, whilst historically 
media reporting on food crises has been fairly episodic, there are signs that one 
legacy of the 2007-2008 food price crisis is a sustained focus on this issue 
within the mainstream media, some of which have constituted special food 
security sections for exactly this purpose. Table 4 below, for example, lists the 
number of articles that contain the term “food security” in the UK newspaper 
The Guardian between the beginning of 1999 and June 2011. The impact of the 
food price crisis is clearly visible, with the number of food security articles 
                                            
108 As suggested to me in an interview with an FAO official closely involved in the UN and G8 
food price crisis responses (Interview, FAO Official, Division Director, 21.8.2009).  
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increasing at a fairly incremental rate between 2005-2007 from 17 to 50, then 
trebling through 2008 up to 173, and remaining around this number through 
2009 to 2010. Interestingly, whilst this search stops at the middle of June 2011, 
the number of food security articles for this year had already reached the 150s, 
suggesting in fact a continuing increase in the attention given to this issue, 
beyond the immediate impacts of the “food price crisis”.  
 
Year Number of 
Articles  
2011 157 
2010 186 
2009 165 
2008 173 
2007 50 
2006 33 
2005 17 
2004 35 
2003 21 
2002 37 
2001 26 
2000 20 
1999 21 
1998 1 
 
Table 4. Number of Articles mentioning “Food Security” in UK newspaper The 
Guardian per year 1998 – 10th June, 2011 
 
It is unfortunate that within this thesis there was not the space to examine the 
extent to which – beyond the reform of the CFS discussed below – this 
discursive and political amplification has resulted in actual concrete outcomes. 
This is undoubtedly one of the many future research tasks generated by my 
thesis, as discussed in Chapter Nine, the Conclusion. Here there are just two 
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observations that I wish to make regarding the impacts of the 2007-2008 food 
price crisis that are particularly relevant for and provide a fundamental part of 
the context for my thesis. The first is that the food price crisis, as suggested 
above by the explosion in the amount of media attention given to food security 
that it provoked, catalysed or stimulated discursive activity in what I am calling 
the aggregate plane of the transnational public sphere in food and agriculture. 
The second relevant impact is that, as a direct result of the renewed political 
attention and in a general context characterised by low levels of satisfaction 
expressed by food system actors towards the institutional food security 
architecture –it also resulted in the reform of a body, the UN Committee on 
World Food Security, the newly assigned status, functions and membership of 
which promises to transform an aggregate of discursive activity into a 
transnational public sphere in food and agriculture.  
 
a. The Food Price Crisis Dynamised Discursive Activity 
 
As noted above, the food price crisis quickly spread (outside of its sites of 
immediate impact) from being an issue of specialist to a focus of broader public 
concern, as captured by the attention given to it by various different 
international media, and - in so far as the UK experience can serve as a 
reference for other locations – by an increase in column inches devoted to food 
security issues. At the same time as it provoked increased public attention, 
moreover, it also underscored the contested nature of agri-food policy. This can 
be seen through at least two dynamics of the food price crisis, relevant because 
in various different ways they delegitimise neoliberal thinking on food 
security.109  
 
                                            
109 The neoliberal approach to food security is encapsulated in the following quote, one of the 
authors of which, Bernard M. Hoekman, was Policy and Research Manager, International 
Trade, at the World Bank at time of publication:  
“Economic research suggests agricultural intervention is not the appropriate policy if the 
objective is food security. Instead, the key need is to have the foreign exchange (and access to 
credit) to be able to buy food in terms of scarcity. Having the domestic ability to produce food is 
not required – countries should only specialize in food production if they have a comparative 
advantage in this activity.” (Hoekman and Kostecki, 2001: 225). 
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Firstly, by essentially pricing poor food consumers in a number of developing 
countries out of global food markets, the food price crisis undermined the idea 
that countries could rely upon those self same markets – rather than through 
domestic production - to meet their food security needs. And relatedly, the 
responses of a number of countries to the food price crisis – particularly their 
imposition of export controls that restricted the supply of international markets – 
also represented a breach with neoliberal principles (of state non-intervention 
into markets). These actions demonstrated that there was not a consensus 
about the virtue of the neoliberal approach, divergences over which – 
particularly in the field of trade - can be seen in the articulations of two high 
profile food system actors: the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Right 
to Food, Olivier De Schutter, and the Director-General of the WTO, Pascal 
Lamy. On March 9th, 2009 De Schutter presented his report on his mission to 
the World Trade Organization to the Human Rights Council, in which he argued 
that divergences in productivity between farmers in different parts of the world 
made the idea of a level playing field between them “meaningless” and that, 
furthermore, the current multilateral trade regime worked “against” the right to 
food (De Schuter, 2009). In contrast, Pascal Lamy has made a number of 
appeals to argue that “Trade is vital for food security” (Lamy, 2011a; 2011b). 
Indeed, the diverging views of Lamy and De Schuter came head to head in a 
public debate in which they both participated on the 11th May, 2009.110 
Moreover, that there are divergent views on agri-food policy and that the food 
price crisis dynamised these divergences is captured by Pascal Lamy when he 
notes the “lack of shared vision” that exists within the international community 
over the relationship between trade and food security (Lamy, 2011b).111  
 
                                            
110 As featured on the website of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, Olivier De 
Schutter, 11th May, 2009: http://www.srfood.org/index.php/en/calendar-/pasteventcal-/110-11-
may-2009-debate-with-pascal-lamy-on-trade-and-the-right-to-food-geneva- (11.3.2011).  
111 Another illustration of both the amplification of discursive activity and the perceived 
undermining of neoliberal principles by the food price crisis can be seen in an article written by 
World Bank President Robert Zoellick (ex-US Trade Representative), in the Financial Times at 
the start of 2011, the title of which “Free markets can still feed the world”, communicates 
perfectly well the defensive posture (Zoellick, 5.1.2011).  
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As well as dynamising discursive activity on the aggregate plane, moreover, the 
food price crisis also provoked a related yet alternate outcome: reform of the 
institutional food and agricultural institutional architecture.  
 
3. The UN Committee on World Food Security: From 
“Irrelevance” to Reform  
 
As discussed in Chapter Five, a concern – founded upon whatever basis – with 
the performance of the international food and agricultural institutional 
architecture had been sufficiently “ripe” (which is to say, agreeable to the 
interests of powerful states) for the launch of an unprecedented-in-scale 
external evaluation of the FAO, and subsequent reform process in 2005. 
However, in the run up to the food price crisis views were mixed on the whether 
or not institutional reform was needed, or indeed, what value the UN could 
serve, in the specific area of food security. For example, the IEE, discussing the 
central space within the UN system for food security matters, the UN 
Committee on World Food Security (CFS) – asserted that: 
 
 The CFS has been dynamic in following up on the World Food Summit 
and has been the committee that best involves civil society. With the completion 
of discussions on the Right to Food, it is now losing some of its momentum and 
questions have arisen as to whether it meets for too long and too frequently. 
  (IEE, 2007: 178).112  
 
However, by October 2009 the members states of FAO and various other 
actors – including a sizeable civil society contingent with La Via Campesina 
amongst them – were celebrating the successful completion of a fairly rapid, six 
month process to define a vision to reform the CFS, the final blueprint of which, 
                                            
112 A year later, in 2008, Senior Research Associate at the Overseas Development Institute, 
Edward Clay echoed the theme in his review of Shaw’s study of UN food security processes 
and events World Food Security: A History Since 1956, stating, somewhat out of step with 
events to come, that “Few currently envisage a UN-centred framework for providing global food 
security.” (Clay, 2008: 248).  
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in fairly stark contrast to the label of irrelevance assigned to it by the IEE, stated 
their aspiration for the CFS to become, amongst others, “the foremost inclusive 
international and intergovernmental platform” for “the elimination of hunger and 
ensuring food security” (CFS:2009/2: Paragraph 4).  
 
i. Pre-Reform Dissatisfaction with the CFS 
 
The Committee on World Food Security was first established in 1974, as part of 
a raft of actions taken at the World Food Conference, the declarations of which 
it was tasked with overseeing. 1996 saw another attempt to martial the 
international community’s political will in support of the elimination of hunger, 
the World Food Summit, and the CFS was re-tasked with monitoring the Plan-
of-Action that this Summit produced. Importantly, civil society were recognised 
as having an significant role to play here, and member states committed to 
encouraging their participation in the monitoring process.113 By 2006, however - 
with another World Food Summit (2002) in-between - dissatisfaction with the 
performance of the CFS was sufficiently pronounced for the first proposals for 
reform to be introduced, by Brazil. Though it was not a specific goal of mine to 
identify within my data collection the reasons for member state dissatisfaction 
with the work of the CFS, comments made by various state representatives 
communicate the impression that there were serious weaknesses in the quality 
in its monitoring work, both in terms of the variability in member state reporting 
(some states taking the reporting seriously, others not, differences in the 
evaluative criteria used within reporting) and in the management of the overall 
                                            
113 As stated within the summit declaration. The final of the seven commitments made by 
member states within this document asserts “We will implement, monitor, and follow-up this 
Plan of Action at all levels in cooperation with the international community.” Sub-objective 7.3g 
adds that, “to monitor actively the implementation of the World Food Summit Plan of Action” 
member states will “[e]ncourage the effective participation of relevant actors of civil society in 
the CFS monitoring process, recognizing their critical role in enhancing food security”.  
World Food Summit (13 – 17.11.1996) “Rome Declaration on World Food Security”. 
http://www.fao.org/docrep/003/w3613e/w3613e00.htm (19.2.2011).  
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process. “Boring” and “Talking shop” were labels that seemed to capture the 
mood.114,115 
 
For civil society, moreover, a particular source of frustrating was the apparent 
difficulty that the CFS was having operationalising the commitment to their 
participation. For instance, in 2006 FAO convened a Special Forum, marking 10 
years since the World Food Summit 1996, and “hosted in the context of the 
CFS” (McKeon, 2009: 98). Premissed upon the idea that “Participation is key to 
stepping up action in the fight against hunger” (FAO, 2006b) and adopting the 
format of a stakeholder dialogue, civil society – whose participation was 
facilitated by the IPC – were in principle assigned relatively strong participation 
rights. However, comprising a delegation of more than 100 people and having 
conducted their own preparatory meeting for two days prior, during the meeting 
itself the civil society participants found that, departing from the pre-arranged 
order (two member states and then one member of civil society) the Chair 
chose in fact just to ignore them, and failed to recognise their requests to 
speak. Faced with the prospect of their status within the meeting being reduced 
to that of mere observers, the CSO delegation asserted what agency they 
could, and walked out (Interview, Beatriz Gasco, IPC Secretariat, 23-
24.3.2011).  
 
However, despite these frustrations, reform of the CFS did not really progress 
between 2006 and 2008.116 Even when the decision was taken at the 34th CFS, 
in October 2008, to embark on a reform process, at the start of 2009 seasoned 
FAO-watchers were less than overwhelmed by this prospect, anticipating a 
fairly slow process (Field Notes, IPC Meeting, 15-17.1.2009, Rome). Within less 
than 9 months, however, the process of formulating a vision for reform was 
                                            
114 This perspective was communicated to me both in interviews and through the comments of 
member states intervening at various intergovernmentals, particularly the 37th Session of the 
CFS.  
115 The defective status of the CFS prior to its reform is captured within the document that 
establishes the vision for the reformed body, and which states “Faced with rising hunger and a 
weak performing Committee on World Food Security (CFS), Member nations agreed at the 34th 
Session of CFS in October 2008 to embark on a reform” (CFS:2009/2, Paragraph 2).  
116 It was, for instance, not addressed by the IEE.  
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complete, resulting in the contours of a body that far exceeded the expectations 
of many within civil society.117 
 
ii. Competing Visions for Reform 
 
In understanding the rapidity of this process and the transformation of the CFS 
from a body the relevance of which was being questioned by the IEE to one that 
aspired to be the central international and intergovernmental space for food 
security, the context is of course crucial. As noted above, the food price crisis of 
2007-2008 had provoked high-level political attention back towards this 
neglected sphere of human misery and action. This was reflected in the efforts 
at the highest levels of the UN bureaucracy to attain system coherence – 
through the establishment of the HLTF – and through the attention given by rich 
country governments to food security issues, as reflected in the G8’s adoption 
of the food security agenda and its articulation in the form of the L’Aquilla Food 
Security Initiative.118 Whether it’s the case or not that high level political 
involvement always has to result in rafts of new initiatives, the issue of 
governance reform became formally part of the post-food crisis response 
agenda when President Sarkozy of France, participating at the High-Level 
Conference on World Food Security: The Challenges of Climate Change and 
Bioenergy, 3rd to the 5th of June, 2008, announced a proposal for a Global 
Partnership for Agriculture, Food Security and Nutrition, the three pillars of 
which addressed governance (ensuring coherence), knowledge (mobilising 
expertise), and finance (increasing the funds available for food security (G20, 
2011).119  
 
                                            
117 As captured elsewhere, one long-term La Via activist, whilst we celebrated the successful 
conclusion of the reform process earlier that day at FAO headquarters with a nice dinner, 
expressed to me that this would’ve been “unimaginable” to them 10 years prior (Field Notes).  
118 Named after the town in Italy where the summit was hosted, chosen by Italian Prime Minister 
Berlusconi because it had recently suffered an earthquake.  
119 A fascinating account could be written about the history and progress of this proposal – an 
account that, due to my good fortune (interviewing, quite by accident, a range of different people 
connected to the process - including the ex-French Civil Servant who first came up with the idea 
- and therefore having attaining a unique and interesting perspective on it), I am in quite a good 
position to write. Here, however there is not the space. 
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From its first being announced by Sarkozy, through the various meetings at 
which attempts were made to turn this idea into a reality, up to and beyond the 
successful conclusion of the CFS reform, the proposal for a Global Partnership 
had a somewhat chequered and provocative journey. One of the central 
characteristics of this journey, however, was a complete lack of consensus – 
even between those different countries that were its advocates – about what the 
Global Partnership actually stood for.120 This lack of consensus stymied 
attempts to translate the idea into concrete practices, with UN officials attending 
the G8 meetings, for instance, at which the Global Partnership was being 
discussed, complaining that they weren’t being given anything substantive to 
engage with due to a lack of agreement amongst member states.121 However, 
having been taken up by various member states, particularly through the G8122, 
the idea of the Global Partnership did have one important impact: It was 
sufficiently nebulous and inchoate to trigger, in the minds of a wide group of 
actors committed to Rome as the locus of UN food security governance, the 
fear that an attempt was being made to shift responsibility for food security to 
New York (UN headquarters) or Washington (Bretton Woods, IFPRI) or even to 
open up food and agricultural governance even more to the influence and 
participation of TNCs and Philanthropic Foundations.123 Whether or not either of 
these outcomes ever formed part of the thinking of the Global Partnership’s 
advocates – and in the minds of the French civil servants who coined the idea 
                                            
120 This lack of consensus was apparent from the outset. To the French civil servants who 
coined with the idea for a Global Partnership, discussions with the countries who were 
supposedly allied behind it revealed the divergences in their understanding, as communicated 
in the response below, given by an Ex-French civil servant with very close involvement in the 
early stages of developing the idea of the Global Partnership: 
 
Josh: Did you think that even within the countries that were allied behind the idea, do you think 
they had the same idea in mind when they were talking about the Global Partnership? 
 
Ex-French Civil Servant: My response, my clear response to that is: No. 
  (Interview, Ex-French Civil Servant, 30.10.2009).  
121 As communicated in a presentation by an FAO official at an IPC meeting on the 17th 
January, 2009, Rome.  
122 For instance, the G8 L’Aquila declaration on food security stated: “We pledge to advance by 
the end of 2009 – consistent with our other actions aimed at an improved global governance for 
food security – the implementation of the Global Partnership for Agriculture and Food Security.” 
  (G8, 2009, Paragraph 9).  
123 This perspective was discernible in each of the three constituencies I spoke to – civil society, 
UN officials, and FAO country representatives.  
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they most certainly did not – these prospects sharpened the thinking of the 
Rome-focused constituency, and prompted their determination to fight for a 
counter-proposal: reform of the pre-existing UN Committee on World Food 
Security. 
 
Thus from the tale end of 2008 up to the successful conclusion of the CFS 
reform process (by which time the Global Partnership process had virtually 
given up all its momentum)124 there appeared to be something of a contest 
going on.125 On the one side were those states (or those actors within those 
states) that championed the idea for a Global Partnership, though somewhat 
confused in conception, and never properly defined. And on the other were the 
champions of CFS reform, which included FAO senior management, the FAO 
member states (particularly the G77 countries who wanted to defend their one-
member-one-vote status) and civil society.126 At the vanguard of civil society 
efforts, of course, was the IPC, with La Via Campesina amongst them. Indeed, 
                                            
124 Hereafter, though it lived on as a reference in various international declarations, there was 
no visible sign of a specific process to advance the idea of a “Global Partnership”, and even 
within those countries that had been its strongest advocates that was a recognition that the 
process had been poorly handled and that the CFS embodied many of its most important 
elements in any case (Interview, OECD Country Ambassador, FAO, 27.10.2009). 
125 I say “appeared” because the frailties built into the Global Partnership process from its 
launch may well have meant that it was never going to result in concrete outcomes. That said, 
the pressure exerted by civil society when they mobilised to resist the attempts of its advocates 
to impose it as the preferred solution for post-food price crisis institutional reform and defend the 
Rome/FAO-space was recognised by those connected to the process as a significant factor in 
its lack of progress (Field Notes). Indeed, in the case of La Via Campesina, it even caused one 
FAO official whose roles brought him into close contact with various global fora, and whose 
analytical view of smallholders was of a constituency destined for eradication, to reflect back 
upon his assumptions. Participating on behalf of FAO at a meeting hosted by the Spanish 
government in Madrid, 26-27 Jan 2009 as part of a wider series of meetings to purpose of which 
was to progress the Global Partnership, he could not help but feel a debt of gratitude for the role 
played by La Via and the IPC during this meeting. Vocally denouncing both the idea and the 
attempts of its advocates to claim consensus around it, they delegitimised it as a prospect, and 
in so doing, protected his institution - the FAO (Conversation with FAO Official, Division 
Director, 10.9.2009). 
126 The position of entities such as the High Level Task Force of the Secretary-General on the 
issue of where the appropriate locus of global food security governance ought to be was hard to 
read. When I Interviewed its Coordinator, David Nabarro, whilst the reform processes were 
ongoing, he gave me the strong impression that he was not at all attached to the idea of a 
Global Partnership, or at the least, that he saw it as expressing more of an attitude of 
collaboration than the prospect of institutional relocation, or innovation (Interview, David 
Nabarro, 28.8.2009). However, coming out of the various meetings where the topic of 
governance reform was discussed, many civil society actors came away with the unequivocal 
view that he was in fact very committed to a New York-oriented movement, and was 
disappointed when this did not materialise (e.g., see ETC Group, 2009).  
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within civil society, following the successful conclusion of the process to 
develop and adopt a vision for reform of the CFS, the sense of a contest won 
was very palpable. This was reflected both in the title of IPC member, writer and 
actvist Nora McKeon’s press release, written days after the successful adoption 
of the CFS reform blueprint, and posted on La Via Campesina’s website, 
amongst other places: “A Food Battle Won” (McKeon, 2009b), and in the spirit 
of celebration which broke out amongst the civil society contingent – and 
member states - present at the 35th CFS meeting, when the reforms were 
adopted (Field Notes).   
 
The proposal, then, for a Global Partnership for Agriculture, Food Security and 
Nutrition, and the perception that this posed a threat to FAO/Rome-based food 
security governance spaces, can be regarded as a significant contributing factor 
to the rapidity with which the CFS reform moved from initiation to adoption.127 At 
the same time, however, and discussed below, this episode captures how the 
reformed CFS was “born” as it were into a potentially destabalising dynamic – 
competing ideas about where the locus of global food security governance 
ought to be – a dynamic which was both fully evident in the annual meeting of 
the 37th CFS, 2011, and which raises serious questions about the extent to 
which this body is going to be able to fulfill its – and those of constituencies like 
La Via Campesina – aspirations for political centrality.  
 
As noted above, at the start of 2009, shortly after the October decision of the 
34th CFS, 2008, to launch it, long-term FAO watchers amongst civil society 
were expressing somewhat muted expectations for this process of reform. 
However, in April 2009, the Contact Group established to formulate the reform 
blueprint held its first meeting, and by October of the same year the discussions 
and negotiations were complete (See BOX EIGHT for a brief overview of IPC 
participation in the Contact Group). In the following section I identify the ways in 
                                            
127 Of course, the fact that the member states of FAO – coming off the back of an extensive 
engagement with FAO’s own reform process – were “reform ready” as it were, was also an 
important part of the context, and member states recognised this as such (Interview, G77 
Country Ambassador, 29.9.2009). 
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which the body imagined within the reform blueprint can be said to promise to 
institutionalise a transnational public sphere in food and agriculture.  
 
BOX EIGHT: La Via and IPC Participation within the Contact Group 
Process 
 
In April 2009 the Contact Group established by the Bureau of the CFS to 
formulate a vision for reform of this body had its first meeting. Under the 
visionary leadership of its Chair – Argentinean Ambassador to FAO, Maria Del 
Carmen Squeff – the Bureau had taken the bold decision to open up 
participation within the Contact Group to a range of actors beyond states, 
including representatives of other UN entities of relevance to food and 
agriculture (e.g., IFAD, WFP, the HLTF) and, most importantly, civil society (the 
private sector were also invited, but their participation was minimal to non-
existent). Indeed, the participation rights assigned to civil society in this process 
were unprecedented, and, short of decision-making authority, were more or less 
equal to states (being able table and respond to reform proposals through the 
Contact Group’s website and attend and intervene within the physical meetings 
held at FAO.). At the conclusion of the process it was felt amongst member 
states and Bureau members that civil society participation had been an 
important determinant of the final outcome, particularly the high level of 
ambition embodied within the reform blueprint.  
 
From its first meeting in April 2009 to the adoption of the reform document in 
October later that year, the Contact Group met physically a total of seven times, 
with much website mediated activity in-between. During this time the reform 
blueprint went through a number of different drafts, as Contact Group 
participants worked within four Working Groups to consider 1) the Role and 
Vision of the renewed CFS; 2) its Membership and Decision Taking; 3) its 
Mechanisms and Procedures, and; 4) its High Level Panel of Experts. Within 
the context of these working groups discussion and negotiation focused 
implicitly upon such questions as: 
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Who should be entitled to participate in the renewed CFS and what should their 
participation rights be? 
What roles should the CFS play within the global food security “system” and 
how authoritative should it be? 
With which other parts of the international system should the CFS be related, 
and how?  
What mechanisms” does the renewed CFS need in order to be able to fulfill its 
roles?  
 
Given the types of questions being addressed and the range of participants 
involved (developed and developing countries, civil society, various UN actors 
etc) it was inevitable that during the Contact Group process there were going to 
be areas of disagreement. What is worth emphasising is that from the IPC’s 
perspective, a great many of these disagreements were resolved in favour of 
the positions that they had advocated from the outset. This outcome, of course, 
reflects the depth, quality and commitment of the IPC’s engagement with this 
process. 
 
In essence, the IPC consistently advocated for a reformed CFS:128 
 
With a strong, central role in the defining, overseeing implementation, and 
monitoring of global food security policy (including the development of a Global 
Strategic Framework for Food Security); 
 
In which states were the primary actors (holding decision-making authority and 
being generally accountable for the attainment of hunger reduction targets); 
 
With expanded participation opportunities for CSOs, (with a strong emphasis 
upon people’s organisations representing smallholder food producer and 
                                            
128 IPC positions within the reform discussions were articulated – outside of the Rome meetings 
– through a total of seven documents, submitted between the 27th April and the 13th October, 
2009. 
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providers, the urban poor, agricultural workers etc) built on the principle of CSO 
autonomy; 
 
Which had strong links with the different levels of food and agricultural activity, 
recognising that these levels were themselves important sites of policy 
initiatives, and of further democratisation, and; 
 
In which the Right to Food was an overarching reference.  
 
In each of these areas, as I discuss below, the IPC had good reason to feel 
very satisfied with the eventual reform blueprint. Of course it has to be noted 
that there were some important areas in which they were not able to secure the 
outcome they would’ve liked. For instance, the IPC were consistently opposed 
to the inclusion of the private sector, IFIs, the WTO, and philanthropic 
organisations within the list of CFS participants, arguing both that they lacked 
political legitimacy and that their inclusion would threaten the participation of 
smallholder producers and other People’s Organisations. The IPC was also 
opposed to any reference to the Global Partnership in the final document. In 
terms of their positive agenda, the IPC pushed for both a direct reference to 
“food sovereignty” within the reform blueprint, and – in order to strengthen the 
CFS as much as possible – the inclusion of “governance” under its roles and 
responsibilities. The resistance to both of these within the Contact Group 
process perhaps a useful reminder that both the content and location of food 
security policy-making and governance continue to be contested.  
 
(IPC submissions to the CFS Contact Group process between the 27th April and 
the 13th October, 2009; Interview, G77 Country Ambassador, FAO, 29.9.2009; 
Interview, G77 Country Representative, FAO, 25.11.2009; Field Notes).  
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4.The CFS: Promising a Public Sphere? 
 
When identifying the characteristics of the reformed UN Committee on World 
Food Security the existence of which allows us to see it as promising to 
institutionalise a transnational public sphere in food and agriculture, three sets 
of attributes – as articulated within the document that provides the blueprint for 
the reformed body - are relevant: It’s mandate and vision; its roles; and it’s 
composition.  
 
i. The Mandate and Vision of the Reformed CFS 
 
As noted above, the food price crisis catalysed dissatisfaction with the state of 
the international food security institutional architecture into two concerted 
attempts at reform – the Global Partnership being one, and reform of the CFS, 
the other. To an extent, the motivation behind these initiatives – at least that of 
the CFS process - can be implicitly fathomed within the mandate and vision 
assigned to the reformed CFS, which are essentially captured in two 
paragraphs within the reform document:  
 
  The reforms are designed to redefine the CFS’s vision and role to focus 
on the key challenges of eradicating hunger; expanding participation in the CFS 
to ensure that voices of all relevant stakeholders are heard in the policy debate 
on food and agriculture; adapt its rules and procedures with the aim to become 
the central United Nations political platform dealing with food security and 
nutrition; strengthening its linkages with regional, national and local levels; and 
supporting CFS discussions with structured expertise through the creation of a 
High Level Panel of Experts (HLPE) so that decisions and the work of the CFS 
are based on hard evidence and state of the art knowledge. 
  (CFS: 2009/2, Paragraph 2).  
 
 The reformed CFS […] will constitute the foremost inclusive international 
and intergovernmental platform for a broad range of committed stakeholders to 
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work together in a coordinated manner and in support of country-led processes 
towards the elimination of hunger and ensuring food security and nutrition for all 
human beings. 
  (CFS: 2009/2, Paragraph 4).  
 
In Chapters Four and Five I introduced some important dynamics of the context 
for this thesis, a context that can be read as implicitly informing the vision and 
aims elaborated in these paragraphs. One part of this was noted as the 
fragmentation that existed across all the different food and agriculturally 
relevant institutions and entities at the global level (which was also echoed at 
the sub-national level, or vice-versa, depending on where you start your 
analysis), and that can be regarded as informing both the accent placed upon 
“coordination”, and the status assigned to the CFS as the “foremost” and 
“central” global food security body. Another important part of the context 
concerns the general trajectory of food policy thinking in the post-war period. As 
I discussed in Chapter Four, this, in the contemporary period, is regarded as 
leading from an era of neoliberal dominance towards one in which both the 
ends and means of food policy are increasingly being called into question, as, 
for example, a wide range of different issues – the “new fundamentals” of food 
policy (Lang et al., 2009) – seek to impress themselves upon the policy agenda, 
and the food price crisis, as discussed above - just one of many contemporary 
crises - undermines the notion that markets left to their own devices are the 
best ways to secure the public good. This part of the context, and which is no 
doubt a consequence of the activities of La Via Campesina and others 
demonstrating that food policy is a contested terrain, can be gleaned in the 
mention made within the reform document to “policy debate”,129 which implies 
the recognition of contestation and uncertainty. The background rationale 
                                            
129 The recognition that food policy is a contested terrain shaped, in fact, the original proposal 
for the Global Partnership discussed above. In my interview with the French Ex-Civil Servant 
who was part of the team that originally conceived it, they explained how their design of the 
Partnership’s different components included spaces for encounter between competing, and 
indeed, conflicting, viewpoints, such as those on the most appropriate trade policies: “And the 
idea for this HLPE was to have a place where the controversies could be really explained, 
meaning for instance [we] still have people who think that we need to have more liberalization in 
agricultural trade, and other people advocate for kind of protectionism. Both sides have their 
own… evidences.” (Interview, French Ex-Civil Servant, 30.10.2009).  
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behind the stated commitment “to ensure that voices of all relevant 
stakeholders are heard in the policy debate on food and agriculture” is 
discussed in BOX NINE, below.  
 
 
BOX NINE Justifying CSO inclusion within global policy debates 
 
In an 18th May 2009 submission within the Contact Group process, the IPC 
stated that “The ‘Principles of Engagement’ with civil society constituencies in 
global policy forums listed in para.22 of CFS 2008/6 should be the basis for 
defining the role of civil society in the CFS.” (IPC, 2009: 2). The document 
referred to here by the IPC is of value when seeking to identify the rationales 
that informed the commitment, stated above, to “expanding participation in the 
CFS to ensure that voices of all relevant stakeholders are heard in the policy 
debate on food and agriculture”.  
 
The purpose of this document, situating itself in the context of the food price 
crisis and the value of the CFS as it sought to ensure “broadened engagement 
of civil society who are contributing to the solutions and responses especially at 
the field level.” (FAO, 2008c: Paragraph 18), and referencing the IEE’s 
emphasis upon the “importance of partnerships” in FAO’s work (FAO, 2008c: 
Paragraph 5), is stated as to review “the evolution of practices of civil society 
engagement in global policy debate within FAO and elsewhere in the UN 
system.” (FAO, 2008c: Paragraph 1). Included within the review is a list of 
justifications for FAO engagement with civil society, with the authors noting that 
“Experience demonstrates that FAO’s engagement with such organizations can: 
 
- enhance the validity and equity of policy debate and decision-making 
conducted under FAO auspices by ensuring that it takes into consideration the 
interests of all sectors of society and has their support;  
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- obtain substantive input into the normative130 activities of the Organization;  
- increase the effectiveness of FAO's field programme by drawing on the 
experience of CSOs/NGOs and by ensuring ownership of activities by the 
populations they are intended to benefit;  
- build public support and political will to attain food security objectives; make 
FAO's work more transparent and better known to a wider public;  
- harness additional resources by matching complementarities.” 
  (FAO 2008c: Paragraph 6).  
 
Clearly, this evaluation of the basis of FAO’s engagement with civil society 
extends beyond the two types of justification invoked by La Via Campesina and 
identified in Chapter Six – as those affected by policies, and those whose 
functional role endows them with knowledge and experience - though these are 
of course more or less acknowledged (within the first three, and final bullets). 
That is, it also includes the idea that civil society organisations can act as 
important channels to the “wider public”, and can contribute to the attainment of 
“political will”. This instrumental approach - without suggesting that anyone is 
seeking to justify civil society’s participation in global food policy processes on 
deontological terms, including La Via Campesina – extends to the idea that civil 
society participation is also important for generating “ownership” of FAO policies 
and actions.  
 
Within this document, which, aside from its being referenced by the IPC, is also 
cited by member states as an important reference document for the CFS,131 the 
                                            
130  It is important to note that the term “normative’ when used in the context of FAO’s work 
carries a somewhat unique meaning. For example, a 1998 FAO publication titled FAO’s 
Normative Role – A Review for Members and Partners defined normative thus:  
 “The work that FAO carries out under its mandate falls broadly into six categories, five 
of which may be described as normative and are examined in this paper, and one, the provision 
of technical assistance, which is operational. The normative activities cover: setting up, 
maintaining and constantly updating databases of statistical information; providing a world 
centre of knowledge, information and expertise; providing a neutral forum for policy dialogue 
among nations and for the preparation of international agreements; developing international 
norms, standards and conventions; and disseminating information in support of Member 
Nations.” 
  (FAO, 1998: pages unnumbered).  
131 As communicated to me in an email from Jess Duncan, a PhD Student also researching the 
CFS through a participatory methodology and whose thesis – predominantly focused upon the 
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participation of civil society is justified in a number of different ways. As well as 
acknowledging these different roles, the document also recognises that within 
the somewhat fuzzy category of “civil society” itself there are different 
constituencies and that differentiating between them, and clarifying the different 
types of contribution that each ought to make, is important:  
 
 It is important to recognize that civil society cannot be considered a 
single homogenous voice. Different kinds of organizations carry out different 
functions, defend different interests, and can lay claim to different forms of 
legitimacy. The distinction between non-profit CSOs and private sector 
associations is a fundamental one. So is the distinction between NGOs which 
undertake advocacy, emergency or development activities in favour of the rural 
populations of developing regions, on the one hand, and rural peoples’ 
organizations encompassing farmers’ and rural producers’ organisations which 
have a mandate to speak on behalf of their membership and are accountable to 
them, on the other. It is important to ensure that there is effective input from all 
the different constituencies and regions.  
  (FAO, 2008c: Paragraph 22) 
 
FAO. (2008c)  “Committee on World Food Security: Participation of Civil 
Society/Non-Governmental Organizations”, Document reference: CFS: 2008/6. 
ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/meeting/014/k3028e.pdf (30.11.2011).  
 
The vision and mandate of the reformed CFS are reflected in the roles that it 
was assigned during the Contact Group deliberations and negotiations.  
 
ii. The Roles of the Reformed CFS 
 
During the Contact Group process there was some controversy surrounding the 
timing with which the CFS would adopt its new roles, with OECD states in 
                                            
dynamic of civil society participation and beginning essentially where mine finishes – will make 
a vital contribution to our understandings of the challenges and meanings attached to the of 
participation of CSOs in global food and agricultural policy processes, (1.12.2011.) 
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particular pushing for a “phased” approach against the preferences of civil 
society and some G77 countries (Field notes, 2009). Though the reformed 
blueprint captures that, in the end, the countries pushing for a two-phased 
approach were successful, the implicit overlap between the roles assigned to 
the CFS within the different phases suggests that in practice it will be difficult to 
separate them. For example, according to the reform blueprint, in the first phase 
of reform implementation the roles assigned to the CFS will be i) Coordination 
at global level, (defined as providing a “platform for discussion and coordination 
to strengthen collaborative action”); ii) Policy convergence (defined as “promote 
greater policy convergence and coordination”); and iii) Support and advice 
(defined as “At country and/or region request, facilitate support and/or advice” 
pertaining to the development, implementation and monitoring of nationally 
owned plans of action for hunger reduction); (Paragraphs 5 i. ii. and iii).  
 
In Phase II, the “additional roles” of the CFS are to include i) Coordination at 
national and regional levels (defined as “Serve as a platform to promote greater 
coordination and alignment of actions in the field, encourage more efficient use 
of resources and identify resource gaps.”); ii) Promote accountability and share 
best practice at all levels (defined as “help countries and regions, as 
appropriate, address the questions of whether objectives are being achieved 
and how food insecurity and malnutrition can be reduced more quickly and 
effectively”); and, finally, iii. Develop a Global Strategic Framework for food 
security and nutrition “in order to improve coordination and guide synchronized 
action by a wide range of stakeholders.” (Paragraphs 6i. ii. and iii).  
 
Thus, though Coordination at global level and Develop a Global Strategic 
Framework are located as the first role of the first period and the last role of the 
second period, it seems exceptionally difficult to imagine – if the CFS is 
functioning properly – how global coordination can be achieved without having 
first clarified amongst all the various different actors whose collaboration is 
required for global coordination to have occurred (many of which are included 
amongst the ranks of those formally entitled to participate within the work of 
reformed CFS, discussed below) what their strategic objectives are. At the 
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least, the aspiration for global coordination would seem to imply a need to 
clarify strategic objectives from the outset.  
 
One thing that can be said with certainty is that, irrespective of the order in 
which the different roles are adopted, the roles that have been assigned to the 
reformed CFS can be regarded as embodying  – and seeking to operationalise - 
the reference to “policy debate” within its vision, as captured above. Whether 
achieving coordination at the global level, or developing a global strategic 
framework, it would seem that some form of discursive process is required in 
which, at the least, objectives/frameworks for action/general principles of 
coordination etc can be formulated. The inherently contested nature of that 
process, moreover, is anticipated by the number and range of actors now 
formally entitled to participate in the work of the reformed CFS,  given that, as 
discussed in Chapter Six, La Via Campesina see both TNCs (the “enemy”) and 
IFIs in a radically negative light.  
 
 
The two most important things to note about the composition of the reformed 
CFS are the breadth of actors now formally entitled to participate within its work, 
and the depth of their participation.  
 
iii. The Breadth of Actors and Depth of Participation Within the Reformed 
CFS 
 
These are defined in three categories – Members, Participants and Observers 
(CFS: 2009/2, Paragraph 7). Members are states, in particular “all Members of 
FAO, WFP or IFAD”. Members enjoy the right “to intervene in plenary and 
breakout discussions, approve meeting documents and agendas, submit and 
present documents and formal proposals, and interact with the Bureau132 during 
                                            
132 The Bureau of the CFS “represents the broader membership of the CFS between plenary 
sessions”. Its roles include preparing documents, setting agendas, sending requests and 
receiving inputs from the High Level Panel of Experts, facilitating necessary coordination to 
facilitate its intersessional work, and overseeing the reform of the CFS. The Bureau consists of 
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the inter-sessional period.” Importantly, “Voting and decision taking is the 
exclusive prerogative of Members, including drafting the final reporting of CFS 
Plenary sessions.” (CFS: 2009/2, Paragraph 10).  
 
The second category – Participants – is where the CFS’s aspirations for 
inclusivity are fully evident. This category is sub-divided into five sub-categories. 
The first of these includes “Representatives of UN agencies and bodies with a 
specific mandate in the field of food security and nutrition such as FAO, IFAD, 
WFP, the HLTF (as a coordinating mechanism of the UN-SG) and 
representatives of other relevant UN System bodies whose overall work is 
related to attaining food security, nutrition, and the right to food such as the 
Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, the Office of the UN High 
Commissioner on Human Rights, WHO, UNICEF, UNDP, Standing Committee 
on Nutrition (SCN).” (Paragraph 11i). 
 
The second of the sub-categories is “Civil society and non-governmental 
organizations and their networks with strong relevance to issues of food 
security and nutrition”. Importantly, and reflecting the CFS’s aspiration to ensure 
that the CFS hears the voices of “those most affected by food insecurity” 
(Paragraph 7), the reform blueprint states that “particular attention” should be 
given to “organizations representing smallholder family farmers, artisanal 
fisherfolk, herders/pastoralists, landless, urban poor, agricultural and food 
workers, women, youth, consumers, Indigenous Peoples, and International 
NGOs whose mandates and activities are concentrated in the areas of concern 
to the Committee.” (Paragraph, 11.ii). The final three categories of Participants 
are 11.iii) International agricultural research systems (e.g., the CGIAR), 11.iv) 
International and regional Financial Institutions including World Bank, 
                                            
a Chairperson and 12 members (CFS: 2009/2, Paragraphs 29/30). The Advisory Group 
provides a bridge between Participants within the CFS and the Bureau, and its function is to 
“provide input to the Bureau regarding the range of tasks which the CFS Plenary has instructed 
it to perform.” (CFS, 2009/2, Paragraph 32). The Advisory Group is not to exceed the 
membership numbers of the Bureau and its 13 members serve the same term as the Bureau – 
two years. The seats of the Advisory Group are allocated: 5 amongst UN Bodies and Agencies 
with Mandates in Food Security and Nutrition; 4 amongst CSOs and NGOs, 1 from International 
Agricultural Research Bodies, 1 from International Financial and Trade Institutions, and 2 from 
the Private Sector/Philanthropic Foundations. 
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International Monetary Fund, regional development banks and World Trade 
Organization (WTO), and 11.v) Representatives of private sector associations 
and private philanthropic foundations. The final category of those entitled to 
participate in the work of the CFS are “Observers”. This category includes 
“other interested organizations relevant to [the CFS’s] work” and who “may be 
invited by the Chair to intervene during discussions.” (Paragraphs, 13, and 
13.iii).133  
 
It is clear from looking at the range of actors included within the category of 
Participants that the CFS seeks to engage a vast range of different actors in its 
work. Importantly, the participation of these actors is intended to be deep, with 
their participation rights – notwithstanding decision-making authority134 – equal 
to states.135 Indeed, the depth of participation opportunities assigned to CSOs 
within the reformed CFS are, in the words of Nora McKeon - whose study of 
civil society engagement across the UN system is the most up to date and 
comprehensive on the subject - “unprecedented” (McKeon, 2009). These rights 
extend, moreover, to both the annual meetings of the CFS – its “plenary” – and 
the ongoing programme of work to prepare for the plenary discussion in-
between – its “intersessional work”.  
 
                                            
133 The reform blueprint states that: 
“Such organizations could include: 
i) Regional associations of countries and regional intergovernmental development institutions; 
ii) Local, national, regional and global CSOs/NGOs, other than those attending as participants, 
which are active in areas related to food security, nutrition, and the right to food, particularly 
organizations which are linked to a regional or global networks; 
iii) Other networks or associative organizations including local authorities, foundations and 
research or technical institutions.” 
  (CFS:2009/2, Paragraph 13).  
134 Within the Contact Group process a proposal was indeed made – by a representative from a 
UN institution – for civil society to enjoy decision-making rights also. However, the organisations 
within the IPC participating within the process rejected this idea, on the grounds that diluting the 
principle that member states alone hold decision-making authority could open the door to TNC 
acquisition of this right (Based on Conversations with IPC participants in the Contact Group).  
135 “Participants take part in the work of the Committee with the right to intervene in plenary and 
breakout discussions to contribute to preparation of meeting documents and agendas, submit 
and present documents and formal proposals. They commit to contribute regularly to 
intersessional activities of the Committee at all levels and interact with the Bureau during the 
intersessional period through the Advisory Group established by the Bureau.” (CFS:2009/2, 
Paragraph 12).  
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iiii. The Blueprint for CFS Reform: Institutionalising the Public Sphere 
 
In Chapter Three, following a discussion of Habermas’s STPS and subsequent 
critical responses to and qualifications of his ideas, I arrived at the following 
definition of a public sphere, describing it as: 
 
 The space in which affected publics communicate and contest 
(symbolically and rationally) with (political) authority in the context of policy and 
governance debate. 
 
In these terms, and given the characteristics captured above, I propose 
therefore that the body envisioned within the document the purpose of which is 
to provide a blueprint for reform of the CFS can be read as promising to 
institutionalise a transnational public sphere in food and agriculture. That is, 
through its aspiration to create an inclusive, politically efficacious discursive 
arena.  
 
Beyond the features defined above, the reform blueprint of the CFS identifies 
and establishes a number of different mechanisms and aspirations to help it to 
attain its vision. For instance, to ensure both that the CFS is “aware of the 
reality on the ground” and that CFS outputs are “disseminated” at the regional, 
sub-regional, country and global, the CFS aspires to have strong and 
meaningful linkages with those levels.136  And to ensure that discussions within 
the CFS benefit from “structured food security and nutrition-related expertise to 
better inform its sessions” (CFS, 2009/2, Paragraph 36) a High Level Panel of 
Experts has been constituted to undertake and oversee research on specific 
CFS agenda topics. And to facilitate their participation and to respect their 
autonomy, the reform blueprint states that “Civil society organizations/NGOs 
and their networks will be invited to autonomously establish a global 
mechanism for food security and nutrition which will function as a facilitating 
body for CSO/NGO consultation and participation in the CFS.” (CFS:2009/2, 
                                            
136  “[i]t will be fundamental for the CFS, through its Bureau and Advisory Group of the CFS, to 
nurture and maintain linkages with different actors” at these levels (CFS:2009/2, Paragraph 23). 
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Paragraph 16). This body is otherwise known as the Civil Society Mechanism 
(CSM).  
 
It is also important to note, however, that the reform blueprint is quite vague, or 
lacking in important details, about how to operationalise many of its stated 
aspirations. For example, with regards to its ambition to be the “central United 
Nations political platform dealing with food security and nutrition” the document 
generates uncertainty about how this objective might be attained by not 
providing any information about how, for instance, the reformed CFS proposes 
to establish linkages with the various global level bodies that are, in one way or 
another, deemed relevant for food and agriculture. Or where it seems an 
attempt has been made to identify such a linkage, the language seems so weak 
and lacking in ambition as to strip the aspiration of any meaning.137 Indeed, this 
lack of detail here meant that, even in the immediate euphoria of the period 
following the reform blueprint adoption, some member states were already 
expressing very low expectations regarding the level of influence that the CFS 
was likely to enjoy (Conversation, G77 Country Ambassador, FAO, 
26.11.2009). To an extent this lack of clarity reflects the disagreements within 
the Contact Group, discussed above, regarding the level of political ambition 
that should be assigned to the reformed body - a dynamic that is clearly visible 
in the post-reform context, discussed below. 
 
Another seemingly important omission within the reform blueprint concerns the 
ways in which the commitment to inclusivity is to be operationalised in the 
implementation period. To an extent this should not be surprising, given that the 
history of UN-civil society relations communicates how responsibility for 
bridging the disconnect between the discussions and decision-making 
processes of member states and Civil Society Organisations trying to influence 
                                            
137  Paragraph 21 of the reform blueprint states that “The results of the CFS Plenary shall be 
reported to the FAO Conference and to the UN General Assembly (UNGA) through ECOSOC. 
The Chair of the CFS shall consult with ECOSOC and take all necessary actions so that 
modalities for meaningful reporting be established and implemented. CFS Participants, 
including UN and other intergovernmental agencies, NGOs and CSOs are encouraged to 
consider in their respective governing bodies the outcomes of the CFS which are relevant to 
their own activities.” [Emphasis added]. It doesn’t really need pointing out that “encouraged to 
consider” seems some way short of fulfilling the aspiration for political centrality.  
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and seek voice within these processes has predominantly fallen to the latter 
(McKeon, 2009).  However, given the range of actors now formally entitled to 
participate in the work of the reformed CFS – who bring with them, amongst 
others, vastly different resource endowments - and the fact that the reform 
blueprint places a special emphasis upon the participation of “those most 
affected by food insecurity”, serious questions can be asked about the types of 
interventions, processes and mechanisms that are going to be required to give 
weight to this aspiration, and the extent to which member states are going to be 
willing to support the commitment to rural constituency participation with 
resources.138  
 
And finally, and related to the challenge of operationalising the CFS’s inclusivity 
aspirations, the document is completely silent about how to give meaningful 
form to its stated vision facilitating “policy debate”. This, I believe, evidences a 
chronic failure to appreciate the distinctions between the different types of 
debate that are relevant to food policy. This distinction hinges essentially on the 
difference between normative/moral debates – what do we value and why? – 
and technical debates – how do we achieve particular objectives? The lack of 
clarity around the difference between these two different types of discussion – 
though the normative/moral debates of course implicitly inform the technical 
debates – replicates I believe the lack of clarity surrounding the terms on which 
La Via and others aspire to participate in global food policy processes. That is, 
whether or not they participate on the basis of their identity as citizens or on the 
basis of their functional identity as agri-food system practitioners. The lack of 
                                            
138 The norm that civil society ought to be the ones to bridge this gap is surprisingly strong, even 
amongst those countries whose domestic and multilateral policies embody a very strong 
commitment to the idea of civil society participation. For instance, one member state 
representative from such a country complained to me about the disconnects between the 
Declaration produced by civil society at their 2009 parallel forum, and that which had been 
produced by states in the FAO Summit. He felt that developing countries had been able to 
secure a victory there by establishing the principle of member-state determination of national 
food security planning, but that the failure by civil society to acknowledge this within their 
declaration was damaging to the process and draining for its participants. “They should pay 
more attention”, he complained. Lost on him, and me at the time, however, was the idea that the 
absence of civil society appreciation of developing country success in this forum was not a 
result of their lack of attention but of the states’ lack of communication. Challenging these 
background norms will be a fundamental part of the process of operationalising the aspiration 
for inclusivity within the reformed CFS (Interview, G77 Country Representative, 25.11.2009).  
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clarity regarding the status of both the discussions and of the participants within 
them leads to messiness in both areas, as can be seen, as I discuss in the final 
section of this chapter, in the experiences within the CFS, post-reform blueprint 
implementation. The inherently contested nature of CFS policy debates, 
moreover, is anticipated by the number and range of actors now formally 
entitled to participate in the work of the reformed CFS, given that, as discussed 
in Chapter Six, La Via Campesina see both TNCs (the “enemy”) and IFIs in a 
radically negative light. 
 
Notwithstanding the omissions identified above, we can say that, tentatively, the 
blueprint that maps out the contours of the reformed CFS can be read as 
promising to institutionalise a transnational public sphere in food and 
agriculture. In the final section of this chapter I will shift the focus from the 
document that maps out the blueprint of reform to the actual process of reform 
implementation. Looking at this process from three perspectives – an interview 
with the Vice-Chair of the CFS, observations at the 2011 annual CFS Plenary, 
and the actions and statements of other global level bodies and processes – 
reveals, in two of the three main aspirations - inclusivity and policy debate - a 
very mixed and somewhat complicated picture. In relation to the CFS’s 
aspirations for political centrality, however, the picture seems quite stark, the 
most recent data suggesting that the CFS is a very long way from fulfilling its 
aspirations to become “the foremost inclusive international and 
intergovernmental platform” for food security.   
 
5. Beyond Reform: Promise Fulfilled or Failed?  
 
As discussed above, the blueprint for CFS reform was successfully adopted at 
the CFS’s 35th annual session, in October 2009. Following this adoption, the 
mood and expectations amongst those connected to the process was generally 
very high, and as the newly created mechanisms of the CFS, and newly 
appointed actors within them, began to take up their work agendas, they did so 
with a degree of excitement and optimism (Field notes). The lack of funding, 
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however, to support the creation of the mechanism to facilitate civil society’s 
participation in the work of the reformed CFS – the CSM – cast some early 
doubts upon the extent to which member states were going to follow through on 
the commitment they had made in the reform blueprint. And the “interfering” of 
FAO officials in the process to select a Steering Committee for the High Level 
Panel of Experts, whilst providing early indication of a dynamic that would 
continue to pose a serious challenge for the work of the CFS beyond, was 
another major hurdle that meant that the honeymoon period of post-CFS reform 
adoption was a short one.139 However, in this first year, the work to give form to 
the roles and aspirations of the reform blueprint progressed fairly steadily, and 
the first post-reform adoption Plenary (October 2010) came and went without 
any major crises, and many stakeholders (particularly civil society and those 
within the CFS’s steering mechanisms) felt buoyed and positive by the general 
momentum (Field Notes).  
 
To an extent the relative lack of controversy during the first year of the reformed 
CFS can be attributed to the nature of the work and the decisions taken during 
this period, which were mainly procedural. This at least was the view of Vice-
Chair to the CFS, Hugo Verbist, when I interviewed him just one month before 
the CFS’s second post-reform annual Plenary meeting, between October 17-22, 
2011. In the run-up to this second meeting, however, there were signs that as 
the CFS moved into its more substantive work – facilitating policy dialogue and 
convergence – it would find itself in a more sensitive position, particular 
regarding its aspirations for political centrality (see Box TEN, A Snapshot of 
CFS implementation via an interview with its Vice-Chair, Hugo Verbist). Indeed, 
my observations at the 37th CFS, and following events, communicate that – in 
each of the three areas of political centrality, inclusivity, and policy debate – the 
implementation of CFS reform is becoming much more tested. 
                                            
139 As relayed to me in an interview with the Vice-Chair of the CFS, Belgian diplomat, Hugo 
Verbist, 14.9.2011.  
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BOX TEN A Snapshot of CFS implementation via an interview with its 
Vice-Chair, Hugo Verbist 
 
“The potential is there, but we are not completely there yet.”  
  (Vice-Chair to the CFS, Hugo Verbist, 14.9.2009).  
 
Elected Vice-Chair to the CFS in November 2009, the perspective of Hugo 
Verbist, recorded by me in an interview one month before the second post-
reform annual Plenary, provides a valuable insight into the challenges faced by 
the CFS as it seeks to give form to the aspirations contained in its reform 
blueprint. Whilst generally being both positive about the work that had already 
been achieved and challenges so far overcome, and optimistic for the future, in 
our interview Hugo identified a number of important and potentially problematic 
dynamics confronting the implementation of CFS reforms. Though these 
dynamics touch upon a number of areas of the CFS’s work, those related to its 
internal functioning and its aspirations for political centrality stand out.  
 
Internal Functioning 
 
As the Vice-Chair of the Bureau of the CFS between November 2009 and 
October 2011, Hugo has acquired a sustained, first hand experience of the 
work of this mechanism, which, it will be recalled, has a central role within the 
CFS both in representing member states within the intersessional period (its 
work outside of the annual Plenary), and in coordinating and overseeing the 
CFS’s work in general.140 Given the scale of the ambition contained in the 
reform blueprint, it’s of course logical to expect that this key coordinating 
mechanism needs to be working on full capacity. Hugo’s experience 
communicates, however that this in not the case, with only a handful of its 12 
                                            
140 The Bureau of the CFS “represents the broader membership of the CFS between plenary 
sessions”. Its roles include preparing documents, setting agendas, sending requests and 
receiving inputs from the High Level Panel of Experts, facilitating necessary coordination to 
facilitate its intersessional work, and overseeing the reform of the CFS. The Bureau consists of 
a Chairperson and 12 members (CFS: 2009/2, Paragraphs 29/30). 
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members (excluding the Chair) meaningfully active (doing work between 
meetings). Given that, according to Hugo, the exigencies of Bureau 
membership already ask for state representatives to go well beyond their 
normal state-first attitude and commit much more of their work-load to this body 
than they would serving on other Bureaus, he identified this lack of active 
participation amongst the greater majority of the Bureau membership as an 
obvious obstacle to the CFS’s full attainment of its roles and visions. That the 
full Bureau was up for re-election at the 37th Plenary, in October 2011, also 
raised serious questions about the extent to which the “institutional memory” of 
the CFS – knowing what happened and why – was likely to be preserved.  
 
Political centrality  
 
Beyond the variability in the level of work being undertaken by different 
members of the Bureau (some of the reasons for which, because of their 
already heavy workloads and the fact that in many instances countries have just 
one person to represent them at the 3 Rome-based UN food agencies, Hugo 
understood), internal Bureau dynamics, as perceived by Hugo, were also 
relevant in identifying challenges faced by the CFS as it seeks to fulfill its 
aspirations for political centrality. Firstly, at quite a local scale, the degree to 
which the Rome-based representatives of the broader state membership of the 
CFS are involved with and following the CFS varies from region to region. This 
is in part because of variability in the extent to which member states in the 
Bureau report back and consult with their regional groupings whom, within their 
work in the Bureau, they are meant to represent. Given that their 
representatives at the CFS are the first channel for member states wanting to 
participate within and follow the work of the CFS, this variability in Bureau-
geographical region reporting is of course problematic. Beyond this, however, 
Hugo identified that – in the case of the minority of the Bureau membership that 
could be said to be active – though apparently committed to making it an 
efficient and effective body - there could be discerned a variability in their level 
of commitment to the idea that the CFS ought to be the central political space 
for food security at the global level. Whilst some regions seemed strongly 
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supportive of this, others were cold, and others seemed indifferent. The 
comments and responses of member states at the 2011 annual Plenary, 
discussed below, confirm the variability in the level of commitment that member 
states attach to this idea, with some in fact actively intervening to diminish the 
strength of CFS communications or to restrict its sphere of influence. Moreover, 
the fact that, as Hugo communicated, the Bureau was often too preoccupied 
with its internal functioning to even find time for the issue of its political centrality 
– beyond the work undertaken by its Chair, Noel De Luna, as he represented 
the CFS in various other global bodies and meetings – reveals obviously 
another dynamic of concern to the CFS’s capacity to fulfill this aspiration.  
 
Moving outside of the CFS, the fact that some of the issues taken by the CFS 
were also being addressed by other global bodies and processes was identified 
by Hugo as potentially posing a challenge to the CFS’s aspirations for political 
centrality. In the case of the CFS’s work on food price volatility, for example, 
discussed below, G20 engagement here - though generally welcomed by Hugo 
- did raise questions for him about which body would in the end be defining the 
international response. The fact that there was “no clear process” for 
establishing a relationship between the G20 and the CFS did not diminish 
Hugo’s sense of optimism, and he believed that the G20, meeting after the 37th 
CFS at its Summit in Cannes, France, 3-4 November, “cannot neglect what the 
CFS said before because in the CFS there was a decision from all the member 
states”. Unfortunately, however, the declaration issued by the G20 after its 
November Summit reveals that not only did it neglect the CFS’s outputs on food 
price volatility, but – in contrast to a generally positive attitude expressed by it 
towards the CFS in previous G8/G20 Declarations – it omitted any reference to 
the CFS in any of its statements on food security (see below). This raises 
profound and difficult questions about the extent to which, in practice, the CFS 
is going to be able to claim for itself the status of global politically central food 
security body, as outlined in its reform blueprint.  
 
For Hugo, the issues of the CFS’s political centrality and general functioning 
were not separate, it being a chicken-and-egg situation whether high level 
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political support comes before effective decision-making, or after.141 Moreover, 
beyond those identified above, Hugo also identified a number of important 
issues relevant to the CFS’s work, including the disproportional scale of the 
budget relative to the volume of new roles assigned to the reformed CFS; the 
suggestion of ongoing tensions between FAO senior officials and the High 
Level Panel of Experts of the CFS; and the challenges of defending and 
advancing civil society inclusion in the face of the different views on the 
desirability of this to be found within one geographical region and another. All in 
all, the dynamics relayed by Hugo in our interview communicate with an 
irresistible clarity that turning the vision of CFS reform as articulated within its 
reform blueprint into reality will be far from an easy matter.  
 (Interview, Hugo Verbist, Member of Belgian Representation at FAO, 
Vice-Chair Committee on World Food Security, 14.9.2011.) 
 
 
i. The 37th Annual Session of the Committee on World Food Security  
 
As noted above, since the session at which its reform blueprint was adopted – 
the 35th, in October 2009 - by the time of its 37th annual session,  between 17-
22 October 2011, the Committee on World Food Security had only  met once in 
its reformed composition. Whilst to an extent the focus of this earlier meeting – 
the 36th – can be described as “procedural”, the launch here of the Civil Society 
Mechanism – established by civil society to facilitate their autonomous 
participation in the work of the CFS, and the result of a very great collaborative 
effort between a range of committed and diverse CSOs – was a major 
landmark, and was acknowledged as such both within civil society and by 
member states (CSM. 2010).  As I discuss in the Conclusion to this thesis, that I 
have not had the time and space to devote to a discussion and analysis of this 
                                            
141 The fact, however, that US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, in a May address to the FAO, 
whilst mentioning a wide range of different global level body and processes as being relevant in 
the fight against food security, did not mention the CFS (despite the U.S. being an active 
member of the Bureau) was, to Hugo, “quite shocking”. 
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instrument has resulted in a major (but inevitable) omission.142 As the 
mechanism that seeks to provide a bridge between the (aspirant) global 
discursive arena of the CFS and civil society organisations at the ground, the 
CSM – like La Via Campesina - has a major role to play in realising the public 
sphere being argued for by me within this thesis. Indeed, though the 
interactions within civil society have been bracketed out of my methodology, it is 
impossible to fully evaluate and determine the prospects for inclusive 
transnational food and agricultural policy debates without some attention to 
them. In Chapter Eight, the conclusion to this thesis, I elaborate on this point as 
well as establishing an important methodological principle for determining 
“representativity”.  
 
Beyond this major landmark, however, the 36th CFS was also notable for 
requesting from the CFS’s High Level Panel of Experts a number of studies – 
two of which (on price volatility and agricultural investments), it was intended, 
would form the basis for discussion at next year’s Plenary, the 37th. The format 
for discussion of these issues in the reformed CFS was provided by 
“roundtables”.  
 
a. Roundtable “Debate” at the 37th CFS 
 
According to the document provided to delegates at the 37th CFS the purpose 
of which was to provide “Provisional guidelines” on the three Roundtable 
discussions, the objective of these sessions was “to highlight some of [the key 
issues that affect food security and nutrition] with a view to arriving at 
recommendations which promote coherence among the policies of various 
stakeholders.” (CFS, 2011d). In terms of format, the “background” to each 
discussion was provided by a concept note (CFS, 2011b, c and h), which, in the 
case of two of the roundtables, was augmented by a document (CFS, 2011a 
and g) featuring “extracts” from the report of the HLPE conducted on the issue 
                                            
142 Although, as I mentioned above, research being conducted by a PhD colleague - Jess 
Duncan, Centre for Food Policy, City University, London - promises to rectify this omission. 
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being discussed (CFS, 2011f and e). The session itself was divided into two 
parts – the first part featuring panel “presentations”, and the second part 
consisting of an “open floor discussion”. Two – very important - roles were also 
defined by this guideline document. Firstly, that of the “Chair”, who would “invite 
panellists to make their presentations and will summarise the major points and 
recommendations coming from the session”. And, secondly, that of the 
“Rapporteur”, whose role was to present “key findings and recommendations 
from each policy round table” to the Plenary (CFS, 2011d).  
 
The three roundtables at the 37th CFS were: 
 
a. How To Increase Food Security and Smallholder Sensitive Investment in 
Agriculture; 
 
b. Gender, Food Security and Nutrition; 
 
c. Food Price Volatility. 
 
As I discuss above, in the interview that I conducted with the Vice-Chair of the 
CFS, Hugo Verbist, one month before the 37th annual Plenary meeting, he 
identified two potentially problematic dynamics impacting upon both the 
preparation and potential meaning of these sessions. Firstly, in preparing the 
concept notes for each roundtable, the Secretariat of the CFS – FAO Staff – 
though generally performing at a very high level under resource constraints, 
were paying insufficient attention to the reports that had been commissioned 
and produced by the HLPE on the issues under discussion. This was reflected, 
for instance, in the lack of reference to the findings of these reports in the 
discussion boxes within each document, a tendency that member states had to 
work hard to rectify. And the second point, and perhaps more important, was 
the presence of parallel and potentially competing global processes addressing 
the issues under discussion in two of the roundtables – price volatility and 
agricultural investments. In the case of price volatility, for example, at their 
meeting in Paris on the 22-23 June, just under four months before the 37th CFS, 
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G20 Agricultural Ministers agreed their “Action Plan on Food Price Volatility and 
Agriculture”, within which they stated that: 
 
 We, the G20 Agriculture Ministers, meet today to address the issue of 
food price volatility with the ultimate objective to improve food security and 
agree on an “Action Plan on food price volatility and agriculture” that will be 
submitted to our Leaders at their Summit in November 2011. 
  (G20, 2011a).  
 
In spite of what this already suggested for the CFS’s aspirations for political 
centrality – the fact that the G20 had taken on this issue whilst the CFS was 
already engaged in a process to address it – Hugo was optimistic that the latter 
meeting of G20 leaders would in fact pay heed to the outcomes of the CFS 
roundtable.  
 
Drawing from my observations from two of the three roundtables at the 37th 
CFS I will, in what remains of this chapter, review the degree to which the CFS 
can be said to be fulfilling its aspirations for policy debate, inclusivity, and 
political centrality. 
 
b. The 37th CFS - Fulfilling its Aspirations for Policy Debate? 
 
On the basis of my observations within the roundtables at the 37th CFS, the first 
thing to note, when thinking about the extent to which the CFS is able to fulfill its 
reform blueprint, is that its aspirations to operationalise policy debate and for 
political centrality cannot be separated. Nowhere was this clearer than when the 
discussions within the roundtables turned to the issue of trade. As was noted 
above, one effect of the food price crisis 2007-2008 was to call into question the 
neoliberal precepts which underpinned, for instance, the creation of the WTO 
and the adoption of its Agreement on Agriculture, as evidenced in the 
exchanges between the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, Olivier De 
Schuter, and the Director-General of the WTO, Pascal Lamy. In the roundtable 
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on Price Volatility, to an extent, this debate over the most appropriate trading 
arrangements to enhance food security became part of the CFS agenda. The 
basis for this discussion or exchange of views was contained in the report by 
the High Level Panel of Experts “Price Volatility and Food Security” (CFS, 
2011a). In its section “Recommendations”, under the heading “Trade Rules”, 
and after making the introductory statement, “Building a rules-based multilateral 
trading system able to guarantee food access for every country is now a major 
challenge for the international community”, the HLPE report makes a number of 
recommendations for “reconsidering” trade rules. These include, within point 
1.a) giving a “larger place to public policy concerns regarding food security”; 
within point 1.c) exploring “distinct rules” for low-income food-deficit countries; 
point 8.c)  “The CFS should coordinate short and long term policy measures 
taken in relation to price spikes (considering trade barriers, food aid, input 
subsidies, stocks, etc…”; and point 8.f) “The CFS, as the highest governance 
body on world food security should stimulate and facilitate debate and learning 
on food security issues, including as a forum for more open debate on how 
agricultural trade rules could support food security” (CFS, 2011a: 4-7). 
However, in the open floor discussion, Argentina rejected these 
recommendations, arguing that it could not endorse them because they would 
result in a “duplication of diplomatic effort” and would put the CFS on a “collision 
course” with the WTO. Unfortunately, as I discuss below, these interventions to 
restrict the authority sphere of the CFS were not isolated.  
 
If disagreement regarding the appropriate authority sphere of the CFS was one 
salient feature of the roundtable debates, another concerns the lack of clarity, 
within the debate format, between normative/moral issues and technical issues. 
In Chapter Four I identified how perceptions of what counts as a policy problem 
or solution, or of the different types of agri-food systems are implicitly informed 
by background norms on the ends of agri-food systems and the rights and 
duties of agri-food system actors. Recognising this linkage makes it clear that it 
is not possible to make a determination of the desirability of this or that 
technical solution – means – in the absence of clarity regarding the framework 
within which that determination is made - ends. This framework is provided by 
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norms – efficiency, effectiveness, ecological sustainability, equity, cultural 
appropriateness, political autonomy, safety, and so on. If the CFS, therefore, is 
going to take its work seriously facilitating policy convergence, then it needs to 
clarify the normative criteria that are used in making the determination of value 
between one policy instrument and another. Unfortunately, the 37th CFS made it 
clear that no attempt was made in the structure of the roundtables – and 
beyond – to differentiate between these two distinctive though interrelated 
spheres of discussion.  
 
A pertinent example of this emerged in the presentation of the HLPE report on 
“Land Tenure and International Investments in Agriculture”. When the 
discussion turned to “agroecological principles”, one delegate from the 
International Foundation for Organic Agriculture (IFOAM) took issue with the 
report’s inclusion of industrial agricultural practices – the usage of chemical 
fertilisers and pesticides – within this category. In response, the lead author 
replied that it was undesirable to rule out certain technologies. The exchange 
illustrated a dynamic that was prevalent throughout every session – that each 
participant was using their own evaluative criteria and that in the absence of 
common evaluative criteria it will be very difficult to build anything resembling a 
“policy convergence”. Indeed, as I emphasise in the conclusion to this thesis, 
contest over these background norms is fundamental to the policy debate in 
food and agriculture that La Via Campesina seek to provoke and participate 
within and which forms the focus of the discursive arenas in the public sphere 
being argued for in this thesis.  
 
Beyond these observations another important set of observations relevant to 
the CFS’s aspirations to facilitate policy debate relate to the success or 
otherwise of the format. Firstly, it has to be noted that – at least in the sessions I 
observed – there was very little in the way of “debate”. The contributions of 
delegates were in the main unidirectional – that is, they made interventions on 
the text presented before them, or on other reference points, but not really in 
relation to each other. This, it seemed to me was a function of two dynamics. 
One of these was the amount of time available for the discussion (a morning or 
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afternoon session) relative to the range of issues being addressed and the 
number of delegates within the room - typically over 200 in any given session. 
There simply was nowhere near enough time. The second dynamic was the 
representative basis in which delegates participated. For instance, civil society 
were given a handful of slots within the open floor discussion, their interventions 
for which had been prepared in (their own autonomous) previous meetings. 
Whilst member states – excluding the EU states - just represented themselves, 
the collective basis in which the civil society representatives participated means 
that it’s much harder for them to respond – without caucusing – to emerging 
statements. Though, in practice, the lack of time meant that in the sessions that 
I observed this last dynamic was pretty much irrelevant.  
 
Other format issues that stood out included the Chairs of the sessions seeming 
woefully ill-equipped to manage a “debate” on this scale, with their “summing 
up” and interventions limited to quite floral, insubstantial diplo-speak, and 
showing little capacity in terms of guiding the discussions or in maintaining a 
faithfulness to the role and visions of the CFS; and a lack of transparency 
around the process by which interventions made during the roundtable and 
plenary sessions would in fact be captured by the Rapporteur and translated 
into CFS outputs. Indeed, this latter point became crucial in the Roundtable on 
Price Volatility, as discussed below. 
 
c. The 37th CFS - Fulfilling its Aspirations for Inclusivity? 
 
Starting with a positive, the first thing to note about the inclusivity of the 37th 
CFS was that, when compared to the extent of their participation in other 
intergovernmental spaces – limited to a couple of statements at the end of the 
meeting once all the decisions had been taken – the opportunities for CSOs to 
participate within the new format have of course radically increased. One 
obvious manifestation of this was the inclusion of a civil society representative 
amongst the (4-5) panelists whose presentations opened the roundtables, 
discussed above. When it came to the open floor discussions of the roundtable 
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and the plenary, however, the extent to which the CFS was able to 
operationalise its inclusivity was patchy, for the full range of stakeholders – 
beyond states – in attendance.143  
 
The most critical challenge, however, to the CFS’s attempts to operationalise its 
inclusivity came in the closing session of the Roundtable on Price Volatility. 
Despite their formal participation rights, the civil society delegates within the 
room found that their requests to speak were going unheeded by the Chair, who 
consistently passed them over to give the floor to member states. Faced with 
the reality of their marginalisation from the discussion, and concerned in any 
case about the extent to which their interventions had been accurately recorded 
in earlier stages of the discussion, after caucusing and establishing a 
consensus, they walked out.144  
 
The reasons for the CSO walkout were stated very clearly in a press release 
posted onto the website used by CSOs to facilitate their participation in the 
CFS. In it, they stated that they walked out “to protest the systematic 
marginalisation of our participation”, noting that their views (on trade, biofuels 
and food reserves) had been ignored throughout the whole process of the 
roundtable, from the early formation of the agenda and the discussion points 
through to the actual discussion. Moreover, in the summing up and the session 
reporting, the Rapporteur and the Chairman “inaccurately represented our 
                                            
143 At one point I was sitting just a few seats away from the representative of the World Bank. 
Wanting to intervene in a discussion point, he raised his name card to signal to the Chair, who 
either ignored or did not notice him. Again the World Bank representative raised his arm, trying 
to attract the attention of the Chair. Again he was ignored/unnoticed. Though a minute or so had 
passed since his first attempt at intervention, he tried one last time to attract the attention of the 
seemingly myopic chair, before finally conceding defeat, getting up and leaving. The World 
Bank representative’s lack of success in attracting the Chair’s attention I attributed to his 
location within the room – a vast, rectangular plenary room with a wide central area where 
member states sat, and two angled banks of seating at either side for guests/observers. He was 
seated right at the very front, but to the far left side of the central area, and I think the Chair just 
couldn’t pick him up there in his peripheral vision.  
144 Though I was not there to witness it the visual impact of this must have been very significant 
– the Final Report of the 37th CFS records that over 80 CSO organisations were in attendance 
(CFS, 2011i) and amongst civil society delegates themselves the total number of individuals 
participating from CSOs was estimated at well over 100.  
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views”.145 This meant that, “the opportunity to craft a coherent approach and to 
take policy decisions shared by all countries and relevant stakeholders, 
especially those affected by food price volatility” was “wasted” (CSM, 2011). 
Though, in the weeks following the CFS, seasoned CSO activists attributed the 
episode as being just part of the process of civil society and member states 
“learning to work together” (Conversation, Civil Society Representative, 
21.11.2011), the episode illustrates that the process of operationalising the 
inclusivity of the CFS is not to be taken for granted.  
 
d. The 37th CFS - Fulfilling its Aspirations for Political Centrality? 
 
As noted above, in practice it is not possible to separate the question of what is 
an appropriate topic for CFS debate from the question of how far its political 
authority ought to extend. This dynamic resonates with historical experience in 
FAO, in which, as touched upon in Chapter Five, attempts by FAO analysts to 
engage with international trade issues have met with resistance from those 
institutions – or actors within them – exhibiting a doctrinaire commitment to 
neoliberal principles. Outside of this dynamic, however, it was clear from the 
interventions of member states at the 37th CFS that there is fairly deep 
resistance amongst certain parts of its membership to the idea of its attaining 
something meaningfully resembling “political centrality”. Two examples, beyond 
that identified above, illustrate this: 
 
Firstly, in response to the recommendation made within the concept note that 
provided the background for the Roundtable on Price Volatility, that the session 
“Welcomes the Action Plan on Food Price Volatility and Agriculture of the G20” 
and “recommends its endorsement by the G20 Summit to be held in November 
                                            
145 One participant, Marie Brill from Action-Aid, described what happened thus: “…the chair of 
the session stopped respecting the views of civil society. He would declare consensus on a part 
even when we had objected. In the case of trade he even implied civil society consent. He did 
not allow civil society to speak on biofuels and cut negotiations on reserves short despite civil 
society interventions. It became clear that our window of productive engagement had closed.” 
(Brill, M. (2011) “And We Walked Out… Conclusion of the Food Price Volatility Work at the 
CFS.” http://www.actionaid.org/2011/10/and-we-walked-out-conclusion-food-price-volatility-
work-cfs (30.10.2011).  
Chapter Seven 
Institutionalising the Public Sphere?: The United Nations Committee on World Food 
Security  
 249 
2011” (CFS, 2011b: 1), a representative from an OECD country intervened to 
say that the CFS “should not make recommendations on what other bodies 
should decide”. And secondly, in the Roundtable on agricultural investment, in 
response to the concept note’s recommendation that member states “Ensure 
that public investment, services, and policies for agriculture give due priority to 
supporting and complementing smallholders’ own investment” (CFS, 2011c: 1), 
one OECD country proposed the replacement of “ensure” with “welcome”, or 
“invite”.  
 
Taken in isolation these interventions – aside from illustrating, as with the 
Argentinean intervention mentioned above, the appearance of an opposition 
amongst some member states to a muscular interpretation of the CFS’s 
aspirations for political centrality – might not be so significant, but in context, 
they are. This context, which runs like a red thread through this chapter, is 
defined by a) initial disagreement/contestation in the wake of the food price 
crisis on the most appropriate locus of international food security action, b) a 
variability in the commitment shown by member states in the Bureau to the idea 
of the CFS political centrality, and c) the fact that alternate global bodies – such 
as the G20 – are taking up issues that are already being addressed by the CFS, 
despite member states having already formally committed to the aspiration for 
the CFS to be “the foremost inclusive international and intergovernmental 
platform” for “the elimination of hunger and ensuring food security” 
(CFS:2009/2: Paragraph 4). (Box Eleven, below, identifies other important 
dynamics in the CFS’s relations with global processes relevant to its aspirations 
for political centrality). Indeed, there was a suspicion, expressed by some 
member states and civil society, that having already formulated an Action Plan 
in their June meeting, G20 countries were in fact only interested in steering the 
CFS outputs on price volatility towards their pre-formulated positions (Field 
Notes). The conduct of the Chair in ignoring their requests to speak and the 
lack of ambition in the final report was certainly taken by civil society as a sign 
that “the CFS has been co-opted by the G20 Agenda” (CSM, 2011). All in all, 
these dynamics indicate the huge undertaking that confronts those who wish to 
see the CFS attain its full aspirations for political centrality.  
Chapter Seven 
Institutionalising the Public Sphere?: The United Nations Committee on World Food 
Security  
 250 
 
BOX ELEVEN The CFS and political centrality 
 
In the wake of the successful adoption of its reform blueprint in October 2009 
the CFS has enjoyed recognition by a number of different global level 
processes and bodies. However, much of this recognition implies the status of a 
body that falls some way short of fulfilling the political centrality that is aspired to 
within the reform blueprint and by La Via Campesina, and which is central to the 
CFS’s capacity to fulfill the political efficacy criteria of the public sphere.  
 
The EU – US Transatlantic Development Dialogue (TDD) 
 
After being inactive for more than a decade, in April 2010 the EU and US re-
launched their “Transatlantic Dialogue on Development”, the initial focus areas 
of which were the MDGs (Millennium Development Goals), food security, and 
climate change (WOCAN, 2010). A briefing document outlining the “roadmap” 
for their cooperation on food security states that: 
 
 The framework for our joint actions includes the Joint Statement on Food 
Security agreed at the July 2009 G8 Summit in L’Aquila, the November 2009 
Rome Declaration, and the Global Partnership for Agriculture, Food Security 
and Nutrition. 
  (EU-US Transatlantic Development Dialogue, 2010).  
 
The function of the dialogue is seen as to “intensify policy dialogue on food 
security”, and to provide a forum within which “to discuss and exchange 
experiences on issues of mutual interest”, including inter-institutional, regional 
and country coordination. The briefing document identifies three levels of 
action: the global, the regional, and the country. Under the heading “Joint Action 
at the Global Level”, the overarching goal is identified as: “Jointly support the 
implementation of reforms of the Committee on World Food Security (CFS) and 
the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research.” Elaborating 
further on the CFS component of this goal, the document states:  
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 The reformed CFS should be a body that will provide value-added 
technical support and advice to the ongoing global effort to advance food 
security and nutrition, including the development of metrics to measure 
development progress.         (EU-US Transatlantic Development Dialogue, 
2010) [Emphasis Added].  
 
Whilst assigning a central role to the Committee on World Food Security in its 
global level actions on food security, the EU-US Transatlantic Development 
Dialogue can be said to offer a vision of the CFS that - by defining its role as 
providing “value-added technical support” – as well as failing to recognise the 
significance of normative contestation/dialogue to food policy, divests the CFS 
of its aspirations for political centrality. Moreover, defining part of its own 
agenda as multi-level “coordination” and by identifying its general framework for 
action in the G8’s L’Aquila declaration, the 2009 Rome summit declaration, and 
the Global Partnership for Agriculture, Food Security and Nutrition, the TDD 
both usurps roles assigned to the CFS within its – member state approved – 
reform blueprint, and appears to preclude the relevance of the CFS’s own 
Global Strategic Framework.  
 
The Millennium Development Goal Review, New York, 20-22 September 
2010 
 
In September 2010 heads of state and government gathered at the United 
Nations General Assembly, “mindful of the solemn promises which we made at 
the dawn of the new millennium, to reaffirm our commitment to work together 
for a better world.” (UNGA, 2010, Paragraph 1).  
 
Under the heading:  “Millennium Development Goal 1: Eradicate Extreme 
Poverty and Hunger”, they affirmed that “We commit ourselves to accelerating 
progress in order to achieve Millennium Development Goal 1” and identified 22 
different actions, including, the 12th point:  
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 Strengthening international coordination and governance for food 
security, through the Global Partnership for Agriculture, Food Security and 
Nutrition, of which the Committee on World Food Security is a central 
component, and reiterating that it is essential to enhance global governance, 
building on existing institutions and fostering effective partnerships. 
  (UNGA, 2010: Paragraph 70, L).  
 
The G20 
 
The G20 involvement in food security traces its roots back to the Hokkaido G8 
in 2008 when, in response to the food price crisis 2007-2008 food security 
became part of that meeting’s agenda (G8, 2008). Meeting in L’Aquilla, Italy, 
the next year, the G8 continued to focus upon the global food security agenda 
(G8, 2009). When, as a recognition of the fact that the global economic and 
political reality had shifted and that more states need to be incorporated into 
their informal discussions, the rich industrialised countries of the G8 shifted to 
the G20 as their forum of preference, the food security agenda remained central 
to their agenda.  
 
In its Declaration from its Seoul Summit in 2010, under the heading “Trade and 
Development Policies”, the G20 stated its intention to “focus efforts to resolve 
the most significant bottlenecks to inclusive, sustainable and resilient growth in 
developing countries”, noting nine such bottlenecks, the fifth of which is food 
security. (G20, 2010: 2). Outlining the “specific, detailed actions” that needed to 
be taken to address food security, the G20 includes: 
 
 Enhance food security policy coherence and coordination and increase 
agricultural productivity and food availability, including by advancing innovative 
results-based mechanisms, promoting responsible agriculture investment, 
fostering smallholder agriculture, and inviting relevant international 
organizations to develop, for our 2011 Summit in France, proposals to better 
manage and mitigate risks of food price volatility without distorting market 
behavior. We also welcome the progress of the Global Agriculture and Food 
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Security Program, as well as that of other bilateral and multilateral channels, 
including the UN Committee on World Food Security, and invite further 
contributions. 
  (G20, 2010: 13).  
 
In a “Multi-Year Action Plan on Development”, included as Annex II to the main 
declaration, the bundle of actions identified in the paragraph above are ordered 
into two main action groups, the first of which fall under the heading “Enhance 
Policy Coherence and Coordination” and the second under “Mitigate Risk in 
Price Volatility and Enhance Protection for the Most Vulnerable”. Within the first 
group, the G20 “requests”: 
 
 …key international organizations, including the UN Committee on World 
Food Security (CFS), to identify bottlenecks and opportunities to increase policy 
coherence for food security consistent with the Rome principles. The work 
should focus on harnessing the potential of the agriculture sector to advance 
sustainable economic growth and poverty reduction, enhance engagement with 
the private sector and strengthen North-South, South-South and triangular 
cooperation.  
  (G20, 2010b: 6). [Emphasis Added].  
 
The following year, at the meeting of G20 Agricultural Ministers in Paris, 
between the 22nd and 23rd June, an “Action Plan on Food Price Volatility and 
Agriculture” was produced – despite the fact that the CFS had already 
committed to engage with this issue – within which G20 members stated: 
 
 We recognize the need to improve policy coordination and coherence for 
food security among countries. In this regard, we support the on-going work of 
the CFS as the foremost inclusive international and intergovernmental platform, 
and recognize its important responsibility. We also welcome the implementation 
of the High Level Panel of Experts to the CFS. We stress the CFS responsibility 
towards enhancing engagement with the private sector and strengthening 
North-South, South-South and triangular cooperation.” 
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  (G20, 2010: Paragraph 35). [Emphasis Added].  
 
The Agricultural Ministers of the G20 met to formulate their response  to price 
volatility in June of 2011. As will be recalled above, in October of 2011 the CFS 
met to host its own discussions on the topic, and generate its own outputs. 
Given that the G20 was scheduled for a Heads of State and Government 
Summit in the beginning of November, less than a month after the CFS, there 
was obviously a high degree of interest in whether they would acknowledge the 
decisions taken at the CFS or not.  
Unfortunately the Summit Declaration indicates that they did not.  
 
Under the heading “Addressing Food Price Volatility and Increasing Agriculture 
Production and Productivity” whilst welcoming the G20 Agriculture Ministers 
Action Plan on Food Price Volatility, and commending the joint work undertaken 
by “FAO, OECD, The World Bank Group, IFAD, UNCTAD, WFP, WTO, IMF, 
IFPRI and the UN HLTF” the Summit declaration makes absolutely no mention 
of the 37th CFS’s own outputs on food price volatility.  
 
Moreover, the Declaration makes a further snub to the CFS in Paragraph 72, 
which states: 
 
 The humanitarian crisis in the Horn of Africa underscores the urgent 
need to strengthen emergency and long-term responses to food insecurity. In 
accordance with our Multi-Year "Action Plan on Food Price Volatility and 
Agriculture", we…” – the document then goes on to list a number of initiatives, 
bodies and processes whose work it “welcomes”, but, again the CFS is not 
included amongst them. This omission, in the context of a stated need to 
strengthen “long-term responses to food security” and the fact that the CFS is 
formally defined as the politically central intergovernmental food security 
platform, is quite staggering (G20. 2011b).  
 
The Declarations of the G20 indicate in a number of different ways the 
challenges faced by the CFS – or those within it who are committed to this – as 
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it seeks to fulfill its aspirations for political centrality. Whilst initially being 
prepared to recognise the value of its role, the fact that the G20 – like the EU-
US Transatlantic Development Dialogue in fact - is prepared to issue (soft) 
directives to it (we “welcome”, we “invite”, we “stress the CFS responsibility”)  
indicates that – contrary to the thrust of the intervention by the OECD state 
representative at the 37th CFS, the G20 is more than happy to suggest or 
indicate to the CFS what it wants it to do. However, somewhat more troubling, 
is the failure by the G20 to recognise the CFS’s outputs on price volatility, and 
to omit it from its list of valuable long-term food security initiatives. This lack of 
recognition by the G20 poses a major obstacle to the full attainment of the 
CFS’s aspirations to political centrality, as I discuss in the following chapter, the 
Conclusion to this thesis.  
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6. Conclusion  
 
In this chapter I have both made the argument as to why I believe that the CFS 
can be read as promising to realise the transnational public sphere in food and 
agriculture that is being provoked and constituted by La Via Campesina, and 
sought to glean what post-reform implementation tells us about the extent to 
which this promise is likely to be translated into concrete reality. As I have 
shown, a number of dynamics related to internal functioning, the attitudes of 
member states, and the attitudes and aspirations of other global processes and 
bodies communicate that in relation to the aspirations defined within its reform 
blueprint, held by La Via Campesina, and deduced from public sphere theory, 
the implementation of CFS reforms has some way to go. In the following 
chapter – the Conclusion to this thesis – I will expand on these observations, 
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situating them in the broader context of the ideas and dynamics captured in 
earlier chapters.  
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Chapter Eight – Conclusion  
 
1. Overview 
 
In the introduction to this thesis I stated that I was undertaking three primary 
things, which can be formulated as addressing the following three primary 
questions: 
 
1. To what extent can La Via Campesina be read as seeking to provoke and 
constitute a transnational public sphere in food and agriculture? 
 
2. To what extent can the Committee on World Food Security be read as 
promising to institutionalise the public sphere that is being provoked and 
constituted by La Via Campesina? 
 
3. What dynamics are relevant to the CFS’s realisation of a transnational public 
sphere (with La Via fulfilling its inclusivity criteria by participating within it)?  
 
Though, in practice, these lenses “blur”, to show how I’ve approached these 
questions, to evaluate the extent to which I’ve been able to answer them, and to 
identify important omissions, future research questions, and possible “real 
world” interventions I will divide this Chapter into three main thematic sections. 
In the first section, I will address the range of dynamics that can be captured 
under the heading “policy debate”. In section two, I will turn to “inclusivity”. And 
in the third section the focus will be on “authority”. In the conclusion I address 
everything else that can’t be subsumed under these headings.  
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2. Policy Debate 
i. Thesis Review 
 
The importance of policy debate to public sphere theory was identified in 
Chapter Three. Here, I established its centrality by drawing from Habermas’s 
original thesis – STPS - in which he captures how the bourgeois, provoked into 
a sense of their self-interest by political authority, engaged that political 
authority in a “in a debate over the general rules governing relations in the 
basically privatized but publicly relevant sphere of commodity exchange and 
social labor.” (Habermas, 1989: 27). In the same chapter, drawing from the 
public policy literature, I identified the different “policy stages” into which we 
could organise discursive contestation within the public sphere.  
 
In Chapter Four, I transposed the public sphere concern with policy debate to 
the field of transnational policy and governance action. Here, at the same time 
as I established how the trajectory of food policy history indicated the growing 
importance of discursive contestation, I identified how positions in policy debate 
are implicitly informed by background norms on the ends of agri-food systems, 
and the rights to be enjoyed and responsibilities owed by different agri-food 
system actors. The development of agricultural technology, traced in this 
chapter, illustrates, at least from an abstract level, that policy-makers are now 
confronted with huge potential variability in the scales, technologies, and 
instruments of food and agricultural production, distribution and consumption. 
Moreover, as these choices have increased, so has the number of both 
structurally embedded and interested actors trying to participate within and 
influence food and agricultural governance and policy-making.  
 
In Chapter Six I argued that La Via Campesina can be read as seeking to 
provoke policy debate in food and agriculture, largely through their articulation 
of their food sovereignty framework – which asserts alternate meanings of food 
and agriculture to those, for instance, contained within “economistic” 
approaches – and by their attempts to gain voice within various authority-
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relevant discursive arenas at the global level. And in Chapter Seven I captured 
how, both within its vision and its roles, the UN Committee on World Food 
Security establishes its aspirations to host and facilitate policy debate.   
 
In Chapter Seven, drawing from my observations of the 37th annual Session of 
the CFS Plenary, I also described how the attempt to expand policy debate at 
the CFS to a discussion of trade rules had been resisted. I also described what 
I saw as a lack of clarity around the distinction between the normative and 
technical spheres of food policy contestation, and raised issues related to the 
formatting of the sessions at the 37th.  
 
ii. Discussion 
a. Understanding the parameters of policy debate 
 
It is clear, then, that both La Via Campesina and the Committee on World Food 
Security can be said to be aspiring to fulfill the policy debate component of a 
public sphere. That is, La Via, as an affected public, seek to provoke and 
participate within policy debate, and the CFS aspires to institutionalise it. It is 
also clear that the challenges of operationalising policy debate in the UN 
Committee on World Food Security are significant. For instance, if we take the 
presence of – at an abstract level – a wide range of choices in the in the scales, 
technologies, and instruments of food and agricultural production, distribution 
and consumption as our starting position, then one measure of the health of 
policy debate is the degree to which various different choices can be 
entertained and discussed within it. That trade appears to be off the menu at 
the moment illustrates that there is some way to go before CFS policy debate 
attains full maturity.  
 
However, when seeking to understand the progress that’s being made in 
creating a discursive arena in which policy problems and solutions can be 
identified and discussed in a fairly unrestrained way, it’s important to take a 
backward step to take in the historical context. FAO history, for example, 
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captures that trade has always been a contentious issue. For example, in 
Chapter Five I described how in the past FAO Officials had been on the 
receiving end of strong opposition from neoliberal institutions and advocates, 
just for taking up trade issues in their analysis. Another pertinent example from 
FAO history that illustrates the historical resistance to open discussion on trade, 
and certainly the subordination of this to the strategic interests of member 
states, concerns a conference that FAO organised on Sustainable Agriculture 
and Rural Development in the early 2000s. Though there was significant 
funding, and the conference organiser was committed to the topic, he hadn’t 
realised that the push by some members – supported by financial contributions 
– for the conference to discuss “multifunctionality” was directly related to the 
status of ongoing agricultural negotiations being conducted in the WTO, and the 
potential importance of this idea within them. Without realising it, the conference 
had in fact strayed into the crossfire of opposing WTO camps, and this meant 
that both in terms of the quality of the event itself, and its follow-up process, the 
conference ended up being severely hampered146 (Interview, FAO Official, 
Division Director, 16.9.2009).  
 
Indeed, even in the immediate period after CFS reform, it was possible to 
identify a fairly strong resistance to the CFS taking on trade as a discussion 
topic, even amongst those members who had been very strong advocates of 
increased CSO inclusion (not that the two are related). For instance, when I 
asked one such member state representative about the degree to which, in the 
future, the CFS would be prepared to address trade issues, he replied that: 
 
 …we should not devote energy to those polemical debates that would 
get us nowhere…it’s just , this is the way to make people continue…people will 
be able to say that the CFS is just a talk shop and nothing good can come out 
of it.    
  (Interview, G77 Country Representative, 25.11.2009). 
 
                                            
146 The Chair’s Summary, for example, was not even released.  
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On the basis of FAO history and the attitudes of member states, therefore, I 
personally expected it to take several years for the CFS to be able to include 
trade-issues within its deliberations, and was extremely surprised that these did 
in fact feature – through the channel of the HLPE report – within its first fully 
“operational” meeting. It will be interesting to observe, over time, the degree to 
which the CFS is able to attain the support of its members to discuss this set of 
issues further.  
 
The conference episode from FAO’s history cited above alludes to an important 
set of dynamics, an absence of attention to which in this thesis represents, I 
believe, a major omission. And these concern the ways in which the strategic 
interests of member states – or bits of them, at least – interact to define the 
“freedom of movement” within policy debate. In the example cited, the 
commitment of member states to creating a forum for open discussion of 
sustainable agriculture and rural development was subordinate – in the 
perception of the conference organiser at least – to their negotiation interests in 
the WTO. In Chapter Six I quoted from system practitioners with experience of 
member state food and agricultural policy coordination - which suggested the 
presence of a strong degree of fragmentation to be found there. However, it is 
to be expected that amongst that fragmentation there will be variation in the 
importance attached by capitals to different elements of the food and 
agricultural agenda. In the case cited above, the suggestion is that trade 
interests were more important that sustainability issues, for instance. Defining 
the degree of strategic weight attached by member states to different food and 
agriculturally relevant issues – food security, economic growth, political 
influence, sustainability, ecological sustainability, resource conservation, and so 
on – and how these get translated into and prescribe the scope of global level 
actions is fundamentally essential to understanding the possibilities for, 
restrictions upon and meanings of “policy debate”.  
 
Empirically, moreover, there is a need to go much deeper into global level 
policy debates (I have barely scratched the surface here). The post food crisis 
environment is different to the one that preceded it, and there is a recognition 
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amongst system practitioners that there is now definitely more openness. This 
is reflected in the fact, for instance, that instruments like food reserves – the 
discussion or consideration of which was more or less completely suppressed 
under the hegemony of neoliberalism – are, though slowly and imperfectly, now 
being discussed (Field Notes, 18.10.2011). At the moment there are a number 
of parallel, ongoing global level debates/discursive processes in food and 
agriculture, including those over investment, price volatility, the performance of 
markets in general, land governance, “feeding the world by 2050”, climate 
change, and so on. These debates are not limited to one site, but are diffused 
across a range of different locations and through a range of different media.147 
Attention to these debates, their sites and media, what they tell us about shifts 
in the normative frameworks within which food policy debate is conducted, the 
instruments being considered, the range of actors participating within them, 
their respective resource endowments, the range of positions being advocated, 
and how these articulate – if at all – with political authority, is also crucial to 
understanding the context in which the CFS seeks to fulfill its own aspirations 
for (politically central, inclusive) policy debate.  
b. Normative vs. Technical?  
 
Moving back to the 37th, the lack of clarity around the distinction between 
normative and technical issues is, in my view, a fundamental weakness of the 
format of the CFS policy debates. Indeed, the contest over the criteria that we 
use to recognise policy problems and define policy solutions is, I believe, a 
somewhat submerged, but fundamental dynamic of contemporary food policy 
contestation. I also believe that it is in the food sovereignty movement’s 
interests to seek to establish within the format of CFS debates a recognition of 
this distinction. This is because I believe that the more ends that food policy is 
receptive to the more sensitive it can be to the range of concerns articulated by 
La Via and their allies. Part of their critique of TNCs, for example, is embedded 
within the normative idea that food producers ought to be able to enjoy 
                                            
147 Notwithstanding the fact that, in the case of price volatility, for instance, both the CFS and 
the G20 are addressing this issue, a report prepared for the G20 to inform its discussion of this 
issue featured contributions from no less than 10 multilateral entities – FAO, OECD, The World 
Bank Group, IFAD, UNCTAD, WFP, WTO, IMF, IFPRI and the UN HLTF (G20. 2011b).  
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sovereignty over their productive resources, and that allowing TNC’s IP rights or 
“monopoly privileges” (Tansey, 2009) over these productive resources is a 
violation of that norm. This norm, however, is not shared by everyone who 
participates in agri-food policy processes, and my personal view is that La Via’s 
critique of TNCs enjoys little traction amongst policy-making elites.148 Clarifying 
the normative basis of their critique, and shifting the debate onto that basis 
would, I believe, be an important first step to shifting the thinking of policy-elites 
towards the perspective of La Via.149 
 
However, irrespective of whether or not it is in the interests of La Via to do so, if 
the CFS is serious about achieving policy convergence, then I believe it will be 
fundamentally essential to operationalise the recognition of this distinction in its 
format. At the 37th CFS, when discussing price volatility, a representative from 
the OECD stated that “the economic argument for trade liberalisation” is clear 
(Field notes, 18.10.2011). However, in the absence of clarity on the full range of 
ends that food policy ought to be responsive to, and the evaluative criteria by 
which the identification of policy problems or instruments are made, statements 
such as this are virtually meaningless. If each individual or group of actors 
participating in the CFS are going to use their own evaluative criteria then policy 
convergence – or even, at a minimum – clarity regarding the basis of 
disagreements – seems unlikely. As momentum picks up around the CFS’s role 
to define a Global Strategic Framework, it will be interesting to observe how 
those discussions address, or not, the distinction between the normative and 
technical elements of food policy.  
                                            
148 A view underlined by the comments of FAO Director General-elect José Graziano Da Silva, 
captured in a recent interview in which, mapping out his vision to tackle global hunger, he 
described La Via’s opposition to “agribusiness” as “crippling” (IPS, 2011). However, my 
conservations with various non-managerial staff of FAO revealed a much stronger critique of 
TNCs and enthusiasm for a more interventionist position towards their regulation, an attitude 
that was said to be prevalent (Field Notes, 2009).  
149 Notwithstanding the analysis of the extent to which TNCs feature in the strategic thinking of 
policy elites – the need for which has been identified above.  
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c. Format 
 
Firstly, before making an observation about format, it’s first of all necessary for 
me to identify an important conceptual omission from this thesis. And this is that 
I never defined the difference between, on the one hand, policy debate, and on 
the other, mere discursive/communicative activity. This is an important 
conceptual or definitional omission, because it’s impossible to evaluate the 
extent to which the format of the CFS did or did not meet the criteria of “policy 
debate” in the absence of such a definition. 
 
It’s also important to note, in relation to my reflection on the obstacles to 
openness posed by representative participation to policy debate, that civil 
society do not participate in the policy debate to have their perspectives altered. 
They are not the audience. The audience is made up of the member states. 
Beyond this clarification it is important just to note – beyond the recognition of 
the importance of normative-technical distinction - that the lack of a definition of 
policy debate inhibits further analysis here.  
 
3. Inclusivity  
 
i. Thesis Review  
 
The importance of inclusivity to public sphere theory was established in Chapter 
Three. Here I discussed how the account offered by Habermas  – of the 
inclusivity of the public sphere being underpinned by education and economic 
relations and a discursive mode in which the “the force of the better argument” 
was a key institutional feature – was rejected by a range of scholars who 
argued instead that the public sphere contained a number of exclusions that 
meant that it was never as inclusive as Habermas maintained. Building from the 
observations of Fraser and Calhoun in particular, I developed the idea of 
interlocutionary subjecthood, which focuses our attention on the interplay 
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between the capacities that actors possess, the extent to which their right to 
speak is recognised by other interlocutors within the discursive arena, and 
mode of communication (and other requisites of participation).  
 
In Chapter Six, using interlocutionary subjecthood to define the framework for 
analysis, I discussed dynamics relevant to the realisation of La Via’s right to 
speak, such as the basis upon which they seek inclusion in policy debates, and 
their status as institutional/representative actors mobilising on a citizen’s 
perspective. I also acknowledged the importance of the right to dissent in this 
regard. Moving to capacity, I identified some of the requisites of participation 
within global policy processes, and the extent to which La Via can be said to 
possess these or not. I closed the chapter with a discussion on the inherent 
dynamism between capacity and the right to speak.  
 
In Chapter Seven, I noted how the reformed CFS had assigned to civil society – 
with La Via Campesina amongst them – participation rights that are 
unprecedented across the UN system. I also recorded how, at the 37th CFS, the 
implementation of these participation rights was somewhat patchy, as 
illustrated, for instance, in the CSO walkout of the price volatility session, citing 
bias in the Rapporteur’s reporting and their being ignored by the Chair as their 
concerns.  
 
ii. Discussion 
 
Clearly, the conceptual preparation undertaken in Chapter Three is not, within 
this thesis, supported by a proportionate amount of empirical analysis. That is to 
say, detailed empirical analysis on the dynamics of voice and participation 
within the CFS has not been attempted. This would include determining in 
practice what participation within the CFS has demanded of La Via and their 
allies, what modes of communication were deemed as authoritative by other 
interlocutors in the arena, what cognitive or normative factors are significant in 
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shaping member state responses and expectations around civil society’s – and 
other interlocutor’s - participation, and so on.  
 
In the absence of this deeper empirical engagement, however – a result of time 
constraints - on the basis of the data captured in Chapter Seven, we can make 
some preliminary observations about the status of CSO inclusion within the 
CFS. Whilst the participation rights won by civil society in the reformed CFS are 
unprecedented when compared across the wider UN system, the 
implementation of those rights, as noted above, has been patchy. For instance, 
the lack of member state funding for the Civil Society Mechanism – established 
by civil society to facilitate their autonomous participation within the CFS - has 
been an ongoing issue. And the conduct of the Chair in the Price Volatility 
Roundtable and CSO dissatisfaction regarding their misrepresentation by the 
Rapporteur raises further questions.  
 
When thinking about the obstacles (present and future) to the full realisation of 
civil society’s formal rights within the reformed CFS, the divergence of view on 
the desirability of this, both within the Bureau and across the wider 
membership, seems pertinent. For instance, within the Bureau discussions, 
consistent resistance to the idea of CSO inclusion has been shown by the Near 
East countries in particular (Conversation, OECD Country Representative, 
18.10.2011). One of the arguments put forward by them to defend this was that 
when so many member states struggled to find the capacity for meaningful 
participation in the CFS and beyond, it was not appropriate to direct resources 
to CSO inclusion. For me, the two issues are not mutually exclusive, and in an 
ideal world resources would be made available to ensure the meaningful 
participation of both those countries that are too resource poor to guarantee 
that for themselves (particularly LDCs), and CSOs, particularly the constituency 
of “those most affected by food insecurity” in whose interests, after all, the CFS 
is supposed to function. Certainly, in the wake of the Arab Spring, it will be 
interesting to see – if these democratic revolutions result in reappointments of 
country representatives at the global level – if attitudes amongst this group of 
countries undergo any visible shifts.  
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The difficulties encountered by civil society in the CFS so far – not forgetting the 
great gains that have been made in opening up both the Plenary and the 
intersessional period to CSO participation – suggest that the struggle to achieve 
the right to speak progresses on a continuum. First, there is the struggle to 
speak in the dominant voice or on the dominant terms of the arena, and then, 
having won these rights, the struggle to win recognition to speak in native 
modes, or to have processes that accommodate rhythms of consultation, and 
so on. Certainly, at the 37th CFS, though in my conversations with various civil 
society participants – including those from La Via – a sensitivity to these 
dynamics seemed never far away, there was little sign of an overt attempt by 
civil society to press for claims for expanded mediums of participation 
(Conversation, Kalissa Regier, La Via Campesina, 18.10.2011). The suggestion 
of an implicit ordering in the sequencing of voice struggles was communicated 
to me also in conversation with Nora McKeon, who continues to be very closely 
involved with the practical challenge of attaining meaningful CSO participation 
through her work in the CSM.  Discussing the degree to which it would seem 
likely that actors such as La Via would be able to take up native modes of 
communication within the reformed CFS, she replied that it would be a great 
help if member states could just honour the commitments they’ve already made 
(Conversation, Nora McKeon, 20.9.2011).  
 
One thing that is suggested, however, by the obstacles faced by CSOs in 
registering their dissent at the 37th, and the concerns they raise about the 
manner in which both the Rapporteur and the Chair executed their roles, is the 
need for a much more explicit focus upon issues of process within the reformed 
CFS. The CFS is an innovation without precedent, and it seems natural to 
anticipate – as there have been – that the process of realising its vision will not 
be without obstacles. However, in terms of the challenges of operationalising its 
commitment to inclusivity, there seems little direct evidence that this is being 
addressed explicitly within the Bureau (which we might expect, give the 
resistance to this identified above) or the Secretariat. Certainly “realising the 
CFS’s inclusivity” has not appeared as an agenda item in either of the two post-
reform CFS Plenaries. However, it seems to me to be essential to the task of 
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creating meaningful inclusivity and transparency (in reporting, in translating 
discussion inputs into CFS outputs, etc) to establish “process” as an explicit 
component of the CFS’s ongoing programme of work. As well as creating a 
space to reflect on CFS performance in this area and consider novel or 
innovative mechanisms or arrangements, and so forth, establishing “process” 
as an explicit area of CFS activity would also – it might be expected - create a 
general sensitivity to this range of dynamics across the membership, leading to 
eventually a more open environment for the discussion of the dynamics 
attention to which is fundamentally necessary if the CFS really wants to 
privilege the participation of “those most affected by food insecurity”.150  
 
Invoking this aspiration of the CFS leads us back to the question posed in the 
introduction and above: “To what extent can the Committee on World Food 
Security be read as promising to institutionalise the public sphere that is being 
provoked and constituted by La Via Campesina?” In Chapter Three, I defined 
the principle of inclusion within the nascent transnational public sphere as being 
“affected directly and indirectly by the exercise (or absence) of political 
authority.” Certainly, as was seen in Chapter Six, La Via Campesina establish 
their right to inclusion in those terms – as those affected by decisions taken at 
this level. By focusing upon food security however, and seeking to privilege the 
participation of those most affected by food insecurity – at least within its reform 
blueprint – the CFS establishes a narrower basis for inclusion than that 
established in Chapter Three. Does this mean that it cannot be read as seeking 
to constitute a public sphere? I believe that this question exposes another 
conceptual or definitional omission from this thesis – and that concerns the 
distinction between public and private. Is it the case that if a discursive arena 
fails to accommodate more or less everyone who might have an interest in 
participating within its discussions this mean that it fails to fulfill the criteria of a 
public sphere? Or is it the case that determining whether this arena or that 
arena fulfills the criteria of a public sphere is a matter of evaluating in degrees – 
more or less public or more or less private? If that is the case, then the CFS, by 
                                            
150 A joint Bureau-Advisory Group Working Group would seem to be the obvious location for 
process work in the CFS.  
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providing participation rights to a range of actors that up until then did not enjoy 
those rights, has made or aspires to make global food and agricultural policy 
debates more public, or less private. However, - though a definitional issue that 
might not have much real world purchase – this requires further reflection and 
clarification.  
 
4. Authority  
 
i. Thesis Review  
 
The importance of authority to public sphere theory was established in Chapter 
Three. Here, amongst others, I recognised Nancy Fraser’s stress on the 
importance of discursivity articulating with political authority to the normative 
meaning of the public sphere. I also noted her concerns around the implications 
of the emergence of sites of transnational authority and of economic and non-
state actors – breaching its boundaries– for the capacity of the Westphalian 
state to fulfill the public sphere’s political efficacy components. In Chapter Four, 
I made a number of observations that identify the purchase that Nancy Fraser’s 
concerns have with the field of transnational food and agricultural policy and 
governance activity. These included the importance of TNCs, and the 
emergence of transnational sites of governance and policy that are regarded as 
impacting on domestic level food and agricultural policy and governance action 
in a number of ways. Though I did not discuss its implication for authority, I also 
discussed the importance of neoliberalism in the history of food policy. As I 
suggest below, the nature of the relationship between neoliberalism and 
political authority needs further examination.  
 
In Chapter Five I expanded my discussion of authority. Here I deduced some of 
the properties of a political authority capable of fulfilling the political efficacy 
component of a public sphere: Being authoritative, being open (to debate), and 
being receptive to multiple inputs. I then moved the analysis through a series of 
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horizontal and vertical perspectives to capture dynamics relevant to the 
attainment of these dynamics. At the global level, these dynamics consist of a 
complex and fragmented institutional architecture, in which a wide range of 
different entities address different aspects of food and agricultural policy-making 
and governance with varying degrees of authority and influence. They also 
include, however, the presence of non-state actors – TNCs – the nature of 
whose relationship to states requires closer attention. At the global level, 
moreover, are to be found the inter-state dynamics of the FAO, the recent 
history of which alerts us to the fundamental importance of attention to this site 
of relations and its relevance to both the possibility of political authority 
exercise, and – because of the impossibility of maintaining “dialogue” when 
each state seeks only to attain its own interest – of policy debate. Continuing 
the focus on policy debate, I also identified the possible trade offs between 
meaningful connections between national level authorities and global decision-
making, on the one hand, and openness, on the other. The possibility of 
meaningful articulation with national level authorities, however, might be 
diminished by – focusing upon inter-ministerial dynamics – the lack of effective 
coordination that exists between the different institutional sites relevant to food 
and agricultural in national governments, and beyond. Moreover, the 
institutional and authority fragmentation that exists at the global/transnational 
and national levels, suggests that creating decision-making spaces that are 
responsive to the full range of meanings attached by different actors to food and 
agriculture will not be straightforward. 
 
In Chapter Six I identified how La Via Campesina have attached a strategic 
importance to the establishment of a single, (inclusive) authoritative space for 
food and agricultural political decision-making at the transnational level, thus, in 
so far as such a space conforms to the political efficacy requirements of a 
public sphere, supporting my argument that La Via can be read as seeking to 
provoke and constitute a transnational public sphere in food and agriculture. 
And in Chapter Seven I identified that the reformed CFS – through its aspiration 
to create an inclusive, politically efficacious discursive arena - promises to 
provide that space. I also identified in Chapter Seven a number of dynamics 
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that can be said to pose fairly significant challenges to the CFS’s aspiration for 
political centrality. Indeed, post food price crisis, somewhat ironically, it appears 
that as food security has become a higher political issue and more global 
bodies and processes take it up, the global food security international 
architecture looks set to become more fragmented, not less. At the least, these 
dynamics illustrate the ongoing challenges faced by the CFS as it aspires for 
political centrality. 
 
ii. Discussion 
 
When thinking about the political authority components of the public sphere, it is 
clear that – at this precise moment – there is a significant degree of uncertainty 
around the extent to which the CFS can be expected to meet these. Though – 
given the fact that the CFS has had just one operational Plenary – it is probably 
too early to be sure and much more observation and data needs to be collected 
here, the 37th CFS – and the supporting analysis - suggests that, with regards 
to each of three criteria identified in Chapter Six as needing to be exhibited by a 
public sphere political authority, there will be difficulties ahead. 
 
With regards to being authoritative – though it is undoubtedly the case that the 
presence of a great many representatives from international food and 
agricultural relevant bodies at the 37th illustrates the growing profile of the 
reformed CFS151 - the indifference shown by the G20 to its outputs, the 
                                            
151 The “Final Report” of the 37th CFS records that representatives from14 international bodies 
where in attendance:  
High Level Task Force (HLTF) 
International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) 
UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCR) 
UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food (UNSR) 
United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) 
United Nations Standing Committee on Nutrition (SCN) 
World Food Programme (WFP) 
World Health Organization (WHO) 
Bioversity International (BI) 
International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) 
International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD) 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
World Bank 
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resistance of some member states – both within the Plenary and within the 
Bureau – to the operationalising of this reform blueprint stated commitment, and 
the lack of attention given to this aspiration within the Bureau work agenda – 
coupled with the dynamics captured in Chapter Five - all suggest a difficult ride 
ahead.  
 
With regards to being open, the fact that the participation of civil society within 
the Price Volatility Roundtable was marginalised and their dissent in key areas 
glossed over, again, illustrates a potential lack of receptivity. As does the 
suggestion, conveyed to civil society by the way in which the discussion on 
price volatility was shut down, that the G20 had “co-opted” the CFS agenda 
(which was also shared by some member states, including those from non-G20 
OECD countries).  
 
With regards to the criteria of “being receptive to multiple perspectives”, let me 
just – for the sake of clarity – restate my argument here. As I have argued in 
this thesis, norms are important to food policy in that they inform our sense of 
what counts as policy problems and solutions, and what rights we expect agri-
food system actors to enjoy and responsibilities/duties to owe. The contestation 
over the norms that should inform food policy processes, therefore, is an implicit 
part of the discursive contestation of the public sphere in food and agriculture. A 
discursive arena, therefore, capable of providing a site for this contestation 
needs, as I suggest above, to be clear about its importance (reflected in a 
sensitivity to the distinction between normative/moral contestation and technical 
contestation). Translating this normative sensitivity into authority requires, in the 
case of the CFS, moreover, the capacity to make food security interventions 
sensitive to these alternate ends, and to make other issue- or end-specific 
                                            
World Trade Organization (WTO) 
  (CFS, 2011i, Annex B). 
In stark contrast, the final report of the 34th CFS – the last one before reform – records that just 
4 representatives of international agencies and bodies were present: 
United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) 
World Food Programme (WFP) 
UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCR) 
International Organization for Migration. 
  (CFS, 2008, 2008, Annex C).  
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interventions receptive to food security ends. What does the data from the 37th 
tell us about the extent to which this seems likely?  
 
Though my data in this regard is far too thin to make any definite observations, 
the lack of a sensitivity to the distinction between normative and technical 
contestation indicates that these dynamics have not become explicit in the 
working practice of the CFS. In the absence of an explicit awareness of the 
importance of the norms-technical dynamic, it seems difficult to imagine the 
CFS creating the decision-making and evaluative frameworks that could foster 
the type of authority dynamics that I’m suggesting are required by a body 
capable of fulfilling the authority components of a public sphere. Whilst the 
resistance shown by some member states, for instance, towards the CFS’s 
discussion of trade rules indicates the type of obstacle that will need to be 
overcome (to make other end-specific interventions receptive to food security), 
in the absence of an explicit treatment of these dynamics, however, the 
topography of resistance or acceptance within the membership on this matter 
will be somewhat obscured.  
Going forward, a number of future research trajectories suggest themselves: 
 
Firstly, there is a need to better understand the attitudes towards and 
expectations around the CFS’s aspirations for political centrality amongst the 
broader CFS membership. For instance, one member state representative, 
whose leadership role within the CFS Contact Group process was instrumental 
in both establishing the inclusivity of the Contact Group process and attaining 
the vision of the CFS reform blueprint152 – whilst recognising the fundamental 
importance of political decision-making to food security outcomes, for example, 
communicated to me the idea that multilateralism is not about “forcing” people 
to do things, but rather about “creating consciousness” (Interview, G77 Country 
Ambassador, FAO, 29.9.2009). This expectation stands in fairly stark contrast 
to that held by La Via Campesina – captured in Chapter Six – and illustrates 
                                            
152 For instance, one civil society participant within the Contact Group negotiations relayed to 
me how at a point in the negotiations where substance had apparently given way to procedural 
bickering, the representative of this country refocused the attention of the negotiating parties by 
banging her fist on the desk, and declaring “Gentlemen [sic], people are dying.”  
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that whilst varying levels of enthusiasm towards the idea of CFS attaining 
political centrality might be one important intra-membership dynamic, diverging 
views of what this in fact entails is another.  
 
Secondly, there is a great need to understand better the relationship between 
the CFS and the other parts of the international food and agricultural 
institutional architecture, including what possibilities there are for the CFS to 
articulate with these bodies, what are the internal dynamics within these 
institutions relevant to this possibility, and so on. Luckily, a PhD student based 
at my own institution – Carol Longbottom – is addressing exactly this range of 
dynamics in her research. No doubt the thesis that she produces will be a 
valuable contribution to our understanding of these issues.  
 
Thirdly, a number of different dynamics captured in this thesis suggest the need 
for greater focus of the exact relationship between the state and corporate 
entities under neoliberalism, and the stamp that this particular approach to 
authority-market relations has left upon policy-makers and political authorities. 
This is important, for instance, if we want to understand the possibilities for and 
limits to the CFS acquiring and exercising regulatory authority over actors such 
as TNCs, whose structural importance and power within agri-food systems was 
captured in Chapter Four. If a public sphere requires, on the one hand, the 
presence of efficacious political authority, and, on the other, the responsiveness 
of that political authority to discursive contestation/policy debate, then the 
impression conveyed in Chapter Five of states being somehow politically 
committed to TNCs casts serious doubts about the extent to which these 
conditions are likely to be met. This of course takes us no further than Fraser’s 
original expression of concern, discussed in Chapter Three. What this suggests 
is the need for empirical research, engaging with state authorities to understand 
why they are willing to assign privilege to the expansionist projects of 
Transnational Corporations over the possibility of subjecting their spheres of 
activity to more rigorous regulatory oversight. It also suggests that rather than 
seeing the state as ceding up territory to TNCs, it might be better to see it as 
shifting from a democratic to a technocratic state. This research and analysis is 
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no doubt already out there, but within the time limitations of this research I was 
not able to resource it.  
 
 
In terms of practical interventions, given the suggestion of fairly pronounced 
fragmentation within governments captured in Chapter Five, there is a need for 
intense CSO lobbying of member state governments, to ensure that they follow 
through on their commitment to establish the CFS as the foremost political 
space at the global level. There are signs that, certainly in the European 
context, this is already happening, with European CSOs engaging both 
domestic governments and EU bodies to press for this outcome. However the 
lack of an explicit focus upon this aspiration in the work plan of the CFS, and 
the presence of diverging views on this within the membership – despite the 
fact that they have formally ratified this aspiration with the formal adoption of the 
reform blueprint – suggest the need – as with inclusivity – for the creation of a 
specific mechanism to take this work forward. Again, a Bureau-Advisory Group 
joint committee seems on the surface of it to be the way forward. This, it could 
be expected, would provide a location for systematic pursuit of this objective, 
the creation of procedures and norms to help attain it, for the channeling of 
specific resources towards its realisation, and for the cultivation of appropriate 
political support – within the CFS membership.  
 
Before proceeding to the conclusion, I think it is important to identify further 
omissions and future areas of inquiry beyond those discussed above. 
 
5. Further Omissions and Future Questions  
 
i. Boundary Contestation 
 
In Chapter Three I identified the importance of boundary contestation to public 
spheres. This was relevant both with regards to determining the number of 
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people that might have a claim for inclusion within policy and governance 
processes, and also to the appropriate locus of the boundary between public 
authority and private risk/freedom/responsibility. In this thesis I was not able to 
go deeper into this dynamic, exploring, for instance, the way that La Via seek to 
contest and redraw those boundaries (by their attempt to establish a Charter on 
Peasant Rights, by their aspiration for a strong regulatory environment in which 
private sector actors are subject to public authority, and so on) or the ways in 
which – in the wake of the food price crisis – these boundaries are being 
defended or redrawn. The set of dynamics captured under “boundary 
contestation” definitely require further research. 
 
II. Internal Civil Society Dynamics 
 
In Chapter Six, I argued that La Via Campesina can be read as seeking to 
constitute a public sphere through, in part, their creation of “new citizenship 
spaces” (Borras and Franco, 2009: 38), autonomous discursive arenas, or 
“subaltern counterpublic” spaces (Fraser, 1990). I had also, in Chapter Three, 
discussed the emphasis placed by Fraser upon such factors as the role of 
culture, language, and social imaginary in facilitating the construction of a 
transnational public sphere. However, in this thesis, I have not attempted to 
empirically interrogate the dynamics identified by these concepts and ideas. 
Indeed, this set of dynamics was essentially bracketed out of the research. 
Given, however, the centrality of these spaces and arenas to the possibility of a 
transnational public sphere, their examination would seem to be a matter of 
some necessity. This would include determining the extent to which the 
autonomous discursive arenas established by La Via Campesina, the IPC, and 
elsewhere, really do embody the properties of a “subaltern counterpublic” or 
fulfill the aspirations held of them by their organisers. It would also include 
determining the degree to which the mechanism created by civil society to 
facilitate their autonomous participation within the work of the CFS – the CSM 
(Civil Society Mechanism)- embodies these properties also. As noted above, 
the research of PhD student Jess Duncan – researching CSO engagement with 
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the CFS through a participatory methodology in which she works as a technical 
support to the CSM – will be extremely valuable in that regard.  
 
In the exploration of CSO dynamics, and as identified by Fraser, it would seem 
important to address some attention to the question of legitimacy. In essence, 
this would hinge on the question: “To what extent is this or that actor a 
legitimate participant in the work of the CFS?”  Though I have not had the time 
and space to address this, I would like to briefly offer an important qualification 
that I believe if of methodological utility when seeking to explore questions of 
legitimacy.  
 
For me, participatory legitimacy in a body like the CFS hinges upon the degree 
to which participants are representative of some other group of actors whose 
participation it is not possible to facilitate directly. Indeed, participation in global 
bodies has to be representative – for obvious reasons. The question then is, 
how do we determine representativity? Some scholars, for instance, evaluating 
the representativity of La Via Campesina, though extremely sympathetic and in 
solidarity with their struggle, have suggested that La Via are not a fully 
representative body because their membership excludes important countries 
and regions of the world, like China and Russia, and because some of the 
positions that they take on certain issues reflects the interests of only particular 
segments of their membership (Borras, 2008).153 I think, however, that this 
judgment is based on a partial understanding of what it means to be 
representative. In this analysis representation is understood as occuring in the 
relationship between the base and the representation. That is, by not capturing 
the full range of perspectives at the base, the representation is not fully 
                                            
153 “The very raison d’être of these movements is to represent the poor and the marginalised, 
and the legitimacy of their claims and demand-making, therefore, hinges upon the extent to 
which they are able to do this. However, noting that the high-profile TAMs lack membership in 
large parts of the world, notably “Russia, Central Asia, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) 
region, and most especially China” and that no single organisation, movement, or group of 
movements can represent comprehensively the positions of all farmers within a country, they 
suggest that “in most cases, by representation, TAMs are in fact talking about ‘partial 
representaton’ (Borras et al, 2008: 183). They add that representation is also both a matter of 
degree – the degree to which the base is represented, and dynamic – increasing or decreasing 
over time. 
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representative. Whilst this might be accurate, I believe that representativity is 
actually a two-stage dynamic, the initial act of representation from the base, and 
then to a specific site or arena. 
 
For instance, there might be 1000 different positions amongst smallholder 
producers on water management, and – comparing these positions with that 
adopted by the movement - we could say that La Via's positions on this not 
representative. But in so far as La Via is projecting into an arena where the 
dominant discourse is "smallholders don't matter" and insofar as these 1000 
different farmers have an interest in mattering, we can say that by contesting 
this view La Via are perfectly representative. Determining representavity is an 
empirical process therefore which involves firstly a description of the site into 
which the representation is being made, and then of the representation, and 
then of the positions at the base. You can't determine representativity just by 
looking at the relationship between the base and the projection, as has been 
done by some La Via scholarship.  
 
This raises interesting questions to me about the limits of representativity at the 
global, or any level, and how La Via define their agenda. La Via's capacity to 
harness a representativity is dependent upon their ability to expand “in site” 
representations (at the global) towards the positions of their base, but in 
contexts of more fine grained discussion this would necessitate a shift in the 
site of representation downwards to a lower level towards the base. Of course, 
La Via and the IPC champion this view through the principle of “subsidiarity”, 
but it seems to me that we can generate a lot of reflection and analysis, relevant 
to the broader questions of legitimacy in the CFS, by thinking about this 
dynamic. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
In this thesis I have “laid bare” some of the challenges of operationalising CSO 
– and La Via – participation in politically meaningful food and agricultural 
debates at the transnational level. Whilst, following the first fully operational 
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meeting of the reformed CFS, it seems that morale amongst civil society 
participants is still high (Field Notes), the dynamics that I have identified within 
this thesis indicate that these challenges are significant. Indeed, many of these 
dynamics are not unknown to food governance scholarship. For instance, 
Shaw, in his comprehensive – though flawed - overview of world food security 
action since 1945, records some of the challenges that beset the body that in 
many respects can be regarded as a precursor to the reformed Committee on 
World Food Security -  the World Food Council. Like the CFS, the WFC was 
established in the aftermath of a global food crisis (the world food crisis of the 
early 70s), and mandated with the task of establishing system wide 
coordination. The factors, identified by Shaw, as contributing to the WFC’s 
demise – wound down eventually in the early 90s – may provide stark warning 
for proponents – like me – of the reformed CFS. On the one hand, it was 
assigned roles for which it never possessed the authority nor garnered the 
resources to execute. It also had difficulty receiving the cooperation from other 
UN agencies, who felt threatened by its existence, that was considered 
essential for its successful functioning (Shaw, 2007: 219-220). When one 
considers that the core annual budget of the CFS is less than €3 million Euros 
and how this compares, for example, with the fact that annual expenditure in 
the UK on chewing gum is £350 million (BBC, 2007), then it would indeed 
seem, in the context of the dynamics identified above, that relative to the scale 
of its ambition the CFS is chronically under-resourced. Moreover, the 
suggestion of competition in the attitude shown by FAO officials (of senior 
status) and its recent snub by the G20 capture some of the same types of 
dynamics as that which, according to Shaw, did for the WFC.154 
 
However – despite the fact that the presence of a large, well organised, and 
vociferous civil society contingent stands the experience of the reformed CFS 
                                            
154 One of my major criticisms of Shaw’s book, however, is that it is almost completely power 
and politics blind. His account of world food security action since 1945 unfolds in an 
environment almost entirely devoid of politics, power, and interests. Reading it, one always feels 
that he has omitted much more than he has captured. Having spent a large part of his 
professional career within the UN system, I would contest that he suffers from the same “power 
UNconsciousness” to which I referred in Chapter Five.  
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already in stark contrast to that of the WFC (McKeon, 2009) – one of the 
advantages of situating the CFS within a public sphere perspective is that – 
alongside sensitising us to the dynamics discussed above – it prepares us for 
the possible timeframes that might be involved in facilitating the type of 
qualitative shift in dynamics that, in Habermas’s account, is paralleled by the 
transformation of the medieval Assembly of Estates – in the UK context at least 
– into a modern parliament. Habermas records that this did in fact span one-
one hundred and fifty years (Habermas, 1989). Whether or not what we are 
witnessing in the CFS is the beginning of a commensurate evolution in relations 
between power and publics, and in the institutions of governance, remains to be 
seen.  
 
Certainly, empirical observations conducted so far suggest that expectations for 
the reformed CFS need to be situated in a time frame more associated with 
small-scale, incremental evolution, rather than revolutionary leaps. Maintaining 
the commitment of those – including La Via and member states155 – that want 
the CFS to become an authoritative and effective decision-making body whilst 
being pragmatic about the necessary time-frames involved will, I believe, pose 
a major challenge. As was noted in Chapter Six, given the sense of crisis 
pervading the rural environment, as Paul Nicholson stated, movements such as 
La Via “need victories”.  
 
However, despite what I anticipate as incremental progress in the 
implementation of CFS reforms, and despite the fact that the burden of 
participation for La Via Campesina – given the capacity constraints identified in 
                                            
155  At their Food Sovereignty Forum in 2009, for instance, when discussing the CFS reforms, 
CSOs declared that they would give the CFS three years of their participation and then evaluate 
its performance. In my interviews and conversations with member states I detected an 
enthusiasm – particularly amongst those most heavily involved in the work of the CFS through 
their location in the Bureau, a strong enthusiasm for the idea that the CFS demonstrate its 
usefulness to the international community – by taking decisions – as quickly as possible. The 
correlate of this, of course, was a distaste for anything that might slow this down, such as 
engaging in discussion on “polemics”. The conduct of the Rapporteur in the Session on Price 
Volatility, for example, in ignoring or mis-representing CSO positions I attribute more to a desire 
to show the outside world that the CFS is functioning “well” rather than out of a desire to 
suppress CSO participation. However, in order for the CFS to be successful, it will be important 
to balance the desire for immediate external relevance with a commitment to establishing its 
internal processes, along the lines as I suggest above.  
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Chapter Six – is great, I still believe it is in their continued interest to participate 
in the CFS. As has been noted, the participation rights assigned to civil society 
in the reformed CFS are “unprecedented” (McKeon, 2009). For these alone the 
CFS can be regarded as an experiment without equal in intergovernmental 
bodies. The context of its reform – a food price crisis, an organised and 
politically and technical capable civil society, individual member state 
representatives in positions to exercise “visionary” leadership in the reform 
process, the presence of a general membership that was – following the FAO’s 
own ongoing process of reform – “reform ready”, and the presence of a counter-
proposal to sharpen thinking  - capture how, in many respects, precious and 
valuable the reformed CFS is. I came to this research because I believe on an 
ethical and pragmatic level that the closer we can get affected publics to the 
decision-making centres that shape their lives, the more ethical, more 
legitimate, more responsive and more effective the operation of that power will 
be. The CFS, in my view, presents a rare historical opportunity to fight for that 
at the global level. The challenges may be great, but it is only in confronting 
them that they can be overcome.  
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Appendix One: Acronyms  
 
AOA   Agreement on Agriculture  
CAP   Common Agricultural Policy (of the EU) 
CBD   Convention on Biodiversity  
CFA  Comprehensive Framework for Action 
CFS   Committee on World Food Security 
CGIAR  Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research 
CSO  Civil Society Organisation 
CSM   Civil Society Mechanism (of the Committee on World Food  
        Security) 
DESA  Department of Economic and Social Affairs 
DPA   Department of Political Affairs 
DPI  Department of Public Information  
DPKO  Department of Peacekeeping Operations  
FAO   Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations  
G8  Group of Eight Countries 
G20  Group of Twenty Countries 
G77  Group of Seventy Seven Countries  
GACFS Global Agenda Council on Food Security (of the World Economic 
        Forum) 
GHGs  Greenhouse Gases 
GMOs  Genetically Modified Organisms 
HLTF   UN Secretary General’s High Level Task Force on the Global 
Food         Security Crisis 
ICAARD  International Conference on Agrarian Reform and Rural  
        Development 
IAASTD  International Assessment of Agricultural Knowledge, Science and 
        Technology for 
Development  
ICC   International Coordination Committee of La Via Campesina  
IEE   Independent External Evaluation of the FAO 
IFA  International Fertilizer Association 
IFIs  International Financial Institutions  
IFAD   International Fund for Agricultural Development  
ILO  International Labour Organization  
IMF  International Monetary Fund  
IOS   International Operational Secretariat of La Via Campesina  
IPC  International Planning Committee on Food Sovereignty  
ITPGRFA  International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and 
     Agriculture 
LVC  La Via Campesina  
MST   Movimento dos Trabalhadores Sem Terra 
NGO   Non-Governmental Organisation  
NIEO  New International Economic Order  
OCHA  Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
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OHRLLS  UN Office of the High Representative for the Least Developed 
     Countries, Landlocked Developing Countries 
      and Small Island Developing States 
OECD  Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development  
OHCHR  Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights  
SCN  Standing Committee on Nutrition 
STPS  The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere 
TNC   Transnational Corporations 
TRIPS Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights  
UNCTAD  United Nations Conference on Trade and Development  
UNTNC United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations  
UNDP  United Nations Development Programme 
UNEP  United Nations Environment Programme 
UNFCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change  
UNGA  United Nations General Assembly  
UNHCR Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees 
UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund  
UNS-G United Nations Secretary General  
WEF  World Economic Forum 
WFC  World Food Council 
WFP  World Food Programme 
WHO  World Health Organization 
WIPO  World Intellectual Property Rights Organization 
WTO   World Trade Organization 
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Appendix Two: Table of Interviews and Data Relevant 
Conversations Conducted in this Thesis 
 
CONSTITUE
NCY  
NAME  POSITION (and 
ORGANISATION) 
INTERVIEW/ 
CONVERSATIO
N 
FAO 
OFFICIALS/ 
STAFF 
1) Thomas 
Price 
Senior Programme Officer 
Strategic Planning Unit 
Office of the Director-General  
Interview  
 2) Thomas 
Price 
Senior Programme Officer 
Strategic Planning Unit 
Office of the Director-General  
Interview  
 3) Thomas 
Price 
Senior Programme Officer 
Strategic Planning Unit 
Office of the Director-General  
Interview 
 4) Richard 
China 
Director 
Policy Assistance and 
Resources Mobilization Division 
and Officer-in-Charge Field 
Operations Division 
Interview 
 5) Richard 
China 
Director 
Policy Assistance and 
Resources Mobilization Division 
and Officer-in-Charge Field 
Operations Division 
Interview 
 6) Keith 
Wiebe 
Chief  
Comparative Agricultural 
Development Service 
Agricultural Development 
Economics Division 
Economic and Social 
Development Department 
Interview 
 7) Mike 
Robson 
Secretary 
Working Group on Biosecurity 
Plant Protection Service 
Plant Production and Protection 
Division 
Agricultural and Consumer 
Protection Department 
Interview 
 8) Eve 
Crowley 
Deputy Director and Officer in 
Charge 
Gender, Equity and Rural 
Employment Division 
Economic and Social 
Development Department 
Interview 
 9) David 
Hallam 
Deputy Director Trade and 
Markets Division 
Interview 
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Economic and Social 
Development Department 
 10) Parviz 
Koohafkhan  
Director 
Land and Water Division 
Natural Resources Department 
Interview 
 11) 
Alexander 
Mueller 
Assistant Director-General 
Natural Resources Department 
Group interview 
(with Paul 
Monro-Faure 
and Paolo 
Groppo) 
 12) Paul 
Monro-
Faure 
Chief 
Land Tenure and Management 
Unit 
Land and Water Division 
Natural Resource Management 
and Environment Department 
Group interview 
(with Alexander 
Mueller and 
Paolo Groppo) 
 13) Paolo 
Groppo 
Systems Analysis Officer  
Land Tenure Service (SDAA) 
Rural Development Division 
(SDA) 
Group interview 
(with Alexander 
Mueller and 
Paul Monro-
Faure)  
 14) Paolo 
Groppo 
Systems Analysis Officer  
Land Tenure Service (SDAA) 
Rural Development Division 
(SDA) 
Interview 
 15) Rosalud 
De La Rosa 
Civil Society Cooperation 
Strategic Planning 
Office of the Director-General 
Interview 
 16) Rosalud 
De La Rosa 
Civil Society Cooperation 
Strategic Planning 
Office of the Director-General 
Interview 
 17) Sally 
Bunning 
Technical Officer  
Land Tenure and Management 
Unit 
(NRLA) 
Land and Water Division Natural 
Resources Department 
Interview 
 18) Anna 
Brogna 
PA to Peter Kenmore 
Deputy Director Plant 
Production and Protection 
Division 
Agricultural and Consumer 
Protection Department 
Interview 
 19) Peter 
Kenmore 
Deputy Director 
Plant Production and Protection 
Division 
Agricultural and Consumer 
Protection Department 
Interview 
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 20) Anna 
Rappazo 
IAAH Consultant 
Office of World Food Summit 
Follow-up and Alliances 
Conversation 
 21) Jan 
Michels 
Consultant 
Policy Assistance and 
Resources Mobilization Division 
Conversation 
 22) Kostas 
Stamoulis 
Director 
Agricultural Development 
Economics Division 
Economic and Social 
Development Department  
Secretariat, Committee on 
World Food Security 
Conversation 
 23) Alek 
Zaremba  
Senior Programme Officer   
Field Programme Development 
Service 
Policy Assistance and Resource 
Mobilization Division 
Conversation 
 24) Wim 
Polman 
 
Bioenergy Officer  
Climate Change and Bioenergy 
Unit (NRCB) 
Natural Resource Management 
and Environment Department 
Conversation 
FAO  
MEMBER 
STATE 
REPRESEN
TATI- 
VES 
   
 25) Hugo 
Verbist 
Counselor  
Belgian Embassy 
Interview 
 26) Hugo 
Verbist 
Vice-Chair 
Committee on World Food 
Security 
Interview 
 27) Maria 
Del Carmen 
Squeff 
Ambassador 
Argentina  
Chair 
Committee on World Food 
Security  
Interview 
 28) Agnes 
Von 
Ardenne 
Ambassador 
Kingdom of the Netherlands 
Interview 
 29) Mario 
Arvelo 
Caamaño 
Ambassador  
Dominican Republic 
Interview 
 30) James 
Harvey 
Ambassador 
United Kingdom 
Interview 
 31) Renato Adviser Interview 
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Godinho  Permanent Representation of  
the  
Federative Republic of Brazil 
 32) [Identity 
Withheld] 
Ambassador 
G77 Country 
Conversation 
 33) Gladys 
Urbaneja 
Durán 
Ambassador  
Bolivarian Republic of 
Venezuela 
Conversation 
OTHER UN  
OFFIC- 
IALS  
   
 34) Jean-
Philippe 
Audinet 
Acting Director 
Policy Division 
IFAD 
Interview 
 35) Florence 
Lasbennes 
Country Coordination Support 
High Level Task Force on the 
Global Food Security Crisis 
Coordination Team 
 
Interview  
 36) Florence 
Lasbennes 
Country Coordination Support 
UN High Level Task Force on 
the Global Food Security Crisis 
Coordination Team 
 
Conversation 
 37) David 
Nabarro  
Coordinator of the UN 
Secretary-General’s High Level 
Task Force on the Global Food 
Security Crisis and the UN 
Secretary-General’s Special 
Representative on Food 
Security and Nutrition 
Interview  
 38) Benoist 
Veillerette 
Country Coordination Support 
UN High Level Task Force on 
the Global Food Security Crisis 
Coordination Team 
 
Interview  
 39) Benoist 
Veillerette 
Country Coordination Support 
UN High Level Task Force on 
the Global Food Security Crisis 
Coordination Team 
 
Conversation 
 40) 
Secretariat  
International Treaty on Plant 
Genetic Resources for Food 
and Agriculture (ITPGRFA) 
Interview 
CIVIL 
SOCIETY  
   
 41) Antonio 
Onorati 
International Focal Point 
International Planning 
Interview  
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Committee for Food Sovereignty  
 42) Antonio 
Onorati 
International Focal Point 
International Planning 
Committee for Food Sovereignty 
Interview 
 43) Antonio 
Onorati 
International Focal Point 
International Planning 
Committee for Food Sovereignty 
Interview 
 44) Pat 
Mooney 
Executive Director  
ETC Group  
Interview 
 45) Flavio 
Valente 
International General Secretary 
FIAN International  
Interview 
 46) Flavio 
Valente  
International General Secretary 
FIAN International 
Conversation 
 47) Maryam 
Rahmanian 
 
Research Associate  
CENESTA 
Conversation 
 48) Beatriz 
Gasco 
Secretariat  
International Planning 
Committee for Food Sovereignty  
Interview 
 49) Beatriz 
Gasco 
Secretariat  
International Planning 
Committee for Food Sovereignty 
Interview 
 50) Beatriz 
Gasco 
Secretariat  
International Planning 
Committee for Food Sovereignty 
Conversation 
 51) Sofia 
Monsalve 
Suárez 
Programme Coordinator 
Access to Land and Resources 
FIAN International 
Interview 
 52) Sofia 
Monsalve 
Suárez 
Programme Coordinator 
Access to Land and Resources 
FIAN International 
Conversation 
 53) Aksel 
Naerstad 
Senior Policy Adviser 
The Development Fund, Norway 
and International Coordinator  
More and Better campaign 
Interview 
 54) Nico 
Verhagen 
Technical Support to the 
International Operational 
Secretariat of La Via Campesina  
Interview 
 55) Nico 
Verhagen 
Technical Support to the 
International Operational 
Secretariat of La Via Campesina  
Conversation 
 56) Patrick 
Mulvany 
Senior Policy Adviser 
Practical Action 
Conversation 
 57) Nora 
McKeon 
Formerly responsible for FAO’s 
relations with civil society 
Currently lecturer, author and 
activist on rural peoples’ 
organizations, food issues and 
Interview 
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global governance 
 58) Nora 
McKeon 
Formerly responsible for FAO’s 
relations with civil society 
Currently lecturer, author and 
activist on rural peoples’ 
organizations, food issues and 
global governance 
Interview  
 59) 
Magdalena 
Kropiwnicka  
Food and Hunger Policy Advisor 
ActionAid  
Interview 
 60) 
Magdalena 
Kropiwnicka 
Advisor to CFS Chair, Noel De 
Luna  
Interview 
 61) 
Magdalena 
Kropiwnicka 
International Consultant 
Food and Climate Consultancy  
Interview 
 62) Luca 
Colombo 
Director 
ResearchFondazione Diritti 
Genetici  
Interview  
 63) Chris 
Leather  
Food & Agriculture Policy 
Adviser 
Oxfam International  
Interview 
 64) Paul 
Nicholson 
Ex-Two Term Member of the 
International Coordination 
Committee 
La Via Campesina  
Interview  
 65) Dena 
Hoff  
Member 
International Coordination 
Committee 
La Via Campesina  
Interview  
 66) Kalissa 
Regier 
La Via Campesina, 
and Youth Representative in 
Civil Society Coordination 
Mechanism 
Committee on World Food 
Security 
Conversation 
 67) 
Francisco 
Sarmento  
International Food Rights 
Coordinator 
ActionAid International  
Interview  
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Appendix Three: Proposal Submitted to La Via Campesina to 
conduct research on UN reform  
 
La Via Campesina and UN Reform: A Research Project 
 
12.5.2008 
 
1. Summary: Since its founding at the end of the Second World War the UN has 
been subject to various reform efforts. These increased in scale under the 
previous Secretary-General Kofi Annan, and continue under the present holder 
of that office, Ban Ki-Moon. The principle objective of this research project is to 
determine whether the on-going UN reform process represents a political 
opportunity for La Via Campesina to revise its strategy of engagement with the 
various entities within the UN system which are relevant to La Via Campesina 
and to the lives of family and peasant farmers.  
 
2. Context: At present La Via Campesina engages with only a select few of the 
UN entities that impact upon the lives of farmers and shape the possibilities of 
agricultural policy. In its efforts to promote paradigmatic changes and displace 
neoliberalism at the heart of  global economic governance, La Via Campesina 
chooses to work with those institutions that it feels are more sympathetic to its 
agenda (FAO, UNHRC) while purposively eschewing contact with institutions 
whose activities it contests (Bretton Woods, WTO). For a global social 
movement such as La Via Campesina, obtaining a strategic overview of the 
entities that constitute the UN ‘family’ is a pressing and on-going need. The UN 
system is itself quite complex, comprising many entities with over-lapping 
policy areas and varying levels of power and influence. Determining which of 
those are relevant to La Via Campesina and how best to influence them is vital 
for La Via Campesina to be able to formulate a strategy of engagement which 
contributes to its goal of food sovereignty, is compatible with its organizational 
ethic, and makes best use of its scarce resources.  
 
The complexity of the UN system, moreover, is perhaps further amplified by 
the immanent possibility of reform, several attempts at which have been made 
in the past 30-odd years. In particular, Kofi Annan’s two terms as Secretary 
General were characterized by a prominent reform effort, and the various 
panels and processes that he initiated generated multiple proposals addressing 
all areas of UN activity. Worth noting amongst these proposals are those 
concerning the UN’s engagement with civil society, and it is perhaps fair to say 
that increasing the involvement of civil society within UN activity was a core 
part of Annan’s reform vision, something which may be of significance for La 
Via Campesina. However, it also needs to be noted that there are stark 
divergences between the amount of reform proposals generated during 
Annan’s tenure as Secretary General and the number of reforms implemented. 
Indeed, long-term UN watchers have questioned whether the type of grand 
reform project spear-headed by Annan is even feasible in the context of an 
organization that represents so many divergent views and interests. They point 
to the difficulty of achieving consensus under such circumstances, and contest 
that UN reform, when it happens, is a slow-paced, incremental, and low-key 
affair. Determining the scope of this reform process, its impact upon the UN 
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entities of most relevance to La Via Campesina, and whether this represents an 
opportunity for La Via Campesina to revise its strategy of engagement with the 
various entities within the UN system constitute the core objectives of this 
research.  
 
3. Questions: Given the above, the following list of research questions can be 
provisionally generated: 
Which of the various entities within the UN family are relevant for La Via 
Campesina? 
How influential are they? 
How might they be influenced? 
How are they affected by the reform process? 
What are the factors driving, shaping, constraining the reform process? 
How might La Via Campesina influence the reform process? 
 
4. Process:  At this preliminary stage it is not possible to outline exactly how the 
research will proceed, but some observations can be made which will serve to 
indicate future direction.  
As noted above, the UN system comprises many different entities, some of 
which are working in overlapping policy areas. Identifying which are relevant 
to La Via Campesina will necessitate a clear outlining of La Via Campesina’s 
strategic objectives at this level. This might take a more general form, in terms 
of inhibiting the operation of neoliberalism within global agricultural policy, or 
it could be focused around specific issues (e.g. the seven Nyeleni food 
sovereignty themes). Either way, it will be necessary to collaborate closely with 
core La Via Campesina personnel to determine what would constitute success 
for La Via Campesina in its engagements with UN entities.  
Given the limitations imposed by having only one full time researcher working 
on this project, it will be particularly necessary to formulate clearly defined 
research goals. These might include producing research which is strategically 
useful for La Via Campesina and which contributes to its ongoing efforts to 
locate itself in relation to relevant global agricultural governance. With regard 
to this later point, in its provision of a systematic analysis, and adding to the 
personnel constraint the fact that this research will be limited to a two and a 
half year period, it seems probable that the research will be aiming more 
generally at breadth (systematic analysis) than depth (case study).  
In addition, it is anticipated that this research will: 
- Generate a typology of UN entities outlining, amongst other things, policy 
areas, relevance to La Via Campesina, power, decision-making structures etc. 
- Draw upon La Via Campesina’s pre-existing resources in terms of historical 
experience, testimony of core personnel, and access to sympathetic experts and 
officials etc.  
- Provide on-going and manageable analysis for La Via Campesina’s ICC and 
beyond.  
 
Josh Brem-Wilson 
International Centre for Participation Studies 
Department of Peace Studies 
University of Bradford 
England 
jwbremwi@bradford.ac.uk 
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